


**ESSENTIAL VALUES IN INDIAN CULTURE
FOR MANAGEMENT**

PROF. S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO



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PREFACE

“Essential Values in Indian Culture for Management” (of self and otherwise) is a most timely treatise prepared by Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao, one of our most celebrated thinkers of the day.

When the individual, the society and the country feel confused at the cross roads of value systems, the Treatise comes in handy as a signal post, indicating the most needed direction.

Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao has investigated the many perspectives of the vital theme with dedication in depth research and has put in the document in very simple language.

Gandhi Centre of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan is indeed most grateful to the scholar and feels convinced that the treatise would be widely read for practical application. The Centre is also beholden to Shri H. V. Vishwanth of Prism Books Pvt. Ltd. for seeing through the manuscript of the Treatise.

H. K. Ranganath

Hon. Director

"Non-violence is not a material thing. It does imply not to hurt anybody. Evil thought is violence. Impatience is violence. Jealousy is violence. To tell a lie is violence. To wish ill of others is violence. To possess what is necessary for the world is also violence."

M. K. Gandhi

INTRODUCTION

The present crisis in public life as well the ills of family life often traced, and rightly so, to wrong value-orientations. Every culture insists that certain values of life must be carefully cultivated and protected, for the good of the individual and for the welfare of the group. In India, this has been the main concern. Our systems of philosophy (the darśanas) are in fact so many value-appraisals; our literary works are meant only to instil the proper sense of values; our religious scriptures are attempts to reinforce the most advantageous value-systems.

The value orientation in our country is based on dharma (the supportive actions and ideology in one's own life in the family and in the community), purushārtha (the four-fold goals of life: kāma, artha, dharma and moksha), and ṛṇa (three-fold indebtedness of man from his very birth: to the ancestors, to the cultural forbearers and to the protecting gods). In all walks of life, the value-orientation was insisted upon. Industry, commerce, and health-care were no exceptions.

In some of our scriptural texts (e.g., *Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, 6, 3, 1, 24, *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa*, 7, 91 [32,

8] and *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-sūtra*, 16, 2, 14), there is an expression, 'anaddhā-purusha', which means a man in vain, good for nothing, a person without personality, an empty one. He is described as a person who is selfish, who has no conception of values, who is not aware of his indebtedness, who is of no use to the ancestors, to the others around him or to the gods. His only interests are enjoyment of material pleasures (*kāma*) and acquisition of wealth (*artha*); he has no notion of dharma or of *purushārtha* as a whole; his is not an organized life.

This can be traced back to the idea of 'addhā' (meaning true, real, full) that we find in *Rgveda* (10, 111, 7; 10, 129, 6; 10, 85, 16). The expression 'addhātayah' is employed to suggest perception of meaning in life, apprehension of what is real and significant and conduct in conformity with wisdom. The root of this word is 'at' which means conduct (*gamana*) as well as wisdom (*jñāna*) (*at+dhā+kvip*); and the lexicons give 'tattva' (reality, essence) as its synonym. One who denies this 'addhā' in his life is an 'anaddhā-purusha'. In the reference cited above in *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa*, we have also the explanation that one who does not please the gods, the ancestors or other human beings around him is an 'anaddhā-purusha',

कोऽनद्धापुरुष इति ? न देवान् पितॄन् मनुष्यानीति ।

and also that he fails to discharge his indebtedness to them (*anṛṇarthāt yajeti vachanāch chhritir iti*). The

reference to indebtedness is found in *Taittirīya-samhitā* (6, 3, 10).

जायमानो वै ब्राम्हणः त्रिभिः ऋणा जायते ।

ब्रम्हचर्येण ऋषिभ्यः यज्ञेन देवेभ्यः प्रजया तितृभ्यः ॥

(*Śatapatha-brāhmaṇa*, 1, 7, 2, 1-6, where the same statement occurs, substitutes the word 'brāhmaṇa', with 'whoever is born'; and adds a fourth debt that must be discharged debt to other human beings, viz., hospitality and generosity.)

It is important in the context to note that the main distinction between the 'addhātayah' and the 'anaddhā-purusha' lies in the desire-gratification which is natural to man, and duty-fulfilment which characterizes a cultured man. The 'anaddhā-purusha' orients himself to desire-gratification at all costs, whereas the 'addhātayah' attach importance to duty-fulfilment. In other words, the 'anaddhā-purusha' is guided by the animal aspiration to enjoy; and has no appreciation of human values in life. Life organized according to dharma characterizes the person who is guided by 'addhā'. And dharma is relevant for individual life, family life, community-life, professional and vocational lives. It does not, however, exclude kāma (enjoyment) or artha (wealth), but provides correct guidelines for them.

In the present publication, I have attempted to focus attention on the value-orientations, which are integral aspects of our culture. I have chosen two areas

where the Indian conceptions of values can become eminently relevant: management and health-care, the areas in which I have had occasion to work. In both the areas, stress management and self-management become important issues.

In the first chapter, I have shown how the Mīmāṃsā system deals with many problems of managerial interest; and how the concept of dharma was pressed for practical application in diverse situations. In the second chapter, values pertaining to corporate bodies apropos individual values are dealt with, with particular reference to the Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya discussions of 'jāti' and 'vyakti'.

The third and the fourth chapters deal with what is essentially a clinical issue: Management of stress. But the discussion provides hints for application in the managerial situations also. The discussion is based on *Bhagavad-gītā*, *Yoga-sūtra* of Patañjali and Āyurvedic texts of seminal value. The thrust of the discussion is to emphasize self-management as of universal importance.

I am grateful to my friend, Dr. H. K. Ranganath of Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bangalore, who made this publication possible.

S. K. Ramachandra Rao

I. THE MANAGERIAL CONTEXT

Management is closely and almost exclusively associated at present with the human activities that may be characterized as commercial, like industry and business. It is natural, therefore, that the motives of management should be tied up with strictly commercial values like greater productivity, profit, effective incentives, increased efficiency, favourable labour relations, adequate return for the capital, and customer satisfaction. The stress in normal or standard management is on economic prosperity and material satisfaction.

The business or industry is supposed to have a corporate mind. It illustrates a distinct culture, sliced out of the common human culture and drifting away from it. Its behaviour is plainly economical in orientation. Economics defines the way of life here. This is what we see in all business enterprises, ancient or modern, Eastern or Western, small-scale or large. But in the organized business sectors having corporate minds of their own, money is the primary or only value. People

not only work for money but live for money. Money is not a means to an end, but an end in itself. The basic tenet for the successful businessman consists of efficiency, economy, utility and profit. The issues other than economical (like honesty, concern for others, integrity, morality, responsibility and conscience) hardly enter into the picture; when they do enter, it is only marginally. Ethics is subordinated to economics; the ends justify the means.

The remarkable thing about this economic approach is that it does not always seem to succeed. Notwithstanding profit, aspects like efficiency, labour motivations, customer satisfaction, harmony and cooperation suffer. Competition in business and industry is not always healthy; nor is it welcome. It is found more often than not, to bring about debilitation; and more importantly, it encourages corruption (defined as the misuse of public power for private profit). The profit-oriented industry or business is likely to become eventually shrewd, callous, cynical, cold-blooded and rather indifferent to integrity. It can neither be democratic nor humanistic. A high value is set on intelligence, enterprise and utility.

In a corporate culture such as this, the relation between the managers and the managed

(viz, the workers) can be expected to turn sour and get far from being cordial. The clash between the interests of the managers and those of the managed, which is both inevitable and natural, presents a challenge to the very purpose of their coming together, namely economic prosperity. The prevailing concept of business as a socio-economic organization stands in the danger of getting eclipsed.

Over the past two decades or so there has been an expanding and increasingly organised awareness of this situation in the field of industry and business. In the wake of this impasse of modern (and Western) efficiency turning sterile and also counter-productive, management experts have conceded that exclusive attention to commercial values may not after all deliver the goods. They have recognized the need to involve in some measure at least what may be called common ethics, in addition to the strictly business ethics. There has consequently been in recent years a lot of talk about ethics in business management. The implication obviously is that the standard management has failed to achieve its ends depending solely on commercial values. There is also a perception that morality in business has deteriorated, that dishonesty, corruption and laxity in morale are becoming increasingly evident in business and industry.

A pointer to this awareness is an important and unusual book published in 1988. Kenneth Blanchard and Vincent Peale brought out *The Power of Ethical Management*, on the cover of which was the intriguing and provocative statement boldly displayed: Integrity Pays; You Don't Have to Cheat to Win. By implication, the practice of cheating to succeed was a way of life in business, which was widely accepted and adopted. The book also made this epoch-making point: "Managing only for profit is like playing tennis with your eye on the score-board and not on the ball."

Since that time, ethics in business (quite distinct from business ethics) as a field of inquiry entered the arena of management and it has been made welcome as practical force in managerial decision-making. But then dishonesty and corruption are by no means new to business enterprises, or for that matter to any administrative set-up. They have always been there, and there has also been all along a talk of ethics. In the enduring encounter between commercial values and ethical values, most often it is the ethical values that have been thrown out.

The business or industry is supposed to have a corporate mind, as said earlier, and its behaviour is plainly economic in orientation. Can, or should,

this organizational conduct conform to ordinary principles of morality? Can the commercial values ever coexist with ethical values? Can the businessman succeed at all if he has a conscience that nags him time and again? Do economics and ethics go along with each other, without economics corrupting ethics or ethics weakening economics? These and similar questions are asked frequently. The answers appear to favour a dichotomy between ethics and economics, a cleavage between business as a way of life and morality in personal life outside business.

The business-firm as an organic entity thrives on a double-standard morality: morality in the personal levels of the businessmen and morality in the business enterprises. The role of personal beliefs is all too minimized in business activities. To carry the cross of ethical convictions in commercial ventures would be hazardous. Elimination of the considerations of common human morality from business decisions would, of course, simplify the task of management; and people prefer what is simple.

Besides the impracticality of ethics in what are evidently commercial operations, ethical prescriptions are seldom unanimous. It is notorious that ethics is in actuality tied up to some extent with religion; and ethics operates in

territorial confines. It varies with culture, social structure, history of the community and cross-cultural influences. As some one has said "ethical signposts do not always point in the same direction". The community context becomes an important consideration, when ethics is sought to be involved in commerce.

By definition, ethics is what provides guidelines or rules of conduct by which we as individuals aim to live. But a company or a business organization is a motley aggregation of individuals who are supposed to be collectively responsible for the company's conduct. It is the collective action that matters here; and the ethical ideas of individual members can hardly enter into this collective action, unless the ethical ideas held and applied are trans-personal in nature. It is difficult to carry ethical prescriptions beyond the individuals who partake of them.

Involvement of ethics as such in business appears rather hard to accomplish. For one thing, ethics has acquired an air of pious prescriptions and invites immediate resistance from the people who claim to be practical. Ethics is regarded as alright at home, in the Church, and in books; it does not work in corporate activities like government and business. Ethics is discredited because of its teleological and theological

assumptions, like the will of God being the source of duties of human beings or goodness being somehow the end of human life. And further, ethics normally concerns itself with judgements of obligations (deontology), prescriptions of actions which are "right", "wise" and "good" in preference to what are "wrong", "foolish" and "bad". In actual life, however, there are not only White and Black, where the prescriptions could be explicit and relevant, but large grey areas, where the prescriptions could be ambiguous.

Ethics in business might be looked upon as nothing more than legal compliance, for law takes the place of ethical prescriptions. To steer clear of the legal hurdles would become the sole duty and morality of the business management; and the means adopted to achieve this end do not form a part of this duty or morality. The end justifies the means. The need for conscience or integrity does not arise. The talk of ethics in such a situation becomes a mere travesty and does not fit into what Blanchard and Peale called the power of ethical management. Self-interest prompts the businessman to make profits and obey the laws, lest he gets into difficulties. It is deliberate amorality.

When even the customary ethics fails to resolve the tangle in business management, the management experts of the West are turning

towards the East for clues to save the situation. One of the significant discoveries was the orientation of the Japanese businessman, Konosuke Matsushita, whose vision it was to rebuild the industrial Japan on the ruins of Hiroshima. The book *'Not for Bread Alone'* (1985), which counselled business to reach beyond bread and money, became a trendsetter. The Matsushita Company boldly involved spiritual values in business, and organized work in the factory in terms of Zen meditation. It set out to base itself on seven principles, which are altogether unusual in the field of industry and business:

1. National service through industry;
2. Fairness;
3. Harmony and Cooperation;
4. Struggle for betterment;
5. Courtesy and Humility;
6. Adjustment and Assimilation; and
7. Gratitude.

The Matsushita experiment was so spectacularly successful that those who mattered in management all over the world suggested the transformation of the standard management (emphasizing economics, wealth, profit and material satisfactions) into value-based management (emphasizing human dignity, credibility, integrity and the social culture of peace

and happiness). The philosophy that the means guarantee the ends, that concern for others is an indispensable ingredient for successful business, and that self-management is fundamental to corporate management has had a widespread appeal.

This marks an improvement in the outlook of the management experts, inasmuch as the philosophy of values is more readily adaptable to business considerations than customary ethics. This has become a new paradigm in the business courses in most schools of management. Dr. Albert Schweitzer in his well-known Paris Speech (1952) defined ethics in a manner that included this new paradigm. According to him, "In a general sense, ethics is the name we give to our concern for good behaviour. We feel an obligation to consider not only our own personal well-being but also that of others and of the human society as a whole."

But customary ethics as known to the Western world has two main divisions: (1) the judgements of value (theory of axiology) such as goodness and badness, desirability and undesirability, ends and experiences, and (2) the judgements of obligations (theory of deontology) such as right and wrong and wisdom and foolishness. The former deals with what is to be

pursued or sought after, while the latter with what is to be done. It is usual for ethics as an academic discipline to concern itself with the latter and treat the former as but secondary. That is to say, obligations are considered independently of the theory of values; it tends to prescribe an action as "right" without any reference to the "goodness" thereof. There has been however an attempt in this century to make the theory of obligations dependent upon the theory of values. And this is the turning point, turning from "ethical management" into "value-based management".

May I remind you what Mahatma Gandhi said in 1934? "Let us not be obsessed with catchwords and seductive slogans imported from the West. Have we not our own distinct Eastern tradition? Are we not capable of finding our own solution to the question of capital and labour?" (*Amrit-Bazār Patrikā*, 3,8).

II. VALUE-BASED MANAGEMENT

In India, we do not have a time-honoured word in Sanskrit for ethics; "nīti-śāstra" is a poor invention of recent years. This is so for the simple reason that ethics has not been with us a distinct

academic discipline. That does not however mean that ethical conduct did not appeal to the Indian mind! The topics discussed formally under the subject ethics in the West have all been considered in the course of our philosophical and religious discourses. There are elaborate discussions on values and obligations in every one of our 'darśanas' (philosophical systems); and values and obligations constitute the two principal subject-matters of ethics in the West. We do not distinguish values from obligations, and we incline to subordinate obligations to values.

The Indian philosophical system where the discussion of values and obligations is carried out extensively is Mīmāṃsā, the systemic formulation of which branch of study has been ascribed to Jaimini (about 300 B.C.). A brief account of this system has been given later, to which the interested student is referred. Suffice it to mention here that this system claims to inquire into and examine (which the word "mīmāṃsā" actually means) the import of the Vedic corpus (vedārtha), namely dharma. The word "dharma" literally signifies whatever conduct supports and holds aloft human life. It includes conduct, convictions and inclinations which are "right", "good", "correct", "desirable" and "useful". It covers bodily behaviour, speech and mental processes

and extends to all spheres of human activity. Dharma as it is treated in the Indian texts concerns principally with values and obligations that emanate from them.

Before I take up Dharma for consideration, let me deal briefly with values as they are perceived and discussed in the West. For it is this that is generally found in management studies of our times. Even the idea of "value-based management" in contradistinction to the standard (profit-oriented) management, is a creature of Western studies of value, known as axiology. Modern management in India unfortunately relies heavily on Western models. In the socioeconomic changes that are occurring rapidly and extensively in India, business and industry are trying hard to adjust to the emerging international opportunities and coming to grips with professionalization of management in various sectors of our economic activity.

Our management experts in their search for value-bases for patterns of management practices in the Indian context need to turn their attention to indigenous sources. There is no doubt that in the modern world, there are increasing interactions between different cultures and civilizations and that modernization of all economic activities is going on relentlessly. India

cannot be an exception. But it is a fact that there are differences between cultures, which are real and basic. Management principles and techniques must be evolved in conformity with the cultural context of the people. Each culture has its own set of beliefs and it is well-known that our objectives, activities and policies grow out of these beliefs. By ignoring the beliefs, which have entered into the very constitution of our people in the course of their long history, we would be sacrificing the compatibility of our innate attitudes and their supportive character.

To revert to the subject of values. The Greek word "axios" (from which the expression axiology is derived) means value, worth, the good that is desired or preferred. Aristotle deals with this subject in his *Ethics, Poetics and Metaphysics*; and his treatment provides the main framework for the discussions on value in the West. Value is a word which is a noun as well as a verb. The former could be abstract (when it denotes a quality or property of value or worth) or concrete (when it refers to the object that possesses this property, the valued thing). As a verb, it is a certain mental act or attitude (valuing, valuation).

The discussions on value seek to answer questions like, What is the nature of value? Is it a thing, a quality or a relation? Is it subjective or

objective? Is it a mere feeling, a sentiment, a desire or a motive? Does it involve cognition, volition and judgment? Is there a hierarchy among values? Do values differ among individuals or groups?

For our purpose here, it is enough to understand value as something different from fact. A thing existing or an event occurring which is available for our sense-perception is a fact; it is and can be cognized by whoever is in front of it. Value, on the other hand, is what 'ought to be'; it is not something that merely 'is' or an existential detail, but something one seeks after, strives to attain, like 'goodness', 'beauty' 'rightness.' Some values are intrinsic or ultimate; being honest or good is valuable in itself; they have the 'end' character, and they are sought after for their own sake. Other values are extrinsic or instrumental; they are means to an end. They are sought after not for their own sake, but because it helps us to achieve something else which may have an intrinsic worth. Money has instrumental value, if it brings about happiness, which is an intrinsic value. There may be a series of instrumental values; like efficiency leading to production, which in turn leads to profit; and profit leading to happiness (which is an intrinsic value).

There are individual values, and there are organizational values; and they may not always coincide. An individual in his private life can take a decision easily and safely; but as a responsible member of an organization, he has difficulty in taking a decision, which will involve and affect other persons. Industry and business often find the need to distinguish between personal values and corporate values: And here values acquire fresh dimensions. Being truthful is a value, it is desirable. But if by being truthful, others are hurt, it is no longer desirable. To be honest is a value; but if honesty invites exorbitant taxation, it disappears as a value for the businessman whose eyes are on profit and not on integrity.

This is how values get differently valued or evaluated. Honesty is normally a value that is intrinsic; one must be honest, looking for nothing beyond it. But as Carlyle said "Honesty is of-course the best policy. But one who is honest because it is the best policy is a scoundrel." Honesty in this case becomes instrumental and its entire value-character alters. Goodness is an intrinsic value; it must be pursued for its own sake. But if one is good, calculating that advantages will flow from goodness, goodness is no longer intrinsic. Or consider money, which is but a means to an end, an instrumental value. There are,

however, people who seek after money as if it is an end in itself.

In the field of management, systems involving several values are sometimes commended, like the seven values of the Matsushita Company already mentioned. Responsibility, competence, freedom in expression, control over the results of one's own work, catharsis, togetherness, rejoicing, giving and taking support, self-confidence, enthusiasm, pride in one's work, excellence in work, experience of success, feeling of being useful; or values of courteous behaviour, humility, fairness and so on are frequently suggested; and values are sometimes arranged in terms of managerial effectiveness, leadership (team-work, colleague-relationships), management of stress (frustration-coping), and counselling (for integrated personality, ability to introspect and ethical sensitivity).

Introspection is often advocated as a must for managers and executives; introspection assists in deliberating on values and in developing a conscience (which can strike when an unethical deal is struck). This also encourages one to be critical of his own actions and attitudes and to be conscientious all the time, while designing a product, providing a service or in interpersonal behaviour.

In the value-oriented business enterprise, attention is focused on the individual's intellectual and emotional processes insofar as they are involved in what is described as taking a moral point of view, over and above the purely economic or utilitarian purposes. The individual's commitment to a cause figures here in a big way. Striving for excellence is individual and cannot be corporate. The call that individualism must be counterbalanced by commitment even in the economic set-up is also typically Indian: "If I am good, the world is good." By commitment, thoughts of individual advantage recede to the background, and the sense of duty becomes all important. This is what in fact the word "Dharma" signifies.

The value-oriented management insists on self-examination, which provides a key to insight into how one's own personal values will affect others. Self-examination is in reality contemplation, which only a psychologically mature and healthy manager can undertake. This will occasion an awareness of the world inside him and the world outside and of the relationship that obtains betwixt them. This is also an intensely Indian approach. Training in effective management is said to be incomplete unless self-management is taught. By self-management is

meant mastery over one's own thoughts and feelings. It was Plato who said "The life which is unexplained is not worth living." Self-examination must result in self-management and this is also what our texts point out.

