

Study of Consciousness Project
Fascicule I

CONSCIOUSNESS IN **Advaita**

SOURCE MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS

Vidyalankara

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FOREWORD

The Sri Abhinava Vidyatheertha Swamigal Scientific Research Academy was formed as part of the 61st birth-day celebrations of His Holiness Jagadguru Abhinava Vidyatheertha Swamigal of Sringeri Sharada Peetam. It was felt that, apart from the usual celebrations consisting of religious functions and meetings to express devotion, a more permanent form should be given to the celebrations consistent with the lofty and transcendental objectives of Sanātana Dharma, the maintenance of which is the *raison-d'être* of the great Sharada Peetam. From the time of Adi Sankara down to the present day, the Pontiffs of the Sharada Peetam have made significant contributions to the philosophy of Advaita by personal instruction and written interpretation. Several of the authoritative texts on the subjects like Sri Sureswaracharya's Naishkarmya Siddhi and the Vārttikas and the numerous writings of the great Vidyaranya owe their existence to the spiritual insight and philosophical expertise of the saints who have adorned this Peetam.

But the interpretation of nature which is the cardinal characteristic of Western scientific knowledge has introduced a new methodology in all types of learning, including the rational and supra-rational realms of human experience and understanding. While during the 19th century, the so-called scientific outlook was confined to a mechanistic interpretation of an ever expanding knowledge over the physical world, more recent research seeks to probe into the workings of the human mind, which, in turn consists of an examination of the areas of normal consciousness and of the unexplored boundaries of parapsychology. The great Sankarabhagavatpada has explored this aspect of knowledge in a manner which is baffling to the layman but is a source of understanding to the psychologists. There is need, therefore, at the present time to reconcile the order of matter with the order of mind. Isolated research on such reconciliation has been attempted but no systematic exploration of these comparatively new areas of study has been undertaken.

One of the objectives of the Academy is to undertake the carrying on of systematic research and analysis of the scientific data and knowledge contained in the relevant ancient literature including the Vedas, Shastras and other ancient literature in the light of modern science with a view to determine how far our ancient knowledge and wisdom is relevant to modern life and in solving various problems facing humanity.

This aim postulates both study and experimental verification by modern methods. Prof. Rao's attempt is in this definite direction and when completed will throw considerable light on the problem of consciousness as expounded by Sankara in relation to the new research on the subject. It is a welcome addition to the literature on the subject which, far from being a fanciful and non-scientific *terra incognita*, has come into its own as a subject for scientific research.

S. Y. Krishnaswamy

PREFACE

Exploration of Consciousness is now 'the game in the town'. Several scientific disciplines (including Psychology, Neurology, Neurophysiology, Psychopharmacology and Biology) are increasingly interested in the study of consciousness. Especially the dawn of Existential-Humanistic approach in recent years has emphasized the importance of subjective awareness: the increasing role that phenomenological outlook has been playing in modern thinking has focussed attention on a broader reality including personal consciousness as well as the perspective thereof. As Edgar Mitchell, the celebrated astronaut, pointed out, the exploration of inner space has become more relevant and urgent than that of the outer space, for the welfare of mankind.

In the wake of this academic activity, there has been not only a willingness but an eagerness to obtain help from what till now was branded as 'esoteric' knowledge. Thomas R. Blackburn has confessed: "Perhaps science has much to learn along this line from the disciplines as distinct from the content of oriental religions". It is well known that Indian contribution in this regard will be most valuable, for there has been in India an involvement with the dynamics of consciousness for well over five thousand years. In this long and impressive history, Śaṅkara's work in the seventh century constitutes a major landmark.

An inquiry has therefore been sponsored by Sri Abhinava Vidyātīrtha Svāmīgāl Scientific Research Academy (SAVSSRA) to study scientifically and in depth the Advaitic thinking with regard to consciousness. The investigation has been undertaken to document and analyze the relevant data, seek out the implications and relations, and reconstruct the theories so as to be relevant to modern work that is going on in the field. The study will also assess the scientific value of such theories, indicate correspondences, and obtain clues to solve the contemporary riddles.

The project, which is primarily psychological in orientation, has been planned with two objectives in view : to prepare a Source-Book (a Book of Readings) of all references to consciousness in Advaita literature ranging from Gauḍapāda in the sixth century to Appayya-dīkṣita in the sixteenth century ; and to examine with the aid of scientific methods the relevance and value of such material to strictly scientific thinking that has gone on in disciplines like Psychology and Neurology.

The first fascicule that is now being published is in the nature of a historical survey of source-materials in Advaita : it attempts to define not only the points of view that prevail in the field but to provide the speculative framework of Śaṅkara's system. It will also deal with methodological considerations and examine the relative merits of observation, reasoning, experience and scriptural testimony (or intuition). The fascicule is intended to prepare the ground for a proper appreciation of the contribution made by Advaita towards elucidating the problem of consciousness.

S. K. Ramachandra Rao

CHAPTER

III

SECTION I

SOURCES OF ŚĀṆKARA'S THOUGHT

I. SAMPRADĀYA

Śāṅkara represents a phase of Indian thought that was at once creative and conservative. It was creative inasmuch as the implications, involvements and suggestions of traditional wisdom were drawn out, spelt out and defended with unprecedented clarity, skill and imagination. It was conservative in the sense that the essential frame-work of tradition which had by then tended to fall apart was consolidated, utilizing relentless reason and relying on uncontroverted experience.

Śāṅkara credits correct tradition (*sampradāya*) with high value. He rates it higher than erudition: "Although learned in all branches of knowledge, one who is ignorant of correct tradition is to be ignored as a fool."¹ Whenever he quotes an authority approvingly, he prefaces the citation with such statements as "Here, the knowers of correct tradition tell a story,"² "Even so, the knower of correct tradition says,"³ "Here is what the venerable teacher who knew the correct tradition concerning the meaning of the Upanishads says,"⁴ or "And there are the words of the venerable one who knows the correct tradition."⁵ And his reason for insisting on the knowledge of correct tradition as preliminary to teaching as well as realization is given as follows: "Thus thinking (altogether incorrectly), the mean scholar claims to expound matters concerning the world and salvation and the meaning of scriptures, but he stifles himself (in the process). Being ignorant himself, he succeeds only in confounding others. Because he is alien to the correct tradition concerning the import of scriptures, he ignores what has been correctly taught (by the ancients) and causes such

teaching to disappear: and adds out of his own imagination details not to be found in such teaching.”⁶

It is obvious that correct tradition, according to him, is directly rooted in the Vedic lore. The Veda is for him the paramount authority, and the highest court of appeal both for those who would lead a pious normal life and those who aspire for deliverance. He explains that “it is possible that whatever is not revealed to us was revealed to the wise men of ancient times It is not right that we should compare our own capacities with the capacities of those who could visualize the sacred hymns (*mantras*) and associated passages (*brāhmaṇas*).”⁷ And, “all these men who imagine themselves to be learned cannot understand the import of scriptural texts even in a hundred years by regarding highly their own intelligence.”⁸

It is therefore that Śaṅkara lays down that no one may independently explore the significance of a scriptural text: a teacher is always needed to guide a seeker along the right path. Hence Śaṅkara speaks of ‘guru-saṁpradāya,’ the correct tradition as handed down by the teacher. “It is only through the succession of teachers and the continuity of their teaching that we can understand the highest truth and not by our own reasoning, intelligence or learning.”⁹ He frequently uses the expression “scripture and the instruction of teachers” (*śāstrācāryopadeśa*) as synonymous with correct tradition. He opens his commentary on *Taittirīya-upanishad* bowing to the ancient teachers who expounded the Upanishads with the aid of grammar, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya*.¹⁰

However, what he means by Vedic authority constituting correct tradition is the ‘*Vedānta*’ (the ‘Veda-end’) viz, the Upanishads as both the final phase of the Vedic lore and the real import towards which the Vedic lore strives. It is interesting that he employs the expression “*Vedānta*” in the plural, obviously meaning the Upanishads. He identifies himself as ‘one who upholds the Upanishads’ (*aupaniṣada*)¹¹: and he speaks on behalf of all those who expound the Upanishads.¹² He defines

the Upanishads as texts which lead the aspirant close to the highest reality.¹³ He uses the combined expression "the correct tradition of the import of the Upanishads."¹⁴ And he insists that the Upanishads constitute the final purpose and import of the Vedic lore, and that is why he chose to write commentaries on the Upanishads, and on two other texts that depend almost entirely on the Upanishads, the *Bhagavad-gītā* and Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra*. This complex, according to him, represents the source-material for correct tradition.

The *leit-motif* of Vedānta is visualized by Śaṅkara as an urge towards emancipation (*moksha*), which is the sole purpose of knowing Brahman. All Vedānta is begun to eradicate the source of misery,¹⁵ and that source is the phenomenal involvement due to nescience. The message of Vedāntic texts, therefore, is the postulation of the unity of Brahman, correct knowledge (the elimination of nescience) alone constituting the means thereof.¹⁶ This Vedāntic tradition had been crystallized by Bādarāyaṇa (whom Śaṅkara addresses as "the venerable master," *bhagavān*) some centuries before Śaṅkara, in his *Vedānta-sūtras* (or *sūtras* concerning Upanishads), intended to reconcile the apparent differences in the Upanishadic texts and to formulate the unitary theory. And even this *sūtra*-tradition had fallen on evil days when the great Gauḍa-pāda (*parama-guru* of Śaṅkara) resuscitated it for posterity. Thus, Śaṅkara regards Gauḍa-pāda as the true representative of the correct tradition of Vedānta.¹⁷ And it is this tradition that he himself espouses, and undertakes to expound and defend.

II. BĀDARĀYAṆA AND UPAVARṢA

It is necessary to have a look at the religious atmosphere in the country at the time when Śaṅkara began his work of reform and revival. Within the traditional Vedic fold, there was a prevailing view that rituals alone constituted the royal road to the highest objective of man. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* which held

the field and presented the above view relied on that part of the Veda which is generally known as 'karma-kāṇḍa' (or portion relating to rituals). The authority of the Vedic lore was justified on the ground that in matters relating to *dharma* (religious conduct) and *moksha* (salvation) the normal transactions cannot be guides as they are in matters pertaining to wealth and pleasures.¹⁸ The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, propounded by such eminent masters as Jaimini and Kumārila, undertook to interpret the notion of 'dharma' (religious conduct) as the essence of Vedic lore: it consisted of prescriptions for rituals of various kinds. They did not bother to inquire into the significance of Vedic hymns.¹⁹ In fact, they (in particular, Prabhākara and his camp) went so far as to equate ritualistic prescriptions with the purport of the Veda.²⁰

Jaimini had to wage a battle against the anti-Vedic and atheistic Buddhists in the centuries before our era. He was the author of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which sought to codify the Vedic sanctions of ritualistic behaviour. Śabara in the first century A.D., wrote a commentary on this work, and this commentary continued the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition for several centuries; this has in a stream continued to our own day. But Kumārila's masterly exposition of the rationale and presumptions of *Mīmāṃsā* around 550 A.D., provided a firm framework for this way of thinking. His *Śloka-vārttika*, (on the first 'pāda' of the first 'adhyāya' of Jaimini's *sūtra*, in metrical form), *Tantra-vārttika* (on the second and third 'pādas' of the same work, in prose) and *Tup-tīkā* were not only in the nature of an able defence of *Mīmāṃsā*, but were brilliant writings which influenced generations of thinkers and writers. It cannot be denied that even Śaṅkara was influenced by him, despite the different stand that he took.

But Kumārila confesses that the effect of the ascendance of *Mīmāṃsā* was indirect encouragement of atheism²¹. Jaimini, in fact, hardly involves God (*īśvara*) into his scheme, or even the spiritual 'never-before' (*apūrva*) for that matter. Śabara describes the non-human origin of the Vedic lore in terms of

anonymity or inability to remember the author of the Himālayas or of the Veda. Kumārila too would rather consider omniscience and creatorhood of God as unnecessary ideas (*vitathas*). It is true that Śālikanātha brings in God in a somewhat significant way, but it is only as one whose existence has but to be inferred (*anumāna-gamya*). It is only the later Mīmāṃsakas like Āpa-deva, Nārāyaṇa, Laugākshi-Bhāskara that admitted a merciful God who grants the highest good as reward for actions done in the spirit of devotion. But this is a later story, and when Śaṅkara lived and wrote, Kumārila's admission of atheism still held. It is natural, therefore, that Śaṅkara felt that the Mīmāṃsakas who clung closely to the prescriptive and liturgical aspects of the Veda missed the essential purport thereof. If the Mīmāṃsakas were inclined to ignore the Upanishads as insignificant supplements to the Vedic corpus, Śaṅkara held that it is only the Upanishads that constituted the crowning glory of Vedic thought; and the importance attached to the 'Brāhmaṇa' texts appeared to him inappropriate. This may be regarded as the recovery of correct tradition.

Although Śaṅkara was principally responsible for this recovery, two earlier attempts were significant. The first one was Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra* and the second was Gauḍa-pāda's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*. Śaṅkara holds both Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍa-pāda in the highest esteem; he refers to the former as '*bhagavān*' (revered master) and to the latter as '*smṛti-kāra*' (author of a traditional text). A cloud of uncertainty hangs round the period and identity of Bādarāyaṇa. Dasgupta suggests that he lived about the second century B.C.²² Current tradition identifies him with Vyāsa: Vācaspati-miśra, for instance, refers to him as 'Vyāsa-pārāśarya.' But Śaṅkara (also Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Yāmuna) refers to him only as Bādarāyaṇa, and knows his work as '*Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā*' or '*Vedānta-mīmāṃsā*'. Mīmāṃsā was regarded as one body of doctrines consisting of 20 sections, the first sixteen of which (considered as '*Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*' or earlier Mīmāṃsā) were ascribed to Jaimini and the last four (regarded as '*Uttara-mīmāṃsā*' or later Mīmāṃsā) to Bādarāyaṇa.

Bādarāyaṇa compiled his *Sūtra* (variously called *Brahma-sūtra*, *Vedānta-sūtra*, *Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* and *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, the last among which is preferred by Śaṅkara²³) to crystallise the Upanishadic thought and provide the framework for correct tradition. This work which is in four chapters and 555 aphorisms is neatly arranged in 191 topics (*adhikaraṇas*).²⁴ Bādarāyaṇa commences his work with an inquiry into the nature of the Absolute Real (*brahman*), in sharp contradistinction to Jaimini who formulates the inquiry into ritualistic conduct (*dharma*) as his major theme. While the latter concerned himself with worldly well-being and heavenly rewards as objectives of a house-holder, the former dealt with final liberation as the goal of a renunciant.²⁵ The style adopted by him provided the model for all subsequent philosophical writing : it involves the statement of an objection or *prima facie* view (*pūrva-paksha*), an answer to or a rebuttal of this stand (*uttara-paksha*) and conclusion (*siddhānta*). A topic for discussion (*adhikaraṇa*) is five-limbed : the formulation of the problem, a reasonable doubt about it, the *prima-facie* view, the answer, and conclusion.²⁶ There can be little doubt that Bādarāyaṇa represents an important stage in scientific thinking and writing in India.

There appears to have been an elaborate commentary on all the twenty sections together by Baudhāyana (probably called *Kṛta-koṭi*) : and later appeared an abridgement of this commentary (*vṛtti*) by Upavarṣa. There is a suggestion that Upavarṣa was another name for Baudhāyana (as for instance, in *Vaijayanti-nighaṇṭu*). Whatever the truth of the matter, Śaṅkara is respectful towards Upavarṣa and calls him 'bhagavān'²⁷ as he does Bādarāyaṇa himself. This is interesting because Śaṅkara calls even Jaimini and Śabara merely as 'teachers' (*ācārya*).²⁸

Upavarṣa appears to have lived around 200 A.D., and was the first to divide the Vedic lore into the ritualistic section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and 'wisdom-section' (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*). And perhaps his was the first commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras* : Śaṅkara credits him with a *Śārīraka-sūtra-vṛtti* (no longer available). He

was a Vedāntin who advocated the employment of the six means of valid knowledge that Advaita came to adopt in due course. It was he who began the discussion about self-validation (*svatah-prāmāṇya*), and in a sense Advaita epistemology may be said to have begun with him. He emphasized that the postulation of 'self' as distinct both from the body and from mental processes is unavoidable. He argued that while the self cannot in any manner be revealed to another person, it cannot in any sense be denied by oneself. It is affirmed by introspection, but the introspective process itself cannot be regarded as self. Upavarṣa was also the pioneer with regard to the characteristic Advaita method of 'initial assumption and subsequent withdrawal' (*adhyāropa-apavāda*). It is unfortunate that his work has been lost almost beyond recovery: his views can only be guessed from the scanty references found in Śābara, *Śāstra-dīpikā*, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Yāmuna.²⁹

III. EARLIER ĀCĀRYAS

Both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa mention several earlier masters; and among the names common to both the lists are Bādari, Āśmarathya, Kārṣṇājini and Kāśakṛtsna. Bādarāyaṇa mentions three earlier masters (whom Śaṅkara describes as 'ācāryas') as particularly important: Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna.³⁰ Their views can in outline be reconstructed from the comments that Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja have appended. It is probable that they also wrote *sūtra*-works as Bādarāyaṇa later did; but the character of their works cannot be ascertained. The context in which Bādarāyaṇa mentions them invites reference to the statement occurring in *Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa* of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upanishad*. According to Śaṅkara (and Rāmānuja) this forms part of the sixth *adhikaraṇa* called '*Vākyānvaya*.'

Āśmarathya appears to have held that while the individual self is not different from the highest Self, there exists a cause-effect relationship between them: the analogy suggested by

*Bhāmati*³¹ is that of the sparks flying out of fire.³¹ They are neither the same as the fire, nor are they altogether different from it. They are at once identical with the fire and not identical. It can be viewed as a variety of 'difference-cum-non-difference' (*bheda-abheda*) argument, probably continued later by Bhartṛ-prapañca. The individual self emerges from the highest Self and dissolves in it again. Auḍulomi (who has been mentioned thrice by Bādarāyaṇa³²) also held a similar view: "when it goes out of the body, the individual self assumes the nature of the highest Self."³³ Difference or non-difference between them depends upon the conditions of bondage (or involvement in the world) or freedom. In the stage of bondage or phenomenal existence, the Self which is pure consciousness gets stained by its association with the physical and mental factors. But when it is cleansed by means such as intuitive wisdom and meditation, it becomes identical with the highest Self on its passing out of bodily existence. It will then resume its nature of pure consciousness.

Vācaspati introduces the third ācārya, viz, Kāśakṛtsna, with the words: "Having mentioned the views of these two 'almost-ācāryas' (*ācārya-deśīya*), and having been dissatisfied with them, Bādarāyaṇa gives the view of the 'ācārya.'"³⁴ It must be noted, however, that Śaṅkara does not refer to the first two as 'almost-ācāryas': he speaks of them also as 'ācāryas'. Nevertheless, Śaṅkara affirms that the views of Kāśakṛtsna are in accord with scriptural authority, and thus conform to Bādarāyaṇa's own views.³⁵ Kāśakṛtsna appears to have held the view that as the individual self abides in the highest Self, it is altogether non-different from it: and the assumption of a different form does not in anyway involve modification of the essence.³⁶ The apparent difference is ascribed by Vācaspati to nescience (*avidyā*), although neither the excerpts from Kāśakṛtsna himself nor Śaṅkara's comments thereon are explicit on this matter. It is possible that Śaṅkara was considerably influenced by Kāśakṛtsna.

The views of the first two *ācāryas*, supporting the theory of “difference-cum-non-difference” (*bheda-abheda*) appear to have found many able exponents in the centuries prior to Śaṅkara. And this can be regarded as the philosophical position generally held by the *Purāṇas*, which gained ascendance in popular imagination during the early centuries after Christ. God was regarded as immanent in the phenomenal world as well as transcendental to it. God was looked upon as the creator of the world while not undergoing any change whatsoever in Himself. Dasgupta suggests that even Bādarāyaṇa held this view.³⁷ It is, however, hard to maintain this position. But some important predecessors of Śaṅkara, like Dramiḍa and Bharṭṛ-prapañca sympathized with the *bheda-abheda* viewpoint. And it must be recognised that this paved the way for full-fledged Advaita to emerge.

There are two other ‘*ācāryas*’ who seem to have been important teachers before Bādarāyaṇa: Bādari³⁸ and Kārṣṇājini.³⁹ The views of Bādari mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa refer to the value of meritorious conduct and to the Absolute qualified by attributes that is sought by the aspirants. Śaṅkara approves of these views: and Vācaspati describes Bādari as ‘the perceiver of truth’ (*tattva-darśī*), ‘the knower of what is good’ (*sādhū-darśī*)⁴⁰ and ‘the revered one’ (*bhagavān*). It is possible that this teacher set up good character as more valuable than the ritualistic fulfilments that the Mīmāṃsakas were insisting upon. Kārṣṇājini brought out the relevance of subliminal inclinations (*anuśaya*) in the formation of character. Śaṅkara, in the context which brings up Bādari and Kārṣṇājini, says: “no one whose character is defective is competent to perform rituals,” and quotes from Kumārila himself: “The scriptures do not sanctify one who is devoid of character.”⁴¹ These views were also held by the *Purāṇas*.

IV. APPROXIMATIONS TO ADVAITA

Among the teachers who preceded Śaṅkara there were many whose teachings smacked of Advaita: but they were all

either inadequate formulations or inconsistent positions. Yāmuna perhaps gives expression to a tradition current during his days regarding the line of teachers when he speaks of the writings of “Ācārya Ṭaṅka, Bharṭṛ-prapañca, Bharṭṛ-mitra, Bharṭṛ-hari, Brahma-datta, Śaṅkara, Śrīvatsa, Bhāskara”⁴². Ṭaṅka (mentioned by Rāmānuja in *Vedārtha-saṁgraha*) was perhaps the same as Ātreya, or Brahma-nandin. He is reputed to have written a *Vākya* commentary on *Chāndogya-Upanishad*. About thirty sentences from it are available; twenty-two of them are quoted in Viśiṣṭādvaita works and eight in Advaita works. Madhusūdana-sarasvatī explains that the ‘Ātreya’ mentioned by Sarvajñātman⁴³ is Brahma-nandin, author of *Chāndogya-vākya*. The reference obviously regards him as an Advaitin. But he is also claimed by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as an advocate of *pariṇāma-vāda* and *bhakti*. Sarvajñātman tells us that he postulated *pariṇāma-vāda* as a preliminary step to *Vivarta-vāda*.⁴⁴

Bharṭṛ-prapañca was a more important thinker. Śaṅkara refers to him about twenty times⁴⁵, frequently in his commentary on *Bṛhadarāṇyaka-Upanishad*. Suresvara’s *Vārttika* on this Upanishad also frequently cites him. But it is only to criticize, condemn and ridicule that they refer to him. He is reputed to have written a commentary on *Bṛhadarāṇyaka-Upanishad*, but the extracts that Ānanda-giri included in his gloss on Śaṅkara’s *bhāṣya* on this Upanishad are all that have survived. He may have been an exponent of the theory of ‘difference-cum-non-difference’ (*bheda-abheda*), held along with the notion that the Absolute evolves (*pariṇāma*) into the phenomenal self. According to Śaṅkara, he gave the analogy of the tree being one and also many (in terms of the branches), and of the ocean being one and many (so far as waves are concerned). In its aspect as a unity, the wisdom leading to liberation becomes relevant; and in its aspect of multiplicity, it justifies the common actions and ritualistic conduct.⁴⁶ He, thus, appears to have thought that *jñāna* and *karma* were together necessary to reach the highest goal of life. Śaṅkara, however, attacks his views as “contrary to both scriptural authority and reasoning,”⁴⁷ although it can

be seen that Bhartṛ-prapañca inclines towards Advaita as the ultimate teaching.

Bhartṛ-prapañca was a strong advocate of evolutionary modification. The phenomenal world has been evolved in a eight-fold frame-work : the Brahman evolves into the individual self (*jīva*) and settles himself as the 'inner-controller' (*antaryāmin*); he also evolves into the unmanifest (*avyakta*), common principle (*sūtra*), and the cosmic deity (*virāṭ-devatā*); and finally he evolves into the species (*jāti*) and particular material objects (*piṇḍa*). These eight are regarded as the several conditions (*avasthās*) of the Absolute. His analysis of the relationship between the Absolute, God as the inner controller, and the phenomenal world is : the Absolute is like the ocean, unstirred, changeless ; when, however, there is a slight agitation on the surface of the ocean, a 'condition of being' occurs and God as the inner controller is like this. When the ocean is greatly agitated and is all waves and ripples, it represents the phenomenal self (*kshetrajñā*).⁴⁸

Nothing can be known about Bhartṛ-mitra, whom Yāmuna mentions, apart from the fact that Kumārila also refers to him. Bhartṛ-hari is the celebrated grammarian and philosopher who propounded the theory of *Śabdādvaita* (sound as one and absolute). His influence on Maṇḍana was considerable ; and he has been quoted by thinkers of such diverse persuasions as Somānanda (*Śivadrṣṭi*), Śānta-rakshita (*Tattva-saṁgraha*), Jayanta-bhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī*) and Vimuktātman (*Iṣṭa-siddhi*). He was principally responsible for the essentially grammatical but also philosophical doctrine of 'sphoṭa' (sudden flash of perception).⁴⁹ There is no doubt that his great work, *Vākya-padīya*, formulates a kind of Advaita, but this has been severely criticized by Śaṁkara and Sureśvara.

