

ŚAMKARA

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO



KAVYALAYA : PUBLISHERS : MYSORE

PRICE RS. 5.00

ŚAMKARA

PRICE RS. 5.00

ŚAMKARA

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

BY

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

Reader in Psychology

All India Institute of Mental Health, Bangalore



MYSORE

KAVYALAYA: PUBLISHERS

1960

*Geetha Book House
Mysore-570001.*

First published 1960

This Book is Copyright. It may not be reproduced either whole or in part by any person without permission in writing from the Publishers.



PUBLISHED BY K. CHIDAMBARAM AT KAVYALAYA, MYSORE

PRINTED BY K. A. KORULA AT THE WESLEY PRESS, MYSORE

TO MY WIFE

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	ix
I. THE IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINT	1
II. SENSATION: ITS MECHANISM AND FUNCTION	9
III. MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS	20
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF	35
V. STATES OF THE SELF	52
VI. THE MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEM	67

CHAPTER IV

INTRODUCTION

Śaṅkara (or Śaṅkarācārya as he is known to Indians) is the brightest star in the firmament of India's intellect. The dazzling brilliance of his mind has survived the passage of centuries; its influence has been both wide-spread and profound. The fact that he, a mere human monk, was soon deified and considered by a large section of Indian population as an incarnation of the god Śiva himself is ample illustration of his hold on the nation's imagination. The impact of his personality was felt all over the country; his erudition and intellectual eminence were recognised even during his life-time (which incidentally was very brief); his intuition and genius have since won him an abiding celebrity. As a philosopher, as a thinker, as a scholar, as a writer, and as a poet, his greatness was titanic; as an orator, as a debater, and as an organiser, his eminence was of no mean order. He indeed belonged to a race of men that occur rarely and when they do, hold the world in wonder.

There is conflicting evidence concerning the date of Śaṅkara. While there is an orthodox opinion which places him in a very distant past, long before the birth of Christ, there are scholars ready to assign him to the tenth century after Christ. But there are several historical facts which facilitate an approximate fixing of his date and time: his contemporaneity, for instance, with Kumārila and Dharmakīrti (whose dates are nearly definitely fixed), his visit to Nepal during the reign of King Vṛṣadeva, his mention in his works of the Kerala King Bālavarmān, his meeting with another illustrious philosopher, Gauḍapāda; his having been a teacher of Maṇḍana-miśra, who was also a student with the poet Bhavabhūti and the philosopher Prabhākara under Kumārila. After a close examination of all these evidences, modern scholarship has assigned 655-687 A.D. as dates marking the beginning and close of Śaṅkara's life. The influence that stemmed out of this exceedingly brief span

of thirty-two years of his earthly existence is incredibly immense.

Born in an interior village in Kerala (southernmost province of India) as the only son of a poor Brahmin couple he soon acquired proficiency in Vedic lore. He distinguished himself as a child prodigy and at eight he was conversant with metaphysical doctrines! Even during boyhood he took to the life of a wandering mendicant, moved out of his home and settled down for a while as a student under Govindapāda on the banks of Narmadā (in the present Andhra province). His inquiring turn of mind prompted a critical study of the Vedāntic literature as it then prevailed, and a serious consideration of the conflicting ideologies current in the country at that time. The Vedic religion had deteriorated into a medley of superstitious dogmas and meaningless rituals; the high ideals of the ancestral sages were crumbling into shreds; the Jaina and Buddhist protestants were aiming vital blows into the body of orthodoxy, which was already diseased with its own corruptions; in the absence of a healthy religious atmosphere, pernicious primitive cults with horrid and shameful rites were springing up with renewed vigour; the people at large were confused and were being duped and misguided into errors and regrets. It was indeed a terrible situation, and the times called for a saviour. And Śamkara undertook to answer the call. He expounded the true standpoint of the ancestral religion, and determined to propagate it. He travelled all over the country, lecturing and discussing, repudiating and persuading, writing and teaching.

Born as he was in a southern corner of India he established his supremacy even in Kashmir and drew near him devoted and brilliant pupils from all over the land. He strode across the stage like a giant and left behind him an immortal trail of glory. His end is shrouded in legendary mystery.

The important literary productions of Śamkara are in the nature of commentaries on Vedāntic scriptures: on the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa, on the ten principal *Upaniṣads* and on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Of these, the first is the most

magnificent work, a bulky treatise exhibiting erudition, profundity and consummate skill in exposition. This work stimulated an excellent commentary on itself, *Bhāmātī*, by Vācaspati-miśra (c. 840 A.D.) which in turn was commented upon by Amalānanda (c. 1247 A.D.) in his *Kalpataru*, which again was exquisitely annotated by Appaya Dīkṣita (c. 1600) in his *Parimalā*. This grand work of Śaṅkara established a rich tradition of philosophical thought. Besides the commentaries, numerous independent treatises in poetic style of which *Viveka-cūḍāmaṇi* and *Upadeśasāhasrī* are justly famous, are ascribed to Śaṅkara.

Śaṅkara had the good fortune of being the teacher of several brilliant students: Maṇḍana, the author of a *Vārttika* on Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, and of the excellent tract, *Brahmasiddhi*; Sureśvara, the author of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*; Padmapāda, the great author of *Pañcapādikā* were junior contemporaries of Śaṅkara. He also inspired a long succession of excellent minds: Vācaspati-miśra wrote *Bhāmātī* as a commentary on Śaṅkara's *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, and *Tattvasamīkṣā* as a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*. Sureśvara's pupil, Sarvajñātman (c. 850 A.D.), in his lucid treatise *Samkṣepaśārīraṇa*, explained the essential philosophical standpoint of Śaṅkara, and formulated the problems involved in it. Ānandabodha (c. eleventh century), Śrīharṣa (c. twelfth century), Citsukha (c. 1220), Ānandajñāna (thirteenth century), the anonymous author of *Prakāṣārthavivarāṇa* (c. 1200), Vimuktātman (c. 1200), Vidyāranya (about 1350), Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī (1500), and Appayadīkṣita (about 1550) are important names in the history of the Śaṅkara school of thought: they helped Śaṅkara's ideas to expand and deepen, and also corrected, added and amended the original doctrines.

The particular view-point which Śaṅkara upheld is a highly subtle and intricate metaphysical doctrine styled as *Advaita-vāda* or Non-dualism. It affirms the one Real without a second, and rejects the phenomenal world as but an illusory distortion, which is explained by the theory of 'projection' (*māyā*). While expounding this theory Śaṅkara

discusses at great length the psychological processes at work in both perception and projection.

An attempt has here been made to construct the psychological standpoint of *Advaita-vāda* as contained principally in the works of Śaṁkara. The standpoint has of course been enriched enormously by the later writers belonging to this school, but for purposes of this monograph attention is confined to Śaṁkara's own writings. I have elsewhere endeavoured to delineate the interesting but intricate speculations of the post-Śaṁkara advaitins concerning the problems of self, of consciousness, of perceptual processes and errors.

The substance of this monograph was submitted over ten years ago to the University of Mysore as a thesis for which the degree of Master of Arts was awarded. Since then from time to time I have recast the writing, and the present publication is vastly different from the thesis as it was submitted: I have excluded all metaphysical matter, and have avoided the temptation to cite Western parallels and modern equivalents of many of Śaṁkara's conceptions.

I must acknowledge the inspiration I received from the celebrated and saintly scholar of this country, Professor M. Hiriyanna; the encouragement I received from my teacher, Professor B. Kuppaswami; the interested attention which was accorded my work by my erstwhile chief, Dr M. V. Govindaswamy; and the promptness with which my friend, Mr K. Chidambaram, took up this work for publication.

S.K.R.

I. THE IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

Evolution

Reality has two aspects: existence, the precise nature of which eludes our comprehension; and its phenomenal appearance which forms the locus and data of our experience. Philosophical doctrines apart, this division implies that the universe as is presented to us does not comprehend the whole reality. The universe is vast, infinitely vaster than our imaginations can construct or our reasoning apprehend; but reality is vaster still, for it includes everything that *is* and suffers nothing beyond.

The Indian argument known as *vivarta-vāda*, which is peculiar to the *Advaitic* system of thought, holds that the 'real' did not produce the phenomena, but was itself transformed into the latter:¹ the transformation was not sudden, but gradual; not helter-skelter, but orderly. This position signifies that (1) the phenomenal processes develop spontaneously and do not depend upon an extraneous force either for their sustenance or progression;² (2) the phenomena all agree in their essential identity, the apparent diversity being due to modes of progression by differentiation; and (3) the phenomenal development is not blind or mechanical. The world, in other words, is not a chance creation; it subserves some purpose. This is suggested by the fact that changes in the world are found to assume the form of ascent (*āroha*), progression, evolution, or a continuous, consistent movement to higher and higher forms.³ The world on the surface is not uniform; there is diversity, there is change; but it is not chaotic, there always obtains an order. A pattern runs through diversity and changes obey certain recognisable laws.

Śaṅkara recognises that evolution started from non-life and passed on to life; as an explanation he suggests that the 'Self' seeks increasingly wider expressions and moves from more limited to less limited possibilities. The substance that was a mere lump of matter tends to become endowed with

life: alive, alert and active. At some stage of evolution this passage was accomplished but involved no break in the evolutionary chain. Non-life and life are not two different orders of existence; they are but two stages in the long evolutionary procession. It was non-life in fact that became life in order to achieve superior possibilities; it became more complicated and more specialised so as 'to conquer higher and higher worlds'. Life is no special creation, it is as much an evolute as non-life is. 'We must assume', writes Śamkara, 'that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop: by means of names and forms . . . for we have no reason to make assumptions contrary to what is actually observed at present'.⁴ The world started from obscure beginnings and has gradually been evolving and expanding; in such a process, life and non-life are two major patterns that have come to stay. The former is what we call the animate kingdom (*jaṅgama*) which comprehends innumerable species of living creatures, and the latter is the inanimate world (*sthāvara*), consisting of countless things and objects.

Both kingdoms are alike constituted by elements and their compounds. The entire universe is represented as falling into three compact categories: elements which are the ultimate constituent units of all matter; compounds which we see around us in the form of 'bodies'; and sense organs that 'shine'.⁵ Elements are styled as causes (*kāraṇa*), bodies as effects (*kārya*) and senseorgans as instruments (*kaṛaṇa*). Of elements, two classes are recognised: subtle and gross. There are five subtle elements and the order of their emergence is as follows: from the Absolute-in-unmanifest-state proceeded ether (*ākāśa*), from it air (*vāyu*) and thence fire (*tejas*), from it water (*āp*) and finally earth (*prthivī*). Each is characterised by a distinctive quality: sound, energy, heat-light, taste and smell, in order. These qualities constitute the entire stuff of the elements and hence the term, *tanmātra* ('that only'), has come into currency. These subtle elements intermix in various proportions and bring about the 'gross' elements by a process known as *pañcīkaraṇa*.⁶ The attributes

of the five gross-elements are: *ākāśa*—sound; *vāyu*—sound and energy; *tejas*—sound, energy and heat-light; *āp*—sound, energy, heat-light and taste; and *prthivī*—sound, energy, heat-light, taste and smell. These combine and form compounds in our everyday life; the difference between compounds is due to the variance in the proportions of the five elements. These compounds interact and produce the *body* in the course of evolutionary development. And with body as basis, the senseorgans (*indriyasthānas*) emerge.

What is the nature of evolution? How does evolution proceed? Śaṅkara postulates progress by differentiation: he speaks of the unmanifest Absolute as the greatest and most common universal and all phenomena as systems of universal-differentiations (*sāmānya-viśeṣas*). The Absolute is the ground of all this phenomena; it is a differentiation (*viśeṣa*) of nothing. It is the highest and most general genus (*sarvasāmānya*); all other differentiations spring from it. Each differentiation, however, serves as a *sāmānya* for further differentiations. 'The *sāmānya* supports the *viśeṣas* by endowing on them its own nature'.⁷ In fact, Śaṅkara speaks of the *sāmānya* as the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the differentiation which is an effect (*kārya*); it is also an accepted tenet of his theory that the effect is essentially of the same nature as the cause. *Sāmānya* is the basic nature (*svarūpa*) while differentiations are but modifications (*vikriyās*)⁸ thereof. Vācaspati-miśra, the great commentator on Śaṅkara, speaks of the supporter-supported (*ādhāra-ādheya*) relationship between them.⁹ Śaṅkara also illustrates the point that we observe in the world, the *viśeṣas* springing from the *sāmānya*, as for instance, pot from mud. From the general the particulars are bred, and from each particular further particulars are obtained, even as from the main stem of the tree spring forth the major shoots, from each of which, shootlets issue. The universe is therefore a long and continuous series of differentiations. However, the serial differentiation (*pāram-parya-gati*) is always progressive, not regressive: evolution therefore involves an increase in the number of species of beings.

But multitudinous differentiations do not affect the fundamental unity of the universe; modifications do not alter the essential nature. On the surface the universe appears to be torn into innumerable categories, but deep below we find one stream running through them all. The principle underlying evolution continues unimpaired through all the variety of evolutes; the basic pattern is not obscured in the network of manifold species, types and kinds; at all levels of evolution, the same principle operates. Evolution is continuous and continuously progressive also because new and specialised forms are assumed without forsaking the basic principle.¹⁰ The different species and individuals are 'knit' (*anusyūta*)¹¹ in it to form an unbroken series: unity amidst the diversity.

How is continuity in this evolving universe maintained? Śamkara explicitly denies any extraneous control: the universe proceeds by its own activity and is 'held together by the stream of work and impressions of innumerable beings in combination'.¹² The universe is a series of actions and results and it is this chain of work-result-impression that maintains continuity in evolution. In other words, activity in the universe is a positive and basic fact; by virtue of this activity, every creature continually *becomes* another and thus evolution proceeds. 'The self (as agent of action previously) becomes that which is affected by action at the same time, owing to modification. The self although in full existence previous to action, modifies itself into something special (i.e., self of the effect)'.¹³ Every action leaves its impression by modifying the organism to an extent. The organism after the action is not identical with the organism before: action will continuously transform the organism despite the thread of identity running through it. Activity at no time ceases during the life-course of an organism and hence continuity in the consequent modifications. How are the modifications effected and retained? Śamkara suggests as an explanation the rôle of impressions (*vāsanā*). The organism engages itself in an act and achieves an appropriate result, whether or not intended. This involves an experience and so the

internal psychic instrument is involved; the experience expresses itself as a function of this instrument. At the end of this experience, the function will settle down in an abbreviated form as an impression. Every action is accompanied by a result and every result by virtue of modifying the internal organ is conserved as an impression. These impressions, says Śaṅkara, 'take part in initiating fresh actions as well as in bringing past action to fruition'.¹⁴

Organism

'Matter', says Śaṅkara, 'is the essence of all living creatures';¹⁵ and the organism is 'a material aggregate endowed with life'. The Sanskrit word for life is *prāṇa*: *pra* means 'motion' and *ana* is 'that which pervades activity of all kind'.¹⁶ That is to say, an organism moves and acts: locomotion and action are the chief marks of life. Śaṅkara elsewhere¹⁷ speaks of awareness (*caitanya*) as the essential attribute of life, suggesting that an organism at whatever stages of evolution, is aware of itself in relation to the surrounding world. And this awareness is never found to lapse during the life-course of an organism. Life is also the earliest of bodily functions, for it attains maturity the moment it appears, at the conceptional stage of the organism while all other functions have a history before they mature and inevitably await the maturity of the respective organs.¹⁸ It is not the activity of any one organ, but the total function of the body. Śaṅkara admits that 'it does not transcend the body'.¹⁹ The vital current abides in the body filling every particle thereof, and cannot exist independently of the body.