We can see how management has moved gradually from the profit-oriented, utilitarian and materialistic practices in the direction of values and internal ethical resources. The ideology that self-regulation is better than any other form of control in corporate activity is becoming increasingly important. Recourse to conscience is held out as an effective motivation in organizational effectiveness. These ideas are very much Indian in their character and the Indian students of management would do well to appreciate these ideas not only in their original contexts but in the entirety of their implications. It is necessary, in order to do this, to examine the concept of values in Indian thought as crystallized in Mīmāṃsā, for it is this system that has had, notwithstanding its atheistic character, a far-reaching influence in moulding the typical Indian thought and behaviour.

The impact of Mīmāṃsā, which is an entirely realistic and pragmatic school, on our Smṛti-texts (which are normative in character, prescribing not only rules for rituals but norms for daily conduct),

on Vedānta (which is looked upon as the distinctive contribution of the Indian mind to the world's spiritual legacy) and on the *Bhagavad-gītā* (which is the single most important text guiding the Indian mind at all levels and during centuries, and which is singularly universal in its appeal) is well-known. Indian managers, who feel the need to understand the Indian context, need to acquaint themselves with the Mīmāṃsā philosophy, which fortunately also formulates what may be called a sophisticated methodology for correct and purposeful examination of any topic, especially the topic of values. It is interesting, although one would not expect it, that the ideas of management are very much involved in the Mīmāṃsā system of thought, for the precise conduct of sacrificial sessions and exact performance of rituals (which form the principal theme of the Mīmāṃsā texts) independent of any theological considerations, presuppose management of men and materials, of time and space, of instructions and practices, and of purposes material and spiritual.

III. VALUES OF LIFE

It is well-known that in the traditional Indian life, four values are tacitly assumed, especially

among the more cultured or sophisticated sections of the society. They are known as purushārthas (meaning what are sought after by the people, 'purushaiḥ arthyata iti'). They are: (1) virtuous living or moral merit in the sense of discharging one's duty (dharma), (2) gratification of desires and enjoyment of worldly pleasures (kāma), (3) acquirement of material wealth (artha), and (4) salvation or liberation from the miseries of the rounds of existence (moksha). There are different orders in which they are arranged by different authors, but the first three are usually regarded as forming one group (trivarga), the last one being unworldly taken as outside this group (apavarga). And it is usual for the first three to be described as instrumental values, while the last one is absolute or intrinsic in its value-status.

The idea of these four values is certainly an ancient one although when exactly it got crystallized is hard to ascertain. It is not found in the Vedic corpus, nor in any of the early Upanishads. But it is already well defined and recognised in the two great epics (*Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*); and all our philosophical schools (darśanas) presuppose them as goals of life. The idea is found in our early literary works in Sanskrit and Prākṛit. It is widespread among the masses, and it has been so for many centuries. It comes out in daily transaction quite frequently.

The principal aim of life for all people is to secure happiness and avoid misery.¹ The philosophical systems attempt to examine what happiness is, and prescribe how it may be attained. A distinction was made between what is good (śreyas) and what is pleasant (preyas), as early as the Upanishadic period. We read in *Kathopanishat* (1, 2, 2):

“The good and the pleasant have different directions; but they bind man alike. They come to him, but he must make a wise choice. The intelligent one will choose the good, but the fool will take the pleasant.”²

The good is what will bring about long-lasting welfare, the ultimate happiness, without regret or repentance; it is perfect contentment and sense of fulfillment. The pleasant, on the other hand, is desirable for the moment; it does not endure. It may later bring about pain, disillusionment or despondence. Therefore the scriptural texts (śāstra) provide prescriptions that are meant to secure happiness which comes out of the good.³ The purushārthas belong to this group: They tend towards the good, which is also desirable. When pursued and attained, they bring about satisfaction on the part of the individual that he has done well in life; the values include not only the mental feeling of fulfillment but satisfaction also about the means that he has adopted.⁴

In the Mīmāṃsā system of thought, *purushārtha* ("for the sake of man") is distinguished from what is called "*kratvartha*" ("for the sake of the undertaken act"). Avoiding the ritualistic implications of this distinction, we may say that the former is an intrinsic value, an end, or something desirable for the individual as a whole and for his own sake, while the latter is only instrumental; it is a means to the end (viz. *purushārtha*). The *purushārtha* is the principal act, that upon which follows the happiness of man (*Jaimini-sūtra* 4, 1, 12)⁵; it is undertaken by the individual who desires to secure total happiness, and happiness comes as a reward of his effort directly. *Kratvartha*, on the other hand, does not by itself bring about the satisfaction of the individual; it only helps the principal act.

Some explanation may help. The expression "*Kratvartha*" literally means "for the sake of *Kratu*", in order to fulfil the purposes of *Kratu*. And the word "*Kratu*" is synonymous with "*Yajña*" (sacrificial rite). But the word "*yajñārtha*" is not to be used as an alternative to "*Kratvartha*". This is because "*Kratu*" has overtones (like understanding, desiring, willing, designing, planning) which "*Yajña*" does not have. Even when "*Kratu*" is used in the sense of "*Yajña*" it refers to the particular sacrificial rite

where the "soma" juice is used as offering and where the stake to which the sacrificial animal is tied (Yūpa). In the sacrificial context, "Kratu" as a word is more limited in scope than "yajña"; but outside this context, it is a word of wider significance. Kriyā (individual act, action) is described as the consort of Kratu in the sense of prajñā, understanding, knowledge, purposeful action. Kratu as a ritual need not only be in the religious context: a ritual is principally a structuring of human affairs; it is the giving of unified form to amorphous and discrete situations.

Texts also delineate the sequence: Kāma (desire, purpose, pumsa vishayāpekshā) leading to "Kratu" (plan, resolution, "Kratūpayodhyavasāya" concerted and purposeful); and "Karma" leading to the birth of the desired benefit (janma, origination of the unseen potency known as apūrva).⁶ There is also a definition of "Kratu" as excessive and intense inclination towards the object of desire.⁷

The word "purusha" signifies a person, a human being, individual, irrespective of sex. The suggestion of "man" or the male as the meaning of purusha (as we find in common usage) is only in the sense of expressions like "all men are mortal". For a male person, the regular word in Sanskrit is "pumān-purushah". In the upanishads,

the word "purusha" is used to signify the soul or spirit that abides unseen in the body.⁸ The lexicon *Rājanirghaṇṭa* gives purposefulness as the distinctive feature of "purusha" ("arthāśraya", "arthavān") who is also fit to undertake an action ("Karmastha"). In fact, deliberate human or personal effort is known as "purusha-kāra", as against fate or destiny (daiva). The mīmāṃsakas employ the expression "purusha" in "purushārtha" in the sense of an individual who has resolved to undertake an action (a rite) for a specific purpose.

There is an interesting passage in *Chhāndogya-upanishad* (3, 14, 1-2) which brings out the relation between the expressions "Kratu" and "purusha":

"Verily a person (purusha) consists of purpose (kratu-maya). According to the purpose which a person has in the world, thus does he become on departing hence. So let him form for himself a purpose."⁹

Here the context is to eulogize man and his purposefulness. And man is a fact, he is already in existence, while the purpose must needs be formed, deliberated upon. The purpose is for the sake of man, whose welfare is the intrinsic value; the purpose together with the action that he performs is the instrumental value. In Mīmāṃsā,

however, *purushārtha* is the major objective that the performer of a sacrificial rite has before him, viz. happiness (*svarga*). The sacrificial rite as a whole (viz. in its entirety) as the means that he has adopted to attain his objective (*jyotishtoma*) is also included in this category.¹⁰ In *Kratvartha*, on the other hand, what prompts the performance in several sequences is not the purpose of the performer (viz. happiness) but the totality of the act (viz. the sacrificial rite). In this sense, it becomes purely an instrumental value.

This distinction may be seen in the purpose of the person to achieve happiness (*kāma*), wealth (*artha*), fulfillment (*dharma*) or liberation (*moksha*) and the various specific means that he adopts to achieve them, after deliberation, planning and purposefulness. The former may rightly be called "*purushārtha*"; the latter, however, are not known as "*kratvarthas*", for the expression is not used outside the *mīmāṃsā* context.

But the message is clear. Each one of us has major and minor objectives in life; but we do not always articulate them, or spell them out; nor do we consciously or deliberately distinguish between them. Some are intrinsic values. Enjoyment, for instance, we seek for its own sake; there is nothing further that we seek to get from

enjoying ourselves. Kāma is thus an intrinsic value. But when we seek wealth, we do not do so for its own sake; wealth is valuable only because of the power it provides for securing enjoyment or happiness. Artha can only be an instrumental value. Likewise, liberation (moksha) is an end in itself, but discharging one's duty or acquiring moral merit (dharma) is a means to this end and therefore an instrumental value.

The four-fold values of life, as enumerated in the Indian tradition, do indeed mix up the instrumental and intrinsic values (as pointed out by professor M. Hiriyanna).¹¹ Among the four purushārthas, artha (wealth) and kāma (pleasures) are usually regarded as secular, indicated for the life of the householder, while dharma (moral merit) and moksha (liberation or perfection) are spiritual (for the anchorite and mendicant). Kāma in secular life and moksha in spiritual life are goals that are conceived as ultimate or as ends in themselves, while artha in secular life and dharma in spiritual life are means to ends, artha for kāma and dharma for moksha. But the early order of enumerating the four values ignores the intrinsic or the instrumental character of the values. We find, for instance, in the epic *Mahābhārata*, the order of values to be dharma-artha-kāma-moksha. And the epic pointedly tells us that the wise people

delight in the end-values (namely dharma and moksha) and do not care for the middle ones (viz. artha and kāma).¹²

Indian materialists like the Lokāyatas or Chārvākas found the only worthwhile value to be kāma; it is of course most agreeable to all men and animals. Even the orthodox smṛtis grudgingly concede: "One should not be without normal pleasures of life" ("na nis-sukhāssyāt"). And the means to secure kāma beyond which there was nothing for the materialists, was artha (or wealth) which was naturally also desirable, as an instrumental value. There were authors who espoused the cause of single values, whether instrumental or intrinsic. Vātsyāyana, for instance, wrote *Kāma-sūtras* eulogizing delights of the flesh and mind, as if pleasures were the only value in life. Kauṭilya in his *Artha-Śāstra* explained the importance and power of wealth and how to acquire wealth and spend it. The Smṛti-writers devoted their manuals exclusively to dharma as religious and moral merit. The Vedāntic works make it appear that the attainment of moksha is the only worthwhile pursuit, beyond good and evil. And it is not always accepted that dharma would lead to moksha. Śaṅkara, for instance, would refuse to accord to dharma the status of an instrumental value with reference to moksha,

which, according to him, is the sole value. Uddyotakara, the author of *Nyāya-vārtika*, recognized the four values, but inclined to regard the attainment of pleasures (sukha-prāpti) and avoidance of pain (duhkha-nivṛtti) as basic to all of them.

The Mīmāṃsākas point out that there is some confusion in the matter of values. Jaimini (4, 3, 38-9) prescribes a ritual known as Vaiśvānaresṭi to be performed by the father in order to secure the welfare of his child. The performer of the act is the father; the desire for the benefit is also his. The child is not the performer, nor does the desire for welfare belong to it. An act to become effective must be preceded by desire and will and accompanied by effort. A benefit that is not sought for can never be accomplished.¹³ In this case, the desire of the father is obviously not for his own welfare; how then can what he does bear fruit? But he has to do it because the child (whose welfare he desires) is not in a position to do it. The answer to this riddle is that the act of the father will bear fruit because the child's welfare is included in the father's desires. What the father seeks is comprehensive: it includes the child's welfare because that would be what the father desires; his own happiness in the child's happiness is the issue that becomes relevant.

The discussion highlights the aspect of purushārtha that is not limited to one's own personal satisfactions. A value sought after by an individual might be calculated to satisfy several others in the bargain. In corporate existence, values such as these become important. The concept found in the *Gītā* that one must strive to achieve the good of others by his own effort (loka-saṅgraha)¹⁴ becomes valid in this context. A worker if prompted by a sense of values, would work not only for the immediate monetary rewards, but for the good of all those involved in the work-situation. A manager undertaking some welfare activity for the sake of his employees would be in the same position as the father performing the vaiśvānaresṭi for the welfare of his child: it would not be an exercise in vain. The values of life cannot be divorced from satisfactions, whether they are directly or indirectly engendered.¹⁵

The treatment of purushārthas in Indian texts is generally associated with the notion of stages in life (āśramas). Life of an individual in general is roughly divided into four convenient and sequential stages, in order to accomplish the four values of life:

- (1) The first is the stage of the learner in the

art of right and wholesome living (technically called the life of a religious student, brahmācharya); the beginning of life is marked by intensive enculturation. The youngster acquires competence to lead an adult life satisfactorily in a community. This is training in a socio-cultural milieu. What he learns is the value of discharging one's duties and commitment to honest and useful life (dharma).¹⁶

(2) When he matures physically, biologically, socially and culturally, he becomes a householder (grhastha), and actively participates in the social economy of the community. He assumes responsibilities and discharges his duties. He is no longer dependent on others as in the previous stage of life. He earns his living and acquires wealth; he also enjoys the pleasures of life. Here the values are "artha" and "kāma".¹⁷

He is enjoined also to practise "dharma". *Āpastambha-dharma sūtra* (2, 8, 20) lays down that the householder must enjoy only those pleasures of life which are not opposed to moral merit and thereby he will secure the best of both the worlds.¹⁸ Kaṭilya who extols the importance of wealth and enjoyment and insists that life must not be devoid of pleasures ("na nis sukhah syāt"), counsels that one must enjoy without, however, violating moral merit or sound sense of economy

(*Artha-śāstra*, 1, 7).¹⁹ According to *Mahābhārata*, the rewards of life are three: dharma, artha and kāma. (*Anuśānana-parva*, 3, 18-19).²⁰ Manu provides that dharma and artha together would bring about welfare; or as an alternative, kāma and artha; with dharma thrown in as an auxiliary; or as yet another alternative, artha alone. These are the three ways of human beings in this state of life.²¹

The householder's stage also involves the notion of three debts that need to be discharged. We read in *Taittirīya-samhitā* (6, 3, 10, 5) that the cultured man as soon as he is born is saddled with three debts that he must strive to discharge: the debt to the sages who contributed to his cultural heritage, which will be discharged by the committed stage of learning and training (brahmacharya), the debt to the gods, which is discharged by the performance of sacrificial rites (yajña), and the debt to the ancestral spirits by marrying and obtaining offsprings (prajā).²² These are obligations to fulfill, which must be the foremost duty of the householder, according to Manu (6, 35-7).

Vātsyāyana's *Kāma-sūtra* (1, 2, 7-15) enumerates the three values as relevant to a householder's life in an order of decreasing merit:

(1) dharma: engaging oneself in sacrificial rites and austerities, eschewing conduct which is prohibited in the scriptures; (2) artha: acquiring lands, gold, cattle, food grains, wealth, friends and so on, and increasing what has been acquired ("ārjitasya vivardhanam"); and (3) kāma: favourable inclination towards enjoyment of sense- pleasures and mental recreations.²³

Vishṇu-purāṇa (3, 11, 7) counsels that artha and kāma, which interfere with dharma, must be avoided (parityajed artha-kāmau dharma-pīḍā-karau'); and the dharma which brings about hardships and is against social norms must also be avoided.²⁴

According to Manu (6, 89-90), the householder's life is the very life-breath of society; it is this stage that supports the other stages (viz. the student's, the anchorite's and the mendicant's). It is here that all the three values (with the exception of moksha) are pursued as equally important.

(3) The next stage, known as the vānaprastha, is indicated for the hermits and anchorites, who have given up secular life, retired from society, and who devote their time and energy for their own spiritual progress. The values they pursue are dharma and moksha; they have entirely abandoned artha and kāma; they distance themselves from normal society,

although available still for teaching and counselling.²⁵

(4) The last stage, viz. that of sanyāsa, is a later institution; the scriptures like Dharma-śāstras confine their attention to the above three and some of them prohibit the life of a wandering mendicant (sanyāsi, bhikshu, parivrāṭ). It is known as "beyond the āśramas" (atyāśrama). The individual who has sought recourse to this stage devotes himself wholly to moksha and sees no merit even in dharma. He is altogether out of the social structure.

The concept of āśrama as a stage in life appears to be an old one. The expression "āśrama" literally means the place or period where or when the individual exerts himself (āśrāmyati) to fulfill some value-requirements. It is hard, however, to say when the ideology was formed, or whether the stages in practice were only three till the influence of the Śramaṇa-tradition (Buddhism and Jainism) began to be felt, although there is greater probability in this. Even when the āśramas were only three (excluding sanyāsa), it seems likely that brahmacharya was not always spent away from home in guru-kula, but quite often with the parents in the household. The anchorites in any period were few, and not every householder chose to

adopt this stage of life; most of them did not. The householder's life continued till death. Thus in actuality, the householder's life was the hub of social organisation. The Smṛti-texts also indicate that it is the best of all stages, for it is here that the purushārthas are effectively pursued.

IV. DHARMA AS VALUE

Kumārila (around 600 A.D.) in his *Tantra-Vārtika* (1, 3, 1)²⁶ discusses the sources and validity of the four values of life (purushārtha). According to him, the two secular values (artha and kāma) are derived directly from normal worldly transaction and they are based on our own general observations, common sense and the faculty of reasoning. They are universal in import, and human beings acquire them naturally in the course of their lives. In fact, they are more in the nature of facts of life than values.

The other two values, so called spiritual, dharma and moksha, are not so natural or universal. It is hard to find justification for them either by observation or reason. Their validity rests entirely and exclusively on the authority of scriptural texts (viz. the Vedic corpus). We have no means of knowing about dharma or moksha,

barring through learning and culture. Just as *kāma* among the secular values is intrinsic and *artha* instrumental to it, *moksha* among the other values is intrinsic and *dharma* instrumental to it. Kūmarila being a staunch Mīmāṃsaka attaches greater importance to *dharma* than to *moksha*. In fact the earlier Mīmāṃsakas like Jaimini and Śabara-svāmin did not even mention *moksha*. The ultimate value for them was “*svarga*” (heaven), which was defined by Kumārila as incomparable happiness in the afterlife in accordance with the duties discharged here, which, however, is only another dimension of the reality.²⁷

Dharma, according to the Mīmāṃsā school, is the subject-matter of the Vedic corpus. What then is *dharma*? The *dharma* in the Mīmāṃsā context is not exactly the *dharma* as one of the four values of life (*purushārtha*) that we detailed above, nor is it the *dharma* that the *Smṛti*-texts focus attention upon. In a sense, it includes *artha* and *kāma*; and it is more fundamental, although not more universal, than the *dharma* of the *Smṛti*-texts. And the Mīmāṃsā discussions of *dharma* contain many insights that will become relevant to the issues involved in management. It would therefore profit us to consider this subject at some length.

Dharma is undoubtedly the most frequently

heard word in India. If a linguistic survey be made of the most commonly used words by Indians, irrespective of the age, sex, region, religion, avocations, interests, cultural levels and educational equipments, dharma will top the list. Not only do the Indians employ this word often, but the concept of dharma (which of course has different shades of import and applicability) appears to govern their conduct generally. And the passage of time, successive changes in generations, cultural diffusions and assimilations, political and social transformations, religious rivalries and conflicts, and the altered aspirations of the people do not seem to have made any dent in the extraordinary appeal that the idea of dharma has had to the people.

This popular conception of dharma, however, is not derived solely from the Mīmāṃsā background, but from a reintegration of the Mīmāṃsā outlook, the ideology of the smṛti-texts, the folk crystallization of concepts in the purāṇas and the literary works of seminal importance (like the epics *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*); the contribution of *Bhagavad-gītā* has been of course immense. Dharma in this context is the ultimate authority in matters of conduct and the supreme guide to right living. There is the saying: "There can be nothing higher than dharma" ("dharmāt

param nāsti"). It is called "dharma", according to *Mahābhārata*, because it holds people together and supports and preserves the individual against the odds and ills of life.²⁸

Dharma is in general taken to mean duties and obligations of an individual on account of his being a human being (*sāmānya dharma*), on account of his belonging to a social group such as a caste (*varṇa-dharma*), to a stage of life (*āśrama-dharma*) or relevant to a situation (*nimitta-dharma*).²⁹ There are also special duties and obligations appertaining to an administrator (*rāja-dharma*), to women (*strī-dharma*), and to specific transactions (*vyavahāra-dharma*). The sources of dharma are said to be the Vedic corpus in an indirect, general and abstract sense, the traditional *smṛti*-texts, the exponents who are well-acquainted with them, and more importantly the practices of the good folk.³⁰ The good folk (*sādhu*) are also the elite in society (*śiṣṭa*), the model persons whom the rest of the society follow and take inspiration from (*śiṣṭāchārṇa*).