Brahma-datta was another important thinker. It is conjectured that there was a commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra* from his pen.⁵⁰ Śaṁkara, Sureśvara and Vedānta-deśika refer to his views only to criticize him.⁵¹ Sureśvara's commentator,

Jñānottama describes him as an exponent of the conjoint value of wisdom and ritualistic conduct in securing the highest end (*jñānakarma-samuccaya-vādin*)⁵². He appears to have held the view that the Upanishads contain two kinds of significant statements (*vākyas*): statements that are intended to generate wisdom (*jñāna*) and statements that prescribe worship (*upāsana*). Statements like "That thou art" (*tat tvam asi*) illustrate the first kind; "Self is to be seen, etc" (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah*) could be an example of the latter. Brahma-datta considers the latter statements as superior to the former, as their relationship is one of part-and-whole (*aṅga-aṅgī*). Whatever the depth of wisdom arising from the Upanishadic statements, final liberation is impossible of attainment unless perfected by long and continuous meditation (worship, *upāsana*). This cultivation (*bhāvanā*) must be life-long, for it is only after physical death that final liberation (*moksha*) can be attained. The fruits of liberation, in other words, can never be experienced while one is living: it is an *adṛṣṭa-phala*. One can see that in all these, Śaṅkara differs from him sharply.

There is a more remarkable view that is ascribed to Brahma-datta.⁵³ The Absolute (*brahman*) alone is eternal; everything else is transient. The individual self (*jīva*) emerges out of the Absolute as a distinct entity, and is, therefore, subject to birth and death, i.e., transient. Śaṅkara refers to this view in VSB 3,2,17 as the *prima-facie* view, and criticizes it. But Brahma-datta seems to have taught a variety of Advaita, involving the concept of *māyā*; but the individual self's emergence and dissolution vitiated the coherence of this teaching. We are told that this was the older version of the theory of *māyā*, while Gauḍa-pāda and Śaṅkara represent the newer version.⁵⁴

Another prominent Vedāntin during the pre-Śaṅkara days was Draviḍa. Śaṅkara describes him as "the knower of scriptural tradition" (*āgama-vit*)⁵⁵ and "knower of correct tradition" (*sampradāya-vit*).⁵⁶ Śaṅkara quotes a solution offered by him in his *bhāṣya* on *Chāndogya-upanishad* and calls him an *ācārya*.⁵⁷ He is said to have written a commentary on the *Chāndogya-vākya* by

Brahma-nandin (Ṭaṅka). There is some confusion about his identity with the Dramiḍācārya whom Rāmānuja refers to : it is probable that they were different. Draviḍa is said to have prepared a commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanishad* and a gloss on Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra*. Neither, however, is now available. He appears to have been an exponent of the Advaita point of view, believing that the cosmological passages in the Upanishadic texts are not independent of the identity passages (like *tat tvam asi*), and that the affirmations (*etad vai tat*) and negations (*neti neti*) in the dialectics of Advaita are related by a common thread, and the identity of the Self being established by negations. The story concerning the prince who from his birth was brought up by a hunter, and who therefore thought that he was indeed the hunter's son is ascribed to Draviḍa. The boy later discovered his true status, when told about it. The import of the story is that the individual self involved and led astray in the phenomenal world can recover its true and real identity by instructions from a teacher.

The last master that we have to consider in this context is Sundara-pāṇḍya. Several *kārikās* from his pen have been cited by Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara, Kumārila and Amalānanda. He is believed to have written a *Vārttika* on the entire Mīmāṃsā incorporating the quoted *kārikās*⁵⁸. Śaṅkara quotes three *kārikās*,⁵⁹ and Ātma-svarūpa, the author of the commentary *Prabodha-pariśodhinī* on Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā*, identifies the source as Sundara-pāṇḍya. These three verses clearly though cryptically enunciate the monistic position and suggest the idea of sublation as a result of enlightenment. He has contributed methodological precision to Advaita, which marks an improvement over Upavarṣa. We have seen that Upavarṣa suggested a six-fold approach to valid knowledge : but Sundara-pāṇḍya clubs the six means together under "ordinary sources of common knowledge" and holds that they are not only not useful in revealing the Self but lose their relevance and validity when the Self has been realized. He, therefore, commended the method, now well-known in Advaita : 'initial assumption and subsequent withdrawal'

(*adhyāropa-apavāda*)⁶⁰. Śaṅkara quotes a line from his *kārikā*, describing it as “the words of the knower of correct tradition” :

“अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते” ॥

“What is in itself not spread out (i.e., lacking in details and distinctions) can be spread out (i.e., described or explained) by the (method of initial) assumption and (subsequent) withdrawal.” It is interesting to note that Maṇḍana also quotes the same line in his *Brahma-siddhi*⁶¹, in support of the Upanishadic method of negation. It is a reconciliation of the positive and negative aspects of Advaita dialectics. It is unfortunate that neither do we know more about Sundara-pāṇḍya, nor have more of his *kārikās* survived.

V. GAUḌA-PĀDA AND MAṆḌANA

When we approach the days immediately anterior to Śaṅkara two figures command our attention : Gauḍa-pāda and Maṇḍana-miśra. As mentioned earlier, the two masters who recovered the correct tradition from the mass of Vedic lore before Śaṅkara were Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍa-pāda. It is remarkable that Śaṅkara singles out Gauḍa-pāda to credit him with this achievement⁶². He speaks of him as ‘the teacher of his teacher’ (*parama-guru*) and as ‘the most adored among all his adored ones’ (*pūjyābhīpūjya*). He also describes him as ‘the knower of correct tradition’,⁶³ and as ‘the knower of correct tradition concerning the import of the Upanishads’.⁶⁴ He accords Gauḍa-pāda’s work the status of a ‘*smṛti*’⁶⁵, and considers this work in four sections as the ‘very epitome of the essential teachings of the Upanishads.’⁶⁶

Not much that is of historical value is known about Gauḍa-pāda. According to Ānanda-giri, he hailed from the Gauḍa country, went up to Badarī in the Himālayas, did penance there in the Nara-Nārāyaṇa hermitage and obtained enlightenment ; he realized the Brahman that the Upanishads spoke of. Bāla-kṛṣṇānanda-sarasvatī (author of a *Vārttika* on *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā*)

mentions the banks of the river Hīrāvati in Kurukshetra (Central India) as Gauḍa-pāda's birth-place, and he explains that 'Gauḍa' was the community to which he belonged; he did penance for so long that people forgot his real name and he came to be known only after his community. Rāmabhadra-dīkshita, the author of *Patañjali-carita*, claims that Gauḍa-pāda was the great Patañjali's pupil. There is also a suggestion that 'Gauḍa' refers to an ancient school of Advaita that was prevalent in the Gauḍa country (northern part of Bengal). And many scholars make a surmise that he was a Buddhist, a point that is hotly debated. Whatever the veracity of all these conjectures, tradition believes that there was a break (*vicchitti*) in the teaching of Advaita after Śuka (son of Pārāśarya-vyāsa, who was a pupil and grandson of Śakti, the son and disciple of Vaśiṣṭha), and that Gauḍa-pāda revived it. This account appears reliable.

Many works are ascribed to Gauḍa-pāda, among them a commentary on Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, another on *Uttara-gītā*, still another on *Nṛsiṃha-tāṇiṃya-upanishad*, and some Tāntrik works like *Śrī-vidyā-ratna-sūtra* and *Subhagodaya*. But the work that has made him famous is the *kārikā* that he prepared on a short Upanishad, *Māṇḍūkya*, dealing with the three states of the phenomenal self. This *kārikā* is in four chapters, the first alone (*Āgama-prakaraṇa* the chapter dealing with scripture) being in the nature of a commentary to the Upanishad, the other three ('*Vaitathya*', unreality, '*Advaita*', unity, and '*Alāta-śānti*', extinguishing the fire-brand) making an independent treatise. The purpose of the treatise appears to expound the truth that the three states of the phenomenal self are unreal and illusory and that the fourth one, *turiya*, (which is Gauḍa-pāda's name for the Upanishad's *caturtha*) alone is real. The first chapter points out that revelation is the only means for understanding the true nature of the self; the second explains the illusory character of the phenomenal world by employing reason; the third propounds the view that what is non-dual (*advaita*) is not illusory; and the fourth is in the nature of a reply to the criticisms hurled at Advaita. Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya suggests that the four

chapters were originally composed as independent books and that Śaṅkara brought them together into a book-form. Whatever the truth, Śaṅkara held this book in the highest esteem. In fact, he quotes only from Gauḍa-pāda's *kārikā* and not from the *Māṇḍūkya-Upanishad*.

There can be little doubt that Śaṅkara's philosophical position was greatly influenced by this work. The sources of Śaṅkara's thought can all be traced here. The doctrine of attributeless Brahman, the identity of the Absolute Self with the individual self, the idea of *māyā*, the dual aspect of Advaita methodology (*adhyāropa-apavāda*), grouping of the standpoints into phenomenal and transcendental, and the notion of transformation (*vivarta*) as against evolution (*pariṇāma*) are presented here in a nut-shell. Śaṅkara undertook the task of constructing an elaborate and consistent edifice on this rather slender foundation. He fortified Advaita with philosophical, psychological and epistemological arguments and provided for it a wide scriptural base. It is interesting that Gauḍa-pāda nowhere quotes Bādarāyaṇa or refers to the *Vedānta-sūtras*. One of Śaṅkara's achievements consists in integrating Gauḍa-pāda's viewpoint with Bādarāyaṇa's general position.

About the time Gauḍa-pāda completed his life's work, there appeared on the scene another brilliant master who developed an Advaita viewpoint at variance with Gauḍa-pāda's. Śaṅkara perhaps had to combat this rival, and it must have been no easy matter, for this giant had been endeavouring to reconcile Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta and thus unify the Vedic tradition. Maṇḍana (or Maṇḍana-miśra) occupies a peculiar position in the field of Advaita. While Śaṅkara's own estimate of Maṇḍana's work can hardly be reconstructed, Sureśvara as the prime spokesman of Śaṅkara's Advaita, launched a vigorous attack on Maṇḍana's arguments. But in later Advaita, if Sureśvara was followed by Vimuktātman, Sarvajñātman, Prakāśātman and Ānandānubhava in this anti-Maṇḍana stand Vācaspati was followed by Ānanda-bodha⁶⁷, Citsukha⁶⁸, Madhusūdana-sarasvatī⁶⁹ and Brahmānanda⁷⁰ in his recognition of Maṇḍana

as an authority in Advaita. Vidyāraṇya's *Vārttika-sāra* (summary of Sureśvara's *Vārttika* on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) refers to the author of *Brahma-siddhi* as a great writer who knew the very secret of the Vedic lore (*veda-rahasya-vit*). The post-Śaṅkara development of Advaita bears the unmistakable influence of Maṇḍana.

Regarding the period in which the great trio (Gauḍa-pāda, Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara) flourished, we may accept the careful reckoning by Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppuswami Sastri :⁷¹

Gauḍa-pāda	about 520-620 A.D.
Govinda	,, 560-650 A.D.
Maṇḍana	,, 615-695 A.D.
Śaṅkara	,, 632-664 A.D.
Sureśvara	,, 620-700 A.D.
Padmapāda	,, 625-705 A.D.

Maṇḍana, thus, was a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara and junior contemporary of Gauḍa-pāda. Maṇḍana was extremely proficient in *Mīmāṃsā*, and was considered next only to Kumārila, his teacher : in the field of *Mīmāṃsā*, even such authorities as Pārthasārathi-miśra held Maṇḍana in high regard. He wrote three works on *Mīmāṃsā*, all of which became important : *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇikā*, *Bhāvanā-viveka*, and *Vidhi-viveka*. He was an exponent of the *Sphoṭa* theory of the grammarians, and wrote a *siddhi*-work on the subject. His epistemological treatise, *Vibhrama-viveka*, is an interesting dissertation on the psychological involvements of perceptual error.

His only Vedāntic work is *Brahma-siddhi*, a remarkable volume in four books treating of the nature of Absolute, the structure of reason, scriptural prescriptions, and spiritual fulfilment. We find him both loyal to, and critical of, Bhartṛhari and Kumārila. He accepts the *Viparīta-khyāti* of Kumārila (although with some reservations) and criticizes the *bheda-abheda* viewpoint of Bhartṛ-prapañca. What irked Śaṅkara and Sureśvara against him was his espousal of the cause of Bhartṛhari's *Śabdādvaita*. There were other points on which Śaṅkara and

Sureśvara differed from him : multiplicity of nescience, need for continuing meditation (*prasamkhyāna*) to eliminate the last 'shiver' (*kampa*) of the projective aspect of nescience, the conjoint functioning of meditation and ritualistic action, and optional role of renunciation in securing the highest goal. But it must be recognized that he valiantly took up the cause of Advaita and sought to defend it by scriptural, logical, epistemological and philosophical arguments. And it is not unnatural that Vācaspati sought to reconcile the standpoint of Śaṅkara with that of Maṇḍana : the common points between them are in fact more numerous than differences. It would be foolhardy to assume that Śaṅkara was ignorant of *Brahma-siddhi* and that he was not to an extent influenced by it.

Maṇḍana relies heavily on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-*, *Chāndogya-*, and *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣads*. He cites *Bhagavad-gītā* and Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra* very sparsely ; and Gauḍa-pāda's *Kārikā* has been quoted but once. His *Brahma-siddhi*, incidentally, inaugurated a series of *siddhi* works in Advaita : Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* (which was probably written as a rejoinder to *Brahma-siddhi*), Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, Jñānottama's *Jñāna-siddhi* (not available now, but mentioned in *Nayana-prasādinī* on Citsukha's *Tattva-pradīpikā*), Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*, Sadānanda's *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, and Gaṅgādharendra's *Svārājya-siddhi*. The expression 'siddhi' as the title of the book signifies definitive ascertainment of a particular viewpoint after a critical examination of related arguments. We will have occasion to discuss the *Siddhi* literature again in the next section.

VI. TEXTUAL SOURCES

Śaṅkara endeavoured to reconstruct, preserve and propagate the correct tradition in order to help Hinduism survive. Although he styled his literary works as 'commentaries' (*bhāṣhyas*), his achievement was original, creative and lasting. He recognized the value of the Vedic lore and took this corpus as his primary source. He accepted the division of the Vedic lore into the

former ritualistic section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and the latter wisdom-section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) and pinned his faith on the latter division. He regarded himself as a votary of the Upanishads (*aupanishada*) and his main textual source was the Upanishadic complex. Paul Deussen has assiduously examined his references in the *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*⁷² and finds that he has quoted the Upanishadic texts as many as 2000 times : of them, the references to *Chāndogya* (809) and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (565) come to 1,374.

He also cites as authority the *Samhitā* texts of *R̥gVeda*, *Atharva Veda*, the 'Taittirīya' and the 'Vājasaneyā' recensions of *Kṛṣṇa* and *Śukla Yajurvedas* respectively ; he also cites the 'Maitrāyaṇīya' recension of *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. Among the 'Brāhmaṇa' texts, he cites the *Aitareya* and the *Kauṣītaki* portions of *R̥gVeda*, the *Śatapatha* and the *Taittirīya* portions of *Yajurveda*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Pañca-vimśa*, the *Ṣaḍ-vimśa* and the *Tāṇḍya* texts of *Sāma-Veda*. Only two 'Āraṇyakas' are cited by him : *Aitareya* from *R̥gVeda* and *Taittirīya* from *Yajurveda*. Among the Upanishads, besides those he has commented upon, he quotes *Kauṣītaki* (*R̥gVeda*), *Maitrāyaṇī* and *Śvetāśvatara* (*Yajurveda*) and *Jābāla* (*Atharva Veda*).

Although his reliance on *Purāṇas* for philosophical ascertainment is meagre, he does quote from a few of them : *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Śiva*, *Viṣṇu* and *Vāyu*. The quotations however, are secondary and supportive, unlike the Upanishadic passages. He has a high regard for the 'Dharma-śāstra' authorities ; he cites not only *Manu-smṛti* but *Āśvalāyana* and *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-sūtras*, *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* and *Parāśara-gṛhya-sūtras*. He is intimately acquainted with *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṃkhya* (as represented by *Īśvara-kṛṣṇa*) and *Yoga* systems, and quotes from the *sūtras* belonging to them. He is, of course, conversant with the *Mīmāṃsā* literature, and cites from Śabara's *bhāṣya* on Jaimini, Kumārila's works and Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*. His knowledge of Buddhist schools is considerable and it would appear that Dharma-kīrti was his main source. His acquaintance with the great logician Dignāga is suggested by a reference.⁷³

Śaṅkara's erudition is awe-inspiring. He was thoroughly well-informed about the entire range of philosophical systems and religious cults ; and he was singularly free from ethnocentric prejudices. In his writings he is found to consider carefully the merit of whatever system he deals with, weigh the arguments, and arrive at his own conclusions. He presents scriptural testimony to those who are inclined to respect it, but employs logic while dealing with others. No critic, however hostile, can arraign him for dogmatism. Śaṅkara, although steeped in orthodox tradition, is surprisingly open-minded. His criticism is always dignified, his language restrained but forceful, his style clear (like the waters of Gaṅgā, as Vacaspati describes it⁷⁴), and references apt and illuminating. It is not without reason that tradition regards three commentarial works (*bhāṣya-traya*) as path makers ; Patañjali's *Mahā-bhāṣya* on Pāṇini, Śabara's *Mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya* on Jaimini, and Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* on Bādarāyaṇa. While the impact of the former two was limited, the third provided the stimulus for an intellectual revolution and a spiritual renaissance in the country.

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1. BGB, 13, 2 असम्प्रदायवित् सर्वशास्त्रविदपि मूर्खवदुपेक्षणीयः
2. BUB, 2, 1, 20 अत्र च सम्प्रदायविदः आख्यायिकामाचक्षते
3. VSB, 1, 4, 14 तथा च सम्प्रदायविदो वदन्ति (reference to Gauḍapāda)
4. VSB, 2, 1, 9 अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः (reference to Gauḍapāda)
5. BGB, 12, 13 तथा हि सम्प्रदायविदां वचनम् (reference to Sundara-pāṇḍya)
6. BGB, 13, 2 एवं मन्वानो यः स पण्डितापसदः संसारमोक्षयोः शास्त्रस्य च अर्थवत्त्वं करोमीत्यात्महा, स्वयं मूढः अन्यांश्च व्यामोहयति शास्त्रार्थसम्प्रदायरहितत्वात् श्रुतहानिमश्रुतकल्पनां कुर्वन् ।
7. VSB, 1, 3, 33 भवति हि अस्माकं अप्रत्यक्षमपि चिरन्तनानां प्रत्यक्षं ऋषीणां अपि मन्त्रब्राह्मणदर्शिनां सामर्थ्यं नास्मदीयेन सामर्थ्येनोपमातुं युक्तम् ।
8. PUB, 4, 5 न हि अभिमानेन वर्षशतेनापि श्रुत्यर्थो ज्ञातुं शक्यते सर्वैः पण्डितमन्यैः ।

9. KñB, 1, 3 ब्रह्म चैवमाचार्योपदेशपरम्परयैवाधिगन्तव्यं, न तर्कतः प्रवचनमेषाबहुश्रुतै-
तपोयज्ञादिभिश्च Cf also BGB, 18, 50 गुरुसम्प्रदायरहितानां
....KñB, 2, introduction : ब्रह्मवित्सम्प्रदायनिश्चयश्चोक्तः
10. यैरिमे गुरुभिः पूर्वं पदवाक्यप्रमाणतः ।
व्याख्यातास्सर्ववेदान्तास्तान्नित्यं प्रणतोऽस्यहम् ॥
11. VSB, 2, 2, 10
12. BUB, 2, 1, 20 सर्वोपनिषत्सु हि विधीयते इत्यविप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वेषां उपनिष-
द्वादिनाम् ।
13. BUB, 2, 1, 20 उपनिषदुपसमीपं निगमयतीति अभिधायकःशब्द उपनिषदित्युच्यते ।
Also TUB, ब्रह्मविद्या उपनिषत्, सर्वाभ्यो विद्याभ्यः परमहस्यम् ।....परं भेदः
अस्यां निषण्णमिति । (.... ब्रह्मणो वा उपगमयितृत्वात् ।)
14. VSB, 2, 1, 9 वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायवित्
15. VSB, Introduction अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ।
16. Cf. BUB, 2, 1, 20 सर्वोपनिषत्सु हि विज्ञानात्मनः परमात्मना एकत्वप्रत्ययो
विधीयते इत्यविप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वेषामुपनिषद्वादिनाम् ॥
Also VSB, 2, 1, 11 सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामभ्युपगमः
MUB, 3, 2, 6 अविद्यादिसंसारबन्धापनयमेव मोक्षमिच्छन्ति ब्रह्मविदः ।
17. Cf. His references to Gauḍapāda as 'sampradāya-vit' (VSB, 1, 4,
14), 'Vedantārtha-sampradāya-vit' (VSB, 2, 1, 9), 'follower of
the creator' (ChB, 7, 12, 1) and 'smṛti-kāra' (ChB. 2, 23, 1).
18. Kumārila on Jaimini 1, 3, 1 (Tantra-vārttika)—
यावद्धर्ममोक्षसम्बन्धि तद्वेदप्रभवं । यत्तु सुखविषयं तल्लोकव्यवहारमिति विवेक्तव्यम् ॥
19. Śāstra-dīpikā on Jaimini, 2, 1, 1
तस्माद्धर्म इत्येव शस्त्रविषयो न वेदार्थ इति ।
20. Cf. Prabhākara's *Brhatī* (on Śabara) and Śālikanatha's *Rju-vimālā*
on *Brhatī* : धर्मशब्दश्च वेदार्थपरः ।
21. Śloka-vārttika (prelude):
प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता ।
तामास्तिकपथे नेतुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया ॥
22. S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 418
23. *Bhagavad-gītā* refers to "Brahma-sūtra" in 13, 5 (ब्रह्मसूत्रपदैश्चैव).
Rāmānuja and Madhva see here the mention of Bādarāyaṇa's
work. But Śaṅkara's explanation is
ब्रह्मणः सूक्तानि वाक्यानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि, तैः पदैः ज्ञायते इति
24. This is according to Śaṅkara. But the numbers vary according
to different Commentators : for Rāmānuja 545 sūtras and 140
adhikaraṇas ; for Madhva 534 and 123 ; for Nimbārka 549

- and 161 ; for Śrīkaṇṭha 544 and 182 ; and for Vallabha 554 and 171. And, as is well known, varied standpoints have been ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa : nirviśeṣha-advaita by Śaṅkara, bheda-abheda by Bhāskara, Viśiṣṭa-advaita by Rāmānuja, dvaita-advaita by Nimbārka, Śaiva-viśiṣṭa-advaita by Śrīkaṇṭha, Śakti-viśiṣṭa-advaita by Śrīpati, Śuddha-advaita by Vallabha, avibhāga-advaita by Vijñāna-bhikṣu, and acintyābheda by Baladeva.
25. It may be noted that Pāṇini refers to *Pārāśarya-bhikṣu-sūtra* which Vācaspati identifies with Bādarāyaṇa's sūtra. The expression 'bhikṣu' refers to the renunciant monk for whom the work is meant. Śaṅkara confirms this orientation in his commentary.
26. विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम् ।
निर्णयश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥
27. VSB, 1, 3, 28 वर्णा एव तु शब्दा इति भगवानुपवर्षे ; VSB, 3, 3, 53—
अत एव भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे
28. VSB, 3, 2, 40 जैमिनिस्त्वाचार्यः ; VSB, 3, 3, 53 आचार्येण शबरस्वामिना.
29. Rāmānuja claims that Upavarṣa was his 'upa-jīvyā' (source, authority, or patron). Vedānta-deśika identifies him with Baudhāyana. Yāmuna mentions that he wrote a *vṛtti* on *Vedānta-sūtras*. There is a suggestion that Upavarṣa's theory of equal importance to *karma* and *jñāna* was adopted by Yādavaprakāśa, Rāmānuja's teacher. For reconstruction of Upavarṣa's views, Cf. Ganganatha Jha Commemoration Volume.
30. *Vedānta-sūtra*, 1, 4, 20-22 (in the 'vākyānvayādhikaraṇa'). Madhva suggests in his *Anuvyākhyāna* (1, 4, 28) that they were pupils of Bādarāyaṇa : स्वशिष्याणां प्रसिद्धयर्थं मतमात्मीयमशतः ।
विज्ञातं तैर्जगादान्न तारतम्यं नृणां वदन् ॥
31. Bādarāyaṇa's sūtra : प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः (1, 4, 20) ;
Śaṅkara's comments : विज्ञानात्मपरमात्मनोरभेदाशेनोपक्रमणम् ।
Bhāmātī explains : यथा हि वह्नेः विकारा व्युच्चरन्तो विस्फुलिङ्गाः न वह्नेरत्यन्तं भिद्यन्ते तद्रूपनिरूपणत्वात् । नापि ततोऽत्यन्तमभिज्ञाः वह्नेरिव परस्परव्यावृत्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । परस्परं व्यावृत्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात् सर्वज्ञं प्रत्युपदेशवैयर्थ्याच्च । तस्मात्कर्तव्यचिद्धेदो जीवात्मानामभेदश्च ।
Kalpataru-parimalā adds : सत्यप्यभेदे भेदेनापि भाव्यम् । अत्यन्ताभेदे अनुवाद्याविषेयभावाऽयोगमदित्याश्मरथ्यादिमतमिह मुख्यः पूर्वपक्ष इत्यर्थः ।
Śaṅkara, further notes : आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि परस्मादनन्यत्वमभिप्रेतं तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभिधानात् कार्यकारणभावः किमनभिप्रेत इति गम्यते ॥ (VSB, 1, 4, 22)

32. VSB, 1, 4, 21; 3, 4, 45; 4, 4, 6.

33. VS, 1, 4, 21 उत्क्रमिष्यत एवं भावादित्यौडुलोमिः । Śaṅkara's comments :
विज्ञानात्मन एव देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसंघातोपाधिसम्पर्कात् कलुषीभूतस्य
ज्ञानध्यानादिसाधनानुष्ठानात्संप्रसन्नस्य देहादिसंघातादुत्क्रमिष्यत
परमात्मैक्योपपत्तेः इदं अभेदेनोपक्रमणम् इत्यौडुलोमिराचार्यो
मन्यते ॥

Bhāmatī explains : आचार्यदेशीयान्तरमतेन समाधत्ते— जीवो हि परमात्मनोऽ-
त्यन्तं भिन्न एव सन् देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्ध्युपाधानसम्पर्कात् सर्वदा कलुषः ।
तस्य च ज्ञानध्यानादिसाधनानुष्ठानात्संप्रसन्नस्य देहेन्द्रियादिसंघाता-
दुत्क्रमिष्यतः परमात्मनैक्योपपत्तेः इदं अभेदेनोपक्रमणम् ॥

Kalpāru adds : उपाधिसम्पर्को हेतुः कालुष्ये, न जीवपरभेदे । सर्वदेति
अनादिकाले । भेदहेतोः गमकस्य संसारित्वादीश्वरविरुद्धधर्मस्य इत्यर्थः ॥

Śaṅkara, further, notes : औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ
भेदाभेदौ गम्येते ॥ (VSB, 1, 4, 22)

34. *Bhāmatī*, 1, 4, 22 Introduction तदेवं आचार्यदेशीयमतद्वयमुक्त्वा अत्रापरि-
तुष्यन् आचार्यमतमाह सूत्रकारः ॥ Also, मतत्रयमुक्त्वा काशकृत्स्नीयं
मतं साधुत्वेन निर्धारयति ॥

35. VSB, 1, 4, 22 काशकृत्स्नस्याचार्यस्याविष्कृतः परमेश्वरो जीव नान्य इति मतम् ।
तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं श्रुत्यनुसारीति गम्यते । Rāmānuja also
mentions that Kāśakṛtsna and Bādarāyaṇa hold
identical views. Madhva thinks that the view of
Āśmarathya refers to the aspirant for heaven, whose
spirit of renunciation (*vairāgya*) has not sufficiently
ripened ; that Auḍulomi's view refers to one who
is still walking along the path of *jijñāsā* and whose
wisdom is yet to mature ; and that Kāśakṛtsna's
view refers to the competent one (*adhikārī*), in whom
both the spirit of renunciation and wisdom have
matured.