Life is said to possess two powers: of knowledge and of action.²⁰ An organism *knows*, or is aware of, the surrounding facts and also *acts* to establish adequate contact with them; the organism, in other words, knows and keeps its place in the world. It is with this twofold purpose in view that sensory and other organs and functions are employed as tools and agents. Life thus is the prime vital force in the

body keeping every tissue alive, regulating and directing the inner mechanism and allowing various functions to take place both inside and outside the body.²¹ Our different organs owe their capacity to perform their respective tasks to this fundamental function; with *prāṇa* intact, we know the outer world and behave in an appropriate manner.

This prime vital current, *prāṇa*, in the body is manifested in five different aspects. The first and the most elementary aspect is the simple function of 'forward movement' or respiration: 'it is the energy which directly controls the process of inhaling and exhaling'.²² The second function is termed *apāna* or 'backward movement'; and is described as the energy responsible for clearing the body of waste materials like excreta and urine. The third is *vyāna*, which is supposed to mediate between the above two functions: 'It circulates energy throughout the entire nervous system'.²³ And this plays an important rôle in acts where physical prowess and strength are employed. Fourthly, *udāna* or 'ascending function' is the principle of wearing out or death: it is ultimately responsible for the passing out of life from the body. And finally, *samāna* is the energy active in assimilation and digestion; it is also responsible for the distribution of digested food (food-juices) 'equally' throughout the body. Śaṅkara speaks of it as the agent in reducing all food and drink to an 'equilibrium', and also as linked with 'the internal psychic organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*).²⁴ These five represent different offices of the same prime vital force (*mukhya-prāṇa*), and embody the basic operations that help the bodily preservation and growth.

During sleep, the senseorgans and mind which are the chief instruments of transaction with the outer world, do not function; but the vital current continues to be active, for without it the sleep would be interminable, the body would be said to have died. The continuity between waking, sleeping and *re-waking* is maintained by the incessant activity of this vital current. But there is no means by which it can directly transact with *phenomenā*, for nothing is an 'object' to it; hence it is not an instrument as the senseorgans are.²⁵

The function of life is to keep the body-machine fit to transact with things and events that occur in the world; and the actual working of the body-machine is looked after by different special 'agents' such as the senseorgans, which inevitably presuppose the presence of life.

REFERENCES

¹ *San̄kṣepaśāriraḥ* has this verse:

Vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmir—
Vedāntavāde pariṇā mavādaḥ;
Vyavasthite'smin pariṇā mavāde
Svayaṁ samāyāti vivartavādaḥ.

² *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.4.23.

³ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 1.9.2. 'Param̄param̄ variyo viśiṣṭataram asya jīvanam̄ bhavati, viduṣo dṛṣṭam̄ phalam̄ adṛṣṭam̄ ca paro'variyaḥ, uttarottara-viśiṣṭatarān eva lokān jayati'.

⁴ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.4.15.

⁵ 'devah' from the root *div*, to shine: 'dyotanād devāḥ'.

⁶ Cf. Sadāśiva Brahmendra's *Pañcikarāna*, Sirirangam, 1906.

⁷ *Br̄hadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 2.4.7. Kokilesvar Sastri: *Introduction to Advaita Philosophy*, 1926, p. 30.

⁸ 'Viśeṣas tu vikriyā', *Śāṁkaragranthāvalih*, Vol. VI, p. 117 (Śrīraṅgam).

⁹ *Bhāmatī*, p. 176.

¹⁰ *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, 2.6.

¹¹ *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 7.7.

¹² *Br̄hadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 1.5.2.

¹³ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.4.26.

¹⁴ *Br̄hadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 4.4.3.

¹⁵ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 1.7.2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 5.2.1.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 3.14.2.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 5.1.1.

- ¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.12.3.
²⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.14.2.
²¹ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 2.7.
²² Sircar, M. N.: *System of the Vedantic Thought and Culture*,
 p. 139.
²³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.
²⁴ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.13.4.
²⁵ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.19.

l
 sta
 fun
 ult
 b

II. SENSATION: ITS MECHANISM AND FUNCTION

Body and Senses

The physical frame of man is technically described as 'the ephemeral conglomeration of effect-instruments'.¹ Śaṅkara explains: All emanations of nature are included by the term 'effect'. Effect is always an evolute or modification, and that which undergoes modifications or from which effects arise, is termed the 'cause', namely nature. And the term 'effect' includes not only the physical body but all emanations of nature such as elements, sensory objects (*atigrahas*) and other modifications of nature. The term 'instrument' includes not only the group of ten senses, two aspects of mind and the vital current, but all attributes born of nature and are of the description of pleasure, pain and ignorance.² The instruments are located and lodged in the body and can have no existence independent of it; it is impossible for them to quit the body at pleasure or re-enter it at will.³ It is likewise true that the body cannot function without the senses; it is in fact the senses that 'move' the body,⁴ which by itself is inert. While thus the body serves as the basis or ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the senses to be and to act, senses function as managers or directors for the body in its multifarious activities. The physical frame of man—or of any organism, for that matter—is in this way an integrated whole wherein are indistinguishably welded together the body and senses.

In the delineation of the origin of the physical frame Śaṅkara closely follows the earlier speculations. The subtle elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth came out in gradual succession from the great unmanifest Absolute. Owing to the three-fold functions of illumination (*sattva*), movement (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*) each element becomes possessed of two powers, viz., of knowledge and of action, thus becoming responsible for the emanation of two senses each. Hence are derived the five cognitive senses: sound, sight, touch, taste and smell, and five conative functions: speech,

prehension, locomotion, excretion and generation. By the predominance of the cognitive aspect the internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*) emerges with its twofold form of *buddhi* and *manas*; and by the predominance of the active aspect the vital current emerges with its fivefold functions of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. All these constitute the 'subtle body' (*sūkṣma-śarīra*). But this being incapable of either existing or functioning independently, nature took resort to the process of *pañcīkaraṇa* and brought forth the 'gross body' (*sthūla-śarīra*). In this were lodged the members of the 'subtle body', for this was specially designed for 'enjoying', i.e., transacting with the world.⁵ Śaṅkara speaks of the 'gross body' as the locus of experience or enjoyment of the world (*bhogāyatana*) and the 'subtle body' as the means of experience (*bhogasādhana*).⁶

Although the body is the locus and senses are the means of experience, they are however not the real experiencers.⁷ The argument in this behalf is as follows: We have three states of experience, namely, waking, dream and sleep; all of them are equally experiences. If body should be the experiencer, then experience should be confined to the waking state for in the other two states the rôle played by the body is almost nil. If, on the other hand, we assume the senses to be experiencers we must exclude sleep from experience, for there the senses cease to function. And also, if each senseorgan were independent, sight and touch may never synchronise, and memory, perception, wish etc., fail to be connected. The eye sees the bell and the ear hears the ringing sound; but a statement like 'the sound comes from the bell' or 'I hear the bell ringing', would be unjustified. If each sense were an experiencer in its own right, then correspondence or coördination would be impossible. But, in the words of Troland, the very concept of experience implies 'a distinctive system of elements and processes occurring in point-to-point correlation with the higher coördinative phases of nervous action'⁸ in an organism. Experience is a system, its essential functions being coincidence, correspondence, correlation and coördination. We find, therefore, that

experience, for which the body is meant and the senses are employed, necessitates the assumption of some entity, remaining in the body pervading it and the senses, and also exerting a unifying influence: this is the 'self' (*jīva*), the real experimenter. 'Jīva', says Saṃkara, 'is of the nature of consciousness, lord of the body and bearer of the senses'.⁹ The self is to be construed as the conscious principle in the physical frame responsible for its unified action; the 'light' of self being there, this physical lump of effect-instruments functions as alive and conscious.¹⁰

The self is conceived as fitted with five sheaths or coverings (*koṣas*), in a manner like Pandora's boxes. The outermost covering is the physical body (*annamayakoṣa*) and the innermost is the utter and undifferentiated satisfaction that we have in deep, dreamless sleep (*ānandamayakoṣa*); in between the two are three coverings *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vijñānamaya*.¹¹ The outermost covering, the gross body (*sthūladeha*), is *annamaya* because it is supposed to be produced by food (*anna*) eaten by the parents and nourished by food; it would collapse if deprived of food. It is through this covering that the self transacts with the world; it is physical and tangible. More internal than this is the *prāṇamayakoṣa*, the covering of life, comprising the fivefold vital functions together with five active senses; these are lodged in the body and are neither gross nor external. The body is immediately influenced and controlled by this covering: as a tree moves its branches in diverse directions, blown by the wind, even so the body engages itself in diverse activities being animated by the vital current and activated by the five active senses.¹² Further interior is the *manomayakoṣa*, the covering of Mind, constituted by the mind and five cognitive senses. Here are detailed the major experiencing instruments: eye, ear, skin, nose and tongue, and mind as the controller of these. This covering is responsible for our various mental activities like thinking, willing, doubting, feeling happy or sad, and desiring things.¹³ The predominance of mind over the senses is an interesting speculation, as also the notion that this covering immediately controls the

system of vital currents. And this in turn is directed by a covering more internal to it, the *viññānamayaakoṣa*. The form of the internal psychic instrument known as *buddhi* (intellect) is the center of this covering: it not only serves as a base for all senses in their respective functions, but is responsible also for the ego-feeling. It is at this level that the ego springs up to identify itself with all the actions of senses and body, evident in such assertions as 'I see', 'I go', 'I am happy'.¹⁴ The most internal of coverings, the *ānandamaya*, is immediate to the self. It is unfortunate that the Sanskrit word *ānanda* has no satisfactory synonym in English. It is not 'bliss' as is frequently translated, for bliss is happiness which is essentially an activity of the mind; it signifies rather an indescribable sense of satisfaction, an unqualified feeling of complete comfort. This is characterised as the natural state of self and its nearest approach is the state of deep and dreamless sleep, marked by absolute tranquillity consequent on the cessation of all bodily and sensory activities.

Constitution

The physical body is a material aggregate, produced by physical processes; it is constituted of the same stuff as the rest of the universe, namely the five *pañcīkṛta* elements. The ancient account of the process of its production is quaint, if somewhat absurd also. The gross elements enter into the constitution of the body in the following manner: *earth* becomes bone, flesh, nerves, skin and hair; *water* becomes bile, blood, semen, secretions and sweat; *fire* becomes hunger, thirst, sleep, beauty and indolence; *air* turns into contraction, expansion and motion; the *ether* transforms itself into the spaces of the stomach, heart, neck and head.¹⁵ While the account may be dismissed as amusing at its best, it may be of interest to speculate on the rationale of the quality of space being made responsible for the 'cavities' of head, heart and stomach; the qualities of space and energy for the various bodily movements internal and outward; the qualities of space, energy, heat and light for digestion of food, assimilation, fatigue and need for bodily comfort (hunger, thirst,

sleep and indolence); the qualities of space, energy, heat-light and taste for the liquid components of our body (blood, bile, secretions, semen, sweat and urine); and finally all the five attributes for the solid material in our body such as bone and flesh.

The *Aitareya-Upaniṣad*¹⁶ offers another account of the bodily constitution, equally incapable of satisfying our rational demands. Fire becoming speech (*vāk*) entered the mouth; air became life (*prāṇa*) and entered the nostrils; the sun becoming sight entered the eyes; ether or directions (*diśaḥ*) becoming audition entered the ears; earth—the text has *oṣadha-vanaspatayaḥ*, which symbolise earth)—becoming the hairy portion (*loma*) entered the skin; the moon becoming mind entered the heart; the death becoming *apāna* entered the navel (*nābhi*), which according to Śaṅkara is the place where all the vital currents of the body are tied;¹⁷ and finally water becoming semen entered the organ of procreation.

In his treatment of the senses, Śaṅkara follows an ancient distinction between sense-function (*indriya-vṛtti*) and sense-structure (*indriya-sthāna*). Function being the 'capacity to perceive the respective objects'¹⁸ is said to belong to the 'subtle body'; but structures being a sort of gate allowing the functions to flow out into the world and allowing likewise the sensations from the external world to flow in, belong to the 'gross body'. In any sensory experience the following occur: the senseorgan, the sense-function and the sense-object.

Each senseorgan reveals the senseobjects of a particular type and its constitution therefore is akin to that of the senseobject. 'The organs are of the same category as the objects: the organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as light (which is but a mode of colour) is an instrument for revealing all colours. Similarly organs are but modes of all particular objects in order to perceive them, as in the case of the lamp'.¹⁹ The emergence of each sense from its particular causal element presupposes its capacity toprehend the objects of that particular elemental group. To put it simply, the eye cannot grasp sound, nor the nose

form, due to the mere fact that their constitutions are different, that there is nothing common between eye and sound, or between nose and form. 'By the portion of ether in it, ear grasps sound, its nature; by the portion of air in it, skin grasps touch, its nature; by the portion of fire in it, eye grasps form, its nature; by the portion of water in it, tongue grasps taste, its nature; by the portion of earth in it, nose grasps smell, its nature; by the portion of ether, the organ of speech makes speech movements; by the portion of air, the organ of locomotion makes for movements; by the portion of fire the hands grasp, worship etc.; by the portion of water, the kidneys expel urine and semen; by the portion of earth, the bowels expel excreta'.²⁰ Each senseorgan, therefore, serves as an exit for its function and as an entrance for its object, because it is in continuity with both of them by way of common causation and common constitution.