The *smṛti*-texts discuss what should be main plank for dharma to rest on. The Vedic corpus was always far removed from the population, and even those few who were acquainted with it would find it hard to extract from that corpus the practical

rules of conduct. Smṛti-writers are supposed to have done this, but then they present such diverse and regional pictures of what conduct is correct and what is not that one finds it difficult to follow them; and it is improbable that smṛti-texts at any time were meticulously followed. There is, therefore, naturally and understandably, an emphasis even in the smṛti-texts themselves on the conduct of those who are regarded as best specimens in society. The convention that such conduct establishes is hailed as authoritative (samaya, or dharmajñā-samaya). Texts like *Smṛti-chandrikā* insist that such convention is as binding as the Vedic injunctions themselves.³¹ The conventions involve differences in social groups, regions and family traditions.³² The usages of convention may even overrule the sacred law (*Nārada-smṛti*); and the majority decides whether the usage is correct or not (*Gobhila-smṛti* 3, 149).³³ This relates to social approval.

And the greatest of our medieval law-givers, Manu, makes a remarkable statement: "The conduct must never be decided depending entirely on scriptural injunctions. If there is the absence of reasoning in such matters, the dharma would surely be endangered."³⁴ And he further holds that one of the dependable guides to conduct is one's own satisfaction.³⁵ The satisfaction here refers to

the cultured person taking a decision on the basis of how his conscience prompts him. Thus, the conduct based on dharma is not only traditionally valid and socially correct, but also independently reasoned out carefully by the individual and approved by his conscience. This relates to self-approval. The aspect of dharma that is binding on all alike is known as "sāmānya" or "sādhāraṇa" dharma. *Mahābhārata* defines it simply as "not doing to others anything that he would not like others to do to himself". This is described as the very essence of dharma and everything else is what is prompted by greed.³⁶ Regarding another person as like oneself in pleasure or pain is an important ingredient of "sāmānya-dharma". This should be based on what the scriptures say, as well as on the inner light of conscience. Included in such conduct are truthfulness (satya), non-injury (ahimsā), not taking away what belongs to another (asteya), purity in mind and body (śauca), and disciplining one's senses (indriya-nigraha). Manu describes them as of universal import.³⁷

Mahābhārata adds to this list: freedom from anger (akrodha), sharing one's own wealth with others (samvibhāga), patience and forbearance (kshamā), confining one's love to one's own wife and begetting progeny from her (prajanas sveshu

dāreshu), absence of enmity and hatred (adrohah), being straight in conduct (ārjava), and maintaining with care and concern those dependent on us (bhr̥tyabharanād).³⁶ *Vāmana-purāṇa* adds some more: restraining the sense-appetites (dama), composure of mind (śama), charity (dāna), generosity (akārpaṇya), and austerity (tapas)³⁹, while *Brahmapurāṇa* adds egolessness (nābhimānitā), pleasant and kind approach to others (priya-vāditā), friendliness (maitrī), absence of greed (aspr̥hā), not being envious (anasūyā), not straining oneself overmuch (anāyāsa) and compassion for all living beings (dayā samasta-bhūteshu).⁴⁰

In short, dharma is what is viewed universally as goodness. It is the primary duty of the human being to be good, irrespective of all other considerations. This is how dharma is understood by the average Indian: an obligation to be good in mind, speech and bodily actions. And to be good is not calculated to bring in any specific reward; at any rate no material benefit is expected from goodness.

The epics make a distinction between the way of life governed by dharma and the way of life governed by kāma or desires. The latter is life where natural inclinations, aspirations or appetites are given a free scope; while the former

illustrates restraint, discipline and reason. The latter may appear to afford immediate success and happiness, but will eventually lead to ruin at the very source.⁴¹ It is the way of life governed by dharma that will ultimately win, whatever the hardships and pitfalls in the beginning. Hence the national motto "dharmam eva jayate", which is to be found in one of the Upanishads. The simple lesson which the epic *Mahābhārata* teaches is that success will be where dharma is ("yato dharmaḥ tato jayah").

The concept of dharma as the ordering principle and the sustaining power of life emphasizes the importance of self-management, which is indispensable for organizational effectiveness, and which is of late getting increasingly involved in management development programmes, inhouse consultancy, and interaction with business and industry. Self-examination is becoming a key-concept. The individual managers need to make it clear to themselves where they stand personally, what their personal rules of conduct are, and whether their ethics is expressed in their actions. Oftentimes, these will be more evident to others than to themselves. The managers also need to exercise their care and concern as to whom their decisions will affect. If the management needs

managers who can motivate and lead the workers effectively and can get things done properly, the managers need to be adepts in self-examination and self-management. They must have constant and consistent recourse to conscience, in all situations, problems and emergencies. This is the way of life governed by dharma, and not by kāma. The life governed by kāma will hinder self-examination; one who is under the way of kāma will have a limited awareness of himself, and self-management for him is necessarily precluded. And self-interest becomes his primary objective, and conscience is easily bartered to the material rewards. There is neither social approval (āchāra) nor the pleasure of conscience (ātma-tusṭi) here.

V. MODALITIES OF DHARMA; INSTRUMENTAL VALUE

In the Mīmāṃsā school of thought represented by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa, the approach to dharma takes a different form. It is viewed here as an instrumental value, leading to the total welfare of the individual (śreyaskara). This welfare consists of worldly prosperity (abhyudaya) as the visible reward (dṛṣṭaphala) and spiritual freedom (niḥśreyasa) as the invisible reward (adṛṣṭa-phala). The school represented

by Prabhākara-miśra, however, takes dharma itself to be the intrinsic value, what must be pursued for its own sake (like duty for duty's sake). The prior discussion relates to the question of what constitutes the subject-matter of Mīmāṃsā as an inquiry or examination. The answer of course is the total import of the Vedic corpus (comprising the hymnal mantras and the brāhmaṇas which are injunctions and instructions for the performance of rites and rituals). But what is that import of the Vedic corpus (Vedārtha)? Prabhākara's answer is dharma.⁴²

Kumārila, however, insists that the purpose of inquiry is not the import of the Vedic corpus, but dharma (dharma-jijñāsa). He does not treat them as synonymous.⁴³ But then how is this dharma known? It is not cognized by direct observation or inference based on observation. It may become known directly to exceptional adepts (yogi-pratyaksha), but not to others. Nor can it be said that there is no way of knowing it at all, for it must necessarily be resorted to by those who are interested in their welfare. The only way of knowing it is by understanding the Vedic injunctions. The Vedas must be studied not with a sense of duty, as duty for duty's sake, but to understand and apply dharma in our lives; study of the Vedas has only an instrumental value. Even

in the study of the Vedas, only those portions of the Vedas where promptings are made for rituals (chodanā), are authoritative, and not the entire Vedic corpus. And, further, understanding and application of dharma are also for a purpose; dharma itself is an instrumental value for welfare (śreyas).

Dharma is to be inquired into and examined, for not only are there uncertainties and misgivings about it, but the dharma is a sine qua non of human welfare. Whatever is not uncertain but all too evident, and whatever does not lend itself to inquiry or examination, cannot serve any useful purpose.⁴⁴ The purpose all beings have intrinsically is the welfare (śreyas), which is of the nature of happiness, and this welfare is possible only when the human beings are prompted to undertake certain actions. It is this means of happiness that we call dharma.⁴⁵

Welfare or happiness (called figuratively svarga in the early Mīmāṃsā literature) is the value to be accomplished (sādhya); dharma in the form of prescribed rites and rituals for which promptings (chodanā) are made by Vedic injunctions is the means of accomplishing it (sāadhanā). The process of making actual what is possible is technically called "bhāvanā"⁴⁶, which

involves the capacity to convert the 'ought' into 'is' (real), or to realize what is desired (ishta). This is preceded by the knowledge of the means to be adopted for actualizing⁴⁷ the desire; this is technically called 'ishta-sādhana-tā-jñāna'.

This dharma in practical terms is actions that are enjoined by the scriptural texts, as means to some good (viz. the attainment of prosperity in this life or in the next, *abhyudaya*), and done voluntarily by a person who desires the good.⁴⁸ The scriptural injunctions like "one desirous of attaining heaven (viz. happiness) must perform the *jyotishtoma* rite" are similar to ordinary injunctions like "one who desires health must take this medicine."⁴⁹ The injunction is given by the physician, who alone is competent to command the medicine; it is like the scriptural command (*vidhi*). The person to whom it becomes relevant is the one who is desirous of health: comparable to the person who is desirous of heaven. The prescription has no significance for those who have not lost their health and need to regain it; likewise the scriptural command does not apply to those who do not desire to attain heaven; it is no command at all for them. The performance of the said ritual, like the prescribed medicine, is only a means to the desired end (*ishta-sādhana*). This involves one who volunteers to perform the

ritual (kartā), like the patient who is willing to take the medicine, and the expected or promised reward (phala), namely heaven or health. What prompts the person to undertake the prescribed means to the desired end is the awareness that the means will be capable of bringing in the desired end.⁵⁰

Dharma, in other words, is a value that is easily distinguished from fact; it does not exist at the present moment, nor is it a material object that one can get to know directly or by observation. It consists of actions like rites, rituals, charity, libations offered to the ancestors and so on, which are imagined to produce desirable ends. But the act is transient, and the result is not expected as soon as the act is completed. How then does the result accrue, and where? The true function of the act that is performed in accordance with scriptural injunctions is to engender a certain power or potency in the soul of the person who performs the acts, which power or potency will produce the expected result in due course. This is technically called "apūrva" (never-before), viz. an unseen and subtle power that was not there earlier lies latent in the prescribed act, which is the means and which comes into being only after the act is completed.⁵¹ This "apūrva" which is

the invisible effect (*adr̥shṭa*), although dependent upon real objects (*arthā lambana*), is also called sometimes “*adr̥shṭa*” (unseen) or “*punya*” (merit). Some authorities equate dharma with this “*apūrva*”.

Śabara-svāmin explains that both the visible and the invisible dimensions of reality are within man's reach, the visible through sense-experience and the invisible through effort (*yatna*). The two are interdependent and inter-related. There is a natural link between happiness (invisible) which all people aspire for (as the intrinsic value), and the means to achieve it, namely dharma (as the instrumental value); and the two are meaningless without reference to the man who seeks for happiness and who exerts for it (his *Bhāṣya*, 6, 1, 3). Man does not only look for visible rewards (like money, comforts, material enjoyments etc.) but also for the invisible reward (happiness which is unspecified). Both are alike realities.

Dharma as religious acts (*karma*) is broadly grouped into two types: primary (*artha-karma*) and secondary (*guṇa-karma*). For the present, we may ignore the latter, and consider only the former, because it is only in them that the “*apūrva*” becomes relevant. This group of actions (*karma*) is further classified into three types: (1) *nitya*

(obligatory); (2) *naimittika* (periodical, occasional, or situational); and (3) *kāmya* (optional). The first type consists of the rites or duties that must necessarily be performed, without expecting any reward whatever, like the twice-born one performing his *sandhyā*-ritual. But if the twice-born does not perform that rite which is prescribed in the scriptural texts, he will be guilty of omission, and acquires demerit (*durita*). In order not to occasion this demerit (*"pratyavāyajiḥāsāyā"*), one must perform the prescribed act; there is no positive reward for the obligatory acts (which are duties).⁵² Injunctions like "Tell the truth" (*satyam brūyāt*) "Neglect not your duties" (*dharmān na pramāditavyam*) belong to this type.

The second type of acts included in *dharma* is illustrated by the rites performed by the parents when the child is born to them, the rites performed when a person is dead, or the rituals done during eclipse or in situations when one becomes polluted. This type also is negative in its import; no positive result proceeds from the acts done when the situation demands it. The first two types of action (*nitya* and *naimittika*) are intended in reality only to avoid some unwelcome result, which would follow when the scriptural injunctions are ignored. They do not serve as

means to any other end. And therefore, while performing them one must not be motivated by any desire or expectation.

It is the third type, viz. *kāmya*, that is motivated action. One would not take resort to the act at all, if one did not desire some benefit, reward or merit, or the elimination of some defect, disability or distress.⁵³ Most of the rituals like the different kinds of *yajñas*, *homas*, *vratas* and *dānas* belong to this type: they are motivated by specific, material expectations. The *kāmya-karma* of this type is not incumbent on everyone; it is optional. But Kumārila explains that even a hundred scriptural commands will not be capable of motivating a person as greed will do.⁵⁴

The optional acts (*kāmya*) are undertaken to provide material satisfactions here or hereafter. Three varieties of them are usually recognized: (1) those that are calculated to bring in benefits which are immediate and in this very life (like the ritual known as "*Kārīri*" which is performed for abundant rain); (2) those that are undertaken for the rewards which will appear only in the next world or birth (like the sacrificial rites of "*darśa*" and "*pūrṇamās*"); and (3) and those that will bear fruit both here and hereafter (like the "*vāyavya*" rite for prosperity). The human desires extend to the present as well as to futurity, and naturally

they need to be accommodated in both contexts.

Kumārila appears to subscribe to a sort of psychological hedonism, or he understands common human nature very well and sympathizes with its limitations. Being a confirmed atheist and an independent thinker, he approaches even scriptural authority only as a means to an end. He is not an idealist, unlike his brilliant student Prabhākara, and he does not advocate duty for duty's sake, or the view that scriptures demand implicit acceptance and do not provide motives or incentives. He is practical enough to declare that even an idiot will not set out to do anything without a purpose in his mind.⁵⁵ He asks: "Who ever will undertake to study or to act on a prescription, unless the benefit thereof is clearly mentioned even at the outset?"⁵⁶

According to him, even the categorical imperatives called the *nitya-vidhi* (obligatory acts) and the actions prescribed as *naimittika* are not after all so devoid of benefits, whether one who performs them has desires or not. They are calculated to overcome the past sins and avoid future sins. Sins ("durita", literally meaning "what has gone wrong") are in the nature of obstacles to prosperity in this life or in the next (*abhyudaya*); and they need to be eradicated before one aspires to acquire merit by optional or "*kāmya-karma*".

Kumārila rightly points out that the bulk of the scriptural commands (viz, the brāhmaṇa portion of the Vedic corpus) belongs to the “kāmya” variety, actions done with the expectation of specific rewards. But he contends that the obligatory actions are not to be regarded as altogether purposeless. In fact, he bewails the fact that the Mīmāṃsakas of his day disregarded the practical import of the obligatory rites and hence had become materialists attaching value only to the optional acts.⁵⁷

It is both unrealistic and impractical to expect that even the optional rites must be gone through only as a duty fulfilling the scriptural mandate, and not with desires in the mind to be fulfilled. The scope of dharma includes alike the obligatory duties and the optional rites; and whatever the nature or the motives of the duties or rites, dharma is not an intrinsic or absolute value, but it is instrumental. In this sense, dharma is utilitarian and hedonistic.⁵⁸ Idealists like Prabhākara would plead that the dharma must be pursued for its own sake, and not with any ulterior motive. The idea (nishkāma-karma) emphasized in *Bhagavad-gītā* that actions must be devoid of motives, utilitarian or hedonistic, follows this argument. But it is alien to common human nature.

Doing anything without priorly ascertaining where what is done will lead to, or what it will achieve, and without judging whether the act would be able to bring about the expected results (*sādhya-sādhanatā* or *kṛti-sādhyatā*) is not normally seen. Also a prior knowledge of the value (whether instrumental or intrinsic) is indispensable for the realization of that value.

However, Kumārila does not rest content with describing dharma as a mere instrumental value; he is by no means materialistic, hedonist or strictly utilitarian in his approach. His idea of total welfare (*śreyas*) of the individual to be achieved by dharma goes beyond material prosperity in this life or in the next (*abhyudaya*). It includes in a significant way emancipation or freedom from the possibility of all ills in life (*nihśreyasa*) And to achieve this, Kumārila counsels that one must give up all involvement with optional (*kāmya*) rites, without however abandoning the obligatory (*nitya*) ones.⁵⁹ By eliminating the obstacles that are already there and by preventing fresh obstacles from appearing (through the performance of obligatory rites), and further, by avoiding the obstacles that would naturally arise by the satisfaction of desires as a result of the performance of optional rites, one's

consciousness gets pure (viz. freed from material facts and fictions) and becomes eligible to emancipation (moksha).

VI. THE INTRINSIC VALUES OF DHARMA

The ideal of moksha in the Mīmāṃsā school of thought is not tied up with the idea of a God or heaven. In fact, the early Mīmāṃsakas were atheists and believers of this world being the only possible world. The world, according to them, was not created and will not be destroyed: there never was, nor will there be, a time when the world would be different from what it is now.⁶⁰ Thus there was no need for postulating a godhead as a creator, preserver or destroyer of the world. And the acts done by human beings will fructify as a result of the unseen potency or power (apūrva) emerging out of the action and inhering in the consciousness of the performer of the action; and God need not to be brought in to explain this. It is unthinkable that God would have a body, listening to our prayers, becoming favorably disposed towards us, and bestowing benefits on us. Even the origin of scriptural authority does not rest in some God: the Vedas are only of unknown authorship (like no one knowing who made the

Himālayas) and not revelations of God, much less the commands of some ruler above the world. Dharma is not dependent on God or on the Vedas.

Incidentally, this passage from Kumārila's *Tantra-vārtika* would clarify the Mīmāṃsa position with regard to the Vedic corpus being the source of dharma.

"It is not always necessary that the good men, in all that they do, should always recall the scriptural authority for their actions; the fact is that from time immemorial we have always found the practice of good men to be in keeping with the scriptures...

"People come to be recognized as 'good' by always acting in accordance with the teachings of the Vedas; and when they have thus acquired the title of 'good', even if they do something else in accordance with a fixed tradition (but without express support of the Veda), such actions are believed to have the character of dharma."

The early formulators of the Mīmāṃsā-system (like Jaimini and Śabara-svāmin) confined their attention to dharma as an instrumental value for the attainment of the intrinsic value of material prosperity (*abhyudaya*); they did not bother about salvation or ultimate welfare (*niḥśreyasa*) as the intrinsic or absolute value. The later authorities like Kumārila and Prabhākara emphasized the

latter (ultimate welfare), but did not alter the intrinsic value character of material prosperity. Dharma remained the instrumental value (for Kumārila at any rate) for both material prosperity and ultimate welfare. The earlier idea of 'heaven' (svarga), defined as the individual's unsurpassed happiness, to be attained only in the after-birth experience⁶¹ was later substituted by release or emancipation (moksha).

Both Kumārila and Śālikanātha (student and exponent of Prabhākara, about 650 A.D.) speak of emancipation as a value which is intrinsic. It is, however, negative in import: not having to assume the body again, the final destruction of the material and limiting foundation for the soul, which is of the nature of mere potential consciousness (jñāna-śakti-svabhāva). The soul in bondage to transmigration (samsāra) is owing to its association with the physical body, sense-faculties, mind and understanding, which association again is brought about by 'karma' (traces left by actions). There are two types of karma which render the involvement with transmigration necessary: those which are motivated by desires for positive benefits, and prescribed as optional in scriptures (kāmya), and those which are prohibited in scriptures but resorted to by some persons motivated by greed,

hate or infatuation (*nishiddha*). The former leads to merit (*punya*), while the latter results in demerit (*pāpa*). One who seeks for emancipation must go beyond both these; and hence he must eschew both the optional acts and the prohibited acts.

Dharma as an instrumental value is calculated, in the final analysis, to help us obtain emancipation, which is freedom from material pleasure, pain, desire and even modes of consciousness. This is what is described as 'purification of constitution' (*sattva-śuddhi*), which is consequent upon the destruction of all obstruction (*durita-kshaya*). Emancipation requires knowledge (*jñāna*) as its means, but knowledge should prompt the right kind of action (only obligatory or *nitya-karma*). Kumārila subscribes to the doctrine of combined effort of knowledge and action (*jñāna-karma-samuchchaya*). And emancipation is the total cessation of all inclination to be associated with the ends and means of the transactional world. Kumārila does not view emancipation as bliss or happiness of any kind, for if emancipation were desirable happiness, what is wrong with heaven?⁶² The idea of heaven (*svarga*) as a state of unbounded happiness was given up by the Mīmāṃsakas, because it is in the very nature of

happiness of whatever kind to end after some time (kshayī), and what is transient cannot be ultimate value. Emancipation (moksha) is everlasting (nitya) because of its negative character.

It may be mentioned in passing that the Mīmāṃsā system has in its background the Vaiśeshika school (the crystallization of which is ascribed to Kaṇāda, who lived in the seventh century B.C.), and Kumārila's thoughts reveal an impact of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeshika schools. It was the *Vaiśeshika Sūtra* that for the first time in history set out to explain the nature of dharma;⁶³ and they defined it as that from which worldly prsoperty and salvation are accomplished.⁶⁴ They also held that the authoritative character of the Vedic scripture rests on the fact that dharma is stated in this corpus.⁶⁵ These views are also accepted in the Mīmāṃsā system. Despite the Vaiśeshika acceptance of God (īśvara), their view of emancipation (moksha) is negative; it is the freedom from pain, consequent on the non-production of both dharma (merit) and adharma (demerit). Kumārila has followed this line of thought, and he has also incorporated the Vaiśeshika ideas like "desire leads to attachment,"⁶⁶ and "actions of merit and demerit proceed from desire and hatred,"⁶⁷ and "the transmigratory existence appears owing to the

activities associated with merit and demerit.”⁶⁸ These are important ideas to understand dharma as an instrumental value.