36. VS, 1, 4, 22 अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥

Śaṅkara's comments : अस्यैव परमात्मनोऽनेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थाना-
दुपपन्नमिदमभेदेनोपक्रमणमिति काशकृत्स्न आचार्यो मन्यते ॥

Bhāmatī explains : आत्यन्तिके हि जीवपरमात्मनोरभेदे तात्त्विकेऽनाद्यविद्योपाधि-
कल्पितो भेदः तत्त्वमसीति जीवात्मनो ब्रह्मभावतत्त्वोपदेशश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासन-
प्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मना साक्षात्कारेण विद्यया शक्यः समूलकाषं कार्षितुम् ॥

37. S. N. Dasgupta : *op.cit.*, vol. II, p. 42

38. VS, 3, 1, 11 सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु चादग्निः ॥ Also, 4, 3, 7 कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ॥
 Śaṅkara's comments : कार्यमेव सगुणमपरं ब्रह्मैवान् गमयत्यमानवः पुरुष इति बादरिराचार्यो मन्यते ॥ (4, 3, 7)
39. VS, 3, 1, 9 चरणादिति चेन्नोपलक्षणार्थेति कार्ष्णीजिनिः ॥
 Śaṅkara comments : तस्मात्कर्मैव शीलोपलक्षितमनुशयभूतं योन्यापत्तौ कारण-मिति कार्ष्णीजिनेर्मतम् । न हि कर्मणि सम्भवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता । न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हति ॥ (VSB, 3, 1, 10)
40. Vācaspati draws an unfavourable comparison : तस्मात्साधुदर्शी स भगवान् बादरिरसाधुदर्शी जैमिनिरिति सिद्धम् ॥ (VSB, 4, 3, 7)
41. VSB, 3, 1, 10 न हि सदाचारहीनः कश्चिदप्यधिकृतः स्यात् । 'आचारहीनं न पुनन्ति वेदाः' इत्यादि स्मृतिभ्यः । The quotation is from Kumārila's *Śloka-vārtika*, 3, 1, 10
42. *Siddhi-traya*, आचार्यतत्त्वभर्तृप्रपञ्चभर्तृमित्रभर्तृहरिब्रह्मदत्तशङ्करश्रीवत्साङ्गभास्करादि-विरचितसितासिताविविधनिबन्धनश्रद्धाविप्रलब्धबुद्धयो न यथावदन्यथा च.....
43. *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka*, 3, 217
 अत्रेयवाक्यमपि संव्यवहारमात्रम् ।
 कार्यं समस्तमिति नः कथमाबभूव ॥
 Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī's *Sāra-saṅgraha* introducing this verse,
 says : छान्दोग्यवाक्यकारेण ब्रह्मनन्दिनापि पूर्वपक्षेऽसतः सतश्चोत्पत्तौ दोषमुक्त्वा
 संव्यवहारिकमायामयत्वपक्षेण समाधानमुक्तम् ॥
44. *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka*, 3, 226
 पूर्वं विकारमुपवर्ण्य शनैः शनैस्तद्
 दृष्टिं विसृज्य निकटं परिगृह्य तस्मात् ।
 सर्वं विकारमथ संव्यवहारमात्र-
 मद्वैतमेव परिरक्षति वाक्यकारः ॥
 Madhusūdana explains :
 परिणामवादो व्यवहारदृष्टिपालनाय वर्णनीय अत्यन्तभेदसत्यत्वेऽभिनिविष्टचित्तस्य
 प्रथमत एव विवर्तवादे प्रवेशो दुर्घट इति तदभिनिवेशत्याजनाय व्यवहारदृष्टिं
 रक्षता परिणामवादः प्रथमतः तमुपपादितः । पश्चात् तद्दृष्टिमपि युक्त्यसहत्वेन
 शनैः शनैः त्याजयित्वा ततोऽपि निकटं विवर्तवादं उपवर्ण्य शुद्धाद्वैतं रक्षति स्म
 ब्रह्मनन्दी ॥
45. Buddhakara: *QJMS*, 1933-34, p. 261 ; Prof. M. Hiriyanna collected the references in a paper presented at the Third Oriental Congress held at Madras in 1924. Cf. M. Hiriyanna : *Indian Philosophical Studies* (Kavyalaya, Mysore), Part I, pp. 70-94.

46. BUB, 2, 1, 14 नन्वेकैकैकं ब्रह्म । यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाखः, एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म । अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव । यथा 'वृक्ष' इत्येकत्वं, 'शाखाः' इति नानात्वम् । यथा च समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, तेन तरङ्गात्मना नानात्वम् । तत्रैकत्वं ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति । नानात्वं ज्ञानं तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यतः ॥ Cf. also BUB, 3, 8, 12; 5, 1, 1.
47. BUB, 5, 1, 1 श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च । also श्रुतिन्यायविरोधात् अनुपपन्नेयं कल्पना ॥
48. BUB, 3, 8, 12 अत्र च केचिदाचक्षते । परस्य महासमुद्रस्थानीयस्य ब्रह्मणोऽक्षरस्य अप्रचलितस्वरूपस्य ईषत्प्रचलितावस्थान्तर्यामी । अत्यन्तप्रचलितावस्था क्षेत्रज्ञो यः तं न वेदान्तर्यामिणम् । यथान्याः परयावस्थाः परिकल्पयन्ति । तथा अष्टावस्था ब्रह्मणो भवन्तीति वदन्ति ॥
49. For details of this doctrine cf. S. K. Ramachandra Rao : *Development of Psychological Thought in India*, Kavyalaya, Mysore, 1962, pp. 157-172.
50. About Brahmadatta, cf. M. Hiriyanna, (Ed), *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, Introduction, p. xxiii; also JOR, Madras, vol. II, 1928.
51. Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, (I. 67, prose section) says :
केचित् स्वसम्प्रदायबलावष्टंभादाहुः — यदेतद्वेदान्तवाक्यादहं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं समुत्पद्यते, तन्नेव स्वोत्पात्रेमात्रेणाज्ञानं निरस्यति, किं तर्हि अहन्ग्रहनि द्राघीयसा कालेन उपासीनस्य सतः भावनोपचयात् निःशेषज्ञानमपगच्छति देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येतीति श्रुतेः ॥ The commentator Jñānāmṛta identifies the source as Brahmadatta (*Vidyā-surabhī*) ; Vedāntadeśika, *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvamuktākālāpa*.
52. Jñānottama : वाक्यजन्यज्ञानोत्तरकालीनभावनोत्कर्षात् भावनाजन्यसाक्षात्कार-लक्षणज्ञानान्तरेणैव अज्ञानस्य निवृत्तेः ज्ञानाभ्यासदशायां ज्ञानस्य कर्मणा समुच्चयोपपत्तिः ॥ (*Chandrikā*)
53. Vedāntadeśika : एकं ब्रह्मैव नित्यं, तदितरदखिलं तत्र जन्मादिभागित्यायातं तेन जीवोऽपि अचिदिव जनिमान् ।
54. In *Śrūta-prakāśikā* a distinction is drawn between *jaran-māyā-vādins* and *sākṣān-māyā-vādins*.
55. MKB, 2, 32 'सिद्धं तु निवर्तकत्वात्' इत्यागमविदां सूत्रम् ।
56. BUB, 2, 1, 20 अत्र च सम्प्रदायविदः आख्यायिकां संप्रचक्षते ।
Ānandagiri's gloss identifies the reference with Dravidācārya :
तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमैक्यपरं तच्छेषः सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यमित्युक्तेऽर्थे द्रविडाचार्यसंमतिमाह
Cf. for the story Sureśvara's *Sambandha-vārttika*, verses 233-234.
57. CHB, 3, 10, 4 अत्रोक्तः परिहार आचार्यैः । Ānandagiri's gloss identifies him as Draviḍa.
58. Cf. JOR, Madras, vol. II, p. 156.

59. VSB, 1, 1, 4 अपि चाहुः—

गौणमिथात्मनोऽसत्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।
सद्ब्रह्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥ १ ॥
अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।
अनिष्टः स्यात्प्रमातैव पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥ २ ॥
देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।
लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥ ३ ॥

Vācaspati describes this as ब्रह्मविदां गाथा । It may be noted that a *kārikā* is a memorial verse which means much although clothed in slight metre :

कारिका तु स्वल्पवृत्तौ बहोरर्थस्य सूचनी । (Hemacandra).

60. BGB, 12, 13.

61. *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 26

62. Śaṅkara at the end of MKB ;

प्रज्ञावैशाख्येष्वभितजलनिषेवेंदनाम्नोऽन्तरस्थं
भूतान्यालोक्य ममान्यविरतजननग्राहघोरं समुद्रे ।
काश्यादुद्धारामृतमिदममैर्दुर्लभं भूतहेतोः
यस्तं पूज्याभिपूज्यं परमगुरुमुं पादपातैर्नतोऽस्मि ॥

63. VSB, 1, 4, 14 तथा च सम्प्रदायविदो वदन्ति । (quoting MK, 1, 15)

64. VSB, 2, 1, 9 अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्विराचार्यैः । (quoting MK, 1, 16)

65. CHB, 2, 23, 1.

66. MKB, at the beginning. वेदान्तार्थसारसंग्रहभूतमिदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयम् ।

67. *Nyāya-makaranda*, (css), quotes many times, and in very reverent expressions : e.g. तदादुरत्रभवन्तो मण्डनमिश्राः (p. 234)
तदभिहितमाचार्यवर्यैः (256)

68. *Tattvapradīpikā* (NSP) p. 140.

69. *Advaita-siddhi*, (NSP, 1917), इति ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारोक्तमपि साधु (p. 316)

70. *Laghu-candrikā*, (NSP), p. 326.

71. Based on T. R. Chintamani : “ Date of Sankaracharya and some of his predecessors ”, JOR, Madras, vol. III, 1929, pp. 39-56 ; cf *Brahma-siddhi*, Ed. by S. Kuppaswamy Sastri, Introduction, p. lviii.

72. *Philosophy of the Upanishads*, p. 30.

73. He quotes a *kārikā* from Dignāga's *Ālambana-parīkṣhā* (now lost in the original but preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations) in VSB, 2, 2, 28 “ यदन्तर्ज्ञैरूपं तु बहिर्वैदवभासते । ”

74. *Bhāmātī* Introductory verse, 7 :

आचार्यकृतिनिवेशनमप्यवधूतं वचोऽस्मदादीनाम् ।
स्थोदकमिव गङ्गाप्रवाहपातः पवित्रयति ॥

CHAPTER IV

SECTION II

SOURCE-MATERIAL IN ADVAITA LITERATURE

I. ŚAMKARA'S WORK

Śamkara looks upon himself as essentially an interpreter, a 'bhāshyakāra' (commentator), although many independent 'prakaraṇas' (short tracts) are ascribed to him. His 'bhāshya' works are all in prose :

(1) On the Upaniṣads, *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.¹

These commentarial works have been annotated by a 13th century scholar, Ānanda-giri (also called Ānanda-jñāna).

(2) On Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtras*, also known as *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā-bhāshya*.² This is undoubtedly the *magnum opus* from Śamkara's pen. It is not only elaborate but an original treatise within the framework supplied by Bādarāyaṇa. There are numerous glosses and annotations on this important work of Śamkara, which will be mentioned later.

(3) On the *Bhagavad-gīta*, which is traditionally a part of the great epic, *Mahābhārata*, and as such considered as a *Smṛti*. This commentary also has been annotated by Ānanda-giri, mentioned above.³

The three together constitute what is styled as '*Prasthāna-traya*' or the three-fold source-texts. Literally '*prasthāna*' means a setting forth, a march, a departure, (*pra-sthā-lyuṭ*) ; but in a technical sense it is a system or method. The Upanishads are considered as '*śruti-prasthāna*' (the scriptural text), the Bhagavad-gītā '*smṛti-prasthāna*' (the epic text) and Bādarāyaṇa's work '*sūtra-prasthāna*' (the aphoristic text) or '*nyāya-prasthāna*' (the explanatory or argumentative text). These are the principal

source-materials for the Vedāntic viewpoint, and these have been considered as the most authoritative and basic texts. They have provided the framework within which different Vedāntic schools of thought have developed.

There are many other independent manuals in the nature of dissertations (*prakaraṇas*) that are ascribed to Śaṅkara. Many among them are matrical in form. But it is impossible to vouchsafe incontrovertible authenticity to these works. It should be noted that even the classical Advaita writers have not regarded these works as authoritative, and have refrained from quoting from them in serious discussion. An exception, however, is '*Upadeśasāhasrī*',⁴ which has been regarded as a source-material by no less an eminent author than Sureśvara (in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*). This is an immense work in two parts, the first being in prose, dealing elaborately with the practical problems of study (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), and the second being poetical, in nineteen sections. There is a fine commentary on this work by Rāmātīrtha called *Padayojanikā*; and another, an anonymous *Bodha-vidhi*. Another work ascribed to Śaṅkara, the *Daśaśloki* (the full title of the work is *Cidānanda-daśaśloki*), a short work consisting of not more than ten verses, has merited an elaborate commentary by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (around 1500 A.D.) known as *Siddhānta-bindu*, which came to be regarded as an independent philosophical text and as such evoked a large number of glosses such as Brahmānanda Sarasvatī's *Ratnāvalī*, Nārāyaṇa's *Laghuṭīkā*, Puruṣottama's *Sandhidāna* and Pūrṇānanda's *Tattva-viveka*.

Śaṅkara's main thesis concerns the unitary and abstract character of Reality (*brahman*), its all-inclusiveness and imponderability. He rejected the Buddhist idealism which inclined towards nihilism, and which denied the existence of an absolute and unchanging reality. Śaṅkara recognizes Self (*ātman*) as the sole reality, self-evident and transcendent; it is of the nature of pure consciousness. He took as his main stand experience, and argued that awareness not only suggests the presence of the

phenomenal world but also a world of subjectivity. Beyond these, however, is the self-revealed identity of pure-consciousness viz, the Self. In Śaṅkara's works, therefore, we find an elaborate analysis of consciousness. He distinguishes between pure-consciousness which is immediate (*aparoksha*), universal, unchanging and self-luminous (*svapprakāśa*), and the projected consciousness which is ego-bound, particular and dynamic. Basic to Śaṅkara's position is the dichotomy between the transcendental level of reality and the phenomenal (including the empirically real and the operatively illusory). There are different levels of reality. Closely connected with it is Śaṅkara's theory of 'superimposition' or 'projection' (*adhyāsa*): the superimposition of the objective phenomenal world as well as the subjective world on the transcendental and really non-participating Self, which he identifies with pure consciousness. Arising out of this notion of superimposition is the concept of illusoriness of the presentational world, or what in modern terminology is called the 'assumptive world', the ground for which is the fundamental, subtle, and natural confusion between the real and the unreal. In Śaṅkara's works there is a discussion of the process of projection. The chief method that he resorts to for ascertaining truth is that of 'deliberate ascription and subsequent withdrawal' (*adhyāropa-apavāda*).

The principal source-material from Śaṅkara's pen has gathered round it an immense literature ; commentaries, interpretations, and elucidations, as well as summaries. This literature which represents intense philosophical activity for more than seven centuries reveals not only an orderly development of thought, but a profound concern for the fundamental problem of human existence. There is in it a synthesis of philosophical, psychological, epistemological and axiological speculations.

II. PADMAPĀDA AND THE VIVARAṆA SCHOOL

Śaṅkara's principal works have been from time to time interpreted, explained, defended and summarized by several

eminent thinkers. Their writings are regarded as 'minor commentaries' (*vyākhyāna*). A minor commentary known as *vyākhyāna* (or *ṭīkā*) purports to annotate the original work for the benefit of the average student, and also present, or defend, a particular viewpoint with an elaborate argumentative paraphernalia. The five features of a *vyākhyāna* are: the meaningful separation of words, contextual elucidation of the meaning of each word, dissolution of the compound words into their semantic components, proper arrangement of sentences, and defence against objections raised with regard to the original text.

Among the immediate disciples of Śaṅkara, two figure prominently in philosophical literature: Padmapāda and Sureśvara. Padmapāda began writing a detailed gloss on Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on five sections of *Vedānta-sūtra*, but the extant work deals with only the first four aphorisms (in nine sections called *varṇakas*). The work, however, is called *Pañcapādikā*.⁵ This is undoubtedly the most important of the Advaita texts after Śaṅkara. Its greatness consists in having inaugurated a new line of thinking which was sustained for several generations. Among the commentaries inspired by this work, the earliest and the most illuminating has been the *Vivaraṇa* (*Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*) by Prakāśātman (around 1000 A.D.).⁶ He was a disciple of Ananyānubhava. This work can be described as the basic plank of what has been styled as the 'Vivaraṇa' point of view. The large number of glosses and annotations prepared on this work include: *Ṭīkā-ratna* (*Samanvaya-sūtra-vivṛti*) by Ānandapūrṇa (1275-1350); *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* by Bhārati-tīrtha (or Vidyāraṇya? 1350); *Rjuvivaraṇa* by Sarvajña-viṣṇu (1350, teacher of the author of *Sarvadarśana-saṃgraha*); *Tattvadīpanam* by Akhaṇḍānanda (1350)⁷ who was a disciple of the famous glossator, Ānandagiri; *Bhāva-dyotanikā* (*Vivaraṇa-tātparyadīpikā*) by the celebrated Citsukha; *Vivaraṇa-bhāvaprakāśikā* by Nṛsiṃhāśrama (around 1500 A.D.); *Vivaraṇa-darpaṇa* by Raṅgarājadhvarin (1580), father of the famous Appayya Dīkṣita; *Vivaraṇojjīvinī*

of Yajñeśvara of Veṅgināḍu (1600); and an anonymous *Vārttika*. Besides these works closely following the text of *Vivaraṇa*, there are many independent works expounding its point of view. Important among them are: *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvalī* of Ānandānubhava (12th century); *Vedānta-kaumudī* of Rāmādvaya (1300, which also occasionally assimilates the Bhāmatī viewpoint, and which has an annotation by Śeṣa-nṛsimha); *Tattvaśuddhi* by Jñānaghana; and *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (*Tātparyasaṃgraha*) by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī.⁸

However, the work that became as famous as the *Vivaraṇa* was *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*,⁹ which, contrary to the suggestion in the title, is a voluminous work. The authorship of this work is rather uncertain. Some ascribe it to Vidyāraṇya and others to Bhāratī-tīrtha. Perhaps it is a combined work, as *Pañcadaśī* also is reputed to be.

The other commentaries on *Pañcapādikā* include *Vedānta-ratna-kośa* (*Pañcapādikā-ṭīkā*) by Nṛsimhāśrama (1500, also called Nṛsimhāśramin, disciple of Jagannāthāśrama, author of a commentary on *Vivaraṇa* and several independent treatises like *Bheda-dhikkāra*¹⁰ and *Advaitatattva-viveka*¹¹); *Pañcapādikā-darpaṇa* by Amalānanda; *Tātparya-dyotini* by Dharmarājadhvarin (17th century author of the celebrated *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*; *Pañcapādikā-ṭīkā* by Ānandapūrṇa, *Kaṇṭhīrava* by Vijñānavara, a *vyākhyā* by Vijñānavāsa-yati and a *Vivaraṇa* by Narendragiri. Most of these works have receded to the background by the celebrity attained by the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Saṃgraha*.

Padmapāda's interpretation of Śaṅkara furnished the model on which Prakāśātman constructed an elaborate, integrated and original thought-system, known as the '*Vivaraṇa-prasthāna*'. Its essential orientation is psychological and ontological. It claims to follow closely Śaṅkara's argument of 'superimposition' (*adhyāsa*), but makes some significant departures. Reality is one, absolute and is of the nature of pure consciousness. The material basis for the transactional world of appearance and multiplicity is nescience (*avidyā*), which is superimposed on the Real. For

Padmapāda, *avidyā*, *ajñāna* (ignorance), *māyā* (creative power), *prakṛti* (nature), *avyakta* (unmanifest), *agrahaṇa* (non-apprehension), *tamas* (darkness), and *nidrā* (sleep) are terms which are synonymous. They all refer to some inscrutable power, material in nature, which is located in the Absolute Real (*brahman*). It is responsible for the self-hood (*jīvatva*) which distinguishes each one of us. This nescience conceals the Real and distorts consciousness. It makes for the presentational world, which is essentially unreal, as well as the modes of consciousness such as the ego, which are also fundamentally unreal. Padmapāda interprets rather uniquely Śaṅkara's expression '*mithyājñāna*' to mean "false (*mithyā*) nescience (*ajñāna*)" : by 'false' he understands indeterminateness as well as negation, and by 'nescience' a material energy.

The Vivaraṇa school is distinguished by its theory of reflection (*pratibimba-vāda*), on the model of the face being reflected in the mirror. This model has been employed in the context of explaining the relationship between the Absolute Real and the individual self which represents the phenomenal presentation. The world flashes forth from the primary nescience (*avidyā*) in the form of the subtle seed of multiplicity, and the Absolute Real as a witness is reflected in it, as the moon in several stretches of water. Although the reflecting medium is material and inert, the reflection (individual self) is of the nature of consciousness. An important aspect of this view is the identity of self as reflection with the Absolute Real.

Padmapāda points out the possibility of one's being aware of oneself without the instrumentation of mind. He argues that consciousness itself is of the nature of illumination : one lamp does not need another lamp to show it. Mind (*antahkaraṇa*) is a function of nescience, as life (*prāṇa*) is. Padmapāda has given us an elaborate account of the perpetual process as distinctive of the mind's function. While mind is an active expression of nescience, the nescience remains subliminal and inoperative in deep sleep. Padmapāda has made a detailed analysis of model consciousness in wakefulness, dream and sleep.

III. SUREŚVARA'S POSITION

Sureśvara, another immediate disciple of Śaṅkara, is famous as the author of *Vārttikas*. A *Vārttika* is a metrical work that proposes to inquire into not only what has been explicitly said, but what has been left unsaid and what has been inadequately or improperly said.¹² It is not merely an interpretative work; it is almost in the nature of an independent work, but following a line of thought already enunciated and widely accepted. Sureśvara wrote two great *Vārttikas*, one on Śaṅkara's 'bhāṣya' on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*¹³ and another on *Taittirīya-upaniṣad*.¹⁴ The former, which is more voluminous, is an important source material (comprising more than 11,150 verses). It is preceded by an elaborate inquiry into the relation between ritualistic action and the liberating wisdom. It is known as the *Saṁbandha-vārttika* (called in the colophon, *Saṁbandha-bhāṣya*)¹⁵ and is a brilliant achievement; it consists of 1,136 verses. The *Vārttika* has several glosses, *Śāstra-prakāśikā* by Ānandagiri (Ānanda-jñāna), *Nyāya-kalpalatikā* by Ānanda-pūrṇa, *Nyāya-tattva-vivaraṇa* and *Āraṇyavṛtti-saṁbandhōkti*. The first two have been summarised by Vidyāraṇya in his *Vārttika-sāra*, which was later abridged by Maheśa-tīrtha in his *Laghu-saṁgraha*.