Specialisation

The sense according to the Śāṃkara school of thought, is neither the physical organ (*golaka*) as the Buddhists hold, nor the capacity (*śakti*) of that physical and visible organ as the Mīmāṃsakas hold, but a distinct function having its locus in the senseorgan.²¹ It is also pointed out that sense experience need not always or necessarily imply, or depend upon, a senseorgan; the sense is essentially a function and its particular organ is nothing more than a seat (*sthāna*). Śāṃkara, however, believes that 'senses begin to function only when their special seats, such as eye and ear, are formed'.²² Experience prior to the emergence of individual senseorgans is *en masse*, comprising of undifferentiated amorphous sensations. On the emergence of a senseorgan, certain details forming an aspect of the field of experience are selected and thus the field comes to be structured. The underlying thought in this speculation strongly suggests a correspondence to our own idea of a stimulus as 'the differentiated field of incident energy' in a local environment.²³ In an act of vision, for instance, the eye selects the visible forms and excludes other sensations

like sound or touch which, however, are likewise selected by other organs like ear or skin. The eye is so constituted as to be sensitive only to the radiant energy of the surrounding world; and the ear only to the vibratory stimulation. The sense thus implies specialisation, and hence a more efficient manner of knowing the world than the primitive *en masse* experience.

Although the experience reported by each sense is peculiar and distinct from others, there is no need on that account to postulate a multiplicity of experiencers. The eye indeed is different from the ear in both structure and function; but the subject who sees and hears may be the same. I see a table, approach and touch it: I have now perceived the object through two experiences—visual and tactual. But I am understood when I say that I have touched the table that I saw. Such a statement, however, would be meaningless, were the senses the final experiencers or had there not been the notion of 'I'. There obtains, in other words, in any purposeful and meaningful act something common between different sense experiences that integratē them and give unity for the act. This something is a sort of central office which directs various sub-offices in diverse ways in order to run the entire organisation in an integrated and coördinated way; the chief manager works through different subordinate managers, each of whom controls his particular department, unlike their chief who has the ensemble of all departments in view. In like manner the various senses and their particular experiences are rendered meaningful by means of a central sense, the mind (*manas*). 'The senses perform their functions when grasped by mind'.²⁴ The *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* illustrates the position with a homely and forceful simile: senses are horses tied to the body-chariot; the intellect (*buddhi*) is the charioteer, the mind (*manas*) acts as the reins through which the sense-horses are controlled, and self is the lord of the chariot.

Pressing the above metaphor further, the subordinate managers, although managers so far as their particular departments are concerned, are not managers in the sense

that they can function at will and independently: their actions and movements are both caused and controlled by their common chief. This common control is the means of integration. Even so the senses, although experiencers in their limited fields, have no will of their own and hence may be described as 'inert' (*acetana*), even as an axe is but an instrument and does not act independently.²⁵ Apart from an agent no instrument can function; a pen does not write of its own accord, an axe does not hew wood all by itself. Senses in their original state are elemental, material and mechanical; and in this state they cannot function, neither see nor hear nor taste nor smell. The ability to apprehend is endowed on them by the vital current (*prāṇa*) when it enters into, and enlivens, them.

Doors of Perception

Senses have been described as mere instruments (*karāṇas*) at the disposal of *manas*. And *manas*, as will be evident in the next section is guided by *buddhi*; and these two together constitute the internal psychic instrument (*antaḥ-karāṇa*), whose purpose the senses serve. The psychic instrument is internal, whereas the objects of experience are located outside in the world; and experience is impossible without a contact between the two. It is the function of sense to establish this contact: it mediates between the two and this capacity is due to its location in the periphery of the body, a meeting-point of the inner agent and the outer-world. Sense in this sense is described as the 'door' (*dvāra*) through which the items of experience may pass. In this body, says Śamkara, the senses are located in order to function as doors of experience (*upalabdhidvārāṇi*). Had there been no senses, the agent of experience, (the internal organ) would be blind, a disabled prisoner in the windowless cage of the body, and the external world would have been there as an eternal virgin. 'When they are withdrawn, the individual self is not noticed at all; it is only when they occupy their respective positions in the body that the individual self is noticed as experiencing objects'.²⁶

How do the senses function as doors of experience? Sāṃkara answers: 'Sound is the object of hearing; it stimulates the ear, its senseorgan; when thus the ear is stimulated, discrimination arises in mind and through mind one engages in outward action'.²⁷ In this account are involved three important ideas. First, the object somehow makes itself felt by the senseorgan which functions as a receptor: if it is light, it sends out rays through ether which the eye catches; if it is sound, it sends out waves through air which the ear grasps. The senseorgan is doubtless the preliminary requisite, for without the senses there is no possibility of any experience at all.²⁸ Second, the sensory apprehension is then transformed into the mental, when we become aware of the objective presentation. At this stage the sense passes its responsibility to the mind which functions as the central psychic exchange: the mind by its contact with the senseorgan cognises the sensation as belonging to a particular class: form, sound, taste etc. And finally, the mental comprehension is translated back into a physical process leading to behaviour in relation to the cognised object: an 'activity gradient'.

That sensation is an essential aspect of perception is emphasised by the notions that the senses function only in the presence of their respective objects and that the faculty of grasping the object is peculiar only to the senses and not to any other bodily instruments.²⁹ The sense, however, functions only in the 'present'.³⁰ I cannot now perceive, for instance, the star that was there yesterday, nor can I now witness the eclipse that might happen two years hence. Another requisite for perception is the location of the object in the actual space before the perceiving agent, in the field of his vision; the Tower of London does indeed exist in the present time, but I cannot perceive it because it falls beyond my field of vision. We speak of a temporal and spatial psychophysical simultaneity as indispensable for perception; it is technically termed 'indriyārthasamnikarṣa' (contact between object and sense). The third requisite for perception is that the object should be 'abhivyaktiyogya',

capable of being perceived: no one, for instance, can perceive ether, nor can one perceive the details of the sun. 'Senses comprehend existing things having name and form'.³¹ Unless these three conditions are satisfied there can be no perception, for the possibility of sensation is barred and perception is founded on sensation; mind can cognise only on the report of sensations.

In perception the internal-organ assumes the form or mode (*vr̥tti*) of the object and streams out through the sense outlet in order to pervade the object. When the *vr̥tti* coincides with the object, perceptual knowledge is said to arise. Thus the sense organ serves not merely as gate for the sensations to stream in, but functions also as an outlet for the 'mode of the internal organ' (*antaḥkāraṇa-vr̥tti*) to flow out to meet the object and 'pervade' it. We have here the rudiments of the transactional theory of perception.

Senses enlighten, says Śamkara:³² they illumine objects and bring them into our view even as a lamp makes visible the objects that were hitherto enveloped in darkness. They also determine the special object of a sense. The senses are instruments at the disposal of mind for cognising and communing with the outer world. As to the conditions under which the senses function, three of them may be noted. First, the senses begin to function only when their special organic seats like eye, ear etc., are formed; otherwise cognition will be *en masse*. Next, the senses are not spontaneous in their function; they must be 'grasped by the mind' before they function. They are said to become fit for action when the vital force (termed *Āṅgīrasa*) which is the common 'self' of all the senses, animates them. And finally, the senses function when the object is spatially within reach, temporarily coexistent and has adequate receptivity.

REFERENCES

¹ 'Kāryakāraṇasaṃghāta'.

² *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.20.

³ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.1.15.

- ⁴ *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha*, 537.
- ⁵ *Siddhāntabindu* (Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī), p. 58.
- ⁶ *Ātmabodha*, 13, 14.
- ⁷ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.15.
- ⁸ Troland, L. T.: *Psychophysiology*, Vol. I, 1929, p. 86.
- ⁹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.6.
- ¹⁰ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.7.
- ¹¹ *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha*, 443-447.
- ¹² *Ibid.*, 381-384.
- ¹³
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 350-351.
- ¹⁵ Sircar, M. N.: *Comparative Studies of Vedantism*, 1927, p. 126.
- ¹⁶ Khaṇḍa 2.
- ¹⁷ *Aitareyabhāṣya*, II. 'Sarvaprāṇabandhanasthāna'.
- ¹⁸ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.17.
- ¹⁹ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 2.4.11.
- ²⁰ *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha*, 411-416.
- ²¹ *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṁgraha* (Bharatīrtha), 4th varṇaka.
- ²² *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.8.
- ²³ Zigler, M.: *Encyclopaedia of Psychology*.
- ²⁴ *Kenabhāṣya*, 3.3.
- ²⁵ *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha*, 543, 545.
- ²⁶ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 2.2.1.
- ²⁷ *Ibid.*, 4.3.5.
- ²⁸ Cf. *Bhāmatī*, p. 47.
- ²⁹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.19.
- ³⁰ *Chāndogyaabhāṣya*, 8.12.5.
- ³¹ *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, 2.6.
- ³² *Īśāvāsyabhāṣya*, 1.4.

III. MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Attention

Senses are said to be 'superior to the gross body as they are subtler, more internal and have a wider field of action';¹ nevertheless they are merely 'instruments' and are incapable of spontaneous action. 'The functioning of the senses is an impossibility but for the control (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the 'internal organ' (*antaḥkāraṇa*).² In contradistinction to the external organs of sense, which are externally located (on the periphery of the body in direct contact with the objective world), the internal organ is lodged within the body, and its contact with the world is only indirect, through the former. The senses function at the behest of this internal organ which, although superior to the senses in the pattern of constitution, is equally physical and material. While the *tāmasic* aspect of the five elements combine to form the body, and the *rājasic* aspect the senses, only *sāttvic* or fine and subtle aspect of the elements unite in the production of the internal organ. The *tāmasic* predominance makes the body most concrete and gross, while the *sāttvic* predominance renders the internal organ abstract and subtle. In between are placed the senses (characterised by *rājasic* predominance); they are located in the former and serve as instruments for the latter. The highly subtle constitution of the internal organ makes it an excellent agent for knowledge.³

In reality, the internal organ is not one organ but two organs: 'mind' (*manas*) and 'intellect' (*buddhi*). Sometimes the internal organ is said to be fourfold: *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* (egoity), and *citta* (thought).⁴ Śaṅkara writes: 'The internal organ is variously termed *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta*, *viññāna* (knowledge) etc. This difference in nomenclature is due sometimes to the difference in the modifications of the internal organ'.⁵

The following passage from Śaṅkara is worthy of close examination: 'There is a doubt regarding the existence and

nature of mind. . . . There is a mind apart from the external senseorgans like the ear. For it is well known that even when there is a connexion between the external organ, the object and the self, a man does not perceive the object which may be just in front . . . therefore it is understood that something else, viz., the internal organ called mind, which joins itself to the objects of all the organs, exists, in the absence of which the other organs, eye etc., fail to perceive their respective objects, form etc., although they have the capacity to do so, and in the presence of which they succeed in it'.⁶ Śaṅkara, it will be seen, considers here the objection that the mind is a superfluous and irrelevant hypothesis and attempts to answer it. He inclines to accept the hypothesis of mind on the ground that an act of perception is incomplete without its intervention. The senseorgan might be in an excellent condition, the object might be quite fit for perception (*abhivyaṅgi-yogya*) and there might even be a contact between the organ and the object. All this accomplishes only the first phase of the perceiving activity; the more important phase, however, is the transformation of this physical sensation into a 'mental discrimination'—which, in fact, is what gives the quality of perception to the bare sensation. What Śaṅkara means by 'mind' in this context is *attentivity*. The senseorgan no doubt selects its objects out of a medley of chaotic presentations; although it is by nature thus selective, the selected elements fail to be 'meaningful' unless we *attend* to them. We perceive an object when attention ushers it to the focus of the field of consciousness. Senses succeed in their task of *selection* when mind attends. Śaṅkara offers this fact of attention in successful selection as evidence for the existence of mind.

But mind is not just 'sensory attention', 'primarily involuntary and passive'.⁷ It is not attention in the sense that it is not an act but an attitude (*vorhalten*); it is attention in the sense that 'objects exist for us only in so far as we are attentive to them' (A. Messer). It is an active 'flowing out' in order to assume the mode of the objective presentation. Although the mode (*vr̥tti*) is meant for fact-aware-

ness, it is not merely a passively receptive experience, but an active process. Śaṃkara speaks of it as 'exercising its own independent function toward objects'.⁸

Common Sense

Mind, like the senses, is an instrument employed for acquiring knowledge of the external world. But unlike the senses, it is not confined to this or that particular class of objects: 'its sphere includes all external objects, and therefore, it (mind) is equally connected with all the sense organs'.⁹ It is common to all the senses: 'it is the common instrument of the different manifestations of the power of knowledge',¹⁰ such as eye or ear. It is no doubt the eye that sees and the ear that hears—for activity does exist where it is seen—but the eye or ear has no power of its own to see or to hear; its apparent power is only 'reflected' from mind. Mind therefore knows all objects of the external world through the instrumentality of different senseorgans each of which is sensitive to a particular phase of the phenomenal world. The senses are complementary to each other and together they open up a comprehensive view of the external world. Behind each senseorgan is the mind, uniformly and equally occurring; it is not, however, distributed amongst them, but it is the uniform, undifferentiated background from which diverse figures emerge. Just as there is no possibility of figures occurring apart from the ground, even so senses fail to function, bereft of mind.¹¹ Mind is spoken of as the 'chief whom the other organs follow';¹² 'eye and other senses are under the control of the mind, the highest of senses'.¹³ Śaṃkara also speaks of the 'separate use of the one mind along with each sense'.¹⁴

Thus mind, although an instrument of cognition like the senses, is 'superior' to the senses in as much as it is the prerequisite for the sense to function, and also the ultimate authority (relatively) in matters of cognition. Mind is termed the 'substratum of the experience of all such organs' (*āyatana*) and the 'substratum of the objects cognised by the senses for the sake of the person in the shape of perceptions'.¹⁵

It is 'superior' because it 'has all other senses and objects for its play of activity; this is the means whereby the knower knows everything. . . Functions of mind consist of internal and external objects and serve as means of perception to the self'.¹⁶ There is still another point of superiority that mind enjoys over the senses. The latter function only in the present, that is to say, in the presence of their appropriate objects. But mind can function not only in the present but in the past and future as well; and functions even when the external object—so essential for sense to function—is not ready at hand. Mind, in other words, can *remember* (function in the past), *anticipate* (function in the future) and *imagine* (function without the external object). Its function is not dependent upon, though conditioned by, the external things of the world. In this sense it transcends the scope of the senses.