The “*Vaiśeshika-sūtra* of Kaṇāda commences the exposition of the system⁶⁹ with the statement that the text concerns itself with the exposition of dharma, which is also the subject-matter of Mīmāṃsā. The *Vaiśeshika-sūtra*, however, deals mainly with physical categories like substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*) and so on, which are far removed from what the Mīmāṃsā system deals with. The *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* considers mainly the values associated with worldly prosperity (*abhyudaya*), and the definition of dharma in it refers only to this.⁷⁰ Even Kumārila explains that welfare (*śreyas*) is happiness of the individual attained by substances, qualities and actions.⁷¹

It seems only as an afterthought and owing to the impact of the Vaiśeshika ideology that emancipation as “the ultimate value” (*niḥśreyas*) was conceded by the Mīmāṃsakas (represented by the divisions after Kumārila and Prabhākara). Emancipation is a negative state (*abhāva*), both for the Vaiśeshika and the Mīmāṃsaka; and knowledge is the means to its attainment, according to both the schools. Despite this

acceptance, dharma as the instrumental value in successful and satisfying life continued to be the sole concern of the Mimāmsakas. They had to evolve a highly rational and well-coordinated complex of ideas concerning the values of life, in the context of their general atheistic tendencies.

An appraisal of their analysis of values and their aspects and involvements in actual actions, planning of such actions in terms of several, sequential activities and attitudes, the role of desires and expectations, and the importance of prompting in terms of motivations and injunctions is bound to provide considerable guidance and insight into human personality and behaviour, as relevant to management.

I cannot possibly forget to add that in recent years there has been an eloquent call in India to resuscitate the spirit of Dharma in all our spheres of work, including politics and industry, a call which has unfortunately gone unheeded. I refer to the life-work of Mahatma Gandhi, who sought to live his life and work at the national level guided solely by Indian values. Dharma, according to him, was what "is enjoined by the holy books, followed by the sages, interpreted by the learned, and which appeals to the heart" (*Harijan*, 1946, 10, 41, p. 401). He emphasized: "Do not mix up religion and ethics. I believe that

fundamental ethics is common to all religions. Teaching of such ethics is undoubtedly a function of the state" (*ibid*, 1947, 11, 8, p. 76). And this fundamental ethics was for him the conscience "which reveals itself daily to every human being, but we shut our ears to the 'still small voice'" (*Young India*, 25, 5, 21, p. 162).

The expression of conscience is given in his own words: "They say 'Means are after all means.' I would say 'Means are after all everything.' As the means, so the end. There is no wall of separation between means and end. Realization of the goal is in exact proportion to that of the means. This is a proposition that admits of no exception." (*ibid.*, 17, 7, 24, p. 236-237) He likened the means to a seed, and the end to a tree; there is an inviolable connection between the seed and the tree (*Hind Swaraj*, 1958, p. 71). The right means in other words is discharging one's duty in accordance with conscience. He said, "The true source of rights is duty. If we all discharge our duties, rights will not be far to seek. If leaving duties unperformed we run after rights, they will escape us like a will-o'-the-wisp. The more we pursue them, the farther will they fly."

His thoughts on morality, values, truth, non-violence, svadeśi, socialism and satyāgraha (as noncooperation with evil) are universal in their

application. They will be found extremely relevant in the field of management also. Gandhiji came from the community of businessmen, and claimed to have business in his very veins. He addressed industrialists, and pleaded with them that values of life were superior to their economic interests. "True economics," he said, "never militates against the highest ethical standards, just as all true ethics to be worth its name must at the same time be also good economics" (*Harijan*, 9, 10, 37, page 292). In his opinion, moral was synonymous with spiritual. He held before us the "end to be sought" which is "human happiness combined with full mental and moral growth", (*ibid*, 18, 1, 42, p. 5).

That Gandhiji continued, albeit unconsciously, the Mīmāṃsā approach becomes evident when we consider that he laid emphasis on motive and not on action so far as moral judgements are concerned. An action, according to him, is truly and completely moral when the motive, means adopted, and preconceived results are all good (cf. Benoy Gopal Ray: *Gandhian Ethics*, 1958, p. 41). Both motives and actions are to be governed by internal sanctions (*viz.* conscience), and not by any external sanction, such as social, political or economic. This is an important aspect of Gandhian philosophy,

complimentary to another of his beliefs, namely the superiority of quality over quantity. A single action, according to him, that emanates from the heart, from the true moral sense, is the right action, and that alone constitutes morality. A hundred other conventionally moral acts, governed by external sanctions, would be worthless before it.

Lastly, this is reflected in Gandhiji's definition of Swadeshi. It is well-known that he strove all his life to inculcate among us the spirit of Swadeshi in all walks of life. "Swadeshi is that spirit within us, which restricts us to the use and service of our immediate surroundings to the exclusion of the more remote" (quoted in C.F. Andrews: *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*, p. 120). This would emphasize the fact that we must look for our own resources in solving our problems, and this would be relevant even in the field of management. He says explicitly enough, while talking about industrialisation:

"We must not be entrapped by false analogies. European writers are handicapped for want of experience and accurate information. They cannot guide us beyond a certain measure if they have to generalize from European examples which cannot be on all fours with Indian conditions. We know, too, that each nation has its own characteristics and individuality. India has

her own; and if we are to find out a true solution for her many ills, we shall have to take all the idiosyncrasies of her constitution into account and then prescribe a remedy."

(*Young India* 1925, Aug. 6)

A NOTE ON MĪMĀMSĀ

Mīmāṃsā is one of the six systems of thought, called darśanas, in India. The word mīmāṃsā means examination of a significant subject. It involves an elaborate methodology evolved in the course of considering the human values, as relevant in a well-ordered life. Its subject-matter is dharma (or human values) in its instrumental function for securing total welfare of the individual. It is regarded here as the chief tool for self-management, which is a necessary precursor to management of men and materials.

Also called Pūrva-mīmāṃsā or Karma-mīmāṃsā, the system was crystallized in the form of aphorisms by Jaimini, the sage who lived around 300 B.C. An important commentary (bhāṣya) on the *Jaimini-sūtra* was prepared by Śabara-svāmin during 57 B.C., on the basis of several earlier annotations by Bhartṛmitra, Bhavadāsa and Upavarsha. Later, Kumārila-

bhaṭṭa (around 620 A.D.) wrote extensive glosses on Śabara-svāmin's Bhāshya (*Śloka-vārtika*, *Tantra-vārtika* and *Tuṭṭikā*). He appears to have had before him a *vārīta* of unknown authorship on *Śābara-bhāshya*, from which he differed considerably. A brilliant thinker, he differed also from Śabara-svāmin himself and boldly propounded fresh viewpoints. He is one of the masterminds of India, and his impact was felt on all subsequent philosophers including Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja.

A contemporary of his, Prabhākara was another celebrated thinker of the times. He appears to have closely followed the Vārtika on *Śābara-bhāshya*, and was faithful to Śabara-svāmin, unlike Kumārila. Thus there were two important divisions in Mīmāṃsā, one led by Kumārila and the other by Prabhākara. Kumārila's division was made popular by Pārthasārathimīśra's *Śāstra-dīpikā* and *Nyāya-ratnākara* (12th century), Khaṇḍa-deva's *Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā*, and Āpa-deva's *Mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*. Prabhākara's disciple Śālikanātha wrote an able commentary on his master's masterpiece *Bṛhatī*. In addition to this work (called *Rjuvimalā*), he authored an independent treatise (*Prakaraṇa pañchikā*),

which explains in great detail Prabhākara's position.

Mīmāṃsā is realistic in its orientation, and atheistic in its attitude (although later writers Śālikanātha, Nandiśvara, Āpadeva, Nārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭa and Laugākshi-bhāskara attempted to 'smuggle' the idea of God into the system). It accepts the self-evident authority of Veda (defined as a collection of mantras and brāhmaṇas) for organizing our lives on the basis of dharma as an instrumental value; the rituals prescribed are not to be construed as worship of God or propitiation of deities, but they are said to bring forth results by their own unseen potency called "apūrva". The ritual is essentially an organized behaviour, sufficiently motivated, well-planned and carefully executed. The system discusses the principles involved in this, and hence its interest to the students of management.

CHAPTER II

CORPORATE BODIES AND CONSCIENCE

When we talk of morality in industry, business or any corporate body, the basic issue to be sorted out is whether such a corporate body has a personality of its own and whether it can be said to have a conscience. This question was raised by Kenneth Goodpaster of the Harvard Business School and Peter Drucker as early as 1981. The provocation had come from John Ladd, a philosopher of repute, who said: 'It is improper to expect organizational conduct to conform to the ordinary principles of morality.' Can the group act like a person? Does an industry have any moral responsibility beyond political and legal compliance and obedience? Is it not true that it must be guided solely by rational and economic motivations? Concerned as they are with survival, stability and growth, can corporate bodies ignore the pursuit of profit and self-

interest? Is it useful even to the society at large when they divert their attention from competence and efficiency to considerations of moral responsibility?

Such objections have frequently and naturally been pitted against the attempted involvement of ethics in business. The objections stand, if the corporate bodies like industry and business cannot be identified as individual persons with their own perceptions, predispositions, imperatives, compulsions, commitments and responsibilities. If, however, the corporate body is indeed a specific organisation and structure, existing and functioning as if it were a single individual, a cooperative system for a cooperative purpose, then the idea of a moral projection for it is not far-fetched. It is not impractical to expect it to behave like a morally responsible person. Peter French wrote an excellent article defending this position, in the *American Philosophical Quarterly* (The Corporation as a Moral Person, 1979, July) and the general feeling among the articulate thinkers on the subject is that corporate bodies need to have a high level of moral awareness. The development of business ethics as a field of inquiry has since been greatly facilitated and it is also emerging as a practical force in management policies.

In this context, it may be profitable to turn our attention to what are typically and traditionally Indian ideas about corporate bodies. In Indian philosophy, especially in the Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā schools and also in the traditional philosophy of grammar, there has been a discussion about 'jāti' and 'vyakti' roughly corresponding to corporate existence and individual entity. The Sanskrit word 'jāti' has many meanings, like birth, production, caste, genus, aggregation, nature and character. However, it is a technical word in the philosophical discussions in Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā: it signifies generality (sāmānya) or class character and is distinguished from 'vyakti' (particular, individuality, specific-character). The expression 'vyakti' etymologically means something that shows up as a distinct unit ('vyajyate iti').

There is a difference between 'jāti' and 'vyakti' in the manner in which they are perceived and in the dependence or otherwise of each on the other. There are four views regarding 'jāti' or generality in Indian thought:

- i) The idealists reject altogether the existence or operation of a class-concept (jāti). A jāti is nothing more than the physical aggregation of individuals, even as a substance is nothing more than its constituent parts: What really

exist are individuals, and a class is purely imaginary, a hypothetical construct. This view would deny corporate bodies having individualities of their own; hence they cannot be expected to behave like persons with a sense of moral responsibility. When we speak of the assemblage as a unit, it is more of a fiction than a factual description.

- (ii) This view is opposed by Naiyāyikas as well as Mīmāṃsakas. They argue that the class, a corporate body, an institution or organisation does have an existence of its own, quite distinct from the individuals who form the constituent members of the class or corporate body. The class functions as an individual entity, different from how the individuals thereof would function in their individual capacities. We can speak of the class being there and being operative, independent of the individual members.
- (iii) Some Naiyāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas, however, hold that while the class does have a real existence of its own, it can neither exist nor function independent of its constituent members. A corporate body is after all corporate; it is no doubt more than a more aggregation of individuals, but

consists entirely of the individuals. We cannot think of a class or generality without particulars. The intellectual and emotional processes of the individuals determine what the group does in a very significant manner.

- (iv) The last view holds that the corporate entity is somehow both different and not different from the individuals that compose it. This is the typical Mīmāṃsaka position. The group sometimes does act like a person, and in this it is different from all the individuals that are included in the group, for the ways the individuals act as individuals will be characteristically different. But at other times, the action of the group will closely reflect the resolves, perceptions and imperatives of the individual members; the corporate entity in this case is not different from the individuals that compose it.

The four alternative views mentioned above are taken from Prakaraṇa-pañchikā by Śālikanātha, the student of the great Mīmāṃsaka, Prabhākara. According to Prabhākara himself, the only basis for postulating the existence of jāti (class-essence as translated by Debiprasad

Chattopadhyaya) is the prehension of some non-difference (or sameness) among numerous things which are otherwise seen as different from each other.¹ The substratum for *jāti* is of course the individuals; but the *jāti* (or the class-essence) is different from them; and this difference is accessible to observation.² He would favour the view which points to the independent existence of the corporate body, quite distinct from the component individuals; it would ostensibly behave like a person.

The situation in which this discussion would be relevant to a *Mīmāṃsaka* is the sacrificial session (*yāga*) which is also an organization of activities involving a number of individuals and which suggests similarity with a modern business enterprise, except in two important details. The first difference would be in the duration of a sacrifice, which is relatively brief; for a single day (*ekāha*), for as long as twelve days (*ahīna*), for a month or year (*sattra*) and for a longer period (about ten years). This is unlike an industry or business which is expected to be permanent. The second difference is in the sacrificial session being meant to produce an invisible and spiritual benefit (*apūrva*, *adr̥shṭa*), while a business organisation is calculated to produce visible and material goods.

A sacrificial session is called *yāga*, because it is a form of attentive action ('*yajati*'). It is not an act of worship as it is commonly supposed, for the deities that are eulogized in the mantras and for whom offerings are made, do not really exist to be pleased. The *Mīmāṃsakas* are atheists and the actual act is what is important for them, and not the gods who are imagined or conjured up only for the sake of the act.³ The expression *yāga* involves the sense of an intention or desire.⁴ It is a purposeful enterprise and the purpose is always one or the other of the material benefits like happiness (*svarga*), wealth (*śrī*), celebrity (*yaśas*), efficiency (*yajña*), strength (*vīrya*), cattle (*paśu*), food (*anna*) or self-possession (*svārājya*).⁵ Although these benefits are desired by those who perform the *yāga*, the actual *yāga* will produce only an invisible potency (*apūrva*) and will not directly engender any of these benefits. These benefits are brought about in due course, on account of the invisible potency which will remain in the self of the person who has performed the sacrifice.

And the sacrifice is always a collective affair, involving a large number of people. There must at least be four principal priests (*ṛtviks* called *hotṛ*, *adhvaryu*, *udgātṛ* and *brahmā*), with their assistants (numbering sixteen or more);

there may be more priests in accordance with the duration and complexity of the yāga undertaken. There are actions and responsibilities allotted and assigned to each one of these priests, and even their placements are fixed in the sacrificial hall. Being a ritual, the actions and utterances of the priests are meticulously laid down, and the slightest departure from the prescribed norms will not go unnoticed or uncorrected. The numerous actions of the priests are all complementary and cooperative in character, and directed towards the production of the invisible potency (apūrva), which is secured at the proper completion of the yāga.

Although it is a collective affair, there will usually be one person who sponsors it; he is called a 'yajamāna' (one who engages himself in the sacrificial act). It is his desire that is sought to be fulfilled by the yāga. The priests are hired (or selected) for the purpose, and their exertion is compensated by monetary and material rewards and gifts (dakṣhiṇā), which are also standardized and predetermined. The relationship between the priests and the yajamāna is entirely contractual. The priests lay no claim to the invisible benefit that accrues from the yāga; although they work towards its production, the benefit is wholly the yajamāna's.

Do we not notice the numerous parallels that may be presumed to be there between a sacrificial session (yāga) and a modern economic organisation? The question raised by the Mīmāṃsakas whether the yāga answers to the description of class-essence (jāti) appears relevant in the modern context also. In fact, the Vedic hymns themselves describe the sacrificial session as a person (yajña-purusha). There are many varieties of sacrifices, each one of which has its own settled form (ākṛti), unified structure (samsthā), intentional specificity (kāmya), sequence of events (krama), ritual offerings (havis) and operative procedure (pravṛtti). Each yāga thus is a cooperative system for a cooperative purpose. It is a complex process of organisation, division, planning and management of men and materials.

There is no doubt that the entire sacrificial session is designed to serve the self-interest of the yajamāna, who sponsors the session; it is, as even the Vedic texts themselves concede, a pursuit of profit (called kāmya in the ritualistic language). And the priests who are primarily involved in the conduct of the sacrificial session may also be motivated by the material benefits that they would be eligible to, which in fact are material and immediate (unlike the benefit that

accrues to the yajamāna, which is invisible and deferred). Although the priests are employed by the yajamāna, whose purpose alone the sacrificial session is to serve, and their roles clearly defined and assigned, the priests are nevertheless not accountable for their work, for the result of their work is neither directly visible nor is it by itself supposed to be competent to bring forth the final result of the sacrificial session.

Despite this non-accountability, the priests are expected to be aware of the demands of moral responsibility. However, the priests are not responsible to the yajamāna, who has sponsored the ritual and who pays them, but to the required conduct while performing the ritual (or what may be called legitimacy). They are not result-oriented, nor are they motivated by profit; but they are aware of the discipline which the session requires and each of them is conscious of his responsibility in a cooperative system that the sacrificial session is. The priests act collectively, as a corporate body, in other words as a 'jāti' in the interests of the sacrificial session itself, and do not concern themselves with the interests of the yajamāna.

It must also be mentioned that among the four principal priests that must necessarily participate in the conduct of a sacrificial session, one (called brahmā) will not actually perform any

action relevant to the ritual (like reciting mantras or offering oblations to the fire), but observes keenly all that goes on. His job is to watch if the recitations are properly done, the oblations are correctly offered, the materials are consecrated according to prescription and the order of events is kept. Should there be any omission or commission, he must order its immediate correction by an appropriate expiatory rite. He acts, in other words, as a master-of-ceremonies.

In reality, this priest (called *brahmā*) is the conscience-keeper of the priests. He does not function on behalf of the *yajamāna* (who has sponsored the ritual), nor is he in any way responsible to him. He is one of the priests, and therefore his commitment is to the ritual efficiency and legitimacy. In other words, he functions on behalf of the priests themselves. He personifies the conscience of the participating priests. His presence in the sacrificial hall will amount to a sort of moral projection.

It would not be correct to describe this priest (*brahmā*) as a sort of manager of the group of priests engaged in the sacrificial session. Each priest involved in the cooperative activity like a *yāga* is expected to manage himself, and not look for an outside authority to regulate, dictate or contain his actions. Nor do the priests elect

among themselves a chief, whom they would obey. The entire group acts as a corporate body with a high sense of moral responsibility: it acts as if it has a collective conscience. The group's motivations are of course not economical or material in character. But this does not take away the structure of corporate responsibility as an organised and emergent one, based on the components of individual responsibilities. The sense of moral responsibility will be made manifest in efficiency or competence.

It is in this context that the discussion concerning the existence of a distinct corporate entity or class-essence (*jāti*) becomes relevant. Among the *mīmāṃsakas*, while those who follow *Prabhākara* would view the corporate entity as something very different from the individual components, those following *Kumārila* would argue that it is not.⁶ An individual component of that entity is what is presented to our awareness, but the individual component is cognized only as belonging to the corporate entity. We cannot perceive a class as such, apart from the individuals that go to form it; but that the class exists can hardly be disputed. The class reveals itself through the individuals, and we tend to identify the individual with the class to which he belongs.

Kumārila provides an illustration. We perceive a person as a brāhmaṇa viz, as a member of the brāhmaṇa class. Do we see the entire class of brāhmaṇas, and then find this person included in this class? We do not. We see only this person. How then do we know that he is a brāhmaṇa? Because we know that his parents are brāhmaṇas, and that he is believed to descend from a line of ancestors who were brāhmaṇas. We cannot directly perceive the class-essence of all the brāhmaṇas (present now).

There is a Sāmkhya view, to which Kumārila apparently subscribes, that the jāti is not different from the component individuals, but that it can be seen from different angles. When we look at the class (as identical with the individual), the individual becomes latent, and the class presents itself to our consciousness; but when we look at the individual (as identical with the class) then the class becomes latent and the individual presents himself to our consciousness. When we speak of the relation of inherence (called in Sanskrit, samavāya) of the class in the individual, or the individual in the class, it is only a particular view or aspect of the individuals⁷ themselves.

Any corporate body in the business world is seen to acquire an effective front through its main

executives, who are often identified with the corporate body. It is argued that whatever moral responsibility that is sought to be projected on the commercial concern should be focused only on the top executives and that the other components of the organisation should be let alone. This is to an extent true. The fortunes of a corporation depend ultimately on the honesty and integrity of the top executives, and not merely on their competence or efficiency. But the corporation is an organisation, a cooperative system for a cooperative purpose, as was said earlier. It is wrong to identify the corporation with a few components, however important. It is an organisation which is elaborately structured, and all components are equally involved in the organisation. The sense of responsibility must be evident in each of the components.

The trustworthiness of an individual employee is doubtless a great asset to the organisation; and this comes from the sense of moral responsibility that the individual has both as a person and as a worker. This is what we mean by 'conscience'. The doubt is expressed whether an aggregation of individual 'consciences', such as these, will function as a collective or corporate conscience. Whether or not it functions as such, it will be seen that the corporate body will then

have inbuilt elements of self-control and integrity and a concern for the employees as well as consumers. An internal control system which distinguishes an organisation can indeed be spoken of as conscience at the corporate level.