Sureśvara also wrote an independent work *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, which is justly celebrated as a masterly treatise of the Advaitic viewpoint. The work which is metrical in form in four chapters appears to be intended as a criticism of the view expounded by Maṇḍana in his *Brahma-siddhi* that wisdom and rituals were together necessary for liberation. This work has several commentaries, the earliest being *Candrikā* by Jñānottama. The other commentaries are *Vidyā-surabhī* of Jñānāmṛta, *Vivaraṇa* of Akhilātman, and *Sārārtha* of Rāmadatta. A gloss that has made use of Jñānottama's work extensively is Citsukha's *Bhāva-tattva-prakāśikā*. Sureśvara was intimately acquainted with Śaṅkara's position and was in perfect sympathy with it. He

argues in this work that the Upanishadic texts provide us with, not mediate knowledge, but direct intuitive insight into Brahman, while not abandoning the primary sense of the textual words (*jahallakṣaṇa*).

It is understandable and evident that Sureśvara closely follows Śaṅkara's line of thinking. Nescience, according to him, is the non-realization of the one Absolute Real. Like his contemporary Padmapāda, he too regards *avidyā* and *māyā* as synonymous expressions. As its aspects, he talks of non-knowledge (*ajñāna*), wrong-knowledge (*mithyā-jñāna*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*). The first aspect conceals the Real and the second projects the phenomenal world; they came to be designated respectively as *āvaraṇa* and *vikshepa* in later Advaitic thought. The first aspect refers to its nature, while the second and third point out its functions. Nescience is located in the Absolute Real which is also its object; the individual self cannot be its locus or object, as it is itself a creature of nescience. The nescience without its projective aspect can be experienced in deep sleep. However, nescience itself is a mere presentation, and the Real is not actually involved in it. It is a matter of appearance only (*ābhāsa*). He does not appear to favour the view (Padmapāda's) that nescience constitutes the material basis for this appearance. Sureśvara's main contribution consists in the employment of the traditional inquiry into the three conditions of the phenomenal self (waking, dream and sleep) supplementary to inner vision or intuition. Deep sleep suggested to him the lapse of nescience for the time being, and hence positive experience of self-hood. He held that such intuitive wisdom and emancipation are indistinguishable. Sureśvara in his *Vārttika* also inquires exhaustively into the value and limitations of the sources of common valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). While they are doubtless of value in so far as the transactional world (which is real until the realisation, *avicārīta-saṁsiddha*) is concerned, they are of no value whatever where the Real is concerned, because their value is confined to the phenomenal appearance.

IV. VĀCASPATI AND THE BHĀMATĪ SCHOOL

Vācaspati (around 840 A.D.) exerted very great influence in systematizing the Advaitic concepts. This was in part due to the fact that it is only his commentary among early works that covers the entire text of Śaṅkara's *VSB*. Padmapāda's work, as we have seen, does not even go through the whole of the first *pāda*; and Suresvara did not attempt a commentary on *VSB* at all. Vācaspati hailed from Mithilā and was a contemporary of some unidentified king Nṛga. He was a student of Trilocana and Mārthāṇḍatilaka-svāmi. He was an expert in all six systems of Indian philosophy, and has written treatises on each one of them. In the field of Vedānta, his *Bhāmatī* on Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*¹⁶ and *Brahmatattva-samīkṣā* on Maṇḍanamīśra's *Brahma-siddhi* are well known, although it is only the former that has come down to us. *Bhāmatī* has an important sub-commentary known as *Vedānta-kalpataru* by Amalānanda (1217–1260). This in turn has two glosses, *Kalpataru-parimalā* by Appayya-dīkṣita (around 1550), who was the author of as many as 400 works, and *Ābhoga* by Lakṣmīnṛsiṃha (17th century).¹⁷ Of these two, *Kalpataru* became more popular, obviously because of the author's celebrity, and in course of time there were minor commentaries written on this work, like *Vedāntakalpataru-maṅjarī* (or *Parimalārtha-saṃgraha* of Tāraka-brahmāśrama). The other commentary, *Ābhoga* has attracted little attention. Although apparently inspired by *Parimalā*, this work criticizes *Parimalā* often, and follows relatively an independent line of thinking. The author was an inhabitant of the Kriṣṇā delta in Āndhra-pradesh, and was the son of Koṇḍa-bhaṭṭa. Besides *Ābhoga*, he seems to have written another work called *Tarka-pradīpa*. It has been customary in the South to study the 'five books of Vedānta' (*Vedānta-pañca-granthī*): Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtra*, Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya*, *Bhāmatī*, *Kalpataru* and *Parimalā*.

There are other commentaries on *Bhāmatī* like *Bhāmatī-tilaka* by Alīlāla-sūri (around 1700); *Rjuprakāśikā* by Akhaṇḍānanda-

yati, which is a simple gloss closely following *Kalpataru* ; *Bhāmatī-bhāvadīpikā* by Acyuta-kṛṣṇa-tīrtha, who also wrote a commentary on *Siddhānta-leśa* and *Taittirīya-bhāṣya* ; *Bhāmatī-vyākhyā* by Śrīraṅgarāja ; and an anonymous *Bhāmatyukti-saṁgraha*.

The crystallization of the Advaita standpoint for popular edification was undertaken mainly by Vācaspati-miśra, Ānandagiri (about the middle of the 13th century) and Govindānanda (14th century). Ānandagiri (Ānanda-jñāna) was a monastic pupil of Śuddhānanda. He probably belonged to Gujarat, and his earlier name is said to have been Janārdana. He is variously described as having been the pontiff at Dwārakā and Kāñcī. He prepared faithful and helpful glosses, most of them called *Ṭippanas* on all the important works of Śaṁkara, and on the *Vārttikas* of Sureśvara. His gloss on Śaṁkara's *VSB*, is known as *Nyāyanirṇaya*, and the one on the *BGB* as *Vivecana*. He is also reputed to have written *Vivṛti* on Śaṁkara's *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*. An independent philosophical text called *Tattvāloka* is also ascribed to him. He appears to follow in essential details Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī*. This work was continued in *Bhāṣya-ratnaprabhā* ascribed to Govindānanda. The real author of this short commentarial work was Rāmānanda, who ascribed the contents of the book to his teacher, Govindānanda. This work which is of great help to the students follows Ānandagiri closely. There is a commentary on this work by Pūrṇānanda which continues only as far as the fourth 'sūtra'; another commentary by Acyuta-kṛṣṇānandatīrtha also closes with the fourth 'sūtra'. There seems to have been a prevalent view that the first four 'sūtras' (*Catussūtrī*) contained the essence of the entire work, and that all relevant topics for discussion occur in them. There are many commentaries and annotations covering only this portion of Śaṁkara's *VSB*. Although Vācaspati wrote his *Bhāmatī* on the entire work, it is more usual to study only the *Catussūtrī* portion thereof.

Vācaspati's position differs in many details from Sureśvara's as well as Padmapāda's, and he has adopted Maṇḍana's views to a considerable extent (although he differs from him in some

details, as for instance, with regard to the utility of ritualistic action after the 'desire to know Brahman' arises). It would appear that he was interested in reconciling the views of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara, as, for instance, with regard to the status of God (*Īśvara*). That status in Maṇḍana's thought is almost insignificant, while Śaṅkara affords God a highly relevant status in his scheme. Vācaspati very ably effects a compromise on this issue. The Bhāmatī viewpoint may be considered to be an attempt to revive the most relevant contributions of Maṇḍana, taking a stand quite distinct from either Sureśvara's or Padmapāda's, and render them more meaningful within the grand model provided by Śaṅkara. This is especially significant in view of the fact that Sureśvara set himself severely against Maṇḍana. Among the notions taken directly from Maṇḍana and bodily incorporated in Śaṅkara's brand of Advaita was that the nescience (which is only an efficient cause of phenomena) has the individual self (*jīva*) as its locus and object, and not pure consciousness (or the Absolute Real). Nescience is both positive and indeterminable; and it is individualized or specific to selves. Vācaspati holds, as Maṇḍana held, that nescience is diverse in accordance with the plurality of individual selves. There are as many nesciences as there are individual selves; this view is opposed to the *Vivaraṇa* view that individualizations are only modal variations. Both Maṇḍana and Vācaspati accept two kinds of nescience: Psychological and Phenomenological. And explaining the relation between the Absolute Real and the individual self, Vācaspati postulates the theory of limitation (*avaccheda-vāda*), on the model of the jar limiting the space within it from the space around. One can see that all this is out of tune with Sureśvara's line of thought.

Further, Vācaspati denies that the scriptural passages can directly produce intuitive insight (Sureśvara's position); he emphasizes the need for contemplation (*nididhyāsana*). The value of ritualistic action is exhausted by the arousal of 'the desire to know Brahman'. The content of intuitive wisdom is the Absolute

as enveloped by mind, which, in Vācaspati's view, is a sense-function. Hence he underlines the importance of mind as the means of attaining the essential unity of the individual self with the Absolute Real. The notion of the 'enveloped Absolute' (*upahita-brahma*) is an interesting one in Vācaspati's theory. It can be noticed that the Bhāmatī viewpoint differs from the *Vivaraṇa* viewpoint on all these issues.

V. SARVAJÑĀTMAN

Among the independent treatises purporting to be commentaries on Śaṅkara's *VSB*, *Samkṣhepa-Śārīraka*¹⁸ by Sarvajñātman holds a pre-eminent position. This is a poetical work of 1240 verses in various metres arranged in four chapters, following the four topics of the *Brahma-sūtra*. He is generally supposed to have been a native of Gāndhāra and a disciple of the great Sureśvara, though 'Deveśvara' to whom he refers in the work is not the 'Sureśvara' of *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and *Vārttika* fame, but a disciple of some Devānanda who lived in Trivandrum around 1000 A.D. His name occurs in the Śrīrgerī pontifical list, after Sureśvara, as Nityabodha-ghana. He is supposed to have been for some time the pontiff of Kāñcī-Kāmokoṭī.

This work is at once eminently readable and profound, and makes many original and bold contributions within the general Advaitic framework. There are several glosses on it, like *Siddhānta-dīpikā* by Viśva-veda which was the earliest; the detailed *Tattva-bōdhinī* by Nṛsimhāśrama (the author of a commentary on *Pañcapādikā*, already mentioned); *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā* by Pāmatirtha (around 1600), closely following Viśvaveda's works; *Bhāva-prakāśa* by Prāgviṣṇu; *Sāra-saṁgraha* by the great Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (on the lines of the works of Viśvaveda and Prāgviṣṇu); and *Subōdhinī* by Agnicit-purushottama. There is also an anonymous (sometimes given as Vedānanda's) annotation known as *Sambandhōkti*. Sarvajñātman is said to be the author of another work, *Pañca-prakriyā* (in five sections), which was perhaps intended as a summary of *Samkṣhepa-śārīraka*. How-

ever, the bulk of this work is devoted to the interpretation of the *Mahāvākyas*.

Sarvajñātman undertook to enunciate correctly and clearly all the major issues tackled by Śaṅkara, and sought to fix the exact import of the five fundamental concepts in Advaita—*sākshī*, witness; *Īśvara*, God; *avidyā*, nescience; *jīva*, the individual self; and *jagat*, the phenomenal world, in proper perspective. But his general orientation appears to be in favour of an integration of the approaches of Sureśvara and Padmapāda. He argues that the locus of nescience can only be the Absolute Real, for the individual self is but consequent on nescience. As regards the nature of 'witness', he subscribes (like Sureśvara) to the theory of utter unrelatedness (*ajāta-vāda*). And he regards nescience as unitary, and spells out the view that the individual self also is one (*ekajīva-vāda*). However, in order to explain the relation between God (associated with the projective power of nescience) and the individual self, he prefers the 'reflection theory' of Padmapāda to the 'appearance theory' of Sureśvara. He confirms Sureśvara's thesis regarding the capacity of the scriptural texts to produce directly the intuitive knowledge of the Absolute Real. An important contribution of Sarvajñātman consists in the distinction he has drawn between 'support' (*ādhāra*) and 'substratum' (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The former, which sustains a series of phenomenal appearances, is itself not real but wrongly imagined to discharge that function. The latter, however, is the pure and tranquil 'witness', altogether unaffected by the phenomenal presentations. Sarvajñātman's analysis of phenomenal consciousness, explanation of deep sleep as direct experience, and theory of reciprocity of superimposition (*parasparādhyāsa*) are of great value in the scientific appraisal of Vedānta.

VI. ŚRĪ-HARṢA AND CITSUKHA

An interesting figure in the history of Advaita thought was Śrīharṣa (around 1150 A.D.) who was also a great poet (author of *Naishadha-carita*). He appears to have hailed from Bengal

and was in the court of the king of Kanouj, probably Jayachandra. His dialectic skill and brilliance of exposition are illustrated in his voluminous *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakāḍya*, (also called *Anirvacanīya-sarvasva* because he establishes the doctrine of indescribability of phenomenal existence, refuting all possible arguments against it),¹⁹ which is primarily a disputational exercise. He claims to have made this work deliberately difficult in order to teach a lesson to those who arrogantly imagine themselves clever and think that they have no use for a teacher. The treatise is indeed a brain teaser: but there are helpful commentaries on it by Paramānanda, Bhavanātha, Raghunātha-śirōmaṇi and Citsukha. The dialectical approach that he perfected found an able exponent in Citsukha, whose philosophical insight was better and whose style of writing was not so formidable as Śrīharṣa's.

Citsukha (c. 1220 A.D.) is an important writer whose *Tattva-pradīpikā*²⁰ in four chapters (also called *Citsukhī*) is justly celebrated as an able defence of Advaita thought. He was a disciple of Gauḍa-jñānottama (Satyānanda) of uncertain identity but himself a Vedāntic writer. He is said to be the author of *Advaya-siddhi* supposedly a defence of the 'Śabdādvaita' argument of Bhartṛhari. Citsukha probably hailed from Āndhra country for he was a devotee of Narasimha of Siṃhācala. He was a prolific writer; besides the commentary on Śrīharṣa's treatise, he wrote a gloss on Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* entitled *Bhāṣyabhāva-prakāśikā*, as well as an index of topics dealt with in the *Sūtra*, *Adhikaraṇa-mañjarī*, along with several other works. He wrote commentaries also on *Naishkarmya-siddhi* (Suresvara) and *Nyāya-makaranda* (Ānandabōdha). There is an excellent commentary on *Tattvapradīpikā* called *Nayana-prasādinī* by one Pratyagrūpa or Pratyag-bhagavān (c. 1400 A.D.). It can be seen that Citsukha followed in the main the *Vivaraṇa* viewpoint.

Śrīharṣa's treatise is neatly divided into two parts: a prologue (*bhūmikā*) and the refutation of logical arguments, categories and definitions of realistic and dualistic schools,

especially the *Nyāya*. The purpose of the dialectician is to prove that the phenomenal world is a mere unreal presentation. He also brings into bold relief the distinction between nihilism and Advaita. Citsukha has much the same achievement to his credit; and he contributes greatly to the crystallization of one of the core-concepts of Advaita, viz, the self-luminosity of the Self, whose essential nature is consciousness. His *Tattva-pradīpikā* is a brilliant book, and makes numerous positive suggestions towards understanding the psychological involvements of Advaita.

Of the several standard works on which Citsukha has written commentaries, Ānandabōdha's *Nyāya-makaranda*²¹ in thirteen sections is of particular interest. Ānandabōdha wrote two other works *Pramāṇa-mālā* and *Nyāya-dīpāvalī*. The common approach in all these works is defence of Advaita by the employment of logical categories. *Nyāya-makaranda*, in particular, directs its attention towards establishing Advaita as a consistent, broad-based and positive system; it seeks to resolve the differences within the system in addition to combating the attack from outside, especially from dualistic schools. It follows the Mīmāṃsā method of analysis and argument. Interesting is his attempt to integrate the two kinds of causality (efficient and material) in transfiguration (*vivarta*); his comparative consideration of the theory of 'error' while supporting the 'indeterminability' theory (*anirvacanīya*) is likewise a fascinating study. He establishes by reasoning that the phenomenal presentation is entirely founded on the Absolute Real. The method he has adopted in *Nyāya-dīpāvalī* to ascertain the reality of the phenomenal world appears to have provided the model for the approach of Madhusūdana-sarasvatī in his famous *Advaita-siddhi*.

VII. THE SIDDHI-WORKS

An interesting complex of Advaitic works can be called 'Siddhi' literature. There are six well-known works, whose titles end with 'siddhi', an expression meaning the establishment of a doctrinal standpoint after investigation and discussion. The model

perhaps was provided by the celebrated work of Vasubandhu, *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*, a Buddhist treatise seeking to establish that bare consciousness was the sole reality. In the Vedāntic field, the earliest work of this nature was Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*,²² which in due course was followed by nearly twenty 'siddhi' works. Maṇḍana himself wrote another 'siddhi' work, '*Sphoṭa-siddhi*' arguing in favour of the Sphoṭa-theory, which was vigorously attacked by Śaṅkara. Maṇḍana was a senior contemporary of Śaṅkara, and a younger contemporary of Prabhākara, whose *Bṛhatī* has been criticized in this work. Although he sets out to establish scriptural authority, he holds that scriptural knowledge can only be indirect; repeated contemplation (*prasaṅkhyāna*) holds the key to liberation. He also formulates the Advaitic standpoint; he argues that Brahman is the only reality, and postulates nescience which hides him and which projects the phenomenal world. This work is in four chapters, dealing with Brahman, reasoning, instruction and accomplishment. His chief sources are the Upaniṣads, *Bhagavad-gītā* and Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtras*. Vācaspati, the commentator on Śaṅkara, is said to have written a commentary also on this work known as *Tattva-samīkṣā* (now lost). It is well-known that Vācaspati has attempted to reconcile the views of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara. Maṇḍana's theory of dual *avidyā* as well as his argument that the individual self (*jīva*) is the locus and object of *avidyā* have been adopted by Vācaspati, a position severely contended by other Advaitins. Citsukha's *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā* is another commentary on this work. The other commentaries are *Bhāva-śuddhi* by Ānanda-pūrṇa (Vidyāsāgara) and *Vyākhyā* by Śaṅkhapāṇi.

The second 'siddhi' was the famous *Naīṣkarmya-siddhi*²³ of Sureśvara, who was a direct disciple of Śaṅkara. An account of this work has already been given. It must be mentioned that Citsukha wrote *Bhāvatattva-prakāśikā* as a commentary on this work.

The third was Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi* (around 1200 A.D.)²⁴ in eight sections, expounding the concept of nescience

(*avidyā*) and discussing the theories of error. It is essentially an epistemological work and its interest lies in the two-fold view regarding the nature of the elimination of nescience (*avidyā-nivṛtti*) that it presents : that it is the 'fifth' mode (other than the four : real, unreal, real and unreal, and unspeakable) which can be eliminated by knowledge ; and that it is tantamount to the knowledge of the Absolute (*vidyā*) or the Pure Self. Vimuktātman's student, Ānandabodha (author of *Nyāya-makaranda*) accepted the former view while Citsukha favoured the latter view. Elimination of nescience, he argues, is as indescribable as nescience itself. This work also explains transfiguration (*vivarta*) as the coordination of the two kinds of causality : efficient and material. And the nescience has been regarded in this work as both subjective and objective (involving all phenomena), thus controverting Maṇḍana's view that it is only subjective. Vimuktātman was a disciple of Avyayātman.

It would appear that for a long time these three *siddhis* were the only ones that held the field. So says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (around 1500 A.D.), the author of the fourth 'siddhi' work, *Advaita-siddhi*.²⁵ There is a traditional suggestion that Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi* establishes Brahman as reality (*sat*), Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* establishes Brahman as pure consciousness (*cit*), Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi* argues that Brahman is of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*), and that Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*, following as the fourth, seeks to formulate Brahman as all three at once (*saccidānanda*).

However, *Advaita-siddhi* is essentially a polemic work, answering the criticisms levelled on Advaita by Vyāsātīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta*. This voluminous work enjoyed great popularity during the centuries that followed, partly because of the celebrity of the author and partly because the work attempts a grand synthesis of different viewpoints prevalent in Advaita. It follows the line indicated by Citsukha.

Madhusūdana, perhaps a native of Bengal, was a disciple of Viśveśvara Sarasvatī. He was a prolific writer, and more

than ten works from his pen have been influential in moulding the thought and argument of subsequent writers. His chief celebrity rests on his valiant attempt to reconcile devotion (*bhakti*) with Advaita, especially in his *Bhakti-rasāyana* and his gloss on Śāṇḍilya's *Sūtras*. His commentary on Śaṅkara's *Daśa-śloki*, is regarded, as already mentioned, almost as an independent treatise: *Siddhānta-bindu*. He also prepared a summary and explanation of Sarvajñātman's *Samkshepa-śārīraka*. A well-known commentary on *Advaita-siddhi* has been *Laghu-Candrikā* by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī of the Gauḍa region (the work is celebrated as *Gauḍa-Brahmānandī*). There is an elaborate gloss on this commentary by Viṭṭhaleśa-upādhyāya. There is also another commentary (called merely *Vyākhyā*), by Madhusūdana's own student Balabhadra. There are two other minor commentaries, *Upanyāsa* and *Ṭīkā*, on this great work.

Closely following the structure of *Advaita-siddhi*, but not so voluminous or original is Sadānanda-yati's *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*. Sadānanda, whose *Vedānta-sāra*²⁶ has been popular as a primer among students of Advaita-Vedānta, was probably a junior contemporary of Madhusūdana. His 'siddhi' is principally a defence of Advaita against attacks by Vedāntins of different persuasions. Like Madhusūdana, Sadānanda also seeks to evolve a compromise between divergent views held in the Advaita field. An important contribution of Sadānanda in this work is the distinction he draws between the idealism of Yogācāra Buddhists (who deny objective reality altogether) and the idealism of Śaṅkara (who recognises objective reality independent of subjective processes).

A more recent 'siddhi' work is *Svārājya-siddhi*²⁷ by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (around 1826 A.D.). This work is brief and metrical; it is essentially a description of the state of liberation. There is a commentary on this work called *Kaivalya-kalpadruma*.

VIII. RĀMĀDVAYA AND VIDYĀRĀṆYA

Two important thinkers who flourished around 1300 A.D. are Rāmādvaya and Vidyārāṇya. Rāmādvaya, who was an

earlier writer, is the author of *Vedānta-kaumudī* (with his own commentary *Bhāvadīpikā*), an important work in the field of Advaita.²⁸ Dr. S. N. Dasgupta rightly feels that this work is very much under the influence of the author of *Prakaṭārtha*, who, according to this authority, lived in the latter half of the twelfth century.²⁹ *Prakaṭārtha* or *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa*,³⁰ whose authorship is anonymous, is in the nature of a commentary on Śaṅkara's *VSB*. It is found to criticize Vācaspati frequently. The work traces the source of the phenomenal world to the association (*saṁbandha*) of indeterminable *māyā* with pure consciousness (*cinmātra*); nescience for him is the material cause, and, as such, positive. It distinguishes between *māyā* (which influences God or *Īśvara*) and *ajñāna* (which influences the individual self or *jīva*). In Rāmādvaya's *Vedānta-kaumudī*, we find a detailed treatment of the perceptual process, following the scheme provided in *Prakaṭārtha*. This treatment accords with the *Vivaraṇa* theory of perception. Rāmādvaya's work reveals an acceptance of Kumārila's views regarding self-validation of knowledge and a rejection of the views found in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* (Dharmarāja) concerning valid knowledge. His work abounds in epistemological and psychological insights.

There is some confusion about the identity of the author (authors) of two important works on Advaita Vedānta: *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha* and *Pañcadaśī*. Tradition has ascribed the former to Bhārati-tīrtha and the latter to Vidyāraṇya; it also indicates that Bhārati-tīrtha was the teacher of Vidyāraṇya. There is also a supposition that the two together composed *Pañcadaśī* (the five *viveka* sections by Bhārati-tīrtha and the rest by Vidyāraṇya). But there is an increasing suspicion that the two names referred to the same person. Whatever the truth, Śaṅkarānanda was the teacher of the author (or authors) of these two works. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha*, as we have seen earlier, is an independent gloss on *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* and an important core-text for the Vivaraṇa School. It is obviously a work meant for scholars; the style is learned and presentation of topics rather terse.

Pañcadaśī,³¹ on the other hand has become a popular manual of Advaita-Vedānta over centuries. A book in fifteen chapters (as the title indicates), it is written in a lucid style, and the major topics of Advaita Vedānta are dealt with in a perfectly edifying manner. While *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* is definitely a partisan exercise, *Pañcadaśī* is more broad-based. Although following *Vivaraṇa* in the main, it accommodates the views of other authorities also, especially Sarvajñātman. It may be seen that the individual selves are regarded here as appearances of pure consciousness (*cidābhāsa*), as Sureśvara held. The analysis of 'witness' consciousness is not only elaborate but eclectic. There have been several commentaries and glosses on this work, widely used among which are those of Rāmakṛṣṇa (*Tātparya-bodhinī*) and Niṣcaladāsa (*Vṛtti-prabhākara*). Three other works, *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā*, *Anubhūti-prakāśa* and *Jīvanmuktiviveka*³³ are also generally ascribed to the authorship of the author(s) of *Pañcadaśī*.