The need for mind is felt by the organism because of the limited scope wherein senses operate. The sense can only perceive the objects, it cannot retain them in the form of traces for future use; nor can it anticipate. Mind's existence is justified also as the means of 'distinguishing between perceptions; the sense organ alone cannot do this'.¹⁷ It is therefore often termed as eye of the eye, ear of the ear etc. 'By this one mind becoming the eye he sees'.¹⁸

Mind then is the prime instrument of cognition directing the other senseorgans to gather information from the outer world. The sense functions only with the coöperation of the mind, which coöperation is absolutely essential for 'right perception of the objects';¹⁹ the senses in this wise are benefited by the 'discriminative wisdom' with which mind is endowed. The senses are so constituted as toprehend the external objects; 'the senses by nature have only external things as objects'.²⁰ The knowledge of the exact nature of the things (*vastu-yāthātmya-jñāna*) should depend on the nature of things and not on one's imagination (*na puruṣa-buddhyapekṣam, vastu-tantrameva*). Mind both by its constitution and location cannot directly come into contact with the external things and without such contact no knowledge

arises. In the dream state, for instance, when mind alone functions, the senses being at rest, there is no cognition of the outer world; for 'mind can do nothing without the help of the senses'.²¹ While senses are considered *pramāṇas* (sources of valid knowledge) mind is said to be but an auxiliary to a *pramāṇa*. Senses look to the mind for control and direction; mind looks to the senses for the supply of actual information from the physical world. Each without the other would be crippled and disabled, together they get to cognise the world. This fact is emphasised by the concept of body as '*kārya-kāraṇa-saṁghāta*' and mind is considered to be physical (*bhautika*) as much as other senses are. They are together looked upon as *dhātus*, as they support the body.²²

Modes of Mind

Mind is defined as 'that by which one thinks'²³ and thinking implies a power of reflection, by which power it 'urges the senseorgan towards its appropriate object'.²⁴ Thus cognition arises by the mind-directed sense contacting the object. Elsewhere,²⁵ mind is defined as 'the inner organ characterised by deliberation etc., possessing the power to reflect on the effects'. Although mind in conjunction with the senses perceives the outer world only, in its independent capacity its functions are manifold and various. 'The modes of the activity of mind', says Śaṁkara, 'are desire, volition, deliberation, faith, negligence, boldness, timidity, shame, intelligence, fear etc.'²⁶ In an old Upaniṣad,²⁷ we get the following list of such psychological modes:

- consciousness (*saṁjñāna*)
- direction (*ājñāna*)
- knowledge (*vijñāna*)
- wisdom (*prajñāna*)
- retentivity (*medhā*)
- perception of objects through the senses (*drṣṭi*)
- perseverance (*dhṛti*)
- thought (*mati*)
- imagination (*manīṣā*)

distress, i.e., when ill etc. (jūti)
 recollection (smṛti)
 thinking of forms (saṁkalpa)
 application (kratu)
 self-preservation (asu)
 desire (kāma)
 sex-love (vaśa)

Elsewhere²⁸ some more functions are catalogued:

doubt (vicikitsā)
 faith or belief in unseen things and events (śraddhā)
 shame (hrīḥ or lajjā)
 fear (bhaya)
 intelligence (dhīḥ)

All these are termed 'forms or modes of mind' (*manasaḥ rūpāṇi*); they are different varieties of the thinking process. Consciousness is simple awareness that enters into all other mental functions. Direction is the agency in the sense-function. Knowledge is of the outer world without the use of senses. Wisdom is the ability to discriminate. Retentivity is bringing the past experiences to bear on the present. Perseverance is the function of will, which is employed when fatigue has set in. Thought is perception of the internal objects or inward consideration of outer objects. Imagination is perception in the absence of external objects; this, however, is not hallucination for here is a voluntary perception and full understanding of the imaginary contents of the act, as in the case of artistic production. Distress is described as the mental state consequent on some physical injury or disease. Recollection is bringing into the present awareness traces of the experience of past events. *Samkalpa* is determining the form of the objects; this function is involved when we say, for instance, 'This is a circle', or 'It is a very hot day'. Application is a mental function in so far as it is mentally directed; it implies orientation, and that in turn discrimination. It is curious to note that self-preservation has been characterised as a mental state. Desire is longing

for an object not got: 'Desire residing in the internal organ', says Śaṁkara, 'one remembers what one wants to remember and remembering the form of the object of desire one attains to memory'.²⁹ Sex-love is desire for the other sex for purposes of procreation. Doubt is oscillation: indecision as regards a course of action. Faith is belief in things and events although not cognised by senses. Intelligence is 'the faculty of realising at the proper moment, and of ascertaining the purposes of past and future events; this is the source of will'.³⁰ Shame is the feeling resulting from a reflection on past acts, prohibited or ignoble. Fear is the 'imaginative aversion' to causes of misery or danger. Anger is defined as enmity to causes of misery; and it is said to result when desire is frustrated.³¹ In the *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya* Śaṁkara defines perseverance as 'the patient attitude: a special attitude of mind which removes the exhaustion of body and senses when they are exhausted and, upheld by which act, they no longer feel exhausted'.³²

There is in one of the Upaniṣads³³ an interesting discussion regarding the relative priority or 'superiority' of the different functions of mind. After the premise that 'man acts and experiences only when mind obtains', will is affirmed as 'superior' to mere reflection; will is 'mind to do' (*cikīrṣā-buddhi*), and doing is meaningful only when it follows reflection. 'When one understands, he wills'; and the mind-stuff (*citta*) is the source of will. Superior to mind-stuff is contemplation; the former is mere understanding while the latter is 'continuous uninterrupted reflection'. Knowledge is superior still, for 'contemplation is caused by knowledge'. Superior to it, however, is 'power' which means the 'intuitive faculty' (*pratibhāna*) of mind. After a break in this chain of mental states by the interpolation of the elements, the thread is resumed with memory. Desire is superior to memory for there can be no memory without desire. Superior to memory is the life-principle (*prāṇa*), for 'everything centres in it as spokes in the nave of the wheel'. The above account acquires some meaning if superiority is taken in the sense of complexity. For instance, will is a more

complex phenomenon than mere understanding, intelligence than will, contemplation than intelligence, knowledge than contemplation and so on. We may indeed speak of mental states as simple and complex, the complex states being composed of simpler ones.

What is the rôle of mind in cognition? Śaṅkara answers: The physical object as a presentational detail of the outer world impinges on a senseorgan which apprehends the stimulation, provided mind attends. This apprehension is then deposited in mind, which, owing to the predominance of *rajas* is always active except in deep sleep. The mind now is said to 'flow out' through the sense avenue and assume the form of the object presented. The form thus assumed by the mind (or the modality of mind) is termed a *vr̥tti*. Mind in all beings is well known to be possessed of consciousness³⁴—which latter is described as a passive witness (*sākṣī*) and as the real subject. Cognition is impossible unless the subject-object differentiation obtains: the subject 'extends' to the objective presentation. Śaṅkara's position is stated thus: 'The object is not mental, for it is a *presentation* to the subject. Yet it is private, its existence is not vouched for by others . . . (it is) constructed by the individual and remains for him alone'.³⁵ In an instance of cognition three entities are thus necessary: the object (*viśaya*), the subject (*pramāṇ*) and the subjective modification (*vr̥tti*).³⁶ The object stimulates the senseorgan and thus creates disturbances in the subject, or more properly in the mind; mind by its very constitution is dynamic and is 'increasingly active in receiving the forms of objects'. A mental counterpart of the object is constructed in the shape of a *vr̥tti*. The object, however, is cognised not as a mental image but as extended in space and time, as a physical object. 'In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea . . . that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. . . . That the outward thing exists apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted because of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perceptions

only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls as objects of their perception . . . general consciousness testifies to the existence of the external world'.³⁷ The idea indeed has the form of the object which is apprehended as external. Śamkara opposes the Buddhist argument that idea and object are identical.

Śamkara also discusses the function of mind from another standpoint.³⁸ Suppose there were no mind, all that exist being the self, the senses and the senseobjects. The following alternatives then would obtain: (1) The objects are designed to stimulate the senses; the senses are designed to receive the impressions from objects; the self is of the nature of uninterrupted consciousness; and therefore the result would be continuous perception; (2) in case the conjunction of self, senses and objects is ineffective there would be continuous non-perception; or (3) since neither perception nor non-perception is continuous, 'obstacles' in the way either of self or of senseorgans must be assumed. As in experience we find actually that we perceive sometimes, do not perceive at other times and the assumption of obstacles in the way of self and senses being fantastic, we should, argues Śamkara, posit the existence of some subtle organ mediating between the self on the one hand and senses and their objects on the other.

He argues for the existence of mind from still another standpoint. 'Impossibility of the simultaneity of knowledge through various senseorgans is an indication of the existence of mind. Simultaneity of knowledge through all the senses is contradicted by experience'.³⁹ Śamkara is found to anticipate the later problem of the division of attention involving diverse sensations. Can we listen to a piece of music as well as see a picture at the same time? Śamkara answers in the negative. By implication, even a sense-perception is not a part behaviour, it is the behaviour of the organism as a whole—a total reaction; and, as such, only one sense can engage the organism at a time. This is because in the operation of each senseorgan mind is necessarily involved; and mind being one it functions with one senseorgan at a

time. Śaṁkara's position compares well with the law of derived properties, formulated by R. H. Wheeler: 'Parts derive their properties from the whole. . . . The function of a given organ is derived through dynamic relationship between that organ and the body-as-a-whole'.⁴⁰ (Śaṁkara's 'mind' would be an equivalent of Wheeler's body-as-a-whole.) Śaṁkara describes mind as the *āyatana*: and his statement that the 'senseorgans (i.e., parts) function only when grasped by mind (i.e., whole)'⁴¹ implies fully the Wheeler law. Śaṁkara argues that senseorgans are but parts which derive their power to function from mind (the 'whole'); if the senseorgans (parts) could function independently, numerous senseorgans could function simultaneously, and as this possibility is contradicted by experience, the existence of some whole which conditions the function of each senseorgan, should be assumed.

In the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (5.1) there occurs a story concerning the dispute between eye, ear, speech, mind and *prāṇa* as to which of them was the best. It was agreed that each of them was to go out of the body one at a time, and that organ without which man could not live was to be adjudged as the best. First, the eye went out, but on its return it found the man living—only as blind men do; the ear went out but it left the man only deaf but alive all the same; then speech went out but man lived on, as if dumb; then mind went out and the Scripture says that man continued to live, but 'just as children do, without mind'. The rest of the story is of no interest to us; what is noteworthy is the suggestion that only adults have mind but not children. Śaṁkara, however, appreciates the gross error of such a suggestion and interprets 'without mind' (*amanasaḥ*) to mean 'with undeveloped mind' (*aprarūḍha manasaḥ*). This interpretation further suggests that mind gradually develops and attains maturity in the adult stage of human life.

In the same *Upaniṣad* (6.5.1) there is an account of how the food eaten is transformed into different parts of the body: the 'gross' part of the food is said to become faeces, the 'middle' part flesh and the 'subtle' part mind. Śaṁkara's

comment on this account is interesting: he argues against any part of food actually becoming mind and explains the textual 'becomes mind' to mean 'helps mind to grow'.

Explaining the important rôle of mind in the life of man, Śamkara remarks: The ability of the body to do many things generally depends upon mind; it is well known in the world that men with strong minds pass for strong men.⁴²

The Buddhi

Mind can function when *buddhi* (intellect) shines within. Buddhi is said to be the 'rudiment of elements from which mind originates'.⁴³ Even as mind controls the senses, *buddhi* controls the mind. 'Mind can think, because it is enlightened by the buddhi shining within; mind is thus capable of its activity'.⁴⁴ It pervades mind and the senses. Śamkara explains that it is the instrument that helps us in everything like a lamp in darkness. 'Every object is perceived only as associated with the light of the buddhi, as objects in the dark are lightened up by a lamp placed in front: the other organs are but channels for it'.⁴⁵

The word *buddhi* needs an explanation as it does not admit of an exact English equivalent. While the frequent rendering of it as 'intellect' or 'intelligence' would philosophically serve the purpose, it should be borne in mind that it is neither a faculty nor a mental state. The word has been imported into Vedānta from the Sāṅkhyan ideology, and its strict connotation implies the pre-mental condition of consciousness.

There are accounts in the old texts of the ascending degrees of subtlety: the grossest part of our equipment is the body; 'higher in order' are the senses—subtler than the former; and subtler still is the mind; next is buddhi and the subtlest is the Self.⁴⁶ 'The buddhi is transparent and next to Self: it easily catches the reflection of the Self. Next is mind (*manas*), which catches the reflection of Self through buddhi; then come the organs through contact with

manas; and lastly the body, through the organs'.⁴⁷ The buddhi is subtler and more 'internal' than mind but grosser and more 'external' than the Self; its position is betwixt Self and mind: it directs the mind but is directed by Self. The senseorgan has a limited scope in the apprehension of objects; the scope of mind is larger, for it comprehends the objects of all the senses and also the 'internal objects' (thoughts).⁴⁸ But buddhi has everything (with the exception of self) included in its scope. Just as a senseorgan functions as a door for the mind, even so the mind is a door for the buddhi. It is so 'internal' and so indispensable in all experience that it is sometimes mistaken for Self, 'because it pervades mind and other senses'.

In the picturesque account of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* the body is compared to a chariot, the senses to the horses, the objects to the path on which the chariot moves; the Self is the lord of this chariot but buddhi is the actual charioteer. 'Body', says Śaṅkara commenting on this account, 'is mainly guided by buddhi, for everything done by the body is generally done by buddhi'.⁴⁹ In the above account, mind is likened to the reins which the driver has in his hands; it is no doubt the rein (mind) that controls and directs the horses (senses), but independent of the driver (buddhi) it cannot function. The master (the Self) is but a passive spectator (*sākṣī*); although the command for action and ultimate responsibility rest with him.

Tattva-samāsa, the oldest known Sāṅkhya work, reads: 'And what is called buddhi? Buddhi is ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*). It is that through which there is in regard to a cow etc., the conviction (*pratiṭṭi*): "This is so and so, not otherwise; this is a cow, not a horse; this is a post, not a man." Such is buddhi, the most wonderful phase of nature'. Śaṅkara has imported this view into his system. The buddhi is of the nature of determination or ascertainment (*niscayātmiṇā*); it is, he says, 'our authority in the comprehending of the real nature of existence and non-existence'.⁵⁰ Elsewhere,⁵¹ he says that buddhi is so called because it determines the object (*arthasya niscayāt*). In another place,⁵²

buddhi is spoken of as the 'capacity to discriminate' (*viveka-śakti*). The buddhi, in other words, reveals the nature of objects, fixes them in the outer world, and determines our relation with them. But Śamkara anticipates an objection: is it only when anything is perceived by the instruments of cognition (viz., mind and senses) that it is reputed in the world to exist? He answers: 'The buddhi even in the ultimate analysis of all objects of perception, is still pregnant with a belief in the existence of something'.⁵³ But what is it that the buddhi determines? Is it the nature of the object or the mere existence of the object? Śamkara's anticipated objection has indeed a point. If buddhi determines everything about the object, what are mind and senses there for? Śamkara admits the important rôle of the senses in the objective specification; he also recognises the contribution of mind towards cognition. What then is buddhi's contribution, being at the back of and 'prior to' both mind and the senses? Senses function (i.e., apprehend the object) only when directed by mind, and mind functions (i.e., directs the senses) only when illumined by the buddhi within. Does the following statement of R. H. Wheeler reflect Śamkara's views on the subject? 'Original consciousness is a relatively homogeneous, undifferentiated field, potentially visual, auditory, kinesthetic, tactual, olfactory, all in one. Out of this relatively homogeneous total field there emerge forms that are figured upon a ground'.⁵⁴

The buddhi is also said to generate egoity (*ahamkāra*) or the notion of 'I'.⁵⁵ Buddhi is held to be inert, 'un-conscious' (*acetana*), and it cannot generate anything that is 'conscious' (*cetana*); but the very nature of Self is consciousness. Vidyāranya explains the position of Śamkara by distinguishing between the two forms of the internal organ: the function of 'I' and the function of 'this'.⁵⁶ The former, he says, is *viññāna* (a mode of the buddhi) and the latter is mind (*manas*). Śamkara writes: 'The individual Self pervades the buddhi with a reflection of its own manifested consciousness', so that we are 'conscious' of the 'I'. The buddhi then precedes all mental activity. The process of seeing a tree

or hearing a tune tacitly assumes the 'I' that sees the tree or hears the tune. Consciousness in a sense precedes cognition. The function of buddhi is to offer the subjective frame of reference to a process of experience.