Here again there is a relevant discussion in Indian thought. It concerns the power or potency (*Śakti*) of the class-essence versus the power or potency in the individual member thereof. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools of philosophy attach importance to the concept of "jāti", which gives rise to the notion of commonness or sameness, among a number of discrete things.⁸ The class is "jāti" and the individual is "vyakti". The former has a visible form or shape (called *ākṛti*), which alone helps us to identify not only the class, but also the individual components thereof.⁹ This form (which is corporate in character) is associated with a power, which rests in the class and facilitates the production of results.¹⁰ According to the old Nyāya school, this power is manifold in the individuals who incorporate in themselves the form of the class-essence,¹¹ that is to say the top executives or managers of a business organization. However, the newer Nyāya-school would hold that the power abides only where it manifests, viz. in the individual executives themselves, and not in the corporate entity.¹²

The Mīmāṃsakas like Prabhākara would, on the other hand, accord an independent status to this power (*padārthāntara*); it abides neither exclusively in the corporate body, irrespective of the component individuals, nor entirely in the individuals, regardless of the corporate body. Power can either be in the corporate body as a generality (*samudāya*), drawing its distinctive character from the form or shape (*ākṛti*) which is contributed to by all the component parts, or in the individual (*viśiṣṭa*) who reflects the corporate form or shape. Prabhākara says that the very expression "class-essence" (*jāti*) involves the association with power,¹³ and this power is drawn from the interaction of the class and the components thereof. In individuals, it occurs as their own nature (*svarūpa*), while in the corporate entities it becomes perceived (*jñātā*).¹⁴

The discussion points to the fact that the nature and activities of the individuals contribute 'power' to the group consisting of these individuals. The power is not merely the power to transact business for profit but the power to be stable and productive. Prabhākara would not describe it as structural or functional, but as undifferentiated from the class-essence itself.¹⁵ It is the power to engage itself in activities, irrespective of motives and results.¹⁶ Kumārila,

however, regards it as the power to produce results.¹⁷ While Prabhākara speaks of power as a process, Kumārila emphasizes its directionality.

Whatever the conclusion, the moral responsibility of the individuals towards contributing effective existence to the organisation in which they are involved is a very positive detail. Likewise, the organisation also has a moral responsibility to preserve and promote the honesty and integrity of the individuals that compose it. The power to produce must not run into conflict with the power to satisfy individuals. The power in the corporate body should really be viewed as the power to have conscience.

CHAPTER III

SELF-MANAGEMENT

All systems of thought in India (the darśanas) are in fact so many appraisals of human values. While Sāmkhya among them seeks to inquire into the very foundation of the values in life, its counterpart Yoga is a practical discipline to actualize these values in one's own life. Being practical in orientation, it has naturally to deal with the factors that interfere with the pursuit of values, the kleśas as it calls them. The impact of such factors is denoted by the word 'duhkha' (stress), which is tripartite in its origin: one's own physical and mental constitution (ādhyātmika), outside agencies both material and human (ādhibhautika), and factors beyond one's control or apprehension (ādhidaivika). While Sāmkhya describes and explains the source of such stress, Yoga prescribes methods of managing this stress. The two systems have combined in the perspective presented by *Bhagavad-gītā*, which is both a

‘Brahma-vidyā’ and a ‘Yoga-sāstra’ (as described in the colophon of the chapters).

This remarkable book, which in Gandhiji’s words is the ‘Mother’ intent on our total welfare, provides us with the theory as well as practical guidance for the successful pursuit of the values of life. It is in the nature of a handbook for self-management, the most difficult of all managements. As Gandhiji explained, the battlefield is the heart of each one of us; and Arjuna represents every man torn between impulses and values; Kṛṣṇa is our own conscience, ‘the still small voice’ inside us. The war is really in our own minds, and it is waged by the lower values against the higher values. We need the guidance of teachers like Kṛṣṇa.

In the *Bhagavad-gītā*, Kṛṣṇa is mostly represented as a human teacher of great wisdom and erudition; he figures as a yogī. The *Bhāgavata*¹ records that Kṛṣṇa sat up every morning for meditation ‘merging himself with the transcendental self’. We read in the *Mahābhārata*² also that Kṛṣṇa was in the habit of meditating on Brahman in the hours before sunrise. Kṛṣṇa in all probability was historical in character and was a philosopher who harmonised the Sāṃkhya-Yoga with the *brahmavāda* of the Upaniṣads.

The poem has justly acquired an honoured place in the religious literature of the country, for it is at once philosophical in outlook and practical in intent. Working with metaphysical concepts, it prescribes concrete rules for efficient conduct: it contains a message for the sage, a lesson for the administrator, an instruction for the layman, a warning for the delinquent. Diverse temperaments find their reflections in the book and several aspirations find in it their fulfillment. The poem deals with the dialogue between the Pāṇḍava prince Arjuna who was in mental agony and emotional conflict, and his friend Kṛṣṇa who in this work appears as a philosopher and teacher, and not as a popular god of later Hinduism. Kṛṣṇa clears the knotty tangles in Arjuna's mind and heart, and remakes of him a valiant hero. It is a story of skilful and successful counselling and what follows focuses attention on this particular aspect of this great book, as the modern ideas of guidance and counselling are amply illustrated there.

In the background of the story is the family feud between two ruling tribes, Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas, related however by ties of blood. The battle, which was a historical event (although it assumed mythical proportions in later narratives) was a spectacular event in India's history during

the epic period; indeed it was styled as the 'Indian Fight' (Bhāratayuddha) and forms the theme of the famous epic, *Mahābhārata*. The fight was invested with this celebrity for it marked the triumph of righteousness over evil: the good-natured and unjustly treated Pāṇḍavas worsted in the end their crafty and mean-minded cousins, the Kauravas. After a colorful series of approaches and tussles, the issue was finally settled in the battle on the site of Kurukshetra, near modern Delhi.

The scene of the Song is laid in one of the days of the great battle: The two opposing forces are arrayed on the battle-field and the war-car of the Pāṇḍava hero Arjuna is parked in the centre. He interestedly surveys the opposed armies and is in particular curious to have a last look at the 'well-wishers' of the 'evil-minded Duryodhana', the leader of the Kaurava host. All on a sudden, however, he shrinks with remorse and dismay as he finds in the enemy camp his own teachers, elders, relatives and friends. His conscience is stricken with the enormity of the unwitting sin he is about to commit; compassion for his kinsmen and sudden awakening of self-abnegating love of humanity unhinged Arjuna's courage and presence of mind. Kṛṣṇa who was driving Arjuna's chariot, lifts him by an elaborate counselling out

of the despondent mood. Incidental to counselling, there is a display of high philosophical wisdom and metaphysical subtlety.

The episode represents a symbolism. Arjuna indicates the individual-in-stress. He is confronted with a critical situation, which clouds his thoughts, renders him anxious, and makes him fly reality. He is unable to act. A valiant hero, who had fought without a thought many a tough battle, now entered the field with confidence, ready to fight, and sure of victory. When he asked Kṛṣṇa to drive his car to the center of the battle-field to weigh the strength of the opposite force, he had even lifted up his mighty bow.³ But this preparatory set was soon broken, and an internal conflict raged wild. There was real anguish interfering even with normal bodily functions:

“Seeing these kindred, assembled
battle-bent, my limbs wither and my
mouth becomes parched. There is
trembling in my body and my hair
stands on end; my bow drops from my
hand, and my skin burns fiercely. I am
not able to remain firm-seated; my
mind also seems to wander, and I
perceive omens of evil!”⁴

Verily, a picture of anxiety neurosis! The war is no longer on the grounds of Kurushetra;

it is within the mind of Arjuna. He exhibits symptoms of anxiety, insecurity, confusion and phantasy, together with the physical manifestations of sweating, weakness, tremulousness and palpitation. He is depressed (*viṣhīdantah*) and excited (*samvignamanāh*). His intellectual functions remain intact and he has an insight into his own mental state; his thinking is not entirely unrelated to logic and he readily rationalises his inability to act. He presents the arguments of "tearing down the family tree" and "inflicting injury to friends" as reasons for refusal to fight. Kṛṣṇa, knowing well that these were ego's defences, listens patiently and allows him to unburden himself of the disturbing thoughts and fears. At length, Arjuna seeks guidance from Kṛṣṇa:

"I am thy pupil: instruct me, who in thee have sought refuge!"⁵

Kṛṣṇa was Arjuna's close friend, in whom not only he but his entire family placed an implicit trust. Kṛṣṇa was known for his maturity of mind, honesty of purpose, and love of right conduct. The whole world knew of his affectionate concern for the welfare of the Pāṇḍavas, in particular of his favourite friend Arjuna. Numerous were the instances when he had retrieved the Pāṇḍavas from moments of

embarrassment and misery. He naturally now commanded the entire confidence of Arjuna. The counsellor thus was both intelligent and cooperative.

2

Kṛṣṇa proceeds to help Arjuna out of the dark mood; and his manner of doing it illustrates the technique of an efficient counsellor. He starts by roundly dubbing Arjuna's trouble as 'cowardice' (*klaibya*), 'faintness of heart' (*hṛdayadaurbalya*) and 'dirt' (*kaśmala*). While he spoke so directly he was nevertheless aware that the source of Arjuna's grief was the contending value-systems. Though intellectually alert, Arjuna's will was weak and his withdrawal (refusal to fight) indicated a cleavage in his personality and a consequent disorientation. Kṛṣṇa readily recognized that this was a problem of adjustment: Arjuna was not acting in accordance with the expectations of his social class and status, and his present mood was justified neither by his talents nor by his temperament. Kṛṣṇa realised that Arjuna needed to acquire a wholesome attitude and learn to perceive things in their proper perspective. For this, Arjuna had to discover more about himself.

The first task of Kṛṣṇa as counsellor was to induce in Arjuna an insight into his own problems. And this he did by analysing the problem from diverse angles. It is somewhat strange that he should have begun with the metaphysical viewpoint. But when we realise that Arjuna suffered from an exaggerated emotional attachment to his kith and kin, it appears reasonable that Kṛṣṇa suspects an ego-involvement on his part and hastens to correct it. At the back of Arjuna's love of his folk was a love of himself and an anxiety for the welfare of his own self. Kṛṣṇa therefore commences with an exposition of the true nature of self: unborn, immortal, immutable, intangible and immeasurable.⁶ He preaches the doctrine of untroubled existence of the divine self independent of the mortal body, and explains our affective attachments as due to improper ego-projections of bodily characteristics on to the self. Kṛṣṇa's purpose in this exposition is to transpose Arjuna's problem to a totally different context, and to help him develop a new method of evaluation. The intention is to provide a wider and deeper basis for Arjuna's sentiments.

Without affording Arjuna a chance to doubt or argue, Kṛṣṇa immediately poses another problem for consideration: Arjuna's social status

and the responsibilities associated with it. Belonging to the Kṣhatriya class in the social milieu, invested with the firm duty of upholding the cause of righteousness and suppressing evil tendencies in the community, Arjuna was guilty of an impropriety by being indifferent, soft and sentimental; he swerved with indecision from the conduct, normal and approved in his class. A battle like this was indeed a welcome opportunity for a kṣhatriya to discharge his duties and prove his worth.⁷ And if Arjuna for any reason refused to countenance the situation squarely, what would the world think of him? He would for ever become the butt of ridicule, and his enemies would gloat over this demonstration of infirmity.⁸ In short, Arjuna, preoccupied as he was with his dwarfish and selfish sentimentalism, did not evaluate the situation properly; his humanistic considerations ran counter to the more urgent consideration of mores and of the class-approved behaviour. In the flush of this disorientation, his capacity for role-assumption was undermined. His emotions inhibited his leadership abilities.

It was this role-conflict that landed him in inactivity. Similar to clinical depression, it meant an inhibition of the capacity to act. Although Arjuna readily and elaborately rationalises it, it is inescapably a pathological state, beyond

voluntary control.⁹ There was in the presence of a crisis, clouding of thought, expression of anxiety and indication of despair. He could not see his way about in adjusting to a real life-situation: he failed to appreciate the necessity for proper conduct in keeping with the situational needs, and in keeping with his hereditary and acquired talents, temperament and social role. This is precisely what Kṛṣṇa meant by 'failing in *Svadharma*,¹⁰ which aggravated internal conflict.

In order to facilitate adjustment, Kṛṣṇa undertook to reinforce the ego-dominion by liberating it from the introverted, protective tendencies. The ego in Arjuna's case had shrunk to a narrow range, sharply contoured by conventional relations with the kith and kin. And this sudden shrinking of the ego was attended by anxiety. Kṛṣṇa as counsellor had to enable the ego develop an extensive feeling which met adequately the real situation in the external world. Hence his exposition of the immortality, immutability and essential divinity of the individual self. By transforming Arjuna's problem into a theoretical, academic and metaphysical standpoint, Kṛṣṇa sought to minimize Arjuna's ego-involvement and eliminate the anxiety associated with it. It was necessary to make

wholesome Arjuna's perception, which had become distorted owing to the inner emotional stress. This was achieved by fitting the practical problem to a philosophical context.

Kṛṣṇa teaches the doctrine of intellectual alertness and emotional stability which enables the individual to be at peace with himself and others. The maintenance of a state of psychological equipoise (*sthitaprajña*) is earnestly recommended. The excellent account of the features of a person who has achieved the equipoise also lays down the basic principles of mental health:

“He is known as one with equipoise when he eschews all overmuch desire and learns to be satisfied with himself. Difficulties disturb him not, and pleasures fail to tempt him; freed from longing, dread and hate, he is a sage with steady mind. His heart is settled in nothing, meeting good or evil, he is neither happy nor sad. His senses are all withdrawn, like the limbs of a turtle; and his mind is steady. Objects of lust, unfed, disappear.... Senses indeed are naughty and snatch the mind away. The wise one controls them all.... For when they

are controlled, mind can be steady. Brooding over objects of enjoyment, one gets fixed on them; being fixed he craves for them. Craving (unfulfilled) leads to anger, and anger to confusion; confusion makes for unreasonableness and that results in madness, which is the road to destruction. Bereft of love and hate, senses bridled by the self the individual obtains calmness. In calmness do all cares and worries find their end; calmness helps the mind settle. One that is unadjusted thus lacks resolve, and absence of resolve is difficulty, to cultivate (one's mind), and an uncultivated mind cannot attain peace, and without peace where is happiness? When mind yields to the whims of senses, it is led hopelessly astray, like a boat on water wafted by the gale."¹¹

3

After an elaborate argumentation concerning the merit of work and wisdom, convention and reason, intellection and insightful understanding, application and devotion, Kṛṣṇa realises that mere intellectual conviction would be insufficient

for effecting a lasting change in the ego-involved attitude of Arjuna. He felt the necessity of driving home the thesis by a more direct and personal experience. This he affords by way of exhibiting the pervasiveness and supremacy of the Divine (*viśvarūpadarśana*)¹² This sudden and unexpected revelation of the Deity served as an *Erlebnis* with a vivid and impressive demonstration. It was a sight that filled Arjuna with terror.¹³ It was an experience that was emotionally overwhelming. It convinced him so thoroughly as no amount of argumentation and reasoning could ever have. It brought home to him the reality with a terrific force and his ego-involvement was broken to bits. Arjuna was ducked in a shock. And when he came out of it, he was a changed man.

By argument and *Erlebnis*, Kṛṣṇa lifts Arjuna out of the dark mood of profound depression and inactivity, but insists on his 'examining the position thoroughly and acting with full deliberation.'¹⁴ The book closes with an optimistic note: Arjuna is now ready for action:

"The dark clouds have disappeared, and I have won back the presence of mind. I stand here free from doubt and shall indeed do as you guide!"¹⁵

Arjuna was disoriented to reality; although he was in capacity equal to the situation, he found himself unable to act owing to intrapsychic conflicts which engendered in him anxiety reactions. He had lost self-appreciation, and his personality suddenly lost the flexibility essential for satisfactory adjustment to situational needs. By skilful counselling Kṛṣṇa strengthened Arjuna as a man, raised his dynamic adaptation level and enabled him to plan his action for a suitable and acceptable goal. He made Arjuna appreciate his own personal dignity and recognise his work-capacity.

It is significant to note that Kṛṣṇa does not command, but counsels. This raises an important issue: the differential value of injunctions and suggestions. And this refers to the problem of motivational dynamics. Indian tradition classifies human action into purposeful (*kāmya*), prohibited (*pratishiddha*) and paramount (*nitya*). The purposeful is also optional: occasional needs and situational demands determine these actions. The prohibited are actions disapproved by custom and convention in view of personal integrity and group solidarity. The paramount are actions unconditional in their applicability, necessary for all individuals and at all times. These are of two sorts: sin-eliminating (*duritashaya*) and sin-

preventing (*pratyavāya*). By the performance of these actions, no one expects a positive benefit: they are done with a sense of duty. The example is the daily *sandhyā* for the twice-born castes in our country: the scriptures insist on its daily performance. But no reward is promised: it must be done because of the scriptural command, and it admits of no reasoning. Virtue is accordingly defined as performance of the duties enjoined and abstention from those forbidden. The Vedic injunction (*niyoga*, *vidhi*) is said to goad us to work, initially as a verbal prompting (*śābdībhāvanā*) whereby a volitional tendency is aroused and subsequently as action-prompting (*ārthībhāvanā*), whereby the resolve actually to perform the act is set up. The notion of 'prompting' (*bhāvanā*) in *Mīmāṃsā* is interesting: it is defined as an operation (*vyāpāra*) which sets an action-orientation (*pravartanā*, *preraṇārūpa*). Maṇḍana interprets it as 'an inner volitional direction of mind towards an action' (in the words of Dasgupta).¹⁶ Thus a Vedic command (*niyoga*) has a driving power (*vidhi*), which arouses a felt intention (*ākūta*) and immediately ceases; in the natural course of events, action (*artha*) results. In all this discussion, the main idea appears to be that action must be guided by a sense of duty (*kartavyatā*) regardless of the results of such

action. Or, in psychological terms, action must not be goal-oriented but subjectively determined; the motivation must operate from within, in conformity with one's temperament and genius (pratibhā).

Arjuna's conflict between his temperamental inclination and situational requirements involves this problem. And Kṛṣṇa does not seem well disposed towards the notion of the Vedic command being a categorical imperative, overriding reason. Rāmānuja, however, in his interpretation of the *Bhagavadgītā* emphasizes the obligatory and compulsive nature of caste-duties, being an instance of scriptural insistence. Arjuna, being a Kshatriya had to fight: he had to do it as a command (ekaśāstrārthatayā anuśṭheysm), without reasoning and regardless of results. But nowhere in the text is Kṛṣṇa so dogmatic: indeed, he leaves the decision in regard to fighting to Arjuna himself: "Do as you please!"¹⁷ Śaṅkara suggests that the main theme of *Bhagavadgītā* is to prove the superiority of wisdom to duty. He argues that no action can possibly be done without a motive or desire; and this applies to sacred as well as secular action, and holds true for Vedic injunctions as well as legal regulations. Non-performance of an action insisted upon by scriptures or convention leads to

no evil result whatever, although its performance may help one attain purity of mind (*sattvaśuddhi*), or community approval. "The wise man has no duties."¹⁸ That is why Kṛṣṇa only counsels, and is not in a position to command. And while counselling, he indicates the social and personal involvements and embarrassment in his refusal to discharge the responsibilities of the role he has already assumed. But he lays emphasis on the fact that this problem of caste-duty and injury to the kith and kin does not disturb the deeper and fundamental meaning of life.

CHAPTER IV

THE MANAGEMENT
OF STRESS

The discussion of values naturally involves the consideration of stress, generally indicated by the Sanskrit expression “duhkha” or “kleśa”. While duhkha suggests existential tension, kleśa refers to the discomfort, unrest and agitations felt by individuals caught up in inimical situations. Yoga and Gītā focus their attention on situational stress, which calls primarily for self-management and incidentally for management of men and materials around us. The two systems of thought are again viewed here, mainly from the viewpoint of stress and its management.

1

The word *kleśa*, derived from the root *kliś* (*upatāpe*, ‘to torment’, ‘to cause pain’, ‘to afflict’) means an afflicted state, a condition of pain. *Bhagavad-gītā* (12, 5) uses the word in the sense

of effort (*śrama*). The word has been used in the *Śvetāśvatara-upanishad* (1, 11) in the sense of hindrances or afflictions. Patañjali crystallizes the technical connection of the word while dealing with *kriyāyoga*.¹ It bears elaboration on this reference, for it not only comprehends all the essential details of stress that we are studying now, but shows a way to integrate them.