IX. RECENT ADVAITA LITERATURE

Besides the standard and widely read commentaries and glosses on Śaṅkara's *VSB* mentioned above, there are others which are also of considerable importance and interest : *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, a short work by Citsukha following *Bhāmātī* and *Vivaraṇa* ; *Brahmasūtra-dīpikā* by Śaṅkarānanda (1330), who was a disciple of Vidyā-tīrtha and a teacher of Vidyāraṇya and who has written *Vṛttis* on all the *Upanishads*, *Gītā* and the *Sūtra-bhāṣya* ; *Vidyāśrī* by Jñānottama who was a disciple of Jñānaghana (around 1000 A.D., this is a commentary only on the first two *pādas*) ; *Brahmavidyābharana*,³⁴ a careful and insightful work by Cidvilāsa (Advaitānanda Sarasvatī, a pontiff at Kāñcī) ; *Prakṛtārtha-vivaraṇa*, a deep study by Anubhūtiśvarūpa ; *Adhikaraṇa-ratnamālā* (*Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā*) by Mādhava (1333 A.D., the author of *Veda-bhāṣya*) ; *Subodhinī* by Rāmachandrayati, a work in easy and lucid style covering only the first four 'sūtras' ; *Śārīraka-nyāyarakṣamaṇi* by Appayya-dīkṣita (around 1572, this work covers only the first adhyāya of the 'sūtra' follow-

ing *Bhāmatī*); *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣya-vārttika* by Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī, a disciple of Govindānanda (the author of *Ratna-prabhā*), which is only a gloss despite the title; *Vedāntasūtra-vyākhyā* (*Chando-ṭīkā*) by Sanmitra-bhava of Mithilā (during the days of the emperor Shahjahan); *Nyāyamañjarī* by Appayya Dikṣita (around 1572, a work of 182 verses in different metres); *Śaṅkara-pādabhūṣaṇa-prakāśikā* by Subrahmaṇyaṅgicī; *Kutūhalam* by Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (an explanation for the first 24 sūtras); *Padayojanā* (*Brahmāmṛtavarṣiṇī*) by Sadāśivendra, a disciple of Svayamprakāśa; *Vedānta-bhāṣya-pratipadyāni* by the great grammarian Nageśa-bhaṭṭa; *Sūtrārtha-cintāmaṇī* (a poetical work) by Vāñcheśvara (author of the well-known *Mahiṣa-śataka*); and *Advaita-prakāśa* by Durgāprasāda-yati (in nine sections in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his pupil). There are several *vṛttis* among which may be mentioned *Sūtra-vṛtti* by Śaṅkarānanda, *Mitāksharā* by the great logician Annambhaṭṭa (around 1650, following *Bhāmatī*), *Tattvaparakāśikā* (*Laghu-sūtra-vṛtti*) by Sadāśiva-brahmendra (1800), *Advaitasūtrārtha-paddhati* by Kṛṣṇādvadhūta Paṇḍita (a writer of Mādhva persuasion who has given faithful exposition of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita also), and the works of Vijñānendra (*Vākya-vṛtti*), Rāmakiṅkara, Brahmānanda (*Muktāvalī*), and Subrahmaṇya-kavi (*Ratnāvalī*). Among recent writers on the Advaitic presentation of *Brahma-sūtra* the noteworthy are: Kuraṅgulam Kṛṣṇa-śāstrī (*Brahma-sūtrānugūṇya-vṛtti*), Venkaṭarāghava-śāstrī (*Bhāṣyagāmbhīrya-nirṇayamaṇḍana*), Raghunātha-śāstrī (*Vedāntanyāya-mālikā*), and Nūraṇi Anantakṛṣṇa-śāstrī (*Śārīraka-bhāṣya-ṭippaṇi*).

X. PRAKĀŚĀNANDA

Prakāśānanda (early 16th century) enjoys a peculiar position in the history of Advaitic thought. His *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*³⁵ is a bold attempt to push the argument of superimposition to an extreme degree. He attacked valiantly the citadel of traditional Advaita theories and alienated the sympathy of most of the Śaṅkarites. In a bid to formulate the strict theory of nescience, he brought Advaita dangerously close to the

subjective idealism of Vijñānavāda Buddhists. He held the strange view (altogether unsupported by Śaṅkara or by other classical Advaita authors) that things of the world exist only as long as they are perceived. The world does not exist when not cognized ; and the object is not independent of our awareness of it (*pratīti*). Consciousness, however, is ever-present, and is the sole reality. He did not accept the usual Advaitic explanation of the phenomenal world as 'transformation' (*vivarta*): according to him, it was only meant as a 'teaching aid for beginners' (little children, *bālavutyupatti prayojanatvāt*). It is to be remembered that generally Advaita would accept the theory of 'modification' (*pariṇāma*) as preliminary to 'transformation' (*vivarta*), which alone matters. Prakāśānanda rejects this position. Neither the Absolute Real nor nescience can in any sense be regarded as responsible for the world, which in reality does not at all exist. Nescience is merely subjective, which disappears like mist when the sun of realization dawns.

This view is technically known as '*dr̥ṣṭi-sṛṣṭi*' theory, the theory that things arise when perceived and disappear when not perceived. Prakāśānanda relentlessly controverts the earlier thinkers in the field of Advaita, especially Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman ; and though he cites Sureśvara approvingly he derives his inspiration from Maṇḍana. Dasgupta traces the influence of *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (which reads more like a *Vijñānavāda* than an Advaitic text) in prakāśānanda's work.³⁶ There is a commentary on this work by Nānā-dīkṣita, known as *Siddhānta-pradīpikā*, where it is mentioned that the pupils and followers of Prakāśānanda filled the entire country. But the fact is that Prakāśānanda's work was generally ignored by subsequent generations of thinkers. Among the few writers that have bothered to refer to him, Appayya-dīkṣita was perhaps the only one that is noteworthy. We know very little about Prakāśānanda. It is claimed that he was a pupil of Advaitānanda, who wrote *Brahmavidyābharaṇa* as a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya*. Besides *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Prakāśānanda has written several

Tāntrik manuals : *Tantrarāja-ṭīkā*, *Manoramā*, *Mahālakṣmī-paddhati* and *Tārā-bhakti-taraṅgiṇī*. It is only the last mentioned work that has acquired some measure of celebrity.

XI. COMPROMISES

Although different viewpoints have been foisted on the basic framework of Śaṅkara's Advaita, the essential argument of the unity of the Absolute Real despite the apparent presentation of the phenomenal world has persisted. The chief areas of controversy have been mainly psychological, and attempts have been made to reconcile the differences and evolve compromise positions. Outstanding among them are Sadānanda's *Vedānta-sāra*, Dharmarāja-adhvani's *Vedānta-paribhāṣa*³⁷ (an excellent epistemological handbook, dealing with the six means of valid knowledge accepted in Advaita, and clearly formulating some of the main ideas of Advaita-Vedānta), Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi* and Appayya-dīkṣita's *Siddhānta-leśa saṁgraha*³⁸ (where an account of divergent views has been given).

It is unfortunate that barring the major source-books, much of Advaita literature has not as yet appeared in print. Valuable commentaries, glosses and independent manuals are in hundreds, but most of them are buried in manuscript collections here and there. The remarkable feature of many of these commentaries and manuals is the originality of thinking alongside an incisive analysis. One will discover that within Advaita there are broad but not absolute agreements. In this context, their publication is an urgent need in order to reconstruct the development of core-concepts in Advaita.

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CSS	Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
NSP	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press
SBT	Sarasvatī Bhavan Texts
SVVP	Śrī Vāṇivilāsa Press
TPH	Theosophical Publishing House
UOL	University Oriental Library
VSS	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series

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CHAPTER II

SECTION III

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. SUBJECTIVISM IN INDIAN THOUGHT

Science and philosophy are concerned with explaining and understanding reality. Explanations involve the determination of causal relationships, while understanding refers to the role of reality in the behaviour of individuals.¹ The former claims an adherence to objectivity, but the latter concedes a subjective organisation of what Sherrington would call 'the exteroceptor field'. The restriction of science to explanation has resulted in a near crisis in the field of science, especially in the sciences dealing with human behaviour ; and a heavy subjective bias for understanding has rendered philosophy rather obsolete in the modern context. It is being increasingly realized that the world is neither strictly objective, nor merely subjective. The current phenomenological expression, 'life-world' (Lebenswelt),² describes the proper subject-matter of scientific and philosophical inquiry adequately. It eliminates the errors of both 'psychologism' and 'objectivism', which are both essentially belief-systems.

It is interesting that Indian thought steers clear of these difficulties by rejecting the dualistic outlook on man, the outlook that man has a double nature, that bodily activities and mental processes belong to two different systems. Both are alike involved in what, after Husserl, may be described as "the constitution of consciousness". It is this phenomenological implication that led Indian thought to look with suspicion upon "controlled parametric procedure" or the experimental method. Although its approach was empirical, it remained largely at the descriptive level. But the keenness of analysis and the maturity of epistemological thinking that we find here are remarkable.

That science did not develop in India as conspicuously as philosophy did may also be ascribed to the same reason. The phenomenological commitment of the Indian mind prevented it from the error of 'objectivism', which incidentally was the sole condition for the emergence of positive sciences elsewhere. Strasser rightly makes a distinction between 'objectivity' and 'objectivism'.³ Objectivism is a belief in the independent existence of the objective world and its impingement on the conscious subject, wholly determining the latter's cognitive processes. Objectivity, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the subjective approach in determining the nature of the presented or perceived world. Indian thought considered objectivity as important in our endeavour to understand and explain reality. And in this context it developed an elaborate epistemological enthusiasm. There was in some quarters of Indian thought a predilection for 'subjectivism', an opposite error. The belief, illustrated by Vijñāna-vāda, Yogācāra, and at least one school of Advaita Vedānta, that the so-called objective world is really determined only by the psychological processes, has further vitiated the development of a scientific temperament in India. While the Indian mind successfully checked 'objectivism', it could not escape the inroad of 'subjectivism'. This will be evident from the methodological considerations we are about to embark upon.

II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY

Neither philosophy nor science bothers much about the fact that man knows the world. It is a matter that is taken for granted; it is an uncritical assumption. Man's very being is inevitably a matter of encounter with reality; he must be related with other objects and persons in the external world for having any sort of life at all. Cognition is inherent in man's being. The world around has unavoidable cognitive dimensions. The complex world that looms large outside him is 'simply there,' and is 'revealed' to him in ordinary perception. But whether

what we know is correct at all, whether our cognitions are complete, pragmatic and valid, and how and why errors are caused would be problems. The chief function of philosophy and science appears to be to correct the common-sense views concerning reality. It is natural for the common man to mistake the exact nature of the surrounding world, to be ignorant of his own true nature, and to misconstrue the real relations between himself and the world around him. He frequently ignores that objects do not merely exist but stimulate in characteristic ways.

He does not devote sufficient thought to the matter, even granting that he has the necessary intellectual equipment and ability to do so. Nor is he trained to look upon the objective events or the subjective processes that occur within himself, in a critical manner, and with an eye for veracity. The notions of utility and practical efficiency are what normally guide not only his behaviour but his cognitions as well. Philosophy seeks to think deeply and examine critically so as to reveal reality and confirm its validity ; it seeks also to define the most effective relation of man with the world. Science has the same objectives. It is therefore that both philosophy and science have to devote careful thought to the problem of methodology. For unless the method is correct, what is known and got cannot be regarded as valid.

More than mere encounter with the 'objective world' understanding of the 'lived world' becomes important in philosophy as well as in science. The world should get into better focus, so that it is dealt with better. Relevant here is the distinction that Bertrand Russell made between acquaintance (with objects etc.) and knowledge (of relations etc.). The empirical acquaintance of reality may be functional, and of practical utility, but it cannot by itself guarantee the validity of what is presented to us. It is necessary that the presentation must be represented in our understanding by a conceptual apparatus that is at once appropriate and efficient. It is a matter of construction, or what is now styled 'epistemic reduction'.

Discussions of methodological considerations in Indian thought (especially in Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta) point to a similar conclusion. It is important to remember that Indian philosophy is both a theoretical structure and a practical discipline. It not only seeks to help us understand the reality that we encounter, but attempts to define to our advantage our commitment to it. It is thus that epistemic reduction is sought to be achieved. Further, it recognises that reality is relative to man's understanding. It had necessarily to make use of logic, psychology and epistemology heavily, much more significantly than philosophy has done elsewhere. The purpose of Indian philosophy is an intellectual reconstruction of the reality that is encountered, and it provides a methodology by means of which the immanent principle within the experience (which supports the encounter) could be discovered. 'Perceiving' and 'measuring' (verifying) are distinct acts, and the method is an attempt to check each by the other.

Thus, methodology in Indian philosophy has a set of encounter-correctives (such as sense-perception, inference, reasoning and verbal testimony) as well as a set of subjective-correctives (such as study, reflection and meditation; *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.) One can see that the major emphasis here is on subjectively oriented analysis of the experienced encounter, on the pragmatic assessment of the 'lived world'. The objective methods and the subjective methods constitute a continuum. Further, Indian thought has recognised that scriptural authority (*śruti*) is the point of contact between the two methods. Methodological considerations in Vedānta naturally gather round *śruti*. But, as we shall see, *śruti* is regarded more as an intuition appraisal and a transcendental reflection than as a mere scriptural testimony. Intuition which connects experience with explanation is held out as the highest authority. But this does not obviate the value of other normal methods like observation, inference and reason.

Knowledge concerning the world, derived from the usual empirical methods, may be correct (in the sense of corresponding

with facts or facilitating successful activity) or incorrect. Correct knowledge is doubtless desirable, for it will be effective as well as satisfying. Incorrect knowledge, on the other hand, may lead us to failure, or bring distress. However, it is not always that we can be sure of the correctness of our knowledge ; for many are the variables that are involved, such as the sensory-data, psychological intentions and acts. Objective inquiry should be instituted regarding what constitutes correctness of knowledge, what methods bring about valid and effective knowledge, and what the possible sources of error are. This inquiry is fundamental to all systems of Indian philosophy.

III. VALID KNOWLEDGE

Correct or valid knowledge is called in Indian thought 'pramā' which is defined as 'awareness of a thing as it really is.'⁴ Contrarily, incorrect or invalid knowledge is called 'apramā' or 'bhrama' (illusion or misapprehension). Correct knowledge is further described as that which is free from factors that bring about misapprehension. And these factors (*doṣa*) are various ; some are intra-individual such as biliousness (*pitta*), and some extra-individual, like insufficient illumination. Indian thought is concerned with what generates correct knowledge as well as with what causes incorrect knowledge. And, unlike in the usual scientific enterprises, there is not that constant or necessary reference to sensory data. Correctness or otherwise is here more a matter a phenomenal reality. It comprehends both natural phenomena and the factual details of 'the lived world'.

The sources of correct knowledge are collectively known as *pramāṇa* (the cause of *pramā*).⁵ It is a method, an empirical device to ascertain the veracity of a piece of knowledge that has already been acquired. It is largely a deductive method of analysis but involves an element of intuition. How do we know what we know ? And what are the evidences for the correctness of what we know ? It is the question of a certain pressure towards 'truth', which is both cognitive and effective. The

Sāṃkhyan thinkers defined truth as the mode of knowledge agreeing entirely with the mode of the object; cognitive-objective correspondence is the criterion of truth, according to them. There is here a suggestion of objectivism and of a dichotomy between the psychological processes and sensory apprehension. The Nyāya philosophy, on the other hand, points out that what is true must be effective; if we can act on that knowledge and successfully have our objective attained or desire fulfilled, then the knowledge is correct. Utility, in other words, is the criterion of truth. The Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta would go deeper into the problem, and spell out novelty and freedom from contradiction as criteria of truth.⁶

The notion that valid knowledge must be something which is not already known to us would exclude memory or recollection which are merely subjective phenomena. It emphasizes objectivity. Memory is reactivation of certain residual impressions already present in our minds as a result of previous knowledge and is a property of the subject; and as such it cannot be regarded as 'objective' in the strict sense of the term. The content of recollection may, however, be true; but it cannot be treated as a process of valid knowledge. Even the thinkers of the Prābhākara school, who accept memory as valid knowledge, make a distinction between current experience (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smṛti*). The other criterion insists that valid knowledge must be such that it is impossible for it to be contradicted by other concurrent or subsequent acts of knowledge. In other words, constancy in time and space is a necessary feature of valid knowledge. We will have occasion to revert to the discussion of this aspect later on.

Whatever contributes to such knowledge can be regarded as a *pramāṇa*. It is usual to take this expression to signify methods as 'instruments' (*karaṇa*) of valid knowledge. By 'instrument' is meant a cause that is specific or unique regarding its structure and function (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*), and also an operation (*vyāpāra*) of the sense-organs or mind.⁷ The concept of *pramāṇa* as a

method that we normally employ in order to obtain new and true information concerning something in the 'lived world' has engaged the Indian mind since very ancient times. It is not so much a prescriptive concept as a normative one. That is why the Indian texts that deal with *pramāṇa* invariably analyse the usual processes, both sensory and psychological, that are involved in the obtainment of knowledge, valid or otherwise. Understandably, they do not indicate any unusual procedures for occasioning usual experiences ; they only point out the merits and limitations of each process. They seek to analyse the value of each method, its scope and function. The purpose of a method is only to reveal the facts, and it cannot be said that facts cease to exist in the absence of a method.⁸ The *pramāṇa* does not generate a fact, it is only a means of it being experienced. The factual existence of a thing is not regarded as a mere function of the method employed, although it is accepted that objectivity undergoes an epistemic reduction. With due regard to the areas of the 'lived world' the *pramāṇas* have their own limited fields of operation ; their validity is limited to what they can possibly reveal.⁹ This justifies the multiplicity of methods that we employ to check on our experiences.

Methodological considerations weigh importantly with Vedānta. Among the Indian systems of thought it was Mīmāṃsā that highlighted the importance of valid knowledge and carefully enunciated the processes by which it was obtained. This was rather strange because Mīmāṃsā was almost exclusively concerned with the performance of rituals and sacrifices as prescribed in the Veda, and therefore, only one method, viz, scriptural testimony, would have sufficed its purpose. As a matter of fact, it heavily relies on this method alone. But the brilliant thinkers, Śābara-svāmin, Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara-miśra¹⁰ provided an epistemological framework which was remarkable for its logical rigour and psychological insight. The background for this enterprise can be seen in the Sāṃkhya system ; but its acceptance of scriptural testimony was so inadequate and per-

functory that the Mīmāṃsā thinkers were provoked to institute a thorough examination of all the available methods. The word 'mīmāṃsā' signifies "careful examination by the employment of reason", "an intensive exercise of the mind".¹¹

It is well-known that the Indian materialists (Cārvākas or Lokāyatas) accepted only one source of valid knowledge, viz, sense-perception (*pratyaksha*) or direct observation.¹² They relied exclusively on the ultimacy of sensory data, and their knowledge was confined to the world of physical phenomena. They were strictly empirical in their approach; they dismissed subjective experiences beyond sensations as irrelevant for scientific inquiry. The Vaiśeṣhikas, who were the early physicists of India,¹³ considered deductive analysis or reasoning (*anumāna*, inference) as an additional method of acquiring valid knowledge. They not only set out to explain the nature and characteristics of physical substances (for which they employed the first method), but posited a soul (which could only be inferred). The Buddhists too, although for a different reason, admitted inference as a valid method. The Sāṃkhyan thinkers, however, conceded that verbal testimony (*śabda*, in an extended sense, scriptural authority) can also occasion valid knowledge, in addition to sense-perception and inference. These thinkers were essentially psychological in their approach and orientation. Being also atheistic in general outlook, they confined verbal testimony to the words of an unerring authority (*āpta-vacana*) in matters pertaining to daily life.

The Nyāya system was essentially logistic in its orientation.¹⁴ And its interest in epistemology was naturally deep and extensive. It made careful investigation into the sources and content of valid knowledge. Of the sixteen subjects this system sets out to examine, *pramāṇa* (method) and *prameya* (objectivity) are the first and second. The Nyāya writers examine several possible methods or sources of knowledge, and arrive at a four-fold classification: sense-perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy. All other methods could be accommodated in one or

the other of these four. It is interesting that they regarded analogy (*upamāna*) as an independent method, while the Vaiśeṣikas included it under verbal testimony, which was in turn classified under inference. Vātsyāyana highlighted the association of verbal behaviour with objective presentations.¹⁵ The Nyāya argument was that the four methods differ from each other with regard to the major collocations (*sāmagrī*) that are involved in the production of valid knowledge.¹⁶ These collocations includes physical, physiological and psychological processes. And the type of experience that they generate also contributes to the distinctions between the four methods. This in a sense anticipates the Husserlian conception of 'regional ontologies'.

Of the two major lines of Mīmāṃsā thinking, the line inaugurated by Prabhākara accepts 'presumption' (*arthāpatti*) in addition to the four detailed by the Nyāya system. This method helps in knowing a thing which is not directly available for sense-perception, inference, verbal testimony, or comparison, but which is implied in the knowledge derived from any of these four. It had only to be spelt out. The other line, headed by Kumārila, adds 'non-apprehension' (*anupalabdhi* or *abhāva*) to the list of five. This method of getting to know the non-existence of a thing is regarded as an independent source of knowledge, and as a positive process. Vedānta accepts this latter Mīmāṃsā position of six methods which are productive of valid knowledge.¹⁷

IV. THE ROLE OF INTUITION

Of the six systems mentioned above, barring Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, the others rely heavily on argumentation; they are described as 'reason-dominant' (*yukti-pradhāna*). It is not that Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta do not employ reason or arguments, but their ultimate reliance is on scriptural testimony (*śruti-pradhāna*) derived from transcendental analysis and intuition. Their employment of reasoning is subordinate to scriptural authority; the purpose of reason here is to interpret scriptural texts. Although, among the other four systems, Sāṃkhya and Nyāya

accept verbal testimony as a source of valid knowledge, they do not accord it the same value as Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta do ; scriptural authority for them is not very different in quality or value from the words of a trustworthy person in daily life. It may be noted that the Vaiśeṣika system regarded the Vedas as composed by human beings, albeit superior to us,¹⁸ and it is likely that the Nyāya system held a similar view. Vātsyāyana, the Nyāya commentator, defined verbal testimony (*śabda*) as originating in a trustworthy person (*āpta*), and mentions that it does not matter if he is a sage, an āryan, or an outsider (*mleccha*). That is to say, reliance on testimony applies to the daily transactions as well as to things beyond our normal apprehension (which strictly constitute the scope of scriptures). It is true that the Nyāya thinkers accorded verbal testimony an independent status (unlike their Vaiśeṣika-counterparts, who included it under inference) ; but this was only because the way valid knowledge was produced in this case was different.

A reaction to this outlook on scriptural testimony can be found in the Mīmāṃsā of the Prābhākara persuasion, which would confine this method to the authority to the Vedas, especially those portions that are prescriptive (regarding performance of sacrifices). However, the Mīmāṃsā ascription of authority to the Vedic texts was rather paradoxical. The Nyāya acceptance of Vedic authority involved the belief that the Vedas were derived from the infallible Īśvara (God) ; but the early Mīmāṃsā thinkers did not believe in the necessity of postulating God as a creator or as omniscient. They were impressed only with the high antiquity of the Vedic record.¹⁹ The Veda is for them in the nature of a revelation to sages of superior equipment. It may be remembered that the Mīmāṃsā outlook was essentially empirical and pragmatic.

Kumārila would extend the concept of verbal authority to include the testimony of all trustworthy persons, contrary to Prabhākara's views. It was necessary, therefore, to classify this source of valid knowledge into two groups : (1) personal

(*pauruṣeya*) or transactional (*laukika*), and (2) impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) or scriptural (*vaidika*). The scriptural authority contained in the Veda was looked upon as composed of prescriptive texts (*vidhāyaka-vākyas*) or injunctions with regard to the performance of sacrifices and rites, and passages which were merely informative (*siddhārthaka-vākyas*) or telling us about what is already there. The Mīmāṃsā pragmatism was inclined to accept the former and practically reject the latter group of passages. Since the main objective of the Mīmāṃsā system was to interpret and elucidate the Vedic passages that dealt with rituals, the 'Brāhmaṇa' portion of the Veda was naturally regarded as having paramount authority.

The Vedānta, on the other hand, tilted in favour of the authority of 'informative' passages of the Veda, viz, the Upanishads, almost to the exclusion of the other group of passages.²⁰ The reason for this preference was that the kind of knowledge that was sought was available only in these texts. The argument about the authorship of the Veda became essentially irrelevant in this context, although discussions about it went on in the Vedāntic manuals.

In any case, for the Mīmāṃsā as well as the Vedānta systems, scriptural authority surpassed the authority of the other five sources of valid knowledge. In the words of Manu, who echoes the Mīmāṃsā attitude : "For those who are concerned with knowing about the canons of conduct (*dharma*), scripture is the highest authority."²¹ It is, in other words, a self-sufficient authority ; the other five methods of obtaining correct knowledge can only lead to this authority. Reason here plays a role that is subordinate to revelation ; reason must be employed only to interpret revelation. There is no question of getting revelation confirmed by reason or by observation.

Each of the five methods has its own sphere of functioning ; each supplements the other, and, altogether, they contribute to what may be described as empirical knowledge. In practice, however, there are only three principal methods : sense-

perception (observation), inference (deductive reasoning), and scriptural authority (intuition). Presumption and non-apprehension are included under inference.²² And inference by definition depends on sense-perception. Thus, the only two independent sources of valid knowledge are observation and intuition. And obviously their spheres of operation are distinct, we can almost say, mutually exclusive. The former prevails in the realm of empirical transactions while the latter guides transcendental attitudes and processes. Sense-perception (and the other four methods) is the chief method that we normally employ in matters pertaining to acquisition of wealth, obtainment of pleasures, and social conduct. Kumārila is definite that the jurisdiction of scripture does not extend so far, for its only concerns are religious practices and emancipation.²³

These methods have been neatly grouped in terms of their 'regional ontologies' into two categories : those that inform us about the transactional details of the outer world, and those that let us know about the transcendental reality.²⁴ The former tells us about Becoming in the world, while the latter provides the knowledge of Being. Sense-perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), 'presumption' (*arthāpatti*) and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), and verbal testimony of a reliable person (*āpta-vākya*) are included under the first category ; whereas scriptural testimony (*śabda*) alone constitutes the second. The dichotomy of the methodological categories does not involve any difference in degrees of validity. The transactional methods are as valid as the transcendental method ; but their spheres of operation differ. Effective functioning is relative to the proper sphere.