REFERENCES

- ¹ *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 3.42.
- ² *Bhāmātī*, p. 47.
- ³ *Siddhāntabindu* (Madhusūdana), p. 56.
- ⁴ *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, 344.
- ⁵ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.34.
- ⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 1.5.3.
- ⁷ Ward, J.: *Psychological Principles*, Cambridge 1918. p. 69.
- ⁸ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.14.2.
- ⁹ *Kenabhāṣya*, 1.6.
- ¹⁰ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 1.4.7.
- ¹¹ Cf. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 2.21.
- ¹² *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 1.4.17.
- ¹³ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.2.
- ¹⁴ *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 15.9.
- ¹⁵ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.15.1.
- ¹⁶ *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 5.2.
- ¹⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 1.5.4. 'Vivekapratipatti-kāraṇaṁ manaḥ'.
- ¹⁸ *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 5.2.
- ¹⁹ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 4.16.1.
- ²⁰ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.2.
- ²¹ *Bhedadhikṣāra* (Nṛsiṃhāśramī), p. 19.
- ²² *Kaṭhabhāṣya*, 2.20.
- ²³ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.18.1.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.3.1.
- ²⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 1.2.1.
- ²⁶ *Kenabhāṣya*, 1.6.
- ²⁷ *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 5.2.
- ²⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 1.5.4.
- ²⁹ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.14.1.

- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 7.5.1.
- ³¹ *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 5.23.
- ³² *Op. cit.*, 16.3.
- ³³ *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7.4.1. seq.
- ³⁴ *Muṇḍakabhāṣya*, 3.1.9.
- ³⁵ M. Hiriyanna, Preface to *Iṣṭasiddhi*, G.O.S. Baroda.
- ³⁶ *Vedāntaparibhāṣā of Dharmarāja*, University of Calcutta. p. 44.
- ³⁷ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.28.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.3.32.
- ³⁹ *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 4 (preface).
- ⁴⁰ *The Laws of Human Nature*, Nisbet, Cambridge, 1931. p. 74.
- ⁴¹ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 3.3.
- ⁴² *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 6.7.1.
- ⁴³ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 3.10.
- ⁴⁴ *Kenabhāṣya*, 1.6.
- ⁴⁵ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 4.3.7.
- ⁴⁶ *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*, 3.10.
- ⁴⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.7.
- ⁴⁸ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 3.13.
- ⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.3.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 6.12.
- ⁵¹ *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, verse 345.
- ⁵² *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 7.10.
- ⁵³ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 6.12.
- ⁵⁴ R. H. Wheeler, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
- ⁵⁵ *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.5.
- ⁵⁶ *Pañcadaśī*, p. 162.

IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF

Experience

What is the evidence for assuming the existence of Self? Is not the body itself the experiencer? Why postulate a principle other than the body? Śaṅkara anticipates this objection in his comments on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (2.1.15). Ajātaśatru accompanied by Gārgya approaches a sleeping man and tries to wake him up by calling out 'O Paṇḍaravāsa!' 'O Rājan!' But the sleeper does not get up, whereupon Ajātaśatru moves the man by his hand and wakes him up. Here the problem posed is: Who now is the experiencer? Is *ear* the experiencer? Or is *body* the experiencer? Or shall we point to something else as the experiencer? Śaṅkara explains that the 'function of the experiencer is to grasp (enjoy) the appropriate object that has approached'.¹ If ear were the experiencer, then why were the words of Ajātaśatru not grasped, for the ear would continue in sleeping and waking states alike? If body were the experiencer, why should pushing cause a difference in the state, for, pushing or not pushing, the body would remain the same? How is it that only after waking up does he understand that Ajātaśatru is addressing him, and not while asleep? The conditions that are constant and common between the two states (waking and sleeping) are: the ear, the body and Ajātaśatru's words. Where does the difference in the Paṇḍaravāsa's response come in? The act of pushing made the body different from what it was before. Śaṅkara notes: it endowed the body with consciousness, activity, a different look, etc.; in other words, the act, of perception suggests an entity besides the body and senses.

Involved in an act of experience are the body, the senses and mind, and the vital force (*prāṇa*). The problem at issue is whether any of these can successfully play the rôle of an experiencer; and if so, to postulate Self would be unnecessary. The body can hold no claim, for were it the experiencer, then, pushing or not pushing would not make

any difference as regards awakening since it remains the same'. Nor have the senses and mind any claim for experiencership, for 'in that case it would be difficult to connect memory, perception, wish etc. What one person has seen, another cannot recollect or wish or recognise'.² The vital force cannot be the experiencer, for were it so, 'its organs should never cease to function' (as they do in sleep). Thus we should, according to Śamkara, postulate a *subject* which is the real experiencer, apart from the body. Although we do not perceive or apprehend the self, its existence must be inferred;³ and 'the body (the aggregate) is not the Self'.⁴ Unless we posit the Self, our experience (both its causation and its unity) would remain inexplicable.

Mary Calkins, one of the chief exponents of Self-psychology in the West has similar views. She writes, for instance, 'All experience is the experience of some Self and it is meaningless apart from it'.⁵ Charles S. Myers recognises that Self *is* 'involved in the action of apperception, thinking, willing, imagining etc'.⁶ Śamkara's insistence on the Self as the experiencer, and body, senses and mind as only instruments finds its Western counterpart in G. F. Stout's statement: 'Its (body's) attitudes and movements, so far as they differ from those of other material things, appear to be initiated by something inside the organism. They follow on volitions, emotions, painful and pleasant sensations, and the like. These experiences would constitute the inner self, and the body as it presents itself to the external observer is their instrument used in a way more or less analogous to that in which other material instruments are used'.⁷ 'The purpose of the Self', says Śamkara, 'is served by the aggregate of gross and subtle bodies'.

Self is a 'principle distinct from the body and senses, making the latter function';⁸ 'it inwardly rules the complex of senses';⁹ the internal organ and the modes thereof are its objects'.¹⁰ It is the witness of the states of consciousness, seeing, hearing, thinking and knowing.¹¹ This standpoint agrees well with that of the variety of Self-psychologists, who, according to A. H. B. Allen, 'hold the existence of a "pure"

self, an existent in mental life different in kind from any particular acts or particular contents. Such a self could be defined in the following way: It is that to which contents are present as objects, and which is able to act in various ways towards, and take up various attitudes towards these objects. It has a certain continuity greater than that of any of its separate acts, and maintains its identity through these acts. It is also to a greater or lesser degree aware of itself in both these aspects, i.e., aware of itself as other than its objects, and of its continuous self-identity in various acts.¹²

Ego

Apart from the inferential evidence for the existence of 'self' is there any other evidence, more direct and immediate? Yes, says Śaṅkara: Is there anybody that can say, without involving himself in self-contradiction, that 'he is not'?, that *he* does not exist? 'Everyone believes in the existence of Self';¹³ no other proof seems necessary. This argument however leads us to a difficult problem: Is ego—the 'I'—the same as Self? If it is not, what relation does one bear to the other? Two separate terms are used to denote Self and ego: *jīva* and *ātman*. 'Jīva is conscious, lord of the body and bearer of the vital force; and this (view) has popular consent and is in accord with the radical meaning of the word. Now how could *he* become the Self of this *pradhāna* (body) which is not conscious? The Self, however, is (a being's) own nature; and so it being conscious cannot be the nature of the non-conscious body (*pradhāna*)'.¹⁴

We often make statements like 'I go'. Let us pause to consider what the 'I' here stands for. What is it that *goes*? Observation points to the body. Shall we then justifiably identify the 'I' with the body? If so, then obviously we cannot escape the corollary that changes in the body should concomitantly imply changes in the 'I'. But is this in our experience or observation? The little body of the child changes and, as years roll by, changes into an unrecognisably different form of the old man; has the 'I' undergone these

changes? Suppose a man loses his leg in an accident; does his 'I' also lose a part thereof? The healthy body becomes ill; but is there any corresponding healthy 'I' becoming an ill 'I'? Thus we find this factor 'I' relatively constant, despite the mutability and changeability of the body. We cannot, therefore, reasonably identify the 'I' with the body. We also make a statement like 'I see'. What is it that *sees*? The eye. Is 'I' the same as the eye? Nothing then would prevent us from speaking of the nose as 'I', the ear as 'I' and so on; and we should thus postulate as many 'I's' as there are senseorgans. But this is not supported by our experience: we always experience a single 'I'; we say, e.g., '“I” that saw this apple am now touching it'. This dismisses the hypothesis that senseorgan is the 'I'. Consider a different set of illustrations as when we say 'I am unhappy' when our wives or children are ill; what is it that is unhappy? It is certainly not the body nor the senses of the man making that remark: what is meant here is the extension of the personal 'I' on to the social plane, or, to employ an expression of Śamkara, the 'I' is superimposed on outside qualities. Men identify themselves with their wives and children in practical, social affairs; but no argument is needed to prove that each man retains his 'I' in a personal capacity. We have an 'ego', distinct from the physical and the social environments—the physical, consisting of the immediate factors like the body and senseorgans and other factors like the physical objects; and the social in the form of family, communities, state and so on. This environmental aspect is described as 'this' (*idam*) or object, in contradistinction to the 'I' (*aḥam*), or subject. 'This' however refers to the concrete objects, beyond itself; does 'I' also likewise refer to something beyond itself?

It is interesting to note that Śamkara considers both 'I' and 'this' as mere concepts (*pratyaya*), or notions having their specific fields of reference: the former has the subject characterised by consciousness as its 'field' while the latter has objects as its 'field'. They are divergent in their nature and the difference is said to be as much as between light

and darkness. The object is in simple terms 'a thing': physical, inert, incapable of voluntary movement, lacking in sentience; but the Self is dynamic, full of life and equipped with consciousness. The distinction between the two fields is best illustrated by the fact that '*we* know the world' but 'the world does not know us'. The relation in which the ego stands to the object is compared to that of a light to an object: the former enlightens and in its light appears the latter. What is relevant to our inquiry is the view that the expression 'I' refers to the Self. We shall henceforth use the word 'ego' to mean the 'I' or the notion of the Self, and the word 'Self' to mean what the ego refers to.

In the Sāṃkara system of thought, ego is looked upon as a function of the internal organ and this function is termed *viñāna*, as opposed to its other function, namely that of 'this' (*manas*); whereas Self is, by definition, the 'subject of the notion of 'I' (*ahampratyayaviśayin*). Thus the notion of 'I' is contingent upon the function of the internal organ. When, for instance, in sleep the internal organ ceases to function egoity lapses.¹⁵ The self, needless to say, continues even in sleep, although it cannot be denoted as 'I'. The self as related to the environment, and bearing the notion of 'I', is termed the *Jīva*. *Jīva*, we may say, is the individual self characterised by the individuating factor, viz., internal organ, in both of its forms 'I' and 'this' (*antaḥkaraṇopādhi-viśiṣṭa*). The *ātman* however is 'pure and undifferentiated Self'. The root of all this diversity lies in the limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*), chief of which is the internal organ, capable of (and intended for) presenting the world to us. An organism, therefore, is equipped, besides the 'pure Self', with an empirical self also, peculiar and private to that organism, constituted supposedly of the attitudes, thoughts, memories etc., of that organism. The empirical self implies its individuality, and its function is always in relation to the environment; in other words, it is practically the subject. It is this that is designated as 'I' or ego. It is a 'knower' (of the world), whereas the pure Self is a mere witness.¹⁶ It should not, however, be interpreted that there is a duality

of 'selves', one pure and the other empirical. They are but two aspects of the same principle:¹⁷ pure Self is the designation given to the Self in its transcendental nature whereas the empirical self signifies relatedness to the world. The empirical aspect emerges and functions because of the internal organ; and egoity or the notion of 'I' is in fact a function of the internal organ.

In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*¹⁸ there occurs this description: 'Two inseparable companions of fine plumage perch on the self-same tree. One of the two feeds on the delicious fruit, while the other, not tasting of it, looks on'. Śaṁkara takes the two birds in this passage to mean the empirical self and the pure Self: the former is involved in everyday actions while the latter is 'pure, intelligent (conscious) and free in his nature . . . he is the director of both the eater and the thing eaten by the fact of his mere existence as the eternal witness'.¹⁹ Again in the *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya* (1.2.11), commenting on the 'Kāṭhavalī' statement he remarks: The 'two entered into the cave' mentions the duality of 'the individual soul and the highest Self' in the body; and he appears to view this duality as similar to the duality of 'mind and the individual soul'. The distinction between the two phases of the Self lies in that one is an active agent in cognition and other processes, while the other is a 'passive' witness of these processes.

An explanation is offered by Vācaspatimiśra concerning Śaṁkara's views on ego-self problem: 'The conscious self appears in the concept "I" as agent and enjoyer. And for that (self) which is indifferent there cannot occur the capacity either to act or to enjoy. And for that aggregate of the effect (the body) and the organs, i.e., the intellect etc., to which belong the capacities to act and enjoy, there is no consciousness. Hence it is the conscious self that linked to the aggregate of all effect (the body) and the organs, gains capacity to act and enjoy: though self-manifest, yet by inter-mixture with objects like the intellect etc., it somehow becomes the object of the concept "I", the substrate of the "I-ness" and is (variously) designated individual self

(*jīva*), creature (*jantu*), or knower of the field (*kṣetrajña*). The *jīva* indeed is not different from the conscious self . . . the *jīva*, though self-manifest, because of being non-different from the intelligent self, is yet made by the concept "I" fit for empirical usage as agent and enjoyer; hence it is said to be the basis of the concept "I".²⁰ Ego, therefore, is an agent of Self, attending to the actual affairs of the body machine, while Self like the owner has direct contact only with his agent, namely ego, and not with the instruments like mind and senses. Thus, although the existence of Self is pointed out by our egoity, our notion of 'I' is not an attribute of Self.