As defined in this context, the *kleśas* are not themselves mental processes, but are in the nature of a hindering load on the mental process (*na hi kleśah pratyaya-mātrāh, pratyaya-mātrā hi vṛttayah, klesāstu chittasya malam*).² The analogy given here is that of the cataract on the eye (*yathā chakshos timiram*). The cataract is extraneous to the eye, and its presence interferes with the normal function of the eye. But it can be removed and the normal function of the eye restored. Likewise, the *kleśa* gets into the mental processes, but could be taken out of them. Bhoja's *Rāja-mārtanḍa* (which is an annotation on the *Yoga-sūtra*) explains that the *kleśas* are so called because they produce agitation which is of the nature of obstructions or hindrances.³

Vyāsa's celebrated commentary on *Yoga-sūtra* spells out the dimensions of *kleśa* with remarkable clarity.⁴

“The *kleśas* flooding the mental processes deepen the authority of the aspects (*guṇas*, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*). They organize a pattern of changes. They hasten to produce a stream of reactions and stimulations. The *kleśas* and the reactions becoming interdependent, they together press towards the consequences of the responses.” The Implications of this pregnant passage are brought out by the glossator, Vāchaspati, in his *Tattva-vaiśāradi*. The idea of “the authority of the aspects” needs to be briefly explained. The *guṇas* are aspects of existence, universal ingredients of all things and events. They are three-fold: *sattva* representing the aspect of occurrence, awareness, and tranquillity; *rajas*, representing action, energy and excitement; and *tamas* standing for inhibition, inaction, and exhaustion. Although they are aspects, they are by themselves incapable of their respective functions. The functions are made passible by the involvement of intentionality which in the Sāṃkhya ideology is identified with the association of *prakṛti* and *puruṣa*. When this intentionality is overpowered by the *kleśas*, the functions of the *guṇas* are not only made possible, but are emphasized. The *kleśas* occur only in and through the mental processes. The *sattva* cognizes

the presence of *kleśa*, the *rajas* stirs the organism to activity, and the *tamas* sets limits to such activity. The *sattva* provides the cognitive structure, the *rajas* energy for action and emotional motivation, and the *tamas* the necessary exhaustion. Such is the 'authority of the aspects' (*guṇādhikāra*).

Vyāsa's commentary points out that the "authority of the aspects" is always there in an organism, and that the 'authority' of the *kleśas* only deepens it (*dṛḍhayanti*). The 'deepening of the authority' is explained by the glossator as 'the power to initiate action of each of the aspects' (*kāryārambhaṇa-sāmarthya*). In other words, the *kleśas* operate as effective stimulators for a series of reactions which are to be understood as above the normal threshold. The reactions are in this sense extraordinary; the activity is intensified under the influence of the *kleśas*, which have the demand-character.

The "pattern of changes" (*pariṇāma*), which the *kleśas* are said to organize, is explained by the glossator as the recurrent changes in the relative strength and proportions of the three aspects (*sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*).¹³ The changes are rendered constant and continuous (*avasthāpayanti*). The pattern is figuratively spoken of as

the 'stream' (srota) of reactions, which are brought forth, like the river which swells after a heavy downpour of rain at the source. Hence the significant expression 'un-namayanti', used by the commentator.

The sequence of stimulations and performances assumes a stream-like character because of their common location and uniform direction, with reference to the individual (or what we now call the focal organism). This is in the nature of a constraint. Vyāsa while referring to the interdependent character of the *kleśas*, emphasizes the mutual facilitation (*paras-parānugraha*) of the demands. Each *kleśa* having a specific demand, augments the other *kleśas* having likewise specific demands, in the same situation. The pattern of changes that emerge in the wake of these demands erase the specificity of these demands, and brings into being a generality of demand which will be capable of achieving the consequences of performances (*karmavipāka*). The consequence is unitary; hence the employment of singular terminal for the compound word in Sanskrit.

It is important to note that in the Yoga text, the purpose is to provide a conceptual mode in the framework of common human life, regardless

of individual differences. The passage quoted above refers to the general predicament of man in whom the *kleśas* have begun to operate as stressors. The idea of an organization of these individual stressors to constitute a major stress so as to produce the consequence of performance (*karmavipāka*) is implied here.

However, the glossator introduces a new idea in this context: he takes interdependence and mutual facilitation (*parasparānugraha-tantra*) to refer to the interaction between the *kleśas* and performances.⁵ While this idea is strictly not justified in the commentarial statement (for it speaks only of interdependence among the *kleśas* themselves), it does mark an improvement in the conceptualization of stress. The demands engender performances, and performances in their turn arouse other demands, so that the aforementioned stream is maintained. The stream is an ongoing system, where the load of the *kleśas* to be handled becomes 'normal', normal in the sense that the focal individual's integrity is preserved without much difficulty.

We can see that in the above treatment, *kleśa* is viewed as an intervening variable. The stimulus and response aspects are comprehended in it. The Yoga manuals look upon it more as a stressor than as the phenomenon of stress itself.

The word in Sanskrit for stress seems to be more properly *duhkha*; it describes an organismic state involving the experience of emotions, and characterized by an urge to escape or avoid (*jihāsā*).

2

Patañjali's *Yoga-sūtra* adds a new dimension to the discussion on stress by classifying the *kleśas*, which are really innumerable, into five sequential phases arranged in two levels.⁶ The fundamental connective failure, called *avidyā* or non-cognition, constitutes the first of the levels: it is the ground for the other level comprising four types of *kleśas*. We may pass over the former, as its significance is essentially metaphysical; it may be looked upon as phenomenological stress. Of interest to us here are the four types of *kleśas* at the other (viz., transactional) level. They are termed *asmitā*, *rāga*, *dvesha* and *abhiniveśa*. They are technical words borrowed from the Sāṃkhya thought and have rather stylized connotations.

Asmitā is literally 'I-am-ness' (ego-involvement) and is defined in the text as the assumption of uniformity (*ekātmatā*) between the potency of being the apprehended (*dṛk-śakti*).⁷

The commentarial explanations make it clear that the expression signifies precisely self-appraisal of an aroused organism. In the conceptual model provided in the Yoga-text, this intra-individual stressor indicates personal involvement in the situation. Rightly does an annotation, *Maṇi-prabhā*, describe this factor as 'the knot of the heart' (*hṛdayagranthi*), or the core-crisis implying evaluation of one's own ability to intend effectively in the situation. The philosophical considerations, however, tend to describe this self-evaluation as laden with ignorance and error (*bhrānti*) and herein lies the crisis.

The consequent phase of self-appraisal is intentionality (*rāga*, literally 'attachment' or 'approach'), defined in the text as anticipation of satisfaction (*sukhānuśayī*).⁸ The commentarial explanations emphasize the positive priming of the individual (*sukhābhijñā*), the facilitation of memory traces (*sukhānusmṛti*), and the need-dominance (*gardha*).⁹ It is a *kleśa* or stressor in as much as it involves the evaluation of the environmental details, and tends to press on the individual to make approach-responses. Intentionality (*rāga*) defines the situation for the individual and necessitates a fresh evaluation of one's own needs and abilities *apropos* the

situation; it provides the direction for behaviour. It is worth reminding here the finding of R. H. Rahe that a stressor need not necessarily be unpleasant or noxious but any event requiring adjustment and accommodation may be a potent stressor.¹⁰

The next phase in the sequence is called in the text *dvesha*, which literally means 'aversion'. The commentary of Vyāsa emphasizes the areas of correspondence between *rāga* and *dvesha*: both involve priming of the individual (one positively and the other negatively), facilitation of the memory traces (pleasurable in the former case and painful in the latter) and the need dominance (the need to obtain in the former and the need to avoid or eliminate in the latter). Vyāsa provides suggestive synonyms for *dvesha*: intense repulsion involving the tendency to strike (*prati-ghā*), alarm or anxiety when confronted with inimical objects (*manyu*), urgency to remove (*jighāmsā*), and anger (*krodha*). It is obvious that at this stage the individual perceives threat either to one's own integrity (or self-esteem, *asmi-tā*) or to one's need-dominance (*rāga*). This involves not only re-evaluation of one's own ability and the extenuating conditions in the situation on hand, but the role of emotions appropriate in conflict, competition, or antagonism.

It may be seen that it is this phase which broadly corresponds with the stage of initial shock (or alarm) in Hans Selye's model. It will be conceded that the analysis in the *Yoga-sūtra* takes into account the psychodynamics that precedes this stage. The conceptual model provided by the Indian text thus becomes more meaningful.

The final phase in the *Yoga-sūtra* series is called *abhiniveśa*, literally 'devoting oneself entirely to something' (*abhi+ni+viś*). The literary employment of the word has meanings of 'urgency to action',¹¹ 'firm resolve',¹² 'application of mind'¹³. In the Yoga-context it is the ever-present urge in all living beings to survive as individuals (*ātmāśih*).¹⁴ Patañjali describes it as 'constitutional and natural' (*sva-rasa-vāhī*); the annotator (Bhoja) explains that it is constitutional or natural in the sense that no provocation is required for its operation (*nimittam antareṇa*).¹⁵ More specifically, the Yoga manuals take the expression *abhiniveśa* to signify fear of death (*maraṇa-trāsa*), defensive reactions.

The modern student of stress may be tempted to find in this phase a correspondance with Hans Selye's third stage, viz., exhaustion. But this phase of *abhiniveśa* does not indicate a collapse

of the adaptive mechanism as the stage of exhaustion implies, but marks the beginning of the behavioral response pattern or what the stress analysts would call coping behaviour.

The three earlier phases are all sequential connective appraisals: *asmitā* is self-appraisal, *rāga* is object-appraisal and *dvesha* is threat-appraisal. They represent the increasing relevance of transactional cognitive processes to life-situations, and also the increasing role of energy-dynamics. In self-appraisal, it is more or less purely cognitive; in object-appraisal, intentionality is more cognitive than energetic; but in threat-appraisal the alarm is more energetic than cognitive and involves emotions and organic changes.

All these three phases help in what may be called the arousal mechanism and reality-testing, but they are only preparations for deliberate adaptive behaviour. It is true, however, that some behavioural response is involved in each of these phases, but it is only in the fourth phase that behaviour can be described as 'coping activity'.

It is to be noted that the final phase, viz., *abhiniveśa*, lacks the specificity that we find in the three earlier phases: self-specificity in *asmitā*, object-specificity in *rāga*, and threat-

specificity in *dvesha*. *Abhiniveśa* (which literally means arousal) is general adaptational activity. It is not an attempt to suggest here a correspondence between this and Hans Selye's general adaptation syndrome (GAS). The two are entirely divergent in their implications, expressions and frames of reference. The non-specificity of *abhiniveśa* is mentioned only to emphasize that the fundamental *kleśa*, *avidyā*, is also non-specific. *Avidyā* (literally 'non-cognition') is the opposite of the correct appraisal of self and its encounter with the object. In the absence of such correct appraisal (*samyag-jñāna*), ego-involvement (*asmitā*) emerges as a specific subjective factor (the opposite of discriminative knowledge of self as distinct from the body-complex, *viveka-khyāti*); and from this, the object-appraisal (*rāga*), and the threat-appraisal (*dvesha*) emerge as specific transactional factors (the opposites of indifference or neutrality, inhibiting positive or negative orientation, *mādhyaṣṭha*). The consequent *abhiniveśa* reverts to the original non-specificity, although discrete behavioural activities are specific with regard to the self, object and threat.

3

Although *avidyā* is a *kleśa*, it is outside the transactional plane, and hence not subject to the

variant modes of specific occurrence as the other four phases are. The modes mentioned in the *Yoga-sūtra* (2, 4) are four: 'dormant' (*prasupta*), 'tenuous' (*tanu*), 'intercepted' (*vicchinna*) and 'operative' (*udāra*). The dormancy of the *kleśa* as a stressor consists in its being a mere potency. It is compared to the condition of a seed which has the potentiality to grow into a tree, given the facilitating circumstances. Any mental process has the possibility of emerging as a stressor, but not in the absence of conditions which induce stress and favour such emergence. Some mental processes, however, have strong predispositions to operate as stressors as soon as conditions become favourable. This predisposition is referred to by the expression 'dormancy'. It becomes operative in the normal course of events, given time and the conditions.

'Tenuous' or 'thin' (*tanu*) stressors are those mental processes which are no longer dormant but which have been held in check by other and more powerful stressors. They operate, but lack intensity or urgency. Their demand character is weak; the load or press is light. 'Intercepted' (*vicchinna*) stressors are those that lack continuity, owing to conflict with other stressors. The subjective demands and the situational demands alternate in their pressure

and the mental processes with strong predispositions to become stressors. They sometimes operate and sometimes lie dormant, depending upon other mental processes that facilitate or overpower, and upon the varying need-dominance. They cease to be actual stressors when they lie dormant, but they do not lose their demand character.

'Operative' (*udāra*) stressors are so called because they have risen 'above constraints' (*ut+āra*). They are stresses in the sense of response-patterns which are calculated to achieve the intentions and eliminate threats. They presuppose not only need-dominance but favourable conditions (such as strong predisposition, absence of other and competitive stressors and conflicting need-applications). The demand-character of the stressors here find their fullest expression in overt behavioural modes.

The conceptual model of stress provided by the *Yoga-sūtra* is thus broad-based; and it comprehends the cognitive structuring, emotional state and adaptive reactions. It also presents the outlines of the strategy called 'Kriyā-yoga' which is calculated to reduce the number and intensity of the stressors (*kleśa-tanūkarāṇa*) and to facilitate relaxed conservation of mental energy devoid of tension (*samādhi-bhāvanā*).¹⁶

It would have become apparent by now that the conceptual model of stress presented here concerns itself with cognitive processes much more than their modern counterparts. It may be mentioned in passing that R.S. Lazarus, who is mainly responsible for the increasing interest that psychologists are taking in the problem of stress, attached great importance to cognitive processes, although he could not identify them clearly or comprehensively. The *Yoga-sūtra* model relies on the cognitive appraisals of the self, the object and the threat. But to understand the rationale of this emphasis on cognitive processes we have to turn elsewhere.

For instance, we get valuable clues in this direction from Vātsyāyana's commentary on Gautama's *Nyāya-sūtra*. His words constituting the introductory passage is quoted: "Cognitive appraisal of the object (*artha-pratipatti*) is impossible without the employment of the instruments of cognition (*pramāṇa*); and without the cognitive appraisal of the object, efficient behaviour (*pravṛtti-sāmarthyā*) is impossible. Indeed, we employ the instruments of cognition and appraise the object; and having appraised, we either intend to obtain the object (*artham-abhīpsati*) or to avoid it (*jihāṣati*). When such intention to obtain or to avoid is there, motivation

for specific effort (*samihā*) operates. Efficiency of behaviour is in terms of relating the effort with the desired consequence (*asyāh phalena abhisambandhah*). And it is only when the individual puts forth effort that he obtains the object that he desires, or avoids the object that he dislikes. The object that the man encounters is either pleasure and the means of pleasure, or pain and the means of pain. One whose behaviour is associated with the intention to obtain or to avoid is the cogniser (*pramātā*); that by employing which he cognizes is the instrument of cognition (*pramāṇa*); that which is the cognized is the object (*prameya*); and that which enables the cogniser to appraise the object is cognition (*pramiti*). Among these four factors is comprehended the significance of the object (*artha-tattva*).

There is hardly any need for commenting on this lucid explanation. Cognitive appraisal constitutes the functional framework for the conceptual model of stress, not only in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* system, but also in Nyāya, Vedānta and Buddhism. The threat-appraisal is described in all these systems as due to phenomenological cognitive processes (principally erroneous self-appraisal, and perverted object-appraisal). While the coping mechanism consequent upon this

threat appraisal is normal human behaviour, these systems suggest that the coping activities themselves are laden with stress, because of the initial error in the cognitive appraisal of the self (*avidyā*). Counteracting this error is the practical aspect of these systems. It calls for the coping behaviour of a different kind, called *sādhana* in Sanskrit. An important involvement in this coping behaviour is cognitive re-appraisal of the self, of the object, and of the threat.

4

Bhagavad-gītā provides an excellent illustration of stress and of how it is to be handled. The theme has already been described. It may here be recalled briefly with specific reference to the course the stress takes. Arjuna, the normally efficient man of action collapses when exposed to the anticipated shock of being involved in what he thinks is an immoral act (viz., war). The coping mechanism which uniformly supported him in numerous similar situations previously has now proved altogether inadequate. He makes negative self-evaluation, confesses to confusion and admits of organic and psychological changes which threaten his very survival and which are symptomatic of stress effects; and he

pleads that he is incompetent adequately to encounter the challenge. He seeks to gain safety by avoidance behaviour; but his responses are anxiety-related, and it is a clear case of 'exhaustion'.

Kṛṣṇa discovers that Arjuna's cognitive appraisals of himself (viz., the righteous and valiant warrior), the object (viz. the war) and the shock (viz., the immorality of it) are both unrealistic and inopportune. Kṛṣṇa reinforces Arjuna's coping mechanism that is about to collapse, and enables him to recover his usual efficient adaptive mechanism. The strategy that he adopts to provide Arjuna an opportunity for cognitive re-evaluation of his own self, the object and the anticipated shock. It might appear strange that Kṛṣṇa proceeds to philosophize when Arjuna feels despondent in a situation of crisis. It might also appear that the bulk of the teaching of Kṛṣṇa is irrelevant so far as the questions of Arjuna are concerned. But it must be remembered that in any stress situation, cognitive processes play an enormously important role in perceiving the threat as well in coping with it. Arjuna's real problem was not that his personal resources were unequal to the demands of the situation, but his exaggerated and inappropriate sensitivity to an imagined interpersonal situation.

The stress in which Arjuna was involved was in fact derived from cognitive inadequacy. He was unable to distinguish between his own self-appraisal and the demands of the immediate situation. He was emotionally disturbed, and was thus prone to evaluate the object (viz., war, the immediately relevant event) as a life-stress (e.g., loss of the loved ones), and as a personal disaster. His appraisal of the threat (viz., sinfulness of war) induced him to an attempt at withdrawal from the situation as an unrealistic overt behaviour, without however correcting his errant self-appraisal or object-appraisal. Withdrawal from task-performance owing to subjective stress (which was in his case symptomatic of cognitive confusion) would not have been an effective coping mechanism, for it was a task that was assigned to him, and was not self-generated.

Arjuna lacked a cognitive framework in which the self in its ideal appraisal and the task as behaviour requirement could both be accommodated without conflict. This was because the normal sequence of stressors leading to effective adaptive behaviour was reversed in his case. It may be borne in mind that in the *Sāṃkhya-Yoga* context, the fundamental *avidyā* (non-cognition leading to phenomenological

stress) leads to *asmitā* (self-appraisal), *rāga* (object-appraisal), *dvesha* (threat-appraisal) and *abhiniveśa* (coping orientation) in order. It was mentioned that the last phase is non-specific and is preceded by three phases (constituting reality-testing), each of which is specific. The Yoga manuals indicate that the non-specific non-cognition (*avidyā*, phenomenological stressor) expresses itself in terms of three specific stressors leading to the general adaptive urge to survive and finally to effective overt behaviour.¹⁷ In Arjuna's case, the general adaptive urge to survive (*abhiniveśa*) got afflicted (thus blocking effective overt behaviour), because of the overpowering influence of the non-specific non-cognition of reality. The three intervening stages (self-appraisal, object-appraisal and threat-appraisal) were bypassed, thus preventing reality-testing.

Arjuna in his eagerness to justify his withdrawal from the task-situation tries to test reality by reversing the normal sequence of three intervening stages. He first seeks to evaluate threat (viz., the shock of sinfulness involved in war, conceived wrongly as a self-generated task), then the object (viz., war as an unwarranted interpersonal stress, and not as a response to a situational demand) and finally self (viz., as

unrelated to the situation and devoid of role-status). His error thus consists in setting up cognitive processes leading to non-specific non-cognition, from where he started. It was, in other words, a futile coping behaviour. Kṛṣṇa's teaching corrects this error, and in so doing gives primacy to self-appraisal. Hence the need on his part to philosophize. It may also be noted that the task-based stress can be relieved only by effective appraisal processes; otherwise, it affects the performance process.

The main import of *Gītā* is to redefine the major aspects of stress in life-situations: self-appraisal, object-appraisal and threat-appraisal. In this, it adopts the conceptual model provided by the *Yoga-sūtra*. It brings out the importance of the individual's perception of himself in his role-status and of the objective environment, including the tasks as assigned and as accepted. It provides a new framework for the coping behaviour, where the task performance is made independent of the anticipation of outcome.

Anticipation of outcome can be a stressful intervening variable and may vitiate the efficiency of task-behaviour. Its stressor character is intensified in the absence of the three-fold appraisals (of self, of the object and of threat). Kṛṣṇa teaches that non-anticipation does not

necessarily mean withdrawal from task performance; on the other hand, it may induce more effective performance.

The strategy adopted in the *Gītā* thus seeks to focus attention on the reality of stress in life-situations, and on the value of enlightened appraisals of oneself, of the task-based environment and of the threats inherent in it. The text crystallizes the Indian point of view regarding the importance of cognitive processes in minimizing role-conflicts and eliminating tensions between evaluations, anticipation and performance processes.