All the six methods are equally valid, and there can be no question of degrees of validity. However, there is recognition of dependence and independence among the methods. Inference, for instance, is dependent upon sense-perception ; and presumption, on inference. Sense-perception is not dependent on any other method ; as also scriptural testimony. And the two

methods are recognised in Vedānta as primary sources of valid knowledge, the former as far as the transactional world is concerned, and the latter with regard to the transcendental reality. The purpose of a method is to define its object clearly and specifically, to illumine the object, and it does not direct in any way any action pertaining to it ; that is to say, consideration of utility here is irrelevant. Utility depends upon the object and not on the method.²⁵ Sense-perception is the guide for understanding the world while Scripture helps us to appreciate the significance of reality.

It is important to recognize that Advaita subscribes to realism at the transactional level. Śaṅkara is an unrelenting critic of the Yogācāra rejection of objective reality.²⁶ He admits consciousness as the fundamental reality, but concedes that the phenomenal world of objects and events also has a reality independent of the conscious processes. It is not a mere insubstantial projection of the mind, nor a fleeting reconstruction of subjective experiences. Śaṅkara's opposition to 'psychologism' has often been misunderstood. It is generally imagined that he dismissed the world as a phantasm, as a mere dream, as an illusion. Nothing can be farther than the truth. If that indeed was his stand, he had little reason to combat fiercely the Buddhist position. As will be shown later, Śaṅkara not only accepted the phenomenal reality of the world, but even admitted the role of Godhead (*Īśvara*) in its emergence, subsistence and dissolution. It is sufficient here for us to note that Śaṅkara regards the normal sources of correct knowledge with regard to the world we live in as valid.²⁷ His scientific temperament is revealed when he roundly tells us : " Even a hundred scriptural passages will not become authoritative when they, for instance, announce that fire is cool or dark ! " ²⁸

But, among the tests of truth, Vedānta rejected practical efficiency (*samartha-pravṛtti-janakatva*, Nyāya and Prabhākara), correspondence with objective form (*sārūpya*, Kumārila) and coherence (*saṁvādi*) as absolute or universal. These three have

limited fields of operation, and the validity of the tests is relative and conditional. The most reliable test, however, is 'absence of contradiction' (*bādhārāhityam*).²⁹ This does not refer merely to earlier knowledge being contradicted by later knowledge, but to the experiences at one plane of reality being contradicted by those at another plane. If non-contradiction in all three phases of time (past, present and future) is one aspect of this test, the impossibility of sublation at another level of reality was the other, and more important, aspect. The phenomenal world can be shown by experience as well as argument as subject to such sublation. The methods that provide us with valid knowledge about such a world cannot, therefore, be regarded as passing this test. The Vedānta is positive that when the phenomenal involvement ceases and when the empirically presented world is sublated by the transcendental experience, the methods including scriptural testimony lose their value as well as validity.³⁰ The operation and applicability of the methods are confined to the realm of 'nescience' which is responsible for the phenomenal world.

Viewed from this position, the grouping of the methods into deductive-analytical (sense-perception, inference, analogy, presumption and non-apprehension) and intuitive (scriptural testimony) becomes meaningful. While the former are thoroughly irrelevant with regard to the condition subsequent to realization, and are only distantly helpful in bringing about this condition, the latter not only continues to have some relevance even in this condition but contributes considerably to its emergence. Scriptural testimony would survive the other methods, and in this sense it is called 'final or ultimate authority' (*antyam pramāṇam*), for its merit consists in being founded not on common cognitive processes but upon the intuitive genius of the sages. While the Mīmāṃsā insists on our sole reliance on Scripture in matters pertaining to religious life, the Vedānta refuses to be so dogmatic. Śaṅkara concedes: "In inquiries concerning religious conduct, it may be that Scripture is the sole authority. But it cannot be

so in our investigation into reality. Here, Scripture as well as other sources of knowledge such as phenomenal experience become valid, according to necessity. For, after all, the purpose of such investigation is to end in transcendental experience and to inform us about reality."³¹ The Vedānta would recommend a conjoint approach : scripture (*śruti*) and reason (*yukti* or *tarka*).

Śaṅkara's appreciation of the value of Scripture has already been mentioned. "Scriptural authority in its own sphere is not dependent upon any other method, even as the sun's in the matter of illumining forms of objects."³² It is the highest court of appeal for him. Other methods may lead up to the highest wisdom, but the ultimate method is only this.³³ The methods can be grouped into two kinds. The first includes those that are valid with regard to the details of the phenomenal reality or the transactional world; and coming under this head are all the methods barring scriptural testimony. The second, viz, the scriptural testimony, is designed to make known the absolute.³⁴ It is derived from intuition and transcendental reflection that transforms facts into essences, and brings order into what is desultory and diverse. It lifts our empirical understanding above the objective world bound by space and time. The distinction is owing to the different nature of the 'regional ontologies'. The Absolute is not knowable by any means other than the Scripture.

But Śaṅkara does not credit Scripture with absolute validity, for the simple reason that the Scripture is not regarded by him as 'eternal' or as 'immutable'. The Nyāya system held that the Veda was the word of God who was omniscient ; hence, according to it, the validity of the Veda. The Mīmāṃsā system which does not ascribe the production of the Veda to God, nevertheless, held that the Veda was 'eternal' and free from all defects inherent in human intellect. For the Vedānta, however, the Veda is not 'eternal', for it obviously originated.³⁵ There can indeed be nothing eternal other than the Brahman. The impersonal composition of the Veda too is accepted in a limited framework : the Veda is not a product of any normal human

mind according to its own independent will and fancy. It is not a subjective fabrication. Citsukha would even contend that the Vedic passages are of human origin because they are after all verbal formulations,³⁶ and verbal formulations are obviously human in origination. But that does not mean that the Veda can be classed with other literary productions. The source of Vedic wisdom is intuition, and it is intuition that can guide us in matters concerning transcendental phenomena. It is also true, as Vācaspati suggests,³⁷ intuition does not depend on sense-perception and other methods even in matters of empirical import.

Śaṁkara, however, attached especial importance to Scripture, and he is careful to uphold its authenticity and authority.³⁸ He is aware that reason has limited value, when employed by itself. Reason itself can show that reason is unreliable and unfounded; it can be mere speculation, unless intuition restrains it.³⁹ Human intellect has natural limitations and can easily go astray. But it is impossible to proceed in life without utilizing reason.⁴⁰ Further, however august and paramount the authority of Scripture, it can provide us only with partial intuitions, for an ordinary mind can never fathom the full implications of the Scripture even in a hundred years.⁴¹ And when the meaning of the Scripture is not clear, or when there are apparent contradictions among scriptural passages, one must necessarily rely on reason to understand and appreciate the real and complete import.⁴² In this sense, reason can aid intuition. But Śaṁkara warns that reason can be futile if it is barren (*śuṣka-tarka*), viz, when it is devoid of intuition. He speaks of the value of reason blessed by intuition that becomes an aspect of experience⁴³; otherwise, reason can end up in vain surmises.

The role of reason as an aid to intuition has been elucidated by Padmapāda and his followers. Scripture (transcendental intuition) can at first provide only indirect knowledge; reason will transform this into direct experience. Indirect knowledge (intellectual appreciation) is prevented from maturing into

experience by the 'sense of the impossible' (*asmbhāvanā*) and the wrong notions of ego-involvements (*viparīta-bhāvanā*). Reason can remove these obstructions.⁴⁴ It is indeed possible for Scripture to furnish us with complete and effective knowledge, but due to certain defects inherent in human nature this possibility is vitiated. Reason is employed to overcome this limitation, and when the limitation is overcome, Scripture's capacity to generate complete knowledge is reassured. Prakāśātman points out that reason not only removes the obstacles in this way, but helps stabilise the knowledge that intuition brings about.⁴⁵ He argues that it is not the function of reason to produce transcendental understanding. That is the unique function of Scripture. But the value of reason is that it can convince one of the possibility of such understanding.⁴⁶

Thus Vedānta strikes a neat balance between the group of methods of deductive reasoning and intuition. Each is employed as a corrective to the other. The shortcomings of the former have very well been appreciated, but its relevance to systematization of knowledge has also been recognized. The correct appraisal of the empirical situation is necessary for taking an intuitive leap into the transcendental existence. And Śaṅkara makes it clear that Scripture based on intuition does not set out to alter the things as they are ; its business is only to reveal what lies hidden. Should scriptural passages start saying things that are contrary to our perceptual experience, they lose their credibility. No method can be valid when it is contradicted by other methods. Each method is unique and valid inasmuch as it makes known what are not made known by other methods.⁴⁷ Each method has its own well-defined 'region' of operation, and valid methods do not come into conflict with each other. Intuition comes under suspicion when it is contradicted by reason ; and, likewise one has to take care that reason is upheld by intuition. Further, Śaṅkara points out that transcendental intuition can be adequately communicated only by taking recourse to empirical methods of understanding.⁴⁸ Reason and intuition have thus to be employed as complementary to each other.

In a very real sense, however, all the methods including scriptural testimony are relevant only in the phenomenal context. "This entire business of using a method and knowing an object, whether it is empirical or scriptural, presupposes the phenomenal existence of self"; "we do admit that even scriptural testimony ceases to be authentic when this phenomenal existence has been transcended."⁴⁹ A cogent argument has been advanced. There can be no method such as sense-perception and inference without dependence on sense-organs; and sense-organs cannot exist and function apart from the body enlivened by consciousness. And unless all these conditions are satisfied, the self cannot be regarded as a subject (a knower, employing a method); and unless there be a subject, it is meaningless to speak of a method. Therefore, all the methods as also Scripture have only a phenomenal relevance.⁵⁰

REFERENCES, NOTES AND SOURCE-MATERIAL

1. The distinction is due to Edouard Claparede, Foreword to F.J.J. Buytendijk's book, *Psychologie des Animaux*, cited in George Thines, *Phenomenology and the Science of Behaviour*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1977, p. 143.
2. The expression was coined by Edmund Husserl.
3. S. Strasser : *Phenomenology and the Human Sciences*, Pittsburg, 1963, p. 67.
4. प्रमीयते इति । प्र+माङ्गाने+अनश्चोपसर्गे (Pāṇini 3.3.106) इति अङ् । टाप् । यथार्थज्ञानम् । Nyāya: तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानम् । भ्रमज्ञानभिन्नम् ।
5. प्रमीयते विश्वं अनेन इति । प्रमायाः कारणम् । प्र+मा+ल्युट् (भावे) or प्र+मा+ल्युः (कर्तरि) Udyotakara defines it as 'cause of knowledge' (उपलब्धिहेतुः)
6. VP 1. तत्र प्रमाकारणं प्रमाणम् । तत्र स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वं अनधिगता बाधितार्थ-विषयकज्ञानत्वम् । It is to be noted that Rāmādvaya does not accept the condition of 'anadhigata' as necessary (*Vedānta Kaumudī*, p. 213 अज्ञातज्ञापनं प्रमाणमिति तदसारम् ।) According to him, यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा, or it is the experience which does not wrongly represent its object. For Dharmarāja, the non-contradiction is a subjective

measure, but for Rāmādvaya it is objective in the sense that it involves the absence of wrong representation. (also cf S. N. Dasgupta, op.cit. Vol. 2, p. 212-3)

7. Rāmākṛṣṇa's *Śikhāmaṇi* on the above : असाधारणकारणत्वे सति व्यापारवत्त्वं कारणत्वम् ।
8. Cf. Sureśvara BUW 3,8,113.
 सर्वं हि मानं लोकेऽस्मिन् वस्त्वभिव्यक्तिसाधनम् ।
 तदभावेऽनभिव्यक्तं वस्तु नास्तीति दुर्वचः ॥
9. Sureśvara, SV. 245, स्वमेयमात्रदूरत्वात् मितेर्नान्यत्र मानता ।
10. Jaimini who can be regarded as the first author who formulated the Mīmāṃsā viewpoint defended the Vedic authority against the Buddhists. His *Sūtras* were commented upon by Śabara-svāmin (about the first century B.C.), who expounded the Mīmāṃsā position very ably and elaborately. The argument was later fortified by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa whose *Śloka-vārttika*, *Tantra-vārttika* and *Tup-ṭikā* are monuments of his prodigious intellect and incisive analysis. It is here that we find a systematic examination of the sources of valid knowledge. Among his students, Maṇḍana-miśra (author of *Vidhi-viveka* and *Bhāva-viveka* in the field of Mīmāṃsā) and Umbeka (*Śloka-vārttika-tātparyā-ṭikā*) upheld the viewpoint ably. Pārthasārathi-miśra (around 1300 A.D.) whose fame rests on his *Śāstra-dīpikā*, defended Kumārila's arguments (also in his *Nyāya-vārttika* on Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*) and in his *Tarka-ratna* on Kumārila's *Tup-ṭikā*. Mādhava (*Nyāyamālā-vistara*), Khaṇḍa-deva (*Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā*) and Āpa-deva (*Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*) are great names in this line. Prabhākara-miśra who was supposed to be a student of Kumārila, was responsible for a different direction in the Mīmāṃsā way of thinking (known as 'guru-mata' in contradistinction to Kumārila's position, known as 'Bhāṭṭa-mata'). His *Brhatī* and *Laghvī* were attempts to reinterpret Śabara-svāmin. His student Śālika-nātha (10th century) wrote *Rju-vimalā* on *Brhatī* and *Dīpa-śikhā* on *Laghvī* and popularised Prabhākara's views. However, his independent work, *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, is a more celebrated work. Murāri-miśra struck out a third line.
11. "Vedic Exegesis" by Śrīmat Anirvan, The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. I, p. 316 (The Ramakrishna Mission, Institute of Culture, Calcutta, 1970).
12. Cf. Rāmākṛṣṇa's *Śikhāmaṇi* on VP ch. I. प्रत्यक्षमेकं प्रमाणमिति चार्वाकाः, प्रत्यक्षानुमाने इति काणादसौगतमतानुसारिणः, शब्देन सह त्रीणि प्रमाणाणीति साङ्ख्यः,

प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति नैयायिकाः, अर्थापत्त्या सह प्रमाणानि पञ्चेति प्राभाकराः, एवं प्रमाणविभागमन्यथा व्याचक्षते ।

cf. also a traditional account :

प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः काणादसौगतौ पुनः ।
 अनुमानं च तच्चापि साङ्ख्यं शब्दं च ते उभे ॥
 न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवं उपमानं च केवलम् ।
 अर्थापत्त्या सहितानि चत्वार्याहुः प्राभाकराः ॥
 अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।
 सम्भवैतिह्युक्तानि त्विति पौराणिका जगुः ॥

13. S. N. Dasgupta suggests that Vaiśeṣikas represented an early school of Mimāṃsā thought. cf. *A History of Indian Philosophy*, vol. I, p. 280–285.
14. The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama-Akṣapāda (about 300 B.C.) was commented upon by Vātsyāyana (fifth century), who in turn was annotated by Udyotakara (about 600 A.D.) in his *Nyāya-vārttika*, on which Vācaspati-miśra (about 800 A.D.) prepared his *Tālparyā-ṭīkā*. Later, Udayana (about 899 A.D.) wrote a gloss called *Parīśuddhi* on Vācaspati's work and an other independent work called *Kusumāñjalī*. Amongst great writers belonging to this system Jayantabhaṭṭa (about 850 A.D. *Nyāyamañjarī*), Viśvanātha (*Bhāṣhā-pariccheda*), Śivāditya (*Sapta-padārthī*) and Keśava-miśra (*Tarka-bhāṣhā*) were well-known. The Neo-Nyāya (*Navya-nyāya*) system developed by Gaṅgeśa-upādhyāya (around 1200 A.D.) dealt almost exclusively with the four methods of Nyāya, especially inference.
15. समाख्या सम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरुपमानः ।
16. *Nyāya-mañjarī* अव्यभिचारिणीमसन्दिग्धार्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम् । Also, cf. सामग्रीभेदात् फलभेदाच्च प्रमाणभेदः ।
17. व्यवहारे भाट्टनयः VP deals with these six methods in considerable detail. cf. Swāmi Satprakāśānanda, *Methods of Knowledge*, Advaita Āśrama. Calcutta, 1974.
18. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, 2,1,18; 6-1-1 and 2.
19. कथं पुनरपौरुषेयं वेदानाम् ? पुरुषस्य कर्तृरस्मारणात् (*Śloka-vārttika*) Śabara-svāmī held that the authors of the Veda are beyond recollection even as the creator of the Himalayan ranges. Kumārila argued that omniscience and creatorhood of god are needless conjectures (*vitathas*). Śālikā-nātha and Nandikeśvara believed that God's

existence had only to be inferred (*anumānagamyā*). Nārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭa, Āpadeva and Laugākṣi-bhāskara, however, accepted the compassionate God who granted the highest reward to actions done with a feeling of dedication. But it was a moot point with the Mīmāṃsakas whether God was the author of the Veda. In any case, their reliance on Vedic authority was not on this count.

20. Cf. *Pañcapādikā*, p. 95-96.
21. *Manu*, 2, 13 धर्मं जिज्ञास्यमानानां प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः ।
22. Cf. Kullūka-bhaṭṭa on *Manu*, 12, 105.
23. Kumārila's *Tantra-vārttika* on Jaimini 1, 3, 1 :
यावद्धर्ममोक्षसम्बन्धि तद्वेदप्रभवम् । तत्त्वार्थसुखविषयं तल्लोकव्यवहारमिति विवेक्तव्यम् ।
24. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, 8, 1 एवं निरूपितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं द्विविधम् ।
व्यावहारकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं, पारमार्थिकतत्त्वावेदकं चेति । तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपावगाहिप्रमाण-
व्यतिरिक्तानां सर्वप्रमाणानामाद्यं प्रामाण्यं, तद्विषयाणां व्यवहारदशायां बाधाभावात् ।
द्वितीयं तु जीवब्रह्मैक्यपराणां “ सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत् ” इत्यादीनां “ तत्त्वमसि ”
इत्यन्तानां तद्विषयस्य जीवपैरैक्यस्य कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वात् ॥
25. Cf. *Sambandha-vārttika*, 717.
प्रमाणायत्तं एतावत्स्वप्नमेयाभासनम् ।
कार्याकार्यता वाऽत्र मेयामेयता न मानतः ॥
26. *VS*B, 2, 2, 28 cf. for an account of the fundamental differences between Śaṅkara's idealism and Yogācāra idealism, *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* of Sadānanda-yati. Nṛsiṃhāśrama's *Bheda-dhikkāra* takes an extreme view and denies reality even in the phenomenal context. This, according to Prof. Hiriyanna, is contrary to Śaṅkara's position (cf. *VS*B 1,1,4) and more in accord with Maṇḍana's. Nṛsiṃhāśrama's eagerness was to show that the scriptural testimony and common experience are not in conflict with each other.
27. *VS*B, 2, 1, 14 यावद्धि सात्यात्म्यैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिः तावत्प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेऽपि विकारेषु
अनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुत्पद्यते । Also *Ibid*, 2, 2, 28 उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं
बाह्योऽर्थः । ननु नाहमेव ब्रवीमि न किञ्चिदर्थमुपलभे इति । किन्तु उपलब्धि-
व्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभते इति ब्रवीमि । Also, प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वको सम्भवासम्भवौ ।
28. *BGB*, 18, 66 न हि श्रुतिशतमपि शीतोऽग्निरप्रकाशो वा इति ब्रुवत्प्रामाण्यमुपैति ।
Also, *VS*B, 43, 14 न ह्यसत्यपि सम्भवे मुख्यस्यैवार्थस्य ग्रहणमिति कश्चिदाज्ञाप-
यिता विद्यते ।
29. *Pañcadaśī*, 3, 29 ‘सत्यं बाधशून्यत्वम् ।’ The commentator, Rāmakaṣṇa
quotes : “ सत्यमबाध्यं, बाध्यं मिथ्येति तद्विवेकः ” इति पूर्वाचार्यैरुक्तत्वात् ।

30. Cf. BGB, 2, 69 न ह्यात्मस्वरूपाधिगमे सति पुनः प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः सम्भवति । प्रमातृत्वं हि आत्मनः निवर्तयति अन्त्यं प्रमाणं निवर्तयदेव च अप्रमाणीभवति, स्वप्रकालप्रमाणमिव प्रबोधे ॥ Also, योऽयं लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः स उत्पन्न-विवेकज्ञानस्य स्थितप्रज्ञस्य अविद्याकार्यत्वात् अविद्यानिवृत्तौ निवर्तते ॥ (*Ibid*) cf. also op.cit. 13, 2. तथा नः क्षेत्रज्ञानां ईश्वरैकत्वे सति शास्त्रानर्थक्यं भवतु, अविद्याविषये च अर्थवत्त्वं । यथा द्वैतिनां सर्वेषां बन्धावस्थायामेव शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वं, न मुक्तावस्थायां । एवम् ॥
31. VSB, 1, 1, 2. न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायां । किन्तु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम् । अनुभवावसानत्वाद्भूतवस्तुविषय-त्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।
32. VSB, 2, 1, 1. वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थं प्रामाण्यं रवेरिवरूपविषये ।
cf. also 4, 1, 3. प्रत्यक्षाद्यभावे श्रुतेरप्यभावप्रसङ्गः इति चेन्न ।
also SW. Vol. I, p. 303-304 न हीदं अतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनं आगमान्तरेण उत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम् । (p. 339) अतीन्द्रियार्थेषु विषयेषु श्रुतिः नः प्रमाणम् ।
33. VSB, 2, 1, 4. अपि च अन्त्यमिदं प्रमाणं आत्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकं नातः परं किञ्चि-दाकांक्ष्यमस्ति सर्वात्मैकत्वविषयत्वादवगतेः ।
34. VP, 8, 1. एवं निरूपितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं द्विविधम् । व्यावहारिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं पारमाथिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं च इति ।
35. *Ibid*, 4, 47-49. तत्र वेदान्तानां नित्यसर्वज्ञपरमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वेन प्रामाण्यमिति नैयायिकाः । वेदानां नित्यत्वेन निरस्तसमस्तपुद्गलतया प्रामाण्यमिति मीमांसकाः । अस्माकं तु मते वेदो न नित्यः, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् । नापि वेदानां त्रिक्षण-व्यवस्थायित्वम् ।
36. Citsukha, TP, p. 269. वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि वाक्यत्वात् ।
37. *Bhāmatī*, p. 9.
38. Cf. his remarks, VSB, 2, 1, 42. ततश्च वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमीयात्, and VSB, 3, 3, 31. यद्यन्यत्राश्रयमाणापि गतिविद्यान्तरं गच्छेत् श्रुत्यादीनां प्रामाण्यं हीयेत सर्वार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात् ॥
39. VSB, 2, 1, 11. एतदपि हि तर्काणां अप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्कैरेव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते । Also, निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनाः तर्का अप्रतिष्ठा भवन्ति । उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात् ।
40. *Ibid*. सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ।
41. PUB, 4, 5, न ह्यभिमानेन वर्षशतेनापि श्रुत्यर्थो ज्ञातुं शक्यते सर्वैः पण्डितमन्यैः । Also VSB, 2, 1, 1 परतन्त्रप्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुं अशक्नुवन्तः ।

42. VSB, 4, 1, 5 सन्दिग्धे तु तस्मिन् तन्निर्णयं प्रति लौकिकोऽपि न्याय आश्रयणीयः, न विरुध्यते ।
43. VSB, 2, 16 श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्को अनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते । Also VSB, 1, 1, 2 श्रुत्या एव च साहाय्यत्वेन तर्कस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात् । also अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् ।
44. PP, p. 39 अथ कोऽयं तर्को नाम । युक्तिः । ननु पर्याय एषः । स्वरूपमभिधीयताम् । इदमुच्यते । प्रमाणशक्तिविषयतत्सम्भवपरिच्छेदात्मा प्रत्ययः । क.... तर्कस्योपयोगः । विषयासम्भवाशङ्कायाम् । तथानुभवफलानुत्पत्तौ तत्सम्भवप्रदर्शनमुखेन फलप्रतिबन्धविगमे । Also, p. 76 तस्माद् ब्रह्मजिज्ञासापन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते । तैर्वेदान्तैरविरोधी तर्को युक्तिरुपकरणमितिकर्तव्यासहकारिकारणमिति यावत् । अथवा तर्कोऽनुमानं वेदान्तैरविरुद्धं तदर्थप्रतीतिरेव दृढत्वहेतुतयोपकरणमस्या इत्यर्थः ॥
- 4th Vārṇaka, 1st Sūtra.
45. PPV, p. 171 तथातथाविधत्वसामान्यतोदर्शनेनार्थविरोधबुद्ध्या च पुरुषदोषेणान्यथाज्ञानान्युत्पद्यते शब्दाच्च तत्त्वज्ञानमेवोत्पद्यते । ततश्च शब्दात् पुरुषदोषाच्च बहुषु परस्परविरोधिषु ज्ञानेषु जातेषु शब्दशक्तितात्पर्यावधारणं पुरुषदोषापनयनेन प्रतिपक्षज्ञानान्तरमात्रं निवर्तयति । निवृत्ते च प्रतिबन्धे शब्दादेव तत्त्वज्ञानं जायते । जातं वा निश्चलमवतिष्ठते ॥
46. Ibid, p. 221. ज्ञानानन्दसर्वज्ञप्रत्यगात्मभूतं ब्रह्म निश्चाययितुमसमर्था अपि युक्तयः शब्दावगते ब्रह्मणि सामान्यद्वारेण सम्भावनावुद्धिहेतवो भवन्ति ।
47. BUB, 2, 1, 20 न शास्त्रं पदार्थानन्यथाकर्तुं प्रवृत्तम् । किं तर्हि ? यथाभूतानां अज्ञातानां ज्ञापने । ... न हि अग्निः शीतः आदित्यो न तपति इति वा दृष्टान्तशक्तेनापि प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यं प्रमाणान्तरेण अन्यथाधिगतत्वाद्भ्रस्तुनः । न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यते । प्रमाणान्तराविषयमेव प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति ॥
48. Ibid. न च लौकिकपदपदार्थाश्रयव्यतिरेकेण आगमेन शक्यं अज्ञातं वस्त्वन्तरमवगमयितुम् । Also, BUB, 3, 9, 7 तस्माद्युक्तं वेदवाक्यार्थनिर्णयाय विचारयितुम् ॥
49. VSB, *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* : तमेतदविद्याख्यामात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराभ्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः । VSB, 4, 1, 3 इष्यत एवमस्माभिः श्रुतेरप्यभावः प्रबोधे ॥
50. *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* : न हि इन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः सम्भवति । न अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते । न च एतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन् असति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते । न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति । तस्मात् अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च ॥

CHAPTER I

SECTION IV

THE VEDĀNTIC PARADIGM

I. WHAT IS A PARADIGM ?

The old world outlook on science is illustrated when Oswald Kuelpe (1862-1915) identified science with physical science. Psychology set out to become an image of Physics, the master model, and therefore, considered mediate experience alone as its proper subject-matter. It was, however, conceded that conscious phenomena were the existential reals as far as Psychology was concerned. But there was obviously no way of an outsider directly getting at them ; they could be reached only indirectly, inferentially, and perhaps with the aid of introspective reports. The world of uncanny consciousness had obviously to be distinguished from the world of observable objects and measurable events. When, in 1874, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1933) inaugurated the scientific study of consciousness, Psychology for him was a sort of 'mental chemistry' viz, Psychology was an aspect of Chemistry ! He was impressed by the supposition that the content of consciousness was sensory. He was, therefore, concerned with sensations as mental 'elements', much as details in Chemistry.