The Self

The Self is viewed as 'extremely subtle, lodged in the inmost recess (of the body) being concealed by the modifications of consciousness that are caused by worldly objects';²¹ it is 'the witness of all the several processes of the *internal organ*'.²² 'The word "self" in its primary meaning refers to what is conscious only'.²³ 'This *ātman* is itself the light that is pure consciousness, and reveals everything by its own nature of illumination'.²⁴ Self is the inmost and the most intimate entity in any organism; it is to be distinguished from mind and its processes and other vital operations of the body all of which are witnessed by it as objective presentations. Unlike the material, physical stuff that has assumed the form of the subtle and gross body, the nature of Self is consciousness (*caitanya*).

Self, then, is the inner principle of consciousness in a living being.²⁵ It is described as the 'light which is different from one's body and organs, and which illumines them like the external lights such as the sun, but is itself not illumined by anything else'.²⁶ In the darkness we cannot perceive anything, although objects are present. When, however, a lamp is brought (or the sun shines) the objects, which were all the while there but invisible now *appear* to us; our eyes are able to catch the forms of the objects in the presence of some source of light. Just as the eye does not function in the absence of

light, even so no organ (sense or mind) functions without the aid of self. The objects around us, the body, the senses, the vital current, and the mind are all inert being purely material, physical, and composed of parts. Without the light of the self, the collection of body and organs is a mere meaningless confusion. It is an aggregate like a heap of stones; it becomes an organism only when the Self *organises* this inert and material mass. Self being there, functioning as consciousness, the 'blind' senses catch up the 'dumb' objects and present them to the mind to determine, define and interpret, which presentation is grasped by the ego at a subsequent phase. This 'booming buzzing confusion' of varied objects scattered helter-skelter without an order, without a scheme, without a meaning, transforms itself into an orderly, meaningful 'presentation' only so long as it is *experienced*. 'Self is of the nature of experience'.²⁷ In Śamkara's psychology consciousness (*samvit*) and experience (*upalabdhi*) are synonymous.

The consciousness that is Self is 'homogeneous and unbroken'.²⁸ The 'relative' condition of the self which we find around us and characterise as 'I', 'You', 'Mr X' and so on is brought about by the limiting adjuncts such as the internal organ and the body. And there is an unbroken continuity in consciousness: like the light which illumines the objects without a break or pause. When in sleep there is an apparent cessation of this continuity, the absence of actual cognitive processes is due to the absence of objects, and not to the absence of consciousness—even as, notes Śamkara, the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.²⁹

The Self endures through different states of body and mind. It is the unchanging ground from which variegated structures emerge: cognitions, experience, ideas, images and memories. The Self is described as 'the witness of perceptions, pure and unconditioned'.³⁰ The activity that is seen in reality belongs to the body and no activity fails to make some change in what is associated with it; the body (including

mind) is, therefore, continually changing. Self, however, is the constant amidst the variables; it endures all changes that affect body and mind.

Śaṅkara affirms the impossibility of the existence of self independent of body.³¹ He even suggests that self and body should be viewed as 'non-different'.³² The self cannot be conceived as 'without mind', for 'mind constitutes (its) limiting adjunct'³³ and 'as long as this self is in the *samsāra*-state, . . . so long (its) connection with the *buddhi* does not cease'.³⁴ Its relation with the senses is likewise clarified: 'By their (ref. to senses) being *grahas* (seized) is meant that they are bonds by which the individual soul is tied'.³⁵ The *prāṇas* or the vital currents are also connected with the individual self.³⁶ Thus the self is limited to, and defined by, this aggregate-of-body-and-organs. The latter is well known to be inert (*acetana*) and incapable, therefore, of any action of its own accord; it acts only when the self confined to this 'city' illumines and thus directs. The body, of course, is observed to act; activity *does* belong to it—for activity belongs to where it is observed—but the purpose of activity does not belong there but to the self. The self *makes* the body act although it does not itself act. This, however, is not a paradox for 'a thing which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron'.³⁷ The self is the director of all bodily actions, and is therefore styled as the Internal Ruler, and the Lord of city (body). 'The self is capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action as it is the *enjoyer*'.³⁸

How does Self function as the agent of action? The answer is: By illumining. Śaṅkara explains: 'Consciousness (*buddhi*), being transparent and next to Self, easily catches the reflection of self . . . next comes *manas* which catches the reflection of Self through consciousness; then the organs through contact with mind; and lastly the body through the organs. Thus the Self successively illumines with its own consciousness the entire aggregate of body and organs'.³⁹ When the body is ready to act, the senses open their gates

to the outer world, the mind is primed to receive the impressions of forms and names, the vital current is alert and intellect is busy in its managerial office: cognition results. In the case of movements or actions, motor organs will take the place of senses.

Agency of self in action being thus settled, what about the self's experiencership? Even as *buddhi* is practically the 'actor', it is also the experiencer practically and self only indirectly acts or experiences. The self is said to be 'of the nature of the essence of *buddhi*'s qualities, because qualities such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e., the principal characteristics of the self so long as it is implicated in transmigratory existence.⁴⁰

Introspection

The process of self-observation known as introspection has gained currency in Western Psychology as a method of unearthing mental data; Angell long ago defined it as the direct observation of one's own mental processes.⁴¹ The subject or the observer was to direct his attention on to a psychological process during its very course. This has raised a serious doubt whether such a procedure is possible at all, whether what we get thereby is what we aim at, whether we are only chasing one fiction by another. Stout held that introspection is a 'special development of the explicit self-consciousness'. Introspection in the English language is a tame word; it merely means a 'looking within' which, however, is not objectionable or impossible, for only mental processes are involved. But *selbstbeobachtung* in German is troublesome: 'Self' stares us in the face like the mysterious grin of the cheshire cat in the Wonderland of Alice. Even Self is quite mysterious; and to make it *observe itself* would make matters worse. The genius of Wundt, the resourcefulness of Titchener and the labour of the Würzburg men like Külpa, Marbe, Watt and Ach struggled to find for introspection a proper place in scientific psychology, despite its baffling metaphysical implications. Indeed for several decades introspection was employed as a major method in

psychology. Latterly, however, when the Wundtian Self lost its hold on the psychologist's interest, introspection came to refer only to the mental processes. The Behaviourists took objection even to mind and its processes and rejected introspection altogether. At present, introspection as a method has merely a historical value and in use, it only means a 'reflection upon one's experience'.

Śaṅkara has comments to make on introspection as a method of self-observation. The problem of the Self observing itself means for him the subject becoming an object of itself. He rejects the possibility of introspection on two counts: the nature of Self and the nature of observation. Observation or cognition is contingent upon the duality of subject-object, which is bridged by senseorgans and the mind. We observe a tree because the object which is 'out there' and the Self which is within are connected by the mind streaming out through the senses. But Self is beyond both senses and mind.⁴² Thus even if self were to be an object there would be no possibility of its observation, owing to the absence of the instruments of observation. 'As fire does not burn itself, so Self does not know itself, and the knower can have no knowledge of a thing that is not its object'.⁴³ 'If it be suggested', Śaṅkara further observes, 'that the Self can be both the knower and the knowable, we argue that it is impossible, for Self is altogether indivisible'; and 'it cannot be that the Self reaches to itself, because there is no difference within the Self'.⁴⁴ The familiar objection that is raised against introspection that it implies the duplication of Self is admirably stated by Śaṅkara: 'All that is thinkable cannot be thought of except by the thinker (i.e., the self), mind being only an instrument. If so, what would be the result? . . . That which thinks of all will only be the thinker and never the thinkable; and there is no other thinker of the thinker when Self is to be thought of by the Self. Or, the same *Ātman* should be divided into two forms as the thinker and the thinkable, just as a bamboo is split into two: this is absurd'.⁴⁵ Hence the impossibility of introspection.

He also suggests the unnaturalness of such a process. He asserts that our instruments of observation are by nature characterised by an out-going tendency.⁴⁶ We naturally, and for the major part of our lives, think of the outer world, and sometimes when we turn our attention to 'ourselves' we are concerned with mental acts and attitudes—which are, of course, objective to, and different from, the self, or the observer. 'Nor has the thinker any time left to *think* of himself as he is always engaged in *thinking* of the thinkable'.⁴⁷ Besides only one mental activity can occur at a time: when one thinks of something, he cannot think of another thing at the same time. Attempting to bring about a process where and when another has already been on is futile.⁴⁸ All introspection is at best a retrospection only.

But Śamkara does not reject the possibility of observing our mental processes. And this, because the *observer* happens to be the Self while the *observed* are the modifications of the internal organ, which are but objects for the Self. Mind, however, cannot observe its own processes, as it is not in the nature of mind to be an observer; it is meant only to convey the facts of the outer world to the Self. And Self cannot observe itself as it cannot at once be object and subject. Further, mind cannot observe the Self because it is inert and objectively oriented. But nothing prevents the Self from being the observer of mental processes. Śamkara holds that the Self 'is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ'.⁴⁹ Thus if introspection is defined as the 'observation of mental processes' it is a possibility, according to Śamkara, for there is distinction between the subject and object. His view about the Self is succinctly stated thus: 'It can neither be striven after, nor avoided'.⁵⁰

Self-Psychology

In the West there are psychologists who are styled as self-psychologists, prominent among whom are Mary Calkins, William Stern, James Ward, Francis Aveling, Franz Brentano and G. F. Stout. There are others like Charles Spearman and William McDougall, who employ the

concept of Self but refrain from making a dogma of it. We may in passing consider the chief tenets of their views.

Self-psychology, according to Mary Calkins, has three basic conceptions: Self, object, and the Self's relation or attitude towards its objects. Like Śaṅkara, she also points to experience as the infallible evidence for the existence of Self; all experience is the experience of some Self and is meaningless apart from that Self. 'Anything less than self-consciousness would not be consciousness at all. To be conscious is to be conscious of a conscious self'.⁵¹ She differs, however, from Śaṅkara in identifying the 'I' with the Self; she defines Self as what everyone means by such expressions as 'I am ashamed of myself', 'I appeal to you, yourself';⁵² and introspection is her court of appeal. Śaṅkara's way of ascertaining the existence of Self is different: 'Self is not, in any person's case, adventitious, not established through the so-called instruments of apprehension: It rather is self-established . . . the Self, as being the abode of energy that acts through the instruments of apprehension, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible . . . for it is the essential nature of him who refutes'.⁵³ And further Śaṅkara regards Self as not identical with the 'I' but as the 'object of the notion "I"'. The Self, according to Calkins, possesses these properties: (1) a totality, by which is meant a psychophysical organism; (Śaṅkara also writes: 'the body, sense-organs, Mind and the Intellect . . . it is all these that creatures name as self');⁵⁴ (2) uniqueness, in the sense that 'I am I' and 'you are you' (Śaṅkara ascribes this individuality to the limiting adjuncts); (3) identity, or persistence through various states of the body and mind; (4) changingness, in the sense that the 'I' of the child will undergo a series of changes before it becomes the 'I' of the adult; (Śaṅkara recognises change but ascribes it to the body-and-mind and not to the Self); and (5) relatedness to the objects or consciousness. Calkins, however, appears to hold that consciousness is always a relatedness to an object while Śaṅkara admits the possibility of consciousness even when relatedness does not obtain.

E. A. McGamble corrects Calkins in favour of Śamkara regarding her introspective evidence. He writes that Self is evidenced not 'by introspection, but *in* introspection. . . The Self is the introspector. When I can see my own eyes without a mirror, then I shall be able to find my own self by introspection'.⁵⁵

The subject, says James Ward, is 'at first as always, that which lives, which thinks, and feels and acts, which attends to and is pleased by its sensations and movements';⁵⁶ that is to say, experiencer. Morton Prince in a strong plea for the recognition of consciousness in the study of psychology says that consciousness is 'a cause of the bodily reactions through which the needs of the organism are fulfilled'.⁵⁷ William McDougall approaches the problem of Self thus: 'The most general and fundamental facts about experience as we know it or enjoy it, are two. First, experience or experiencing is always experiencing of something, it is always a thinking about some object even when, as in psychologising that object is itself an experiencing or thinking. Secondly, all experience or thinking is the experience or thinking of *someone*, some subject, some person, some organism . . . whenever we refer to a fact of experience, we imply *someone* thinking of *something*'. 'Experiencing is an activity of some being who experiences something or somewhat'.⁵⁸ Scheerer advancing his criticism of the Gestalt school of thought emphasised the need for a proper recognition of Self. 'Employing Stern's dictum that there can be no gestalt without a gestalter, Scheerer believes that the configurationists belittle the active modifications of the self which occur whenever a thing transforms its meaning. . . These variations are not traceable to the objective datum or thing (*Sache*) but must result from the history of the individual self (person)'.⁵⁹

Of the three neogenetic laws Charles Spearman formulated the first refers to 'lived experience'. 'A person tends to know himself and items of his own experience'.⁶⁰ Here evidently Spearman distinguishes between the person (i.e., Self) and the experiences (i.e., mental processes): but this notion of

the Self is attributable to direct experience. It is, as it were, the first experience, simple and 'primeval'; cognition and other mental processes are later events. Spearman favouring the commonsense view, lists four chief characteristics of Self: substantiality, persistence, simplicity and consciousness.⁶¹ Warren defined Self as 'the individual regarded as conscious of his own continuing identity and of his relation to environment'.⁶² Brennan defined it as 'the actual kernel of a man's being, which remains unchanged through all the physiological and mental variations that each individual undergoes'.⁶³ Griffith favours the view that 'Self is not merely an organisation to which things happen. It is a patterned system of tensions which, in its total character, impresses itself upon other people through the medium of social relations'.⁶⁴

REFERENCES

- ¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśāstra* (Mādhavānanda's Tr.) Advaita Asrama, Mayavati, Almora. p. 273.
- ² *Chāndogyaśāstra*, 7.1.4.
- ³ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.14.
- ⁴ *Psychological Review*, 1906, XIII, p. 63 f.
- ⁵ *British J. of Psychology*, 1913, p. 137 f.
- ⁶ Stout, *op. cit.*, p. 661-662.
- ⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśāstra*, 2.5.14.
- ⁸ *Ibid.*, 3.4.1.
- ⁹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.19.
- ¹⁰ *Vedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, verse 457.
- ¹¹ *Muṇḍakaśāstra*, 2.2.6.
- ¹² *The Self in Psychology*, Kegan Paul, 1936, p. 24.
- ¹³ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.
- ¹⁴ 'Jīva . . . (is) . . . the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the self of the non-intelligent pradhāna? By 'self' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent jīva cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent pradhāna. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent

Brahman, to which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'self' with reference to the jīva is quite adequate'. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.6.

¹⁵ 'Egoity is not the self, because of its non-presentation in sleep' *Vivaraṇāprameyasamgraha*, 1941, Andhra University, p. 121.

¹⁶ Citsukha emphasises the difference between *Draṣṭṛ* (Seer) and *Pramāṭṛ* (cogniser). Cf. *Tattvapradīpikā*.