The other word relevant to the concept of stress is *duhkha*. The exact origin of the Sanskrit word is obscure. The orthodox grammarians insist that the correct form of the word is *dushkha* (*dus+kha*). There is a suggestion that the word is a modification of *Prākṛit* expression *duhstha* (meaning 'illstanding'), the opposite of *Sustha* ('well-standing') which is modified as *sukha*. The unit *kha* in the compound refers to the axle-hole of a chariot or cart; *duhkha* is where the axle-hole is bad and does not allow easy or swift movement of the wheel, while *sukha* is having good axle-hole which facilitates smooth and swift movement. It is interesting to note that

the word *sukha* has always been employed in *Rgveda* in association with the chariot.¹⁸

Whatever the early associations, the expression 'duhkha' in due course came to acquire significance of 'trouble' (*pīḍā*), 'hindrance' (*bandha*), 'suffering' (*ārti*). The earliest of systems, the *Sāṃkhya*, made it the starting point of its inquiry. Buddhism, which was derived from the *Sāṃkhya* focussed its attention on the four-fold aspects of *duhkha*: its nature, causation, elimination and method. All the systems of philosophical thought in India presuppose emergence of *duhkha* from bondage, which in its turn originates from ignorance; the purpose of philosophical thought as well as religious action is the obtainment of wisdom in order ultimately to avoid *duhkha*.

The *Sāṃkhya* system takes *duhkha* to signify the stress that the individual experiences in the course of his interaction with the world around him. The well-known tripartite division of *duhkha* into personal (*ādhyātmika*), situational (*ādhibhautika*) and environmental (*ādhidaivika*) is a contribution of the *Sāṃkhya* thinkers.¹⁹ Personal stress is occasioned by physiological (*śārīra*) and psychological (*mānasa*) stressors: the former illustrated by the imbalances between the three basic constituents, *vāta*, *pitta* and

kapha, resulting in diseases; and the latter illustrated by emotional states like lust, hatred, greed, fear, jealousy, depression and so on.

5

Situational stress is caused by unwholesome interpersonal transactions (conflicts, competition, aggression, exploitation etc.) and exposure to dangers from wild animals. The third kind of stress is occasioned by a composite group of environmental stressors such as natural calamities (extreme cold, sun, storm, lightning etc.) and supernatural agents (possession by spirit, demon, imp, goblin etc.).

Personal stress is so called because it can be handled by 'internal expedients' (*āntaropāya-sādhyatvāt*): physiological stress by internal medicine, and psychological stress by relaxation in agreeable company, fulfillment of desires and so on. The handling of the other two kinds of stress involves external expedients like cultured behaviour, interpersonal adjustment, and safety measures (for situational stresses) and the employment of charms, amulets, spells and drugs.

It is conceded by Gauḍapāda, the commentator on *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, that all stress is mental. But he argues that the nature of the

stressor (viz., the source of stress) determines whether the stress is personal, situational or environmental. Some stresses are purely psychological (*mano-mātra-janya*), while others have non-psychological sources (*amānasa*).²⁰

The liability of the individual to stress is universal and continuous; but the incidence of stress depends upon stretching of the stressor beyond the limits of endurance. The expression in *Sāṃkhya-kārikā* for this state is *abhighāta* ('directed striking'), which is explained by Gauḍapāda as 'unbearable relationship' (*asahya-sambandha*); and by Vāchaspati as 'directed and adverse relationship' (*pratikūlatayā abhisambandha*) with the power of awareness'. The *sāṃkhya* analysis of the *guṇas* has already been indicated; it bears repetition because it is eminently relevant to the experience of subjective stress.

Basic to the *Sāṃkhya* thought as pointed out earlier, is the notion of the three-fold *guṇas* (a word of obscure origin, meaning aspects of existence likened to intertwined strands in rope) which constitute the psychological field of experience: (1) *sattva* (from the root 'as', 'to be', hence meaning 'being' or 'the ideal state of being'), comprehending all cognitive processes which appraise the being (*sarvo bodha*); (2)

rajas (literally meaning 'dust', from the root 'rañj', 'to colour' hence meaning 'passion') comprehending all activity (*sarvā cheshṭā*), signifying change or becoming, and (3) *tamas* (from the root 'tam' 'to distress', 'to cause anxiety', *tamyate anena*, hence gloom) comprehending all inhibition and resistance (*sarva sthitih*), tending towards withdrawal or offset.

The three *guṇas* are in different contexts taken to suggest respectively cognition, conation and retention; pleasure (*sukha*), pain (*duhkha*) and delusion (*moha*); approach (*rāga*), aversion (*dvesha*) and ignorance or indifference (*madhyastha*); ego-sense (*asmitā*), emotions (*rāga-dvesha*) and the urge to survive (*abhiniveśa*); goodness, wickedness and dullness; cheer, anger and gloom; humility, aggression and sloth; and wakefulness, dream and sleep.

The three aspects are universal as well as particular in their connotation; they are essential to the material world as well as to individual life; and they are the ingredients of the individual, of his environment and also of the transaction between the individual and the environment. The original or natural condition of *prakṛti* is the perfect balance or equilibrium of these three aspects; *prakṛti* is, therefore, defined as *guṇa-*

sāmya. But the phenomenal and transactional world illustrates only the disturbance of these aspects (*guṇa-vaishamyā*). There is continuous struggle among these *guṇas* for dominance, and incidental to this struggle are stimulation and reaction, attraction and repulsion, excitation and suppression. When cognitive processes are on the ascendant, both performance and exhaustion are on a low key; when performances are ongoing, cognitive processes and exhaustions are on a low key; and when exhaustion has set in, both cognitive processes and performances are not significant. There is concurrent co-operation and conflict, and hence stress. And incidental to this stress are the pairs of stimulation and reaction, attraction and repulsion, excitation and suppression. When one of the aspects is on the ascendant, the other two recede to the background, but no one aspect can be in ascendance for long. The change thus is continuous and unceasing. Thus stress is inherent in the order of the universe.

The three *guṇas* may be taken to represent respectively perceptions (appraisal, cognitive processes), performances (normal adaptive activities) and resistances (exhaustion, inhibition, fatigue, forgetting). The modern student of stress may be tempted to read the three-fold aspects of

Hans Selye's model of systemic stress here: 'alarm' in *sattva* (perceptions), 'adapation' in *rajas* (performances), and 'exhaustion' in *tamas* (resistances). But the correspondance may not be more than superficial. In the *Sāṃkhya* framework, besides other differences in the conceptual model, stress is not a consequence of the stage of exhaustion (*tamas*), but is a manifestation of the adaptive behaviour (*rajas*). Hence Vāchaspati's emphasis on the differential and sequential changes in *rajas* (*rajaḥ-pariṇāma-bheda*) as major contributions towards stress.

The three *guṇas* together are responsible for the existential, the experiential, the evaluative and the transactional dimensions, each of which may be regarded as an operative motivational source of stress. Human life is itself the consequence of stress, and therefore, all human perceptions and performances are functions of particular stresses, which are all so many expressions of the fundamental stress, viz., *duhkha*. If the general stress (bound up with the existential and experiential dimensions of life) is the ground, the individual stress (evaluative and transactional dimensions) are figures thereupon, and may be looked upon as 'elevated stresses' (*udāra-kleśa*). And if the ground-stress signifies the basic anxiety of life, the figure-stresses are

situational feelings of conflict, inadequacy, helplessness, ignorance and so on.

The situational stresses are the ones that are sought to be avoided or eliminated in normal transactional life, and they are the ones that call for coping behaviour. The Sāṃkhya thought, committed as it is to the ultimate human destiny of complete withdrawal of the phenomenal involvement (called *apavarga*), has focussed attention on the avoidance of the ground-stress (the *duhkha* proper) on the part of the principle of consciousness, viz., the *purusha*. No performance is involved in this stress-avoidance; the coping activity is entirely in terms of cognitive appraisal of the isolate and independent character of the *purusha* (*viveka*). The figure-stresses, however, demand performance. Yoga and Āyurveda, as emergent and practical dimensions of Sāṃkhya, have applied themselves to the avoidance of figure-stresses.

6

Āyurveda, the Indian system of medicine, relies on the Sāṃkhya school for its general theoretical orientation, but builds up an elaborate ideology with regard to what we have called the figure-stresses. In the conceptual model adopted in Āyurveda, the three *guṇas* are represented by

their intra-organismic counterparts, *pitta*, *vāta* and *kapha* (called the *doshas*); and the Sāṃkhyan notion of *Prakṛti* as the perfect equilibrium of the three *guṇas* occurs here as the construct of health or *svāsthya* (a variant form of *su-stha*) as the perfect balance of the three *doshas* (*dosha-sāmya*).²¹

The concept of *dosha* is a focal issue in Āyurveda. Its significance is all important, for it adequately comprehends the concepts of health, the explanations of disease, and the planning of treatment. Unfortunately, it is at present widely misunderstood and misrepresented, for the traditional conceptual model has been lost sight of. The word *dosha*, which generally signifies 'defect' 'fault', 'vice', 'offense', 'harm', or 'morbid element', is derived from the root *dush*, which means 'to alter', 'to corrupt' (*dush vaikṛtye*). When, however, the word is used in a technical sense in Āyurveda to refer to the three intra-individual counterparts of the Sāṃkhyan *guṇas*, it cannot have any of the above meanings. The differential patterning of the three factors is fundamental to the physical constitution, psychological processes, health and disease.

Health (*svāsthya* or *ārogya*) is defined in the Āyurvedic texts as the perfect balance of the

three doshas (*dosha-s āmya*); and disease (*vyādhi*) as the imbalance in the *doshas* (*dosha-vai shamya*): *Dosha* is a neutral concept as far as health and disease are concerned. Its function is not only 'to corrupt' or 'to defile', and thus bring about disease (as the etymological significance of the word would suggest, *dūshyate anena iti*); but it also builds up, and sustains the psychophysical constitution (and hence also called *dhātu*).²¹ In fact, the early employment of the concept was in a positive sense, and it did not have morbid associations.²² The three factors are involved in the normal human constitution and are responsible for all performance. *Dosha* is alike involved in prevention of stress and production of stress.²³

But human life, as envisaged in the Sāṃkhya thought, is itself a departure from the equilibrium of the three *guṇas*; and therefore their counterparts in the individual cannot be expected to be in perfect balance at any time. It is only the soul, unsullied by the psychophysical constitution (called by Charaka *paramātmā*) that is altogether unalterably balanced (*nirvikāra*).²⁴ The transactional individual who is called in Āyurveda by terms such as 'Karma-purusha', 'samyoga-purusha' and 'rāśi-purusha', is characterized by a differential and unstable patterning of these

three factors and is thus naturally liable to distress and disease. Disease (called variously *roga*, *vyādhī*, *āmāya*, *ātāṅka*, *vikāra* etc.) is defined as the association of pain with the transactional individual ('*tad duḥkha-samyogā vyādhayah*' as *Suśruta* has it), while association with pleasure (*sukha*) is called health.²⁵

Pleasure and pain are both experiential concepts, and are consequences of particular patternings of the three intraorganismic factors. The 'balance' of the three occasioning the experience of pleasure for the transactional individual is only balance within the framework of the basic imbalance of the factors (which expresses itself as life). It is natural that such intraorganismic 'balance', poised precariously over the organismic imbalance and transacting delicately with environmental 'imbalances' is frequently tipped. There are factors within the individual and outside him that upset this 'balance'.

Āyurveda also suggests a classification of stressors; it distinguishes four sets of factors that are capable of disturbing the functional 'balance': aggressive attacks like injuries from outside (*āgantū*), physiological disorders or organic changes brought about by the disturbances of the three doshas (*śārīra*), psychological processes

like emotions (*mānasa*), and natural events like hunger, thirst, ageing etc. (*svābhāvika*).²⁶ But a disease is said to be impossible without the disturbance of the *doshas*.²⁷ Thus, whatever the factor that brings about the diseases, the *doshas* are immediately involved in the disease phenomenon.

The expression *dosha* here signifies that the intraorganismic factor has become overpowering or errant; but before it becomes errant, it is a *dhātu*. Because it is liable to turn errant, it may be described as a potential stressor. It is in this sense that the expression *dosha* is employed to refer to the essential factors in health as well as in disease. Health is the situation where no *dosha* has become overpowering; hence they are in a state of functional balance and the load on the organism is practically nil. Disease, on the other hand, signifies the aroused condition of the organism, when one *dosha* or the other, two or all three *doshas*, has/have become errant, thus upsetting the balance and putting functional load on the organism. It is an extra-ordinary situation.

Āyurvedic texts make a normative distinction between healthy or 'wholesome' (*hita*, literally 'well established', 'organized') and unhealthy or 'unwholesome' (*ahita*) styles of life, the former

corresponding to 'happiness' (*sukha*) and the latter to misery (*duhkha*).²⁸ The distinction is derived from the presence or absence of distress (*kleśa*) that demands avoidance or elimination (or in the modern parlance, the defensive or coping behaviour).

Āyurveda prescribes a code of conduct called *svastha-vṛtta*, conducive to the wholesome style of life and also a regimen for the sick called *ātura-vṛtta*. The former is defensive coping (*rakṣaṇa*) involving anticipatory and preventive processes to preserve the condition of functional balance. It enumerates and defines all the potential stressors in the normal interaction between the individual and his environment, and prescribes differential strategies to avoid them. The stressors are here regarded as intra-individual, and the strategies are meant to prevent their becoming critical (viz., productive of actual stress). Suśruta, in fact describes this as "preventive medicine" (*anāgatab ādha-pratishedhanīya-chikitsita*).²⁹

The latter, on the other hand, involves extra effort (*samīhā*) to eliminate the stresses by augmentation of the deficient (*vardhana*), reduction of the excessive (*kṣhapana*) and the pacification of the excited (*praśamana*).³⁰

There is another concept in Āyurveda concerning the involuntary adaptive mechanism

of the body, i.e., *sātmya*.³¹ *Bhaishajya-ratnāvalī* explains: Whatever process is good for oneself is *ātmya*; and whatever abides agreeably with this is *sātmya*.³² The concept relates to adaptability of the body with regard to particular articles of food, tastes, seasons, place of residence, and exposure to sensory stimuli of particular intensities. Even if the articles of food etc. initially evoke unpleasant effects on the physiological constitution, by the regular use of these articles, one gets habituated to them and their effect on body would no longer be harmful; in fact, they may produce pleasant effects.³³ One of the definitions of the Sanskrit word is 'whatever conduces to the happiness of the individual' ('*sukha-janakam*'). I propose to translate the Sanskrit word as "copeability".

But there are physiological limits of tolerance levels in the physiological constitution, beyond which the impact would be unsuitable, unfavourable, or harmful to the body (this situation being called *asātmya*³⁴). Failure of the organismic adaptability to excessive, violent or inadequate sensory impingement (*asātmayendriyārtha-samyoga*) is given as one of the causes of ill-health.³⁵ The sensory objects in such an event function as stressors; they are subjectively felt as stressful stimuli, or stimuli that have a demand-

character beyond the individual's capabilities. It is not necessary that conscious awareness of this imbalance (or cognitive appraisal) should be present. However, there is a variety of habituation known as '*oka-sātmya*' 'abiding adaptability') which correspond to addictions and are characterized by a subjective demand.

The concept of *sātmya* further implies that if the individual is exposed to a wide spectrum of stimuli (e.g. several tastes in the articles of food) and has adapted his body to it, he is better equipped to transact effectively with the environment, resist stress and to live long. This observation suggests that the organism has the inherent ability to assimilate and neutralize the stressors and thus prevent the transformation of even intense stimuli into stressors and avoid the harmful effects of such transformation. It is, then, not exactly a case of preventive coping, but rather prevention of the need for coping behaviour. It is a case of reduction of the dissonance between the force and the resistance opposed to it and is thus a defence mechanism. It eliminates the 'alarm' element from the potential stressors, and thus makes special effort in adaptation unnecessary.

The depth and spread of the insights provided by the ancient thinkers in this country concerning stress and how to handle it is impressive. The

philosophical and religious texts deal with the fundamental problem of life-stress, and suggest strategies to cope with it by essential cognitive reorientations and spiritual practices. But the problem of handling the stresses in everyday life, in the contexts of community, neighbourhood, family, domestic life, occupation, education and so on, has also been considered. Passages in *Rāmāyaṇa* (e.g. Kacchit-sarga), in *Mahābhārata* (the portions of 'Rāja-dharma' and 'Moksha-dharma'), in Bhāgavata, and in several Purāṇas, as also in the *smṛti* manuals, deal with the practical aspects of situational stress. There are also didactic works dealing with *Nīti*, and *subhāshitas* that tell us about the coping techniques that are suited to our culture. There is need to compile these passages and texts, for it would help crystallize the peculiarly Indian outlook on the problem of mental health.

The understanding of the nature of stress is also in evidence when we consider the scheme of four-fold human values (the *purushārthas*) and its involvement in planned life (the *āśrama* scheme); acquisition of the instruments of wholesome life (*artha*, wealth in its general sense) in the early stages of life (*kaumara* or *brahmacharya* involved in studies and training),

fulfillment of bodily, mental and social needs (*kāma*, desires) in youth (*yauvana*, or *gṛhastha*, involved in family and community life), effective withdrawal from active involvement in family and social transactions but equipment for guidance and counselling (*dharma*, wise conduct) in old age (*vārdhakya*, or *vānaprastha*), free from commitments and responsibilities, devoted to the higher callings of life, but available for others in the family or community to offer advice and instruction), and total withdrawal from all aspects of practical life, being devoted wholly to the final goal of all life (*moksha*, liberation from the misery of life) in extreme old age (characterized by the *saṁnyāsa* stage).

It is interesting to note that all the early works on the subject prescribe only the first three stages of planned life (*brahmachāri* as student, *gṛhastha* as householder and *vānaprastha* as a non-participant guide in the family or community), corresponding to the first three values (*artha*, *kāma*, *dharma*) together called *tri-varga*. The renunciant condition (*saṁnyāsa*) was historically a late concept in the social scheme, accommodating the fourth value (*apavarga*, literally 'outside the group of values', or *moksha*). We do not come across *saṁnyāsins* in the *Veda*,

in the Vedānta, in the classical *upanishads*, the *Gītā*, in *Rāmāyaṇa* or *Mahābhārata*. They find mention only in the *purāṇas*, the *smṛti* texts and literary works of comparatively recent date.

The early enduring emphasis in India has always been on family life and on normal social values. An Indian finds his fulfillment only within the family framework. The recognition of the role of family in achieving mental health of the individual or in causing distress to him can be found almost ubiquitously in philosophical, religious, legal and literary works in our country. Family life is itself a coping mechanism for personal stresses; and when the family itself provides stresses, the individual's coping behaviour naturally breaks down. And it cannot be reinforced unless the family stresses are also reduced. Involvement of the family and reeducation of the family in the efforts to treat mental cases are basically Indian concepts.

CHAPTER I REFERENCES

- (1) 'Sukham dukhābhavaś cha purushārthah.'
- (2) 'Śreyaś cha preyaś cha.'
- (3) 'Purusha-prīṭaye vidhīyamānah purushārthah.'
- (4) 'Kṛtārthosmīti vṛttih tat-sāadhanam purushārthah.'
- (5) Jaimini-sūtra, 4, 1, 12.
- (6) 'kāmah kratuh karma-janmetyeshām kramo bhavet'.
- (8) 'puru-sañjñe śarīre śayanāt purushah.'
- (9) 'atha khalu kratu-mayah purushah; yathā-kratur asmin loke purusho bhavati, tathetaḥ pretya bhavati; sa kratum kurvīta' (Chhāndogya-upanishad, 3, 1, 4, 1) cf. also Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishad, 6, 4, 5).
- (10) 'yasmin prītiḥ purushasyā tasya lipsārthalakṣhaṇābibhāktatvāt' (Pūrva-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, 4, 1, 2) ('yasmin padārthakṛtā purushasya prītiḥ svargādilakṣhaṇā upajāyate sā darśa-pūrṇa-māsādiḥ purushārthah').
- (11) *The Quest after Perfection*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1952, p. 23 fn 2.
- (12) 'anteshu remire dhīrāḥ, na te madhyeshu remire.'
- (13) 'na cha akāmyamānam phalam bhavati' (Kumārila).
- (14) 'chikīrshur loka-saṅgraham', (Bhagavad-gītā).
- (15) 'avibhakto hi purushārthah prītyā (Jaimini-sūtra 4, 1, 2).
- (16) 'brahmachārīṇo gurukula-nivāsinaḥ sva-śāstra-vihitāni guru-śuśrūṣhāgnīnadhana-bhaikshacharaṇādini madhumāmsa-divā-svāpābhyañjanādi-varjanam cha.) Praśasta-pāda-bhāṣya).