Wolfgang Kohler's plea that Psychology should deal with 'direct and immediate experience' fell on deaf ears, as by then scientific Psychology had dedicated itself to the task of exploring the experiences in a person as if they were objective data. Psychology aspired to outstrip Physics and Chemistry in scientific rigour. Needless to say, it failed. But the irony of the situation is that even when Physics and other disciplines found it necessary to relax the old probabilistic patterns, Psychology stuck to the old and outmoded model with a persistence that was unwarranted.

The framework of scientific method that Psychology seeks to fit itself into, severely limits the scope of introspection, and it seeks to eliminate speculation altogether. The framework emphasized that observation was essentially a search and that its merit consisted in its public nature (that is to say, worthwhile observation had to be replicable). Theorizing had to be logical so that the phenomena observed could be consistently and satisfactorily accounted for. Even the logical structure of the formulated theory had to conform to the norm of public reason. The theorizing activity was effective only in so far as observable consequences could be predicted within several probabilistic limits of accuracy. This general framework, tried and honoured in the physical sciences, was totally borrowed by Psychology, whose subject-matter, however, did not entirely satisfy the requirements of this framework.

The famous formulation of Krause (quoted and immortalized by the eminent physical scientist, Ernst Mach) brings out the peculiarity of the phenomena sought to be scientifically studied in Psychology :

“ The Problem : To carry out the self-inspection of the Ego.
Solution : It is carried out immediately.”

In other words, there is no problem in introspection. It is direct and immediate experience ; and, for the same reason, its value for scientific study was limited. Subjective and inarticulate introspection which is a normal and familiar process among human beings was of little practical value for the laboratory-oriented Psychologist. To be useful, introspection had to be ‘scientific’ ; that is to say, objective. Immediate experience had somehow to be projected as mediate experience : thoughts and feelings had to appear like atoms and geological specimens. Introspection had to be ‘scientific’, methodical and objective. Otherwise, it came dangerously close to speculation. And is not speculation a sworn enemy of science ?

There has, however, been a change in the outlook during

the past two decades. Here is what an eminent psychologist, Edwin G. Boring, writes :

“ In both Physiology and Psychology there is a strong and healthy tradition against what is called ‘speculation’ and naive epistemology holds that science espouses observation and rejects speculation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that careful consideration does not support a strict opposition between observation and speculation.”¹

Without a precisely delimited and stable area of study, psychologists busied themselves with adapting the experimental methods and models of more or less empirical science ; there was necessarily a disciplinary drift. There were multiple hypotheses, made more competitive than compatible. In the circumstances, it was unavoidable that Psychology should develop what Edward O. Wilson calls “ the Advocacy method ” (*Sociobiology*, Belknap, Harvard 1977, p. 28), selecting and arranging the evidence in the most persuasive manner possible. Each theorist considered it his legitimate duty and scientific responsibility to defend or rebut, in part or whole, a particular hypothesis by a planned pattern of observation and experiments.

There has been a tendency of late to resort to what is now described as ‘sensuous activity’ approach as complementary to the classical observation-experimental method in Psychology. A major provocative influence came from the celebrated astronaut, who later turned mystical, Dr. Edgar Mitchell. His involvement in the space-programme suggested to him that exploration of the outer space was less important than the understanding of the inner space, for the welfare and progress of mankind. The motivation, of course, cannot strictly be called scientific, for a scientist’s major concern must be to reveal reality and extend man’s understanding. But Psychology is a practical discipline as much as a theoretical one. In an address before the American Psychiatric Association in Dallas in 1972, he declared : “ Science has reached that point in its growth where the experimenter could no longer eliminate himself from

his experiment ". What he meant by science here was scientific Psychology.

The unavoidable observer-involvement in observation and the consequent interference with the objectivity and veracity of what is observed became evident first in the work of Physicists, and soon became a problem in Physical Science. The workers in these fields tried methods of minimising this involvement, of measuring the amount of interference and of constructing probabilistic models, which took into account this involvement and interference. Psychology had to tackle this problem from the earliest days of its scientific career. When, however, it realized that the problem was not solved even by most rigorous experimental conditions in physical sciences, it began to recognize that such involvement and interference were themselves the subject-matters of psychological inquiry.

Consequent on this recognition there has been an interest in the so-called esoteric Psychologies of the Eastern religions, principally Vedanta, Yoga and Buddhism (especially Zen and Tibetan methods). Thomas B. Blackburn voices the feelings of the present-day psychologists when he says: "Perhaps science has much to learn along this line from the disciplines as distinct from the content of Oriental religions". He was referring to the understanding of the modes of human consciousness.

Thomas S. Kuhn popularized the concept of the scientific paradigm in recent years.² Basically, a paradigm is a pattern, a model, an exemplar. But as used in science, it is a framework within which explanation as well as understanding of facts could be neatly fitted. It seeks not only to set the boundary of accepted and permissible inquiry, and thus formulate the scope, but also to provide a model for the organization of the information obtained during the inquiry. A paradigm is thus the basic requirement to guide an inquiry, to direct the methods and approaches employed in it, and to integrate the findings of the several workers in the same field. Therefore, the chief merit of a paradigm lies in its being shared by all the members of a

scientific community. It facilitates joint exploration into a commonly accepted and neatly delimited field of inquiry. It is a technique by means of which scientific efforts could be co-ordinated. Kuhn refers to the "blinding function" of a paradigm. A paradigm blinds in the sense that the inquirer's attention is narrowed down to a specific area of inquiry, and preserves him from distractions and meanderings. A paradigm has its own procedures and categories of thought in a specific pattern. In this sense, a paradigm serves as a road-map for the inquirer.

II. THE METHOD IN ADVAITA

Vedānta has developed its own paradigms, according to what G. C. Williams calls 'the ground-rules' or doctrines (*Adaptation and Natural Selection*, Princeton, 1966), which it espouses. The influence of the Advocacy Method as well as the multiple hypothesis has been quite considerable in this field: and arguments are often reduced to semantic skills and verbal exercises. Nevertheless, concept-formation has been very much in evidence. It is curious that development of theory in Vedānta follows 'the postulational-deductive' method of contemporary celebrity. A Vedāntic theory seeks first to identify the parameters, then determine and define the relations between them, and finally constructs a workable model, not only to understand reality but to accomplish the religious goal as well. For in India, theory is a handmaid to *Sādhana*. A paradigm in this context defines the traditional hypothesis and provides a workable model so as to prevent conceptual drift.

The paradigm adopted by Advaita Vedānta is technically styled as "(initial) assumption and (subsequent) withdrawal or rejection" (*adhyāropa-apavāda*). Sadānanda (around 1500 A.D.), the author of the well-known *Vedānta-sāra*, describes this as a 'nyāya', a scheme, plan or method. Venkaṭa-nātha, disciple of Rāmabrahmānanda-tīrtha (called Abhinava-Śaṅkarācārya) in his gloss on Śaṅkara's *BGB* also calls this a 'nyāya' for the sake of ascertainment of Brahman, who is beyond description and

imagination.³ Raghunātha's *Laukika-nyāya-saṁgraha* lists this as one of the 334 *nyāyas*.⁴ It is obvious that in later Advaita thought this paradigm has been accorded the honoured status of an accepted method. But Śaṅkara himself nowhere mentions that it is a *nyāya*. In fact, the only place where he mentions the method explicitly is in a citation in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā* :

“And these are the words of the knower(s) of the right traditional method of teaching.... ‘By (initial) assumption and (later) withdrawal or rejection, the undifferentiated-and-unextended is shown up’.”

It is hard to identify the source of this formulation. The glossator, Ānanda-giri merely remarks :

“Here is a concurrence from elders that a knowable, although unreal, can indeed be helpful in bringing about knowledge.”

It may be noted that the celebrated elder contemporary of Śaṅkara, Maṇḍana, also cites the same half-verse.⁶ There has been a suggestion that this statement is from a *vārttika* (now lost) of Sundara-pāṇḍya, an earlier thinker towards whom Śaṅkara's attitude was reverential. This thinker is said to have prepared *vārttikas* on both *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* and *Uttara-mīmāṃsā* ; and he has been quoted by Kumārila also (an older contemporary of Śaṅkara). Śaṅkara has quoted three verses towards the close of his commentary on the fourth ‘sūtra’ of the *Vedānta-sūtras* (1-1-4) with a respectful “And it is said” (*apīcāhuh*). Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī* on this describes the three verses as “the inspired utterance of the knower(s) of Brahman” (*brahmavidāṁ-gāthā*). But Ātma-svarūpa, the author of *Prabodha-parīśodhinī*, a gloss on *Pañcapādikā*, has occasion to cite the same verses and mention that they are from Sundara-pāṇḍya. And curiously, these three verses also involve the method that we are now considering.

It is interesting to note that Śaṅkara has called this method ‘traditional’. Of course, his illustrious predecessor Gauḍapāda,

has extensively employed this method in his treatment of the states of consciousness and their parallelism to the units of the mystic syllable Om (*Kārikā* on *Māṇḍūkya-upanishad*), although nowhere mentioning it by name. He refers (3,26) to the method of negation (*neti neti*, 'not this, not this') employed in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upanishad* (2,3,6); and he speaks of the 'denial' (*apahṇava*) of 'erroneous personal constructions' (*vikalpas*). In the field of Vedānta, he appears to have been the earliest known writer to employ the well-known illustration of the rope in darkness being mistaken for a snake (2,17). This mistaking, according to him is an erroneous personal construction (*vikalpa*), which is negated when light is brought.

The earliest traceable reference to this method, however, is to be found in *Saddharma-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, a celebrated Buddhist text of Vijñāna-vāda persuasion. This important work was translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra as early as 443 A.D. ; it is claimed that Aśvaghosha quotes from this work, and therefore the work may be assigned to the first century A.D. The work mentions the method by name (2, 25, 135) but substitutes '*samāropa*' for *adhyāropa* ; however, with little change in the meaning.⁷ But the material to be found there is altogether insufficient to reconstruct the framefork of the method in the Vijñāna-vāda context. Incidentally, we find in this work the illustration of the whirling fire-band (10, 5, 443), which Gauḍapāda also employed (*alāta*).

It may be proper to ascribe the original formulation of this method to the Upanishadic thinkers by whom the Buddhist Vijñāna-vāda as well as the Advaita Vedānta were influenced greatly. Śaṅkara inherited this traditional method from Gauḍapāda, who attempted a synthesis of Buddhist and Vedāntic viewpoints. And, during Gauḍapāda's days, the method must have been so widely used that he did not think it necessary to make a formal mention of the method. Even Śaṅkara refrains from such a formal description of the method, which he employs so consistently and brilliantly. Nor do we find the method being

mentioned by name by the immediate disciples of Śaṅkara like Sureśvara and Padmapāda, although they have clearly adopted the method. It is in the *Samkshēpa-śārīraka* (of Sarvajñātman, around 1000 A.D.) that we find an early discussion of the merits of this method (2, 253).

The expression *adhyāropa*⁸ is taken to mean 'superimposition', 'wrong imputation', 'attribution (*ad-tribuere*, to assign, to ascribe) of a false characteristic', 'assumption of some nature or feature', or 'supposition'. It is a near equivalent to the Scholastic 'praedicamentale' (as distinguished from 'substance'). It is essentially a psychological construction, a projection, an assumption only for examination and falsification. It denotes the empirical framework, constructed by our sense-organs and mind, which in reality does not exist as such. The other word *apavāda* means 'negation', 'withdrawal', 'denial', 'rescission', 'elimination' of what has been imputed, attributed, assumed or superimposed. This is the result of superior knowledge, a knowledge of things as they are.⁹ It is denial not of the substance itself, but of the particular attribute that has been constructed or projected on it. The purpose of the denial is not to assert or confirm the existence of a contrary or opposite attribute, but to lead gradually to the understanding that the substance as such is to be distinguished from the same substance as endowed with attributes. Tārānātha's *Vācaspatyam* suggests 'bādhakah' (sublation) as synonymous with 'apavādah'. It may be construed as phenomenological reduction of an 'accident' (in the Scholastic sense, an attribute which is not an invariable aspect or part of the essence).

Sadānanda defines: " *Adhyāropa* is to project or assume a snake in a rope that is in reality not a snake at all."¹⁰ And he clarifies that by substance is here meant that which is not affected in any way by the three-fold time, (past, present and future), or in other words, which does not undergo any change whatsoever due to the passage of time. The word refers to the Brahman, the solely real. Non-substance, on the other hand,

is the entire phenomenal complex, in which each one of us is involved. If substance is consciousness, non-substance is the absence of it; the former is spirit (*cetana*) while the latter is inert (*jada*).¹¹ Therefore, the objective of right knowledge must be the substance devoid of all attribution, because attributions and assumptions are the chief source of all misery of phenomenal existence. Although the rope appears like a snake, it is only a rope; its snake-like appearance was merely a transformation (*vivarta*), untrue and short-lived, for when light is brought the snake-like appearance instantaneously vanishes. The phenomenal world, likewise, is a transformation of the Brahman-substance into an extended world of objects in space and time with the experiencing ego as the vortex. *Apavāda* is annulling or dissolving this appearance, so that the true nature of substance is revealed. It is the falsification of false appearances. Even as the rope which was always so will appear as it really is in the presence of light, the Brahman's real nature will dawn when ignorance is undone by intuition aided by scriptural testimony and reason in accordance with it.

The method is justified by the fact that there can be no other way of apprehending the real nature of Brahman. In fact, the very habits of our thinking and the modes of our speaking necessitate the adoption of this method. It is not only the ignorant man-in-the-street that finds this method unavoidable; even a sage that knows and wants to teach finds it necessary and expedient. But the latter knows that the assumptions he has to make are in essence unreal; he does not get deceived by them.

Technically this is called 'conformity with the sublated', a conventional acceptance of what one knows to be false, a sort of 'make-believe'. Śaṅkara refers to the occasional appearance of the sky as dark or red; the wise know that the sky is really neither dark nor red, while the ordinary folk easily believe that it is so.¹² This conventional conformity is involved in the method adopted by the Advaita masters to teach the highest

truth. This is the context in which Śaṅkara cites the formulation of this method ascribed to Sundara-pāṇḍya :

उपाधिकृतं मिथ्यारूपमपि अस्तित्वाधिगमाय ज्ञेयधर्मवत् परिकल्प्य उच्यते ।

The import is that the teacher here assumes for the moment that what really do not exist do indeed exist, and considers such existence as if it were an attribute of what really exists. Elsewhere, he draws our attention to the usual method of teaching numbers and letters to little children.¹³ The teacher makes marks on the paper with ink and asks the child to recognize in them numbers and letters. The child perceives the forms but learns to sublimate them and apperceive the abstract numbers and letters that they symbolize. Likewise, the scriptures describe the Absolute as the creator of the phenomenal world and attribute several traits like 'truth', 'knowledge', 'infinity', and 'bliss' to this attributeless Absolute, only to lead the inquirer to sublimate them and arrive at the transcendental knowledge.

Advaita examines in this context other methods of knowledge such as observation, inference, analogy, presumption and testimony, and holds that it is only scriptural testimony (*āgama*) that can lead us to this transcendental knowledge. Śaṅkara points out that scripture is not creative in nature but is only revelatory (*jñāpaka*)¹⁴, it cannot add to anything that already is, but is designed to eliminate the veil that normally obscures it. It is only this method that can give us a glimpse of the transcendental reality : all other methods are valid only in the phenomenal realm.¹⁵ Scriptural knowledge coupled with intuitive understanding will enable an individual ultimately to reject the fundamental assumption that engenders in a sequence all other assumptions.

This fundamental assumption is known in Vedānta as *avidyā* or ignorance. It is the natural tendency on the part of all beings to project an assumptive world and also get involved in it. When that is there, all other erroneous assumptions gain ground and bring about phenomenological distress. Synonyms of ignorance (*avidyā*) are : superimposition (*adhyāsa*), projection

or assumption (*adhyāropa*), inversion (*viparyaya*), error (*viparyāsa*), delusion (*bhrānti*), infatuation (*moha*), mistaken conception (*mithyā-pratyaya*), darkness (*tamas*), and wrong apprehension (*anyathā-grahaṇa*). The purpose of Vedānta is to undo this distress by loosening the hold of the assumptive world. Vedānta prescribes the method of *adhyāropa-apavāda*, to theoretically appreciate the distinction between the 'that' (*tat*, the assumptive world) and the 'thou' (*tvam*, the conscious substance after the elimination of all assumptions).¹⁶ This is a necessary prelude for practical *sādhana*.

III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE

Advaita makes a distinction between the transactional attitude (*lokadr̥ṣṭi*) and the scriptural attitude (*śāstradr̥ṣṭi*).¹⁷ The former is regarded as a creature of *avidyā*: the mind mixes up the real and the assumptive. The latter, on the other hand, seeks to distinguish between the two, with the help of reason based on intuition and guided by scriptural testimony. It provides us with the transcendently real. If the former binds, the latter liberates. The transactional attitude makes for involvement (*pravṛtti*), for it abounds in assumptions, while the scriptural brings about withdrawal (*nivṛtti*), for it seeks to reject all assumptions. The common ground for both attitudes, however, is experience (*anubhava*). Śaṅkara describes the experiential content in the transactional context as natural, inborn or inherent. By contrast, that in the other is cultivated. Experience at the transactional level is psychological and sensory (*pratyayānubhava*), while experience at the other level is that of the 'witness' (*sākṣyānubhava*). For the latter, Scripture alone is the authority,¹⁸ for the Scripture is concerned with teaching the method of rejecting all the assumptions of the transactional attitude.¹⁹ Scripture is an aid to move from the phenomenological level to the transcendental level of reality.

In other words, the phenomenological attitude is an illustration of natural *adhyāropa* while the transcendental is deliberate

apavāda. Advaita distinguishes between the transactional (*vyāvahārika*) and the projected (*prātibhāsika*) levels in the phenomenological attitude. The waking stage is an example of the former, and dream of the latter. In the waking state, there is an external reality and the individual responds to it; the world cannot strictly be called an assumption (*adhyāropa*), and cannot in the normal sense be sublated altogether (*apavāda*). Dream, on the other hand, is both projected (or assumed) and sublated. The initial procedure outlined by Gauḍapāda is to transform the waking level to the dream level, by the technique of deliberate assumption and rejection. This is calculated to facilitate the final rejection of all assumptions when wisdom matures. The individual passes from the transactional level to the transcendental level, which passage is the intended outcome in the scriptural texts.

It is to be noted that scriptural texts themselves speak of some attributes as applicable to the Absolute, which in reality and by implication is utterly devoid of all attribution.²⁰ The texts here are said to adopt the common-sense method (or the transactional method) of deliberate assumption, however, only to be sublated by reason and deep reflection (*manana* and *nididhyāsana*). Advaita, therefore, regards the scriptural passages that emphasize negation (or denial or sublation) as more important.²¹ In fact, when an Upanishad questions “Who now is our *ātman* and who is *brahman*?”, Śaṅkara explains: “By the word *brahman*, the *ātman* as limited by psychic constructs is negated; and by the word *ātman*, the adorability of the *brahman* such as that of the Sun, altogether different from the self, is negated”²²

Sureśvara, following the master closely, argues that the Self is not the sense of that word nor the import of a sentence, and that its real nature is ascertained only by the scriptural passages that negate.²³ The *Nyāya-tattva-vivaraṇa* commenting on this verse from *Saṁbandha-vārttika*, explains: “the true nature of the Self is determined by negating all senses of words and imports of

sentences by such scriptural suggestions as 'Not this, Not this'."

The well-known story of the prince who had been brought up as a hunter from early childhood has been cited by Śaṅkara as from a 'knower of tradition', (who has been identified by Ānanda-giri with Dramiḍācārya⁴). He had imagined himself to be truly a hunter by birth and profession until it was revealed to him that he was in actuality a prince. He had never been a hunter, and was always a prince; but this prince-idea was absent from him until the moment it arose as a result of revelation. His hunter-hood which was an error, was an assumption, and it was negated by the prince-idea, which corresponded to truth.

The paradigm, however, does not lay stress on the mere act of negation or sublation. It is not to be construed as a negative procedure. As Sarvajñātman rightly points out,²⁵ the negative method will not lead us to the ascertainment of the true nature of reality; it can only bring to our attention the non-existence of the phenomenal world. This is in fact the purpose of the paradigm as contained in Sundara-pāṇḍya's statement. Sarvajñātman pleads that positive and suggestive statements in the Scripture (like "I am brahman") are more effective than the negative statements (like 'Not this, Not this'). What is important is what remains over when all possible sublations have been effected; what, in other words, cannot be sublated or negated. This is otherwise called the method of 'residual reality' (*pāriśeṣya-nyāya*). By eliminating all ascriptions the natural state is revealed.

An excellent application of this method is to be found in the Upanishadic treatment of the three conditions of life, viz, waking, dreaming and sleeping. Gauḍapāda's *kārikā* on *Māṇḍūkya-upanishad* takes this up as the main theme, and shows how the method is employed to arrive at the 'fourth' (*turiya*) condition by sublating sequentially the other three. It is really not a condition, but is known so by continuing the conventional usage. The phenomenality that obtains in the three conditions is negated in the

fourth, which persists when everything else is sublated. By a residual reasoning, this only is *real* while the others are mere assumptions or constructions (*vikalpa*).

Other illustrations of this method are also derived from the Upanishads. But the suggestions contained in them are elaborated by Śaṅkara, who also explains the methodological involvement. Examples are : (1) the assumption that the Absolute is the 'lord', thus negating its subordinate position, and the later formulation that it is in fact everything, thereby denying the 'lordship'²⁶ ; (2) the assumption that 'all this' is the Absolute, worthy of adoration, and the later formulation that it is not that but the one spirit that energizes it that is worthy of adoration²⁷ ; (3) the assumption that the Absolute is the cause of the phenomenal world, and the subsequent claim that the effect is illusory, thus denying the causal role of the Absolute²⁸ ; (4) the assumption that the Self is the only 'knowable' (*jñeya*), thus excluding all other knowables, and the later postulation that the Self is really the 'knower' (*jñātṛ*)²⁹ ; (5) the assumption that the Self is the 'knower', thus denying the preceding assumption, and later sublating it with the claim that the Self is a mere 'witness' (*sākṣi*)³⁰ ; (6) sublation of this assumption by denying validity of duality, which obtains only at the phenomenal level³¹ ; (7) the assumption that the Absolute can be understood only with the aid of scriptural testimony, thereby denying the utility of all other normal methods of knowing such as observation and reason³², and the later formulation that it is impossible to ascertain the Absolute by verbal or mental processes.³³

The credit for discovering this Upanishadic method and for defining this Vedāntic paradigm must be shared by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. The elaboration and extensive application of this method were of course the achievement of Śaṅkara. It is to be noted that it is only Sureśvara among Śaṅkara's early followers who was fascinated by the potentiality of this method. His references to this method in his *Vārttikas* as well as in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* are both numerous and highly suggestive.