¹⁷ 'The Self within is one only; two internal selves are not possible'. (*Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.21)

¹⁸ *Op. cit.*, 3.1.1.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 135, *bhāṣya* on the above.

²⁰ *Bhāmatī*, pp. 40-41.

²¹ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 2.12.

²² *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 4.3.21.

²⁵ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 3.10.

²⁶ *Bṛhadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 4.3.6.

²⁷ *Vivaraṇāprameyasamgraha*, IXC1 (p. 116).

²⁸ *Bṛhadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 2.1.20.

²⁹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.18.

³⁰ *Īśāvāsyabhāṣya*, 1.6.

³¹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.3.

³² *Ibid.*, 4.3.14.

³³ *Ibid.*, 1.3.14.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.3.30.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 2.4.6.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 2.4.17.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 2.2.2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1.2.19.

³⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 4.3.7.

⁴⁰ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.29.

⁴¹ Moore, J. S.: *Foundations of Psychology*, 1821, p. 42.

⁴² *Bṛhadāraṇyākabhāṣya*, 3.9.26.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 2.4.14.

⁴⁴ *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, second valli.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁷ *Aitareyabhāṣya.*
- ⁴⁸ *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 4.1.
- ⁴⁹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1.1.4.
- ⁵¹ *Psychological Review*, 1906, XIII. p. 68.
- ⁵² *History of Psychology in Autobiography*, (Ed. Carl Murchison).
Vol. I, 1930, 45 f.
- ⁵³ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.7.
- ⁵⁴ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.18.1.
- ⁵⁵ *Psychological Bulletin*, 12, p. 196.
- ⁵⁶ *Mind*, 1887, Oct., p. 567.
- ⁵⁷ *Psychologies of 1925*, (Ed. C. Murchison), p. 211.
- ⁵⁸ *Outline of Psychology*, Methuen, p. 40, 221.
- ⁵⁹ Hartmann, G. W.: *Gestalt Psychology*, Ronald, N.Y. 1935,
p. 384.
- ⁶⁰ *Nature of Intelligence and Principles of Cognition.*
- ⁶¹ *Psychology Down the Ages*, Vol. I, Cambridge, 1937, p. 390.
- ⁶² *A Dictionary of Psychology*, p. 244.
- ⁶³ *General Psychology*, Mcmillan 1938, p. 422.
- ⁶⁴ *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, Illinois, 1943, p. 610 ff.

V. STATES OF THE SELF

The Three States

The Self, in so far as it is connected with the body, is said to have three states: wakefulness, dream and sleep. It is impossible for the three states to occur simultaneously, for by a state of the Self is meant the action of the entire organism. And no organism is an exception to these states; they are universal. 'It is well known that *all* living creatures pass through the waking, dreaming and sleeping conditions *by turns*'.¹ The distinguishing characteristics of the three states are briefly enunciated by Śaṅkara thus: 'The individual soul (*jīva*) is called *awake* as long as it apprehends the external objects being connected with them by way of mind's modifications (which thus constitute the limiting adjuncts of the soul), and identifies itself with the body, which in fact is one of the external objects. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term "mind". When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e., the subtle and the gross bodies), and on the consequent absence of modifications due to adjuncts, it is in a state of deep sleep, merged in the self as it were, then it is said to have gone to itself'.² It is pertinent here to note that dream is not a sub-state as it were within the state of sleep: real sleep is dreamless. It is a distinct and independent state; but he is aware of the fact that dreams do not occur in the waking state; dream always requires the resting of the 'gross' body, the cessation of the sense function and the absence of external stimuli (i.e., presentations). Nevertheless dream cannot occur when the mind ceases to function, as will happen in sleep: it requires not only the impressions from the waking state but also the 'wanderings' of the mind through them. Thus dream, for its occurrence, demands that the body should not be awake, i.e., aware of the external presentations, and that it should not be asleep completely. It is the function of the 'subtle' body whereas wakefulness is the function of the 'gross' body; and sleep is marked by the absence of both.

We are aware, of course, that sleep and wakefulness follow a regular order of occurrence, a diurnal periodicity. But how about dreams? Śaṅkara holds that the occurrence of dream follows the same law;³ but while we are aware of the periodicity of the former two states, we are only infrequently aware of dreaming; dreaming does not *appear* to be as recurrent or regular as wakefulness or sleep. Śaṅkara nowhere explains or justifies this position, but he seems to be referring to the fact that we do not remember all our dreams. For an even more extreme position, we should turn to Wilhelm Stekel who writes: 'There is no such thing as dreamless sleep, but only an unwillingness to remember dreams. We dream all night, without intermission: and all day as well. The dream accompanies us from the hour of birth till the hour of death'.⁴

We often believe that only human beings dream. We observe the lower animals asleep and they are awake; but they do not give evidence of dreaming. It is also believed that the ability to dream depends on the ability to form images which ability is perhaps restricted to human beings. But Śaṅkara does not subscribe to this notion; he states in definite terms that all organisms dream, sleep and are awake; these being the states of the self there are no exceptions. Whether the animals lower than man dream has not been as yet definitely settled in modern psychology: but 'there are observations enough', writes Nathaniel Kleitman, 'on animals to show that many of them, the horse, the cow, and particularly the dog, probably dream while asleep'.⁵

The Waking State

Let us consider the state of wakefulness (*jāgradavasthā*). It is characterised by knowledge obtained through the functions of the senseorgans. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī describes the state thus: 'Comprehension of objects simultaneously with the operation of an organ of sense'.⁶ Śaṅkara himself has described it as 'connection with the various external organs by means of the modifications of mind'.⁷ The self knows the world 'only as limited by the internal

organ and accompanied by a *vr̥tti* of some senseorgan'.⁸ The mind flows out through one of the sense outlets and, assuming the diverse forms of the objects, cognises. There can be no cognition if the senses do not function as gateways. Thus the waking state is characterised by the alertness and activity of the senses: one is awake so long as stimulations from the outer world incessantly stream in and engage the mind. The self is here marked by outward direction (*bahih-prajña*); to be conscious of the external objects distinct from itself, it employs the senses of knowledge, organs of action, the vital force with its five-fold functions, and the internal organ in its two aspects of *manas* and *buddhi*. One is awake as long as he is *attending*, or *active*. 'The individual self pervades the *buddhi* with a reflection of its own manifested consciousness . . . when it perceives the expansion of the *buddhi*, it is waking experience'.⁹ Expansion of *buddhi* signifies the assumption of new and diverse forms in accordance with the stimulating influences.

Modern views of wakefulness are not very different. The widely held theory is that there is a 'wakefulness center whose continuous activity is necessary to maintain a state of wakefulness'.¹⁰ Its activity is due to the constant stream of impulses to that center, 'which prevent the onset of sleep'. The streams of impulses are through the various senseorgans. Hence the justification of the importance which Śaṁkara attached to the function of the senseorgans in wakefulness.

Sleep

Sleep is characterised by the cessation of the functions of all senseorgans and the consequent absence of particular cognitions. During sleep, says Śaṁkara, 'while the processes of breathing go on uninterruptedly, the activity of the senseorgans is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time of waking only'.¹¹ The word 'śayana' (lying) is taken to signify 'the cessation of the activity of the senses . . . cessation of the partial knowledge produced by the senses'.¹² 'Senses (in sleep) cease activity and prāṇa and other airs keep watch

for the support of the body'.¹³ The activities like breathing and blood circulation, which are responsible for the maintenance of the body will continue (and this is the difference between sleep and death) while the activities which serve to contact the presentations will lapse. The sleeper is alive so far as his body is concerned, but dead so far as the external world is concerned: he has severed his bond with the world. The definition of sleep offered by Henri Pieron hits the same mark: it is 'a suspension of the complex sensory-motor activities that bring the organism into relation with the environment'.¹⁴ The sleeper does not cognise, nor does he *act*; and there is no other way of transacting with the presentations. Ivan Pavlov subscribed to a similar view: absence of stimulation brings about the inhibition of the whole cortex and this 'internal inhibition widely radiated' is sleep.¹⁵

Śaṅkara following the lead of the Upaniṣadic thinkers subscribes to the theory of the 'unity of senses' in sleep. 'The senses of man in sleep become all blended into one. As all the senses together, during waking, act on behalf of some master and are dependent (on him), therefore their coalition in one is reasonable in sleep, because of their dependence and acting together'.¹⁶ When we are awake the senses will be in their appropriate rôles discharging the function for which each is meant: the eye will grasp the forms that are enclosed within the mass of presentation, the ear sounds, the skin touches and so on. The total field of presentation is broken up as it were into numerous fields of sense-objects, and the senseorgans sort them out, select the relevant details and convey them to the mind. Thus the function of the senseorgans and the mind is effective in bringing us 'particular cognitions'. When in sleep the sense gateways are closed and the impressions of presentations are suppressed the mind perforce (unless it be in dream) has to rest, for its activity is dependent on the sense-material, and therefore the scope for particular cognitions is denied. In the waking state we can say 'It is a table', 'I am happy', 'I talk to you' and so on. Why now do we not do so in

sleep? Śaṃkara answers: 'Because of unity. Incidentally it is implied that variety is the cause of particular consciousness'.¹⁷ When particular cognitions are impossible, what results is 'general knowledge'. 'When the mind, like fire in a log of wood, pervades the whole body in its form as general knowledge (as opposed to special modifications), then (one) sleeps'.¹⁸ Knowledge here is without the instrumentality of either the senses or the mind: it is an indistinguishable, partless mass (*prajñānaghana*) of consciousness. In sleep 'consciousness' does not lapse; only object-consciousness and self-consciousness do not function. The nature of the Self being consciousness it lapses in no state whether it be dreaming, sleeping or waking. The limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) produce the object-consciousness and self-consciousness; when they rest in sleep a general consciousness results wherein neither the object nor the ego is cognised. This is what is meant by its description as 'marked by lack of consciousness'.¹⁹ The object- and the ego-consciousness spring up again immediately on waking, when connection with mind and senses is reinstituted; this relation is said to 'exist potentially during deep sleep' and to become again manifest at the time of waking'.²⁰ While thus the waking state is characterised by particular cognitions, the state of sleep is marked by 'general knowledge' or 'mass of consciousness'.

'Sleep', Śaṃkara holds, 'is the natural state'.²¹ He explains: 'Perception in waking and dreaming moments is a modification of the original state. That state of a thing which is dependent on external causes is not its true condition, for this cannot subsist in the absence of the external cause. Therefore sleep being the natural condition, there is no modification there, as in waking or dreaming'.²² The waking state requires the help of the senses, the mind and the objects; without any one of them, wakefulness is impossible. Dreams require the aid of impressions of waking presentations as well as the function of mind. But sleep is not known to need such aid; when the forces and functions that condition and maintain the other two states cease to

operate 'the self returns to itself' (*svam apīta*). Sleep, thus, is the natural state of the Self (as it is absorbed in itself then) and the other two states are merely 'disturbances' and departures from this tranquil state.

It is interesting to note that among modern authorities, Kleitman favours the view of regarding wakefulness as 'representing an addition of activities over sleep' rather than as 'involving activities of a different kind'.²³ The new-born babe remains asleep unless, and until, affarent impulses of the necessary type and frequency arouse the wakefulness center into some activity. As soon as these affarent impulses abate, the babe returns to the state of primitive sleep or mainly vegetative existence.²⁴ For wakefulness the dependence on the affarent impulses which excite the 'wakefulness center' is a necessity, whereas its absence finds the organism back in its pristine state, that is to say, a set of forces or influences keeps the 'naturally sleepy' organism awake, and only so long as the influence lasts the organism is awake. Haenel holds that the primary state of psychic life is the absence of consciousness and that the cortical cells are originally in a state of indifference; 'they are made to function through the stimulating effect of affarent impulses exteroceptive, interoceptive and proprioceptive'.²⁵ Claparède regarded sleep as 'instinctive', which amounts to saying that it is natural; and Coriat held that while waking life involves muscular tension, sleep inhibits it;²⁶ tension obviously is 'an artificially induced' state, its inhibition being more natural than its induction.

'During the waking state, one gets tired by experiences of various troubles in the shape of pleasures and pains, and then follows a cessation of the over-worked organs from their activities . . . all the senses having been drawn in by the *prāṇa*, which alone keeps awake in the body; it is for shaking off the fatigue that the human self returns to its own self'.²⁷ The waking life involves activity which fatigues the organism, and its efficiency is lowered; and unless the fatigue is removed, the organism is incapable of further activity. Fatigue can be removed only by rest or inactivity, and the

best rest is sleep. The tired organism goes to sleep and wakes up refreshed. Śaṁkara speaks of the 'unhappiness or discomfort caused by the fatigue which, in turn, is caused by the continuous assumption of the various forms of objects',²⁸ which is removed by sleep. Sleep is therefore termed '*ānandamaya*' or full of bliss, because of the absence of fatigue caused by contact with the world. Śaṁkara apparently believes that the mind, more than the senses, will be fatigued during the waking moments: he describes sleep as 'rest for mind'.²⁹ Mind is active both in association with the senses and by itself; the fatigue caused thereby is central. Śaṁkara holds thus that central fatigue is responsible for sleep. The modern hyperemia theory of sleep holds that there will be a congestion of blood in the brain due to wakeful activities, which prevents the brain's normal functioning. The anemia theory, on the other hand, attributes sleep to the lessened flow of blood to the brain. Both theories recognise the importance of brain, the organ of mind in the causation of sleep. Kleitman recognises the fatigability of the wakefulness center (in the hypothalamus) together with the neuromuscular and sensory fatigue and the fatigue of the cerebral cortex as component factors in the production of sleep.³⁰

Dreams

We have considered Śaṁkara's views concerning profound sleep, a state of absolute rest marked by the complete cessation of the activity of the senses as well as of mind. But sleep is not always so deep; there is in our experience such a thing as light sleep, wherein the occurrence of dreams is observed. Sleep, light or profound, is characterised by the absence of sense-action: but in light sleep the mind will not be totally at rest as in deep sleep. This continued activity of mind in the absence of sense function is responsible for the state of dream. 'When all the senses are absorbed in the mind and when the mind is not absorbed, the *Ātman* as *manomaya* sees dreams',³¹ and 'one dreams only when the organs have ceased to function'.³² When the mind functions together with the senses, it is the waking

experience; when both of them cease to function, it is deep sleep; when, however, the mind functions but the senses rest, it is dream. By virtue of occupying the mid-position (in between wakefulness and sleep) the dream state is styled as *sandhyā-sthāna*. 'That place is the intermediate place because it lies where the two worlds, or else the place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join'.³³ That it is characterised thus implies that dreams possess characteristics of both wakefulness and sleep. It is a 'kind of perception',³⁴ but actually the organism is inactive,³⁵ it is asleep, albeit lightly. Without a paradox, dream may be described as wakefulness within sleep, not being broadly awake nor completely asleep. 'Dream is seeing within the body, as if he were awake, by one who has turned away from waking consciousness'.³⁶

Dream, then, is a positive experience, unlike sleep. While no one is able to recall what happened to him during his deep sleep (except the later refreshing feeling that he slept well) one can recall and relate the dream experiences. This is because in dream 'the instruments of the self are not altogether at rest'.³⁷ Although the organs that are responsible for receiving the presentations from the world have ceased to function, the internal organ (mind) will still be 'awake'. 'The self wanders about in dreams together with the mind only'.³⁸ But the mind in its function is intimately connected with sense organs: can it function in any condition altogether independently of the latter? If it cannot, how then, can we explain the rôle of mind in dream when no senseorgan is active? It is in one's experience that in dream things appear to us exactly as in wakefulness: we see forms, hear sounds, move about, and talk. But all the events occur when the body is at rest. The explanation is that in dream, mind functions not in association with senses proper, but with the impressions got through them previously in the waking state.

The apparent objectivity and the presentational character of the dream is explained thus: 'Whatever has been seen, such as son, friend etc., the mind influenced by unconscious

impressions, thinks from ignorance that it sees the son, friend etc., produced from such impressions'.³⁹ It is thus that we perceive the dream-world as real so long as we are dreaming: only on waking up, it is 'sublated'; looking back we regard it as mere illusion or vision, in contradistinction with the concrete reality of wakefulness. We fail to grasp the dreaminess of the dreams while dreaming, because the sources of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), namely the senses, will not be functioning; mind, being only an auxiliary to the *pramāṇa* (senses),⁴⁰ cannot give us either the notion of reality or the notion of illusoriness independently. Because the impressions of the senses are there and function as *pramāṇas* by proxy, the notion of objectivity and reality emerges and persists until the senses wake up to resume their function.

Śaṅkara recognises the low integration and lack of critical faculty in dreams, and offers as illustrations the fantastic space-time frames peculiar to dream experience.⁴¹ Although, for instance, the duration of the dream is all too brief, the dreamer experiences his having travelled a hundred *yojanas*. The dreamer starts from the land of Kurus and arrives at the land of Pāñcālas (all the while being on his bed) where he wakes up; nobody, not even the dreamer, would assume for a moment that the sleeper in Kurus has really woke up in the Pāñcālas. Dream occurs always within the body; but we see in dreams huge mansions, an army of persons, cars, horses and so on. It is ludicrous to imagine that these presentations could be objectively located inside the body. The space, time and objects have not the same significance, meaning and relation in dreams as in wakefulness. What are impossible and absurd in the waking state are easy possibilities and sensible enough in dreams. The implication is that the dreamer's critical faculties are at a low level.

Kleitman observes: 'The highest cortical levels have as their function the correct analysis and interpretation of incoming impulses, to form new associations and to exert a certain inhibitory effect upon thought and action, as a result of previous experience or training. This censorship, or

control over desires and fear, is absent, greatly reduced or distorted in sleep because the highest levels do not function in that state'.⁴² William McDougall observes in the same vein: 'in dreaming, we live in a plane of primitive credulity'.⁴³ Sigmund Freud holds that the ego is 'a coherent organisation of the mental processes'⁴⁴ and explains the bizzare, weird, and fanciful nature of dreams as attempts to escape the vigilance of the censor, the mechanism active in the waking state, finding for ego a place in the world (reality principle). Henri Bergson, among philosophers, appears to hold similar views but does not give expression to them clearly: 'We are, during all the waking hours, continually in a state of tension, arising from the process of adapting ourselves to our environment and so while we clearly perceive the outstanding things around us, we are blind to many others that penetrate our minds and leave their impress all unknown to our conscious selves. In sleep, unmarked impressions of this kind, now that the state of tension is no more, assume an equal importance with the conscious impressions and in the sequel our sense of proportion is quite lost'.⁴⁵ In the above context, we find sufficient justification for Śaṅkara's view that dreams are illusory (as opposed to the reality of wakefulness) and are marked by a lack of critical faculty, evidenced by fantastic space, time and object relationships.

Śaṅkara explains the substance of dreams as mere impressions or memory images. Explaining a *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage he writes: 'He (the dreamer) detaches a portion of the world (we experience in the waking state), that is, is tinged by the impressions of the present life . . . makes it inert or unconscious . . . and himself creates a dream-body composed of past impressions. . . . This creation too is the consequence of his past work . . . consisting in the perception of sense-objects, the mind itself being modified in the form of diverse impressions of the latter. It is these modifications that then take the place of objects . . . with this his own lustre as object and revealing it (the mass of impressions of sense-objects) by his own light, that is, as

the detached subject or witness possessing constant vision, he dreams'.⁴⁶ What the real objects are for one who is awake, that the impressions are for the dreamer. Thus the dream is fundamentally of the nature of memory: all dreams are in other words reproductive. 'In dreams and remembrance we notice only things seen before'.⁴⁷ Only familiar things occur in dreams.

But Śamkara recognises a difference between memory (or recall) and dreams: the former is relatively a faithful reproduction, whereas in dreams the creative element predominates. By virtue of its being located in the *sandhyā-sthāna* there is scope for creation.⁴⁸ Visions of the waking life are acts of immediate consciousness, solely dependent on the objects around, while sleep knows no objects at all and is not conscious of anything; in between these two is creation, bringing into existence something new out of the material that already exists. The self 'sees in dreams his own greatness, i.e., assumes diverse forms in the nature of subject and object'.⁴⁹ This assumption of diverse forms is not merely a 'reconstruction of experience', but creation of new patterns (on the basis of impressions) 'by his own ability'.⁵⁰ Śamkara approvingly cites a passage from the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (2.5.8): 'He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep, shapes one lovely thing after another'.⁵¹ For him the dreams are not mere reproductions but also creations. It is now well known that elaboration is an essential feature of dreams; and the psychoanalytical standpoint regarding dreams emphasises this feature: 'There is in dream activity nothing but transformation of previously formed mental processes. . . . The dream activity proper is a process more distant from waking mental life than even the most determined detractor of dream-activities would maintain. It is not merely more careless, incorrect, incomplete, forgetful and illogical than waking thought, but it is something that qualitatively is absolutely different from this, so that the two cannot be compared'.⁵² What for Freud is the latent content is to Śamkara the stock of impressions available for the dreamer; the manifest content is the actual dream experience, exhibit-

ing markedly the process of creation (condensation, elaboration, displacement, symbolisation and so on). Carl Jung's definition of dream as 'the subliminal picture of the psychological condition of the individual in his waking state'⁵³ is also instructive in understanding Śaṅkara's view about creativity in dreams.

Is there a motivation in the dream phenomenon? Creation implies a creator who is a conscious agent and whose purpose the creation serves. The creator of the dreams is, of course, the self-in-the-dream-state (*taijasa*). Now, why does one dream? 'In the waking state one gets troubled owing to the manifold activities of the body and organs; he obtains some relief by discarding them in dreams'.⁵⁴ Waking life indeed demands actions by way of adjustments and adaptations; to satisfy the demands of life completely is impossible, and inadequacies and imperfections produce dissatisfaction; and dissatisfaction is a source of misery. Every organism instinctively tries to avoid misery⁵⁵ and obtain pleasure. And so the self attempts to obtain the pleasure by dreaming. The motivation in dream then is the gratification of desires or wish-fulfilment. 'One who does not desire does not dream', says an Upaniṣad, and Śaṅkara also.⁵⁶ Elsewhere, Śaṅkara asks with emphasis: 'How is dream possible without wish?'⁵⁷

But Śaṅkara recognises that wish is not the only motivational principle in dreams. He points out that many of our dreams are unpleasant (*aniṣṭam svapnam*) and says that the 'dreaming soul is not able to create from its mere wishes'.⁵⁸ As causative factors he points to the actions performed in the waking state (which are responsible for the impressions available for dream creation) as well as to the curtailment or obscurity of knowledge and power of the self (*jñāna-aīśvarya-tirobhāva*) brought about by *avidyā* or ignorance (due to its connection with the body and organs). Also, dreams occur by necessity, prompted by the type of actions during wakefulness. Śaṅkara, thus recognises three factors operating in a dream: ignorance (*avidyā*), desire (*kāma*) and action (*karma*).⁵⁹

What then is the significance of a dream? Is it just a meaningless occurrence, unreal and absurd? Śaṁkara distinguishes between the indicator, *sūcaṇa*, (the actual dream-picture, or the manifest content) and the indicated, *sūcyamāna*, (the latent content) and asserts that while the actual dream-forms are unreal (as they are sublated on waking), the thing indicated is real.⁶⁰ Dream, that is to say, is not a meaningless phenomenon, however fantastic its forms. Śaṁkara makes a reference to those 'who understand the science of dreams' and cites some of the symbols and their meaning, as interpreted by them.⁶¹

And the dream is not a mere illusion, having no effect on the bodily processes. Not only does the fact of experiencing it (*avagati*) persist on waking, but sometimes it has actual physiological consequences. Śaṁkara illustrates the point: 'The dreamer having intercoursed with an imaginary lady in his dream finds his bed wet'.⁶²

In the West there are conflicting opinions regarding dream motivation. Joseph Jastrow lays emphasis on the past sensory experiences; Knight Dunlop shifts the importance to physiological causes like sleeping in odd positions and sensory factors such as sound or smell that disturb sleep; H. L. Hollingworth and L. H. W. Horton regard dreams as misinterpretations of sensory impressions; F. Pierce thinks of dreams as carry-overs from the daily doings; A. Adler explains dreams as symbolic portrayal of unsolved problems; and for the Gestaltists dream is a way of satisfaction for the tension set up by an unfinished business during wakefulness. For Sigmund Freud dream is a wish-fulfilment; for Carl G. Jung a compensatory function of the unconscious (a psychological adjustment essential for balanced action); for W. H. R. Rivers dream is essentially reproductive (of strong emotions excited by repressed instinct, prominently fear); and for William McDougall dream exhibits some conative tendency.

REFERENCES

- ¹ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ² *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.9.
- ³ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ⁴ *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Liveright, N.Y. 1943, Vol. I, p. 164.
- ⁵ *Sleep and Wakefulness*, Univ. of Chicago, 1939, p. 153.
- ⁶ *Siddhāntabindu*, G.O.S. Baroda 1933, p. 263.
- ⁷ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.9.
- ⁸ *Siddhāntabindu*, p. 265.
- ⁹ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.19.
- ¹⁰ Kleitman, N.: *Sleep and Wakefulness*, 1939, p. 507.
- ¹¹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.23.
- ¹² *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 2.21.
- ¹³ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ¹⁴ Cited in Kleitman, *op. cit.*, p. 3.
- ¹⁵ *Conditioned Reflexes* (Tr. by Anrep) Oxford, 1927.
- ¹⁶ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.1.
- ¹⁷ *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.21.
- ¹⁸ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.6.
- ¹⁹ C. T. Morgan: *Physiological Psychology*, McGraw Hill, 1943, p. 375.
- ²⁰ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.31.
- ²¹ *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, second vallī.
- ²² *Ibid.*
- ²³ *Sleep and Wakefulness*, 1932, p. 503.
- ²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 518.
- ²⁵ Schlaf and Schlafzentrum: *Med. Klin*; 21:1258-61, 1935; cited Kleitman, *op. cit.*, p. 498.
- ²⁶ Dorcus and Shaffer: *Text-Book of Abnormal Psychology*, 1934.
- ²⁷ *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 6.8.1.
- ²⁸ *Gauḍapāda-kārikābhāṣya*, 'Works of Śaṅkara', Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, Vol. 5, p. 95.
- ²⁹ *Satasloki*, V. 68.
- ³⁰ Kleitman, *op. cit.*, p. 513.
- ³¹ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ³² *Brhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.14.

- ³³ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.2.
- ³⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 2.1.18.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4.3.15.
- ³⁶ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.1.
- ³⁷ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.40.
- ³⁸ *Ibid.*
- ³⁹ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ⁴⁰ *Bhedadhikṣkāra* of Nṛsiṃhāśramī, p. 13.
- ⁴¹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.3.
- ⁴² Kleitman, *op. cit.*, p. 159.
- ⁴³ *Outline of Abnormal of Psychology*, 1934, p. 155.
- ⁴⁴ *The Ego and the Id.*, 1935, p. 15.
- ⁴⁵ Restated in A. J. J. Ratcliff: *A History of Dreams*, Lond., 1932, pp. 104-105.
- ⁴⁶ *Op. cit.*, p. 634-635 also: 'The modifications of the mind are a little of this world, i.e., are its impressions; the former detaching the latter—in other words, being transformed into the impressions of the chariots etc., and being stimulated by the individual's previous work, which is the cause of their perception, appear as the sense objects'. (*Ibid.*, 4.3.10, p. 637). 'In dreams, the perception is indistinct and produced (i.e., obscured) by the reminiscences of the waking state'. (*Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 6.5.).
- ⁴⁷ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaḥbhāṣya*, 4.3.6.
- ⁴⁸ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.1.
- ⁴⁹ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ⁵⁰ *Śataśloki*, v. 77 f.
- ⁵¹ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.3.
- ⁵² Jones, Ernst: *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1923, p. 229.
- ⁵³ Jung, C. G.: *Modern Man in Search of Soul*, Kegan Paul, 1933.
- ⁵⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.15.
- ⁵⁵ *Hastāmalaḥbhāṣya*, (opening sentence).
- ⁵⁶ *Gauḍapādaḥbhāṣya*, 1.5.
- ⁵⁷ *Sarvavedāntasārasaṅgraha*, v. 607.
- ⁵⁸ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.6.
- ⁵⁹ *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- ⁶⁰ *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.7.
- ⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 3.2.4.
- ⁶² *Prabodhasudhākara*, v. 102.

VI. THE MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEM

Purpose

Experience and observation show that only living beings 'act', i.e., think, perceive, and move.¹ Action, therefore implies life or consciousness. Action is not manifest in material, lifeless things like stones; but when we do see a stone move, we look for the cause of that action elsewhere—in something which is living and conscious, perhaps the man who threw the stone. 'For we observe that things like clay and chariots are engaged in activities tending towards some goal, only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters and horses'.² Thus although activity is seen *in* the inanimate things, it does not mean that they are aroused spontaneously; the *agency* and motivation for the act cannot be ascribed to lifeless and non-conscious things. 'We do not say that activity does not belong to the lifeless things in which it is observed; it does of course belong to them. But it results from some living and conscious principle, because activity exists when life is present and does not exist in its absence'.³

By the same logic, we see the physical body act, because some other *agent* with whom it is connected is prompting it. The action, no doubt, belongs to the body, but the motivation (*pravartakatva*) is due to the self whose nature is consciousness. 'Unless they (the body and organs) are operated upon by a conscious principle, they cannot discharge their functions, such as respiration; as for