- (17) 'vidyā-vrata-snātakasya kṛta-dārasya gr̥hasthasya śālina-yāyāvara-vṛttypārjitaiḥ bhūta-manushya-deva-pitr̥brahmākhyānām pañchānām mahā-yajñām sāyam-prātar anusūthānam'.
- (18) 'bhoktā cha dharmaviruddhān bhogān, evam ubhau lokav abhijayati'.
cf also Manu 4, 176.
'parityajed artha-kāmau yau syātām dharma-varjitau'.
- (19) 'dharmārthāvirodhena kāmam seveta; na nis sukham syāt'.
- (20) 'dharmaś chārthaś cha kāmāś cha tritayam jīvite phalam; etat trayam avāptavyam adharma-parivarjanam' (Anusāsana parvam 3, 18-19).
- (21) 'dharmārthau uchyate śreyah kāmārthau dharma eva cha; artha eveha vā śreyah tri-varga iti tu sthitiḥ'. (Manu-samhitā, 2, 224).
- (22) 'jāyamāno vai brāhmaṇaḥ tribhir nṛavā jāyate; brahma-charyeṇa ṛshibhyo, yajñena devebhyah, prajayā pitṛbhyah.'
- (23) 'alaukikārtha-dṛṣṭatvāt apravṛttānām śāstrāt pravartanam, laukikatvād dṛṣṭārthatvāccha pravṛttebhyascha māmsa-bhakṣhñādibhyah śāstrād eva nivāraṇam (dharmaḥ), vidyā-bhūmi-hiraṇya-paśu-dhānya-bhāṇḍopaskara-mitrādīnam ārjanam, ārjitasya vivardhanam (arthah); śrotra-tvak-chakṣur-jithvā-ghrāṇāṇam ātma-samyuktena manasādhishṭhitānām sveshu sveshu vishayeshu ānukūlyataḥ pravṛttih (kāmah), teshām samavāye pūrvah pūrvo garīyān' (Kāma-sūtra, 1, 2, 7-15).
- (24) 'partityajed artha-kāmau dharma-pīḍā-karau nṛpa; dharmam api asukhodarkam loka-vidviṣṭam eva cha'.
- (25) 'brahma-chāriṇo gr̥hasthasya vā grāmād bahih niḥṣṛtya vaneshu vāsah valkalājina-keśa-śmaśru-nakha-roma-dhāraṇam vanyāmbu hutātithi-śesha-bhojanāni vanasthasya vānaprashasya.
dṛṣṭam cha prayojanam anuddisya etāni sādhanāni bhava-prasādam cha prekshya ātma-manasoh samyoga dharmotpattir iti' (Prasasta-pāda, op. cit.)

- (26) 'yāad dharma-moksha-sambandhi tad veda-prabhavam; yat tvartha-sukha-vishayam tal-loka-vyavahāram iti vivektavyam'.
- (27) 'Svargas tu janmāntara eva; sa hi niratiśayā prītiḥ; karmānurūpā' (Ṭup-ṭikā of Kumārila, 6, 1, 1).
- (28) 'dhānañād dharma ity ahuh dharmena vidhṛtāḥ prajāḥ (Mahābhārata, 12, 109, 14).
- (29) 'atra cha dharma-śabdaś' shaḍvidha-smārta-dharma-vishayah, tad yathā varṇa-dharma-āśrma-dharma varṇāśrma-dharma guṇa-dharma-nimitta-dharma sādharmaṇa-dharmaś cheti' (Mitāksharā).
- (30) 'vedo dharma-mūlam, tad vidām cha smṛti-śīle' (Gautama-dharma-sūtra, 1, 1-2).
 'vedākhilo dharma-mūlam smṛti-śīle cha tad-vidām, āchārāś chaiva sādḥunām atmanas-tusṭir eva cha'. (Manu).
 'vedokto paramo dharmah smṛtiśīlāstra-gato parah'.
 'śisṭāchīrṇah parah proktas trayo dharmāḥ sanātānāḥ' (Mahābhārata; Anuśāsana-parva).
- (31) 'tathānyepi dharmajña-samaya-pramāṇam āhuh; samayaś chāpi sādḥunām pramāṇam veda-vad-bhavet' cf. also Hemādri.
 'viditāny api karmāṇi dharma-lopa-bhayād budhaiḥ, samayena nivṛttāni sādḥvāḥvāt kalau yuge'.
 (Chaturvarga-chintāmaṇi).
- (32) 'deśa-jāti-kula-dharmān śruty abhavād abravīn manuh' (Vāśishṭha-dharma-sūtra).
- (33) 'tasmin kula-kramāyātam āchāram tv āchared budhah, sa garīyān mahā-bāho sarva-śāstroditād api
- (34) 'Kevalam dharmam āśritya na kartavyo vinirṇayah, yukti-hīna-vichāre tu dharma-hāniḥ prajāyate.'
- (35) 'ātmanas tusṭir eva cha' (Manu-samhitā, 2, 6).
- (36) 'na tat parasya sandadhyāt pratikūlam yad ātmanah, esha samkshepatā dharmah kāmād anyah pravartate'. (Mahābhārata, Anu-śāsana-parvan, 113, 8, 9.)

cf also :

'yad anyair vihitam nechchedātmanah karma purushah, na tat pareshu kurvīta jānan napriyam ātmanah sarvam (idid, Śānti-parvan, 260, 20-25).

'śrūyatām dharma-sarvasvam śrutvā chaivāvadhāryatām ātmanah pratikūlāni pareshām na samācharet.'

(Devala quoted in Kṛtya-ratnākara, p.17)

cf also:

'yathaivātmā paras tatvad drashtavyas sukham ichchatā sukha-dukhāni tulyāni yathātmani tathā pare' (Daksha-smṛti).

- (37) 'ashimsā satyam asteyam śaucham indriya-nigrahaḥ, etam sāmāsikam dharmam chāturvarṇye bravīn-manuḥ'.
(Manu-saṃhitā, 10, 63).
- (38) Mahābhārata, Śānti-parvan, 60, 7-8.
- (39) 'ahimsā satyam asteyam dānam kṣāntir damah śamah, akārpaṇyam cha saucham cha tapaś cha rajanī-chara', daśāṅgo rākshasa-śreṣṭha dharmosau sārva-varṇikah.'
- (40) 'dayā samasta-bhūteshu titikṣhā nābhīmānitā, satyam śaucham anāyāso mangalam priya-vādītā; maitrī chair asprhā tadvadakārpaṇyam dvijottamāḥ, anasūyā cha sāmānya varṇānām kathitā guṇāḥ.'
- (41) 'vardhanty adharmaṇa naraḥ tato bhadrāṇi paśyati, tataḥ sapatnān jayati samūlas tu viṇaśyati
(Mahābhārata, 6, 65, 18).
- (42) 'dharma-śabdaś cha vedārtha-parah (Bṛhatī).
- (43) 'tasmād dharma ity eva śāstra-vishayo na vedārtha iti'
(Śāstra-dīpikā, 2, 1, 1).
- (44) 'jijñāsyah samśayād dharmah śreyaskaratayā pi cha, asamdigdho hy ajijñāsyō yo va syān nishprayanah (Śloka-vārtika).
- (45) 'Śreyo hi puruṣa-prītiḥ sa dravya-guṇa-karmabhiḥ, chodanā-lakṣhanaiḥ sādhyā tasmāt teshveva dhārmatā.
(ibid) cf also Śabara-bhāṣya 6, 1, 2, 'prītyartham hi puruṣo yatate'.

‘Śādhya-sādhna-sambandhāh sarvadā bhāvanāśrayah, tena tasya na siddhis syād bhāvanā-pratyayād rte. (Śloka-vārtika).

- (46) ‘bhavya-bhāvana-samartho hi vyāpāro bhāvanā.’
‘prayojaka-kriyām āhur bhāvanām bhāvanā-vādinah’.
(Umbeka).
- (47) This is the position of Kumārila. Prabhākara on the other hand, sees only the sense of duty involved here: the person who is called upon by the Vedic injunction to undertake a rite (niyojya), the sphere of action that is indicated (vishaya), actual action that follows (karma) are important considerations. The Vedic injunctions are categorical imperatives and the person who is addressed by them carries them out with no motive other than the sense of duty. The knowledge that is involved here is that of the bility of the injunctions to be translated into action (kṛti-sādhyaiva). Here the sense of duty is the sole motivation (‘kāryatā-jñānam pravartakam’.)
- (48) ‘yāgādir eva dharmah’ (Śābara-svāmin).
‘śreyaskara eva dharmah’.
- (49) ‘Svargakāmo jyotishṭomena yajeta’; ārogya-kāmah bhaishajya-pānam kuryāt.’
- (50) ‘ishṭa-sāadhanatā-jñānam pravartakam’.
- (51) ‘yāgādeva phalam taddhi śakti-dvāreṇa siddhyati, sūkshma-śaktyātmakam vā tat-phalam evopajāyate’, (Tantra-vārtika 367, 22).
- (52) ‘The expression pratyavāya is defined by Ānanda-giri as :
‘āgāmi-duhkham pratyavāya uchyate’.
- (53) ‘kāmyānām sva-phatārtham cha dosha-ghātārtahm eva cha, (Jābālā).
‘yat kiñchit phalam uddiśya yajña-dāna-japādikam, kriyate kāyikam, yach cha tat-kāmyam praikirtitam’.
- (54) ‘na hi vidhi-śātenāpi tathā pravartate yathā lobhena’.
- (55) ‘prayojanam anuddiśya na mandopi pravartate’.

- (56) 'sarvasyaiva hi śāstrasya karmano vāpi kasyachit,
yāvat prayojanam noktam tāvat tat kena grhyate'.
(Śloka-vārtika, pratijñā-sūtra, 12).
- (57) 'prāyeṇaiva hi mīmāṃsā like lokāyatī-kṛta
tam āstika-pathe netum ayam yatnah kṛto mayā
(Śloka-vārtika, 1, 10).
(Nyāya-ratnākara of Pārthasārathi-miśra explains this
passege thus : 'nitya-karmanām nāstik bahv asiddhānta
parigraheṇa mīmāṃsā bhāṭṭr-mitrādibhih lokayati-kṛtā).'
Kumārila is even more emphatic in another verse in Tantra-
vārtika:
'lokāyatika-mūrkhṇām, naivānyat karma vidyate, yāvat
kiñchid adṛṣṭārtham tad dṛṣṭārtham hi kurvate'.
- (58) cf. M. Hiriyanna: The Quest after Peerfection, Mysore,
1952, p. 25.
- (59) 'mokshārthī na pravarteta kāmya-nishiddayah, nitya-
naimittike kuryāt pratyavāya-jihāsaya, (Śloka-vārtika, 108,
111).
cf. also Brhat-ṭikā.
'nitya-naimittikair eva kurvāṇo-durita-kshayam, jñānam
cha vimalikurvan abhyāseṇa cha pāchayan, vairāgyāt pakva-
vijñānah kaivalyam bhajate narah'.
- (60) 'yathā sandṛśyeta tathā' : 'na hi kadāchid anīdṛsam jagat'.
- (61) 'ekasya prītiḥ svarga-śabda-vāchyā'-svargas tu janmāntara
eva; sā hi niratiśaya-prītiḥ; karmānurūpā na śakyā iha
janmany anubhavitum; yatosmin loke kshaṇe kshaṇe sukha-
duhkhe anubhavanti'.
- (62) 'sukhopabhoga-rūpaś cha yaḍi mokshah Prakalpyate,
svarga eva bhavedesha paryāyena, kshayi cha sāsā'
(Śloka-vārtika, Sambandhākshepa-parihāra, 105).
- (63) 'athāto dharmān vyākhyāsyāmah' (1, 1).
- (64) 'yatobhyudaya-nihśreyasa-siddhi sa dharmah' (1, 2).
- (65) 'tad-vachanād āmnāyasya prāmāṇyam' (1, 3).
- (66) 'sukhāt rāgah' (Vaiśeshika-sūtra, 6, 10).

- (67) 'ichchādvēsha-pūrvika dharmādharmā-pravṛttih'. (ibid, 6, 14).
- (68) 'tat-samyogah vibhāgah' (ibid, 6, 15).
- (69) 'athāto dramam vyākhyāsyāmah' (ibid 1, 1).
- (70) 'jijñāsyān samśayād dharmah śreyaskaratayāpi cha.'
- (71) śreyo hi puruṣha-prītiḥ sā dravya-guna-karmabhiḥ, chodanā-lakṣhanais sādhyā tasmāt teshv eva dharmatā (Śloka-vārtika).

CH. II

REFERENCES

- (1) ábheda-graḥaṇa-purassaram abheda-jñānam bhinneshu jātyabhyupagame śaraṇam (Prakaraṇa-pañchikā)
- (2) jātir āśrayato bhinnā pratyaksha-jñāna-gocharā (Kārikā) : cf also Kumārila 'tatraika-buddhi-nirgrāhyā jātir indriya-gocharā'.
- (3) Śābara-bhāṣya, 10, 4, 23, 'sūkta-bhājaś cha devatāh'.
- (4) Sāyaṇa on Aitareya-brāhmaṇa, 1, 2. "yajati-dhātor ishti-śabdah sarvatraprasiddhah; atra tu ichhati-dhātor iti viśeshah."
- (5) cf Aitereya-brāhmaṇa, 1, 5.
- (6) Śloka-vārtika, 'ākṛti', 52-62 and 'vana-vāda' 75-76.
- (7) ibid., 'vana-vāda', 29, ābrāhmaṇatvādi yonitah', cf. also Śloka-Vārtika, Pratyaksha-Sūtra, 149-50.
'abhedāt samavāyostu svarūpam dharma-dharminoh'.
- (8) Gotama-Nyāya-Sūtra, 2, 2, 64 'samāna-prasavātmikā jātiḥ'.
- (9) Nyāya-sūtra, 2, 2, 68 'ākṛtiḥ jāti-liṅgākhyā'.
- (10) Śakti is defined as 'Kāraṇa-nishṭhah kāryotpādan-yogyodharma-viśeshah'.
- (11) 'jātyākṛti-viśiṣṭa vyaktau śaktiḥ'. cf. also Patanjali : 'akṛtāv eva śaktiḥ'.
- (12) Navya-nyāya : 'vyaktau eva śaktiḥ, na tu gotvādi-jātau'.
- (13) 'śakti-sambandhena jāti-padatvāt'.
- (14) 'viśiṣṭa-gocharā śaktiḥ, kim tu jāti-nishṭhatayā sa śaktiḥ jñātā ityupayujyate; vyaktau sa svarūpā sati; samāna-yitti-vedyatayā cha vyakter api bhānam; vyakter anvaya-prakāratayā bhānam'.
- (15) 'vyāpāra-mātre śaktiḥ' ('phalāvachchhinna-vyāpāre' according to Navya-nyāya).
- (17) 'phala eva śaktiḥ'.

CH 11

REFERENCES

1. *Bhāgavata-purāṇa*, 10.70
2. *Śāntiparvan'*, 53, 2-3
3. *Bhagavadgītā*, 1.20
4. *Ibid.*, 1.28-31
5. *Ibid.*, 2.7
6. *Ibid.*, 2.17f
7. *Ibid.*, 2.32
8. *Ibid.*, 2.34
9. For a description of this state cf. Irving Bieber: "Pathological Boredom and Inertia", *American Journal of Psychotherapy*, 1951, 5, 215-225
10. *Bhagavadgītā*, 2.31
11. *Ibid.*, 2.55-71
12. *Ibid.*, Chap. 11
13. *Ibid.*, 11.49
14. *Ibid.*, 18.63
15. *Ibid.*, 18.73
16. Cf. Maṇḍana's *Vidhiviveka* with Vāchaspati's *Nyāyakaṇikā* on it, pp. 243 of
17. *Bhagavadgītā*, 18-63
18. *Ibid.*, 18.49

CH V

REFERENCES

1. *Yoga-Sūtra*, 2, 1-3
2. BHOJA'S RĀJAMĀRTANDA, 22
3. Te cha bādhānā-lakshāṇam paritāpam upajanyanah kleśa-pada-vāchyā bhavanti
4. Te syanda-mānā guṇādhikāram draḍhayanti; parināmam avasthāpayanti; kārya-kāraṇa-srota unnamayanti; parasparānugraha-trantribhūtvā karmavipākam cha abhinirharanti.
5. guṇānānām vaishamya-rupam pariṇāmam cha abhinirharanti.
6. karmabhih kleśah, kleśaiś cha karmāni.
7. *Yoga-Sūtra*, 2,3 and 4.
8. dṛk-darśana śaktyor ekātmāta (*ibid*, 12;67.)
9. Sukhanuśayī rāgah (2,7)
10. Vyāsa-bhāṣhya, 2,7: sukhābhijñāsya sukhānusmṛti-pūrvah sukhe tat-sādhane va gardhah.
11. Levi, L. (ed): *Emotions: Their parameters and Measurement*, New York (1975).
12. avaśyam kartavyam ityādi-rūpo- 'dhyavaśāyah'.
13. dṛḍha-saṁkalpa.
14. Mano-niveśa.
15. *Vyāsa-bhāṣhya*: sarvasya prāṇinah iyān ātmanāsihi nityā bhavati 'mā na bhūyāsam'.
16. *Yoga-sūtra*, 2,9.
17. *Ibid*, 2,2.

18. *Vyāsa-bhāṣhya* 2,4 Sarvā eva amī kleśāḥ avidyābhedāḥ; 8, 58, 3 (sukhaṁ sushadāṁ); 5, 30, 1 (sukharatham iyamāṇam harihyām); 5, 60, 2 (sukheshu rudra maruto ratheshu); 5,5,3 also *Atharva-veda*, 5, 14, 5 (13) (sukho rathā iva vartatām).
19. *Gauḍapāda-bhāṣhya on Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, 1;
21. *Ibid.* yadyapi sarvaṁ eva duḥkhaṁ mānasam eva, tathāpi mano-mātra-janyatvājanyatvām mānasatvāmanasatva-vibhāgaḥ.
22. śarīra-dūṣaṇād doṣhā dhātavo deha-dhāraṇāt. cf. *Charakasamhitā*, 4,4,34 where the correspondance between guṇas and doṣhas is brought out.
23. *Charaka-samhitā*, 1,1,57 vāyuh pittaṁ kaphaścheti śārīro doshasaṁgrahaḥ; cf. also vāgbhata's *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, 1,6 vāyuh pittaṁ kaphaś cheti trayo doṣhās samāsataḥ; vikṛtā-vikṛtā dehaṁ ghnanti te vartayanti cha.
24. *Aṣṭāṅga-hṛdaya*, 1,20 rogastu doṣha-vishamyam doṣha-sāmyam arogatā; cf. *Charaka-samhitā*, 1,9,4 vikāro dhātu-vaishamyam prakṛtir uchyate; cf. also *ibid* 4,4,34, tatra trayah śarīra-doshā vata-pitta-sleshmāṇah; te śarīram dūṣayanti.
25. *Charaka-samhitā*, 1,1,56 nirvikārah paras tv ātmā.
26. *Ibid.*, 1,9,4 sukha-saṁjñakam ārogyam vikāro duḥkhaṁ eva tu.
27. *Sārṅgadhara-samhitā* 1,1,5. The order given here is 'śvābhāvika-kāyikāntara'. Āḍhamalla's commentary explains: (1) the natural stressors (*svābhāvika*) are inherent in one's nature, like hunger, thirst, aging and death; (2) the accidental or adventitious stressors (*āgantukā*) are due to external factors like injury caused by wild animals; (3) bodily or physiological stressors (*kāyikā*) caused by wrong food, drinks etc., like cough, cold, fever etc., involving the disturbance of the three doṣhas and of blood; and (4) internal or psychological stressors (*āntarā*) dervied from

- emotions like lust and anger and involving intoxication, insensibility, insanity, possessions etc.
28. *Ashṭāṅga-saṁgraha*, 1,22, na dosha-vyatirekeṇa rogānubandhah.
 29. *Charaka-saṁhitā*, 1,1,41 hitāhitam sukham dukkham āyuh.
 30. *Suśruta-saṁhitā*, 1,1,41 hitāhitam sukham dukkham āyuh.
 31. *Rasa-vaiśeshika-sūtra*, 4,67 Nṛsimha's comm. Svastha-vṛttam hi nāma labdhasya phalāya anapāyitvena rakṣaṇam; āturavṛttam hi nāma alabdhasya ārogyākhyasya phalasya lābhāya samīhā. cf. also *ibid.*, 4,68.
 32. cf. *Suśruta-saṁhitā* (Sūtra.sth.), 20,9 and 35,40; *Charaka-saṁhitā*, 3,20.
 33. Ātmano hitam karma ātmyam; ātmyena saha vartate iti sātmyam.
 34. *Suśruta-saṁhitā* (Sūtra-sth.), 35, 41: yo rasah kalpate yasya sukhāyaiva nishevate....tat sātmyam iti nirdiśet.
 35. *Charaka-Saṁhitā* (Śārīra-sth.), 1,127, asātmyam iti tad vidyād yan na yāti sahātmātām.
 36. *Ibid.* (Śārīra-sth.), 1,98, asātmyārthāgamāś chetijñātavyā dukkha-hetavah. cf. also sūtra, 11, 43. asātmyendriyārtha samyogah prajñāparādhah, pariṇāmāś cha trayas trīvidhakalpā hetava vikārāṇām.

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
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I cannot possibly forget to add that, in recent years, there has been an eloquent call in India to resuscitate the spirit of Dharma in all our spheres of work, including politics and industry, a call which has unfortunately gone unheeded. I refer to the life-work of Mahatma Gandhi, who sought to live his life and work at the national level guided solely by Indian values. Dharma, according to him, was what "is enjoined by the holy books, followed by the sages, interpreted by the learned, and which appeals to the heart" (Harijan 1946, 10, 41, p. 401). He emphasized: "Do not mix up religion and ethics. I believe that fundamental ethics is common to all religions. Teaching of such ethics is undoubtedly a function of the state" (ibid, 1947, 11, 8 p. 76) and this fundamental ethics was for him the conscience "which reveals itself daily to every human being, but we shut our ears to the 'still small voice' " (Young India, 25, 5, 21, p. 162).



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