It is curious that the later thinkers and writers in the field of Advaita were rather lukewarm in their appreciation of this most remarkable paradigm developed in Indian tradition, although other *nyāyas* have been frequently utilized by them.³⁴

IV. THE MODEL AND METAPHOR

The employment of a *nyāya* becomes justified when the matter under consideration is vague and controvertial³⁵; presumably when the doubt or problem can hardly be resolved by any other means. There is a conventional explanation of the expression '*nyāya*' used in this context: that it is 'an illustration' (*dīṣṭānta*). It is in this sense that literary works and grammatical works (principally Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, Bhartṛhari's *Vākya-pāḍīya* and Kaiyaṭa's gloss) often employ the word. But the earlier and more numerous and more meaningful employment of *nyāyas* was by the Mīmāṃsaka writers (like Śabara, Kumārila, Udayana and Āpastamba). And they regard a *nyāya* as more forceful than a mere analogy: it formulates in a nut-shell an entire argument, it epitomizes a whole viewpoint. The merit of a *nyāya* consists in that it is directly derived from common experience and daily life; and its source frequently is folklore. It, therefore, admits of ready appreciation. In fact *Pañcatantra*, *Hitopadeśa*, and Jain and Buddhist fables have provided a considerable number of *nyāyas*. While, therefore, analogy or illustration is of course involved (as in *rajjū-sarpa* and *śukti-rajata*), the argument or methodological precision becomes all important in a '*nyāya*' like the *adhyāropa-apavāda* or *prasajya-pratiśedha*³⁶ which is entirely methodological in its import.

The theory formation in Advaita has not only employed the above paradigm but has utilized as a supplement to it the descriptive model of the piece of rope appearing as a serpent in insufficient light (*rajjū-sarpa*). Like the *nyāya*, this model also has been drawn from the world of common experience. It illustrates an essential analogy with what is sought to be explained, viz, the theory of transformation (*vivarta*) with regard to the

phenomenal world. The rope's appearance as a serpent is not a mere illusion. It involves the psychological processes of transformation and projection, while the physical datum remains unaltered. The serpent seems to emerge out of the rope during inadequate illumination, and dissolve into it when light is brought in. The serpent was never in reality there at all ; it lacks the status of an objective datum. And the rope as a physical reality was always there, even while the serpent appeared in its place. The serpent could not have been presented without this physical foundation, and therefore it cannot be classed under a total illusion (*alīka*). It had reality as its ground, but the misapprehension was due to its appearance as something other than its own true nature. The rope was the reality and the snake a presentation on that basis. The former is an existential datum while the latter is an experiential detail. The serpent-status is a super-imposition or an assumption (*adhyāropa*), and its subsequent annulment is an illustration of withdrawal (*apavāda*). The model thus supplements the paradigm.

The model involves some identity of structure between the common experience illustrated by the model and the phenomenal actuality to be intuitively understood. The model employs something already known and something that is popularly appreciated to drive home a point that is at once abstract and real. There is, however, no perfect analogy ; and an argument is not an evidence. The rope-serpent model is not employed in Advaita as an argument ; its purpose is to illustrate. Analogy involved in the model is limited, and is not meant to provide a prototype of what is sought to be explained. It is true that in many later and minor works on Advaita, this model or its equivalent, the shell-and-silver (*śukti-rajata*), takes the place of the principal argument ; and the discussion carries the impression that the model has been more important than what it seeks to represent. It is necessary to abstract from the model what is called 'the positive analogy'. The model is observational, but what it represents is non-observational. The

notion of 'transformation' (*vivarta*) is what Bertrand Russell would call "a logical construction".

The "rope-serpent" model in Advaita is not what Mary Hesse calls "a dead metaphor".³⁷ It is a real description, and it facilitates passage from the observable to the actual, from the factual to the theoretical. It has been of great significance as an aid to theory-formation in Advaita. Śaṅkara's merit consists in the elaborate and consistent interpretations that he provided for an axiomatic system that the Upanishadic texts contained. And in so doing, he contributed significantly to the Indian theory-formation.³⁸

REFERENCES AND NOTES

1. *The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness*, Dover, N.Y. 1963, p. XI.
2. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Chicago, 1962.
3. Brahmananda-giri-ṭikā, on BGB, 13, 13.
4. Cited in *Śabdakalpadruma*, Vol. 2, p. 933. The popular 'maxims' (*laukika-nyāyas*) employed in literary, grammatical and philosophical works have been compiled by several writers, the most prominent among whom are Raghunātha (*Laukika-nyāya-saṁgraha*) and Tārānātha (*Vācaspatyam*). An article in *Pandit* (1867) by Jhalkikar Vamana Acharya contained a list of them. A recent and valuable collection, with annotations in English, is Col. G. A. Jacob's in three 'Handfuls' or parts (*Laukika-nyāyāñjali*, Bombay 1925). The '*Adhyāropa-nyāya*' is to be found in the second part of this collection (p. 2). The word न्याय is derived from नि+इन् (नियमेन ईयन्ते or नीयन्ते प्राप्यन्ते विवक्षितार्थो येन)
5. BGB, 13, 13 : तथा हि सम्प्रदायविदां वचनम्—'अध्यारोपापवादेन निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते । Ānanda-giri comments : मिथ्यारूपमपि ज्ञेयवस्तु ज्ञानोपयोगीत्यत्र वृद्धसम्मतिमाह ।
6. *Brahma-siddhi*, p. 26. The commentary explains : परमार्थतो निष्प्रपञ्चमेव ब्रह्म तदविद्यया प्रपञ्चस्याध्यारोपेण तदपवादेन तन्निषेधेन च प्रपञ्च्यते व्याख्यायते इत्यर्थः ॥
7. सर्वधर्माः सदसत्पक्षविगताः समारोपापवादैश्च बालः विकल्पन्ते, न त्वार्यैः ।

8. अधि+आ+रह् (णिच् भावे अच्) ; अप+वद् (भावे घञ्)
9. VSB, 3, 3, 9.
10. VS असर्पभूते रज्जौ सर्पारोपवत् वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपः । कालत्रयानपाय्यात्मैव वस्तुशब्दार्थः ।
11. वस्तु सच्चिदानन्दरूपं ब्रह्म, अवस्तु अज्ञानादिसकलजडसमूहः ।
12. BUB, 2, 1, 20.
13. Ibid. 4, 4, 23. There is another 'nyāya' known as 'rekhā-gavaya-nyāya' which is relevant in this context. A man of the town who has not seen a wild bovine animal (*gavaya*) seeks to know what it is like from a forester ; the forester draws a picture of the animal and the townsman takes the very lines to be the animal. Later when he goes to the forest and actually sees the animal, the knowledge will dawn on him that the animal is different from the picture.
14. BUB, 1, 4, 10 etc.
15. VSB (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*), अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणादीनि शास्त्रादीनि । cf. BGB, 2, 18.
16. BUB, 3, 5, 1. Also, VS, आभ्यां अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां तत्त्वंपदार्थशोधनमपि सिद्ध्यति ।
17. BUB, 3, 5, 1
18. VSB, 2, 1, 6.
19. VSB, 1, 1, 4 & GB, 2, 18.
20. e.g., BU, 3, 9, 28 ; 3, 4, 2, 1, 19 ; CHU, 3, 19, 1, 7, 2, 3 ; TU, 2, 1 ; 2, 7, & 8 ; AU, 1, 1.
21. e.g., BU, 3, 9, 36 also cf. VSB, 3, 2, 22 ; & SV, 1046.
22. CHU, 5, 11, 1.
23. SV, 462.
24. BUB, 2, 1, 20 ; also cf. SV, 233, 234.
25. SS, 253.
26. IU, 1 & 6.
27. KnU, 1, 2-8.
28. KtU, 2, 20 ; SU, 2, 4, 1 ; BU, 7, 1 ; TU, 2, 6.
29. BU, 2, 4, 5 ; SU, 1, 11 ; MaitU, 6, 7.
30. KtU, 6, 13 ; BU, 2, 4, 14,

31. MandU, 7 ; MundU, 2, 2, 10.
32. MundU, 1, 2, 12, 13 ; KtU, 2, 9 ; VSB, 1, 1, 4 & 2, 1, 6 ; GB, 13, 34.
33. BU, 2, 4, 14 ; KnU, 1, 3.
34. Such as 'chāyā-piśāci-nyāya' (Nṛsimha-sarasvatī's commentary on VS), 'iṣyamāṇa-pradhāna-nyāya' (VKP), 'rekhā-gavaya-nyāya' (*op.cit.* and Vācaspati's *Tātparyā-ṭikā*), 'baka-bandhana-nyāya' (PPV and *Tattva-dīpana* on it), 'praśajya-pratiṣedha' (BUV), 'jala-kataka-reṇu-nyāya' (*op.cit.*), 'vyādha-rājaputra-nyāya' (BUB, BUV, and SL), 'śākhā-candra-nyāya' (TUV and VPS), 'kaṇṭha-cāmikara-nyāya' (VP and *Ātmatattva-viveka*) and 'tusha-khaṇḍana-nyāya' or 'piṣṭa-peṣaṇa-nyāya' (Padmapāda and Sureśvara).
35. This is itself regarded as a 'nyāya': "Saṁdigdhe nyāyah pravarata itī nyāyāt..." (Jñānottama's commentary on Sureśvara's NS, 4, 3).
36. The latter occurs often in Advaita works, and was first used by Sureśvara in BUV, 3, 9, 73. It is an interesting counterpart of the paradigm we are here considering. It seeks to evoke an interest in a specific situation or particular attribute, and after making sure that the interest has been sustained, that situation or attribute is negated. *Vācaspatyam* explains the maxim thus : प्रसज्य प्रसक्तिं सम्पाद्य आरोप्य इति यावत् प्रतिषेधः । अत्यन्ताभावे । 'प्रसक्तं हि प्रतिषेध्यत इति न्यायेन आरोपितप्रसङ्गस्यैव निषेधः । तेन वायौ रूपं नास्तीत्यादावपि वायौ रूपारोपं कृत्वा एव निषेधः नञा बोध्यत इति विवेकः ॥ (cf. Jacob's collection, 2, p. 49-50). For an account of the rope-snake model, cf. VSB, 1, 4, 6. यथा कश्चित् सन्तमसे पतितां काञ्चिद्रज्जुं अहिं मन्यमानः भीतो वेपमानः पलायते । तं च अपरो ब्रूयात् " मा भैषीः, नायं अहिः रज्जुरेव " इति । स च तदपश्रुत्य अहिकृतं भयं उत्सृजेत् । वेपथुं पलायनं च । न तु अहिबुद्धिकाले तदपगमकाले च वस्तुनः कश्चिद्विशेषः स्यात् ॥
37. "Forces and Fields", *Models and Analogies in Science*, Thomas Nelson, cf. Dudley Shapere : *Philosophical Problems of Natural Science*, Macmillan Co., N.Y. 1965.
38. For the importance of theory-formation in modern science, cf. Carl Hempel "The Theoretician's Dilemma", in H. Fiegl *et al.* (Ed), *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. II, 1958.

ADDITIONAL SOURCE-MATERIAL ON METHODS

(1) *Vedānta-kaumudī* quoting Kumārila says (p. 61)

तदाहुः—अज्ञातज्ञापनशक्तिः प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च सर्वलौकिकवैदिक-
प्रमाणानां स्वारसिकमित्यर्थः ।

(The means of knowledge is valid inasmuch as it lets us know a hitherto unknown matter. This is the very essence of all means of knowing, mundane or religious.)

(2) सर्वं हि मानं लोकेऽस्मिन् वस्त्वभिव्यक्तिसाधनम् ।

तदभावेऽनभिव्यक्तं वस्तु नास्तीति दुर्वचः ॥

(Sureśvara, BUBV, 3,8,113)

(All method is an instrument of revealing objects. But it would be wrong to say that in the absence of such method the object does not at all exist, because it is not revealed.)

Ānanda-giri explains :

न हि दीपाभावे तदभिव्यङ्ग्यं घटादि तमसावृतं नास्तीति सुवचनमिति
हि शब्दार्थः ।

(In the absence of light, the pot which could have been revealed by it is hidden in darkness, but it does not cease to exist just because there is no light)

(3) स्वमेयमात्रशूरत्वात् मितेर्नान्यत्र मानता ।

(Sureśvara, SV, 245)

(A method is valid only with regard to what can be known by it.)

(4) श्रुत्यसम्भवे च लक्षणाश्रयणं न्याय्यमेव ।

(VSB, 3, 1, 22)

(It is indeed reasonable to accept the secondary import of scriptural text in case literal interpretation appears meaningless.)

(5) न चानुमानं प्रत्यक्षविरोधे प्रामाण्यं लभते ।

(BUB, 2, 1, 20)

प्रत्यक्षविरोधेऽनुमानस्याप्रामाण्यात् ।

(BUB, 4, 3, 6)

(Inference does not become valid when it goes against what is got from perception.)

(6) न च दृष्टिविरोधः केनचिदप्यभ्युपगम्यते । न च दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम दृष्टत्वादेव । (BUB, 1, 4, 10)

(No one can reasonably contradict what is seen ; there can be nothing unreal in the seen, because of the very fact of being seen.)

(7) न हि क्वचित्साक्षाद्वस्तुधर्मस्यापोद्गी द्रष्टा कर्त्री वा ब्रह्मविद्या । अविद्या-
यास्तु सर्वत्रैव निवर्तिका दृश्यते । न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं
निवर्तयितुं बार्हति ब्रह्मविद्या । (BUB, 1, 4, 10)

(The wisdom concerning the Absolute is nowhere seen to contradict the nature of what is actually existent, nor to create [any existent thing] ; it only eliminates ignorance with regard to it..... The wisdom concerning the Absolute is not capable of creating or eliminating any thing that really exists.)

(8) तस्माद्यथानुभवं तत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छद्भिः बहिरेवावभासत इत्यध्यवसितम् ।
नायं साधुरध्यवसायो यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ संभवासंभवाव-
धार्यते, न पुनः संभवासंभवपूर्विके प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती । यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादि-
नामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत्संभवति । यत्तु न केनचिदपि
प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तन्न संभवति । असति विषये विषयसारूप्या-
नुपपत्तेः, बहिरुपलब्धेश्च विषयस्य । (VSB, 2, 2, 28)

(It stands to reason that those who see an actual object should refer it to an outside source, and not say that it only appears to be so. It is an untenable judgement to deny external reality altogether and make our perceptions deal with merely appearances. For, the criterion for the presence of an external object rests with the operation of the means of knowing. Whatever is apprehended by a means of knowing must indeed exist, and whatever is not so apprehended must be unreal : If objects did not exist actually, it would be impossible for cognitions to assume the objective forms and objects are in fact cognized to be existing outside us.)

(9) ज्ञेयाभिमुखस्यापि ज्ञानं कदाचिज्जायते कदाचिन्न जायते । तस्मात्तं
प्रति ज्ञानविषय एव दर्शयितव्यो ज्ञापयितुकामेन । तस्मिन्दर्शिते
स्वयमेव यथाविषयं यथाप्रमाणं च ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । न च प्रमाणान्तरेणा-
न्यथाप्रसिद्धेर्धेऽन्यथाज्ञानं नियुक्तस्याप्युपपद्यते । यदि पुनर्नियुक्तोऽह-
मित्यन्यथाज्ञानं कुर्यान्न तु तज्ज्ञानं, किं तर्हि ? मानसी सा क्रिया ।

स्वयमेव चेदन्यथोत्पद्यते, भ्रान्तिरेव स्यात् । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं
यथाभूतविषयं च, न तन्नियोगशक्तेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते । न च
प्रतिषेधशक्तेनापि वारयितुं शक्यते । न हि तत्पुरुषतन्त्रं, वस्तुतन्त्रमेव
हि तत् । (VSB, 3, 2, 21)

(A person may be confronted with an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge may sometimes arise and sometimes not. Therefore any one who wishes to let this person know must only tell about the object. And when he is told, his knowledge will arise in accordance with the nature of the object [subtle or otherwise] and also in proportion to his capacities of knowing. Then no instruction contrary to the object's nature can be convincing. If in case such instruction is believed in, that would not then be a piece of knowledge but a mere mental act; it may in fact be an illusion. For knowledge is always occasioned by the means of knowing and is tied to the object as it is; and not even a hundred injunctions can arouse it, nor can a hundred prohibitions prevent its arousal. Knowledge depends on the object and not on the individual's fancy.)

(10) ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसं; तथाऽपि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा
कर्तुं शक्यं, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्, ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । अतो ज्ञानं
कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम् । केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् । न
चोदनातन्त्रम् । नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् । तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि, ज्ञानस्य
महद्वैलक्षण्यम् । यथा च 'पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः' 'योषा वाव
गौतमाग्निः' (छान्दो. ५-७, ८-१) इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी
भवति । केवलचोदनाजन्यत्वात्क्रियैव सा, पुरुषतन्त्रा च । या तु
प्रसिद्धेऽग्नावग्निबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा । नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा । किं
तर्हि ? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवैतन्न क्रिया । एवं सर्वप्रमाण-
विषयवस्तु वेदितव्यम् ॥ (VSB, 1, 1, 4)

(Contemplation, being a reflection, is a mental act. But it is possible to do it one way or an other, or not do it at all, for it is a matter that depends upon the individual. Not so is knowledge, because it is occasioned by the means of knowing. When the means are valid, they refer to an object that is actually existing; and the individual's preferences are of no significance here. Knowledge thus is different from contemplation.)

(11) स्वविषयशूराणि हि प्रमाणानि श्रोत्रादिवत् । (BUB, 2, 1, 20)

(The means of knowing are competent only with regard to their own distinct fields, like the ear (which can apprehend only sounds.)

(12) वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणा निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना
प्रस्तूयते । (SW. Vol. I. p. 9)

(The ultimate good is commended to be served by an inquiry into the Upanishadic texts, helped by reasoning that does not go against them.)

(13) तदपि श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधच्छब्द एव तर्कमप्यादर्थव्यं
दर्शयतीत्युक्तम् । नानेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्यात्रात्मलाभः सम्भवति ।
श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्कोऽनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते ॥ (VSB, 2, 1, 6)

(They argue that scriptures themselves commend reflection in addition to, and different from, textual study [hearing], and then they accord an honourable place to reasoning. But, this pretext cannot help empty reasoning justifying itself. It is only when reasoning is in perfect accord with scriptural testimony that it can claim a place as a valid method, even that as auxiliary to experience.)

(14) श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।

(Even the scriptures accept reason as an aid.)

(15) न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किंतु
श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम्, अनुभाववसानत्वाद्भूत-
वस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य । कर्तव्ये हि विषये नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति
श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य । कर्तु-
मकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म, यथाश्चैन
गच्छति, पद्भ्यामन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति । तथा 'अतिरात्रे
षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनम्', 'उदिते जुहोति' इति ।
विधिप्रतिषेधाश्चात्रार्थवन्तः स्युः विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च । न तु वस्त्वेवं
नैवमस्ति नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते । विकल्पास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः ।
न वस्तुयाथाम्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । किं तर्हि, वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् ।
न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषोऽन्यो वेति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति ।

तत्र पुरुषोऽन्यो वेति मिथ्याज्ञानम् । स्थाणुरेवेति तत्त्वज्ञानं, वस्तुतन्त्र-
त्वात् । एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम् । तत्रैवं सति
ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् ॥ (VSB, 1, 1, 2)

(In the case of inquiry into religious conduct, scriptural testimony alone is relevant and valid ; but not so with regard to inquiry into the Absolute. Here scriptural testimony as also intuitional experience [and other methods] become applicable whenever necessary [or in so far as they are possible], because such inquiry should culminate in the realization of the Absolute, an already existing principle. In the matter of duties, there is not this dependence on intuitional experience, and scripture would suffice as the valid means ; and religious conduct is dependent upon man for its source. Religious action, also ordinary behaviour, may be done or not done, and if done it may be done in one way or another. A man may decide to travel or not to travel, and if he decides to travel he may go on foot or he may ride on a horse. Similar is the case with regard to sacrifices. Choice in method is possible in these matters, and choice depends on individuals [their needs and fancies]. But knowledge of an existent real does not admit of such choice ; it depends on the thing itself and not the individual's fancies.)

- (16) इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् । तस्मिन् निरागमाः
पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति । उत्प्रेक्षायाः
निरङ्कुशत्वात् । तथा हि कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्नेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्त-
तैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते । तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तः ततोऽन्यैराभास्यन्त
इति न प्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्काणां शक्यमाश्रयितुम् । पुरुषमतिवैरूप्यात् ।
..... न हि प्रतिष्ठितस्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । एतदपि हि
तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते । केषाञ्चित् तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठि-
तत्वदर्शनेन अन्येषामपि तज्जातीयकानां तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात् ।
सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । अतीतवर्तमानाध्व-
साम्येन ह्यनागतेऽप्यध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानो लोको
दृश्यते । श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं
तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते । अयमेव तर्कस्यालङ्कारो
यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम । एवं हि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्कः

प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति । न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन
भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणम् ॥

(VSB, 2, 1, 11)

(When matters can be understood only by scriptural testimony, mere reasoning should not be called in to contradict them. Reasoning based only on human ingenuity and not supported by scriptural tradition can be very inconclusive, for man's imagination is unrestrained. Reasonings of a very clever person are seen to be proved erroneous by persons cleverer than him, and the findings of these cleverer persons can likewise be thrown out by persons far more clever than them. It is unwise therefore to rely on reasoning as all-too-well-founded or decisively conclusive, for there is vast individual difference in the abilities of people..... But [there is here a suggestion of a *prima facie* view] if it is argued that there can possibly be no reasoning which is conclusive, it must be noted that even this inconclusiveness of reasoning is established by reasoning alone ! In fact, if all reasoning were to be inconclusive, normal transactions in the world would come to an end. People ordinarily plan their future course of action on the basis of [reasoning based on] past experiences and present occurrences. In cases where scriptural texts contradict each other, it is reasoning that we should resort to in order to figure out the proper import of the texts and to avoid wrong and superficial conclusions. The inconclusive character of reasoning is in fact the embellishment of reasoning. Were it not so, the fallacious arguments could never be contradicted nor the correct ones upheld. There is no sense in saying that a person must be stupid just because his ancestors were stupid !)

- (17) तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय-
व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः ; सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधि-
प्रतिषेधमोक्षपराणि । कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि
शास्त्राणि चेति ? उच्यते, देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वा-
नुपपत्तौ प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादि-
व्यवहारः संभवति । न चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेणेन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः संभवति ।
न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद्व्याप्रियते । न चैतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन्नसति
असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते । न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाण-
प्रवृत्तिरस्ति । तस्मादविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि
च । पश्चादिमिश्राविशेषात् । यथा हि पञ्चादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां
सम्बन्धे सति, शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले

च प्रवर्तन्ते ; यथा दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हन्तुमय-
मिच्छतीति पलायितुमारभन्ते, हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रत्यभिमुखी
भवन्ति ; एवं पुरुषा अपि व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यत-
करान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान्प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते, अतः
समानः पश्चादिभिः पुरुषाणां प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः । पश्चादीनां च
प्रसिद्धोऽविवेकपुरःसरः प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः, तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद्युत्पत्ति-
मतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारस्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते ॥

(VSB, 1, 1, 1)

(Contingent upon reciprocal superimposition all worldly conduct and religious action, which in their turn depend upon the means of knowing and the objects of knowledge, go on For one on whose body there is no superimposition of "I" and "mine", neither the desire to know can be known, nor will there be any scope for the operation of the means of knowing. There can be no sense-organs unless there is a body as their support. And no one can function without a superimposition of the self on the body. In the absence of all this, the subjective percipience for the self [who is by nature untainted] is impossible ; and without such a subjective percipience the talk of means of knowing is meaningless. Therefore, all means of knowing including scripture presume some one that is subject to nescience.

This is so with regard to human beings as with regard to the animals. Their approach and avoidance tendencies are dependent upon their sensory apprehensions ; human beings and animals alike employ means of knowing. Although animals lack fine discrimination, and humans are endowed with it, it does not make a difference as regards the employment of the means of knowing.)

(18) न ह्यात्मान्तुकः कस्यचित्, स्वयंप्रसिद्धत्वात् । न ह्यात्माऽऽत्मनः
प्रमाणमपेक्ष्य सिध्यति । तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्यप्रसिद्धप्रमेय-
सिद्ध्य उपादीयन्ते । न ह्याकाशादयः पदार्थाः प्रमाणनिरपेक्षाः स्वयं-
सिद्धाः केनचिदप्युपगम्यन्ते । आत्मा तु प्रमाणादिव्यवहाराश्रयत्वात्
प्रागेव प्रमाणादिव्यवहारासिध्यति ॥

(VSB, 2, 3, 7)

(The self of no man is adventitious, for it is self-evident. Its assumption cannot therefore be made dependent upon means of knowing ; in fact, it is the self that employs these means of knowing such as perception to ascertain the existence of things not yet known. The existence of self is thus established even before the means of knowledge begin to operate.)

There has been in recent years a great interest in the problem of Consciousness, not only in the field of Psychology but also in other scientific disciplines like Neurology, Physiology, Biological Sciences and Social Anthropology. In the wake of this interest, there is a world-wide appreciation of the value of Indian thought in deepening our understanding of Consciousness. The need is keenly felt by scientific workers for authoritative Source-books containing relevant reflections by Indian thinkers, ancient and medieval, regarding all aspects of Consciousness, and reconstruction of such reflection in scientific terms.

The present study focusses attention on Consciousness as treated in the school of Advaita. An attempt has been made to reconstruct Psychological thought as developed mainly by Samkara and his immediate disciples in so far as it is relevant to modern thinking in Psychology and allied sciences.

The First of the four Fascicules planned by the Academy deals with the evolution of Advaita thought and contains a comprehensive survey of Source Material. It also reconstructs the methodological outlook of this school, especially with reference to the Vedantic paradigm of *Adhyaropa-apavada*.

There is here an exhaustive collection of source material on all these issues, as well as an evaluation of all the significant contributions made over the ages, from pre-Samkara days to recent years.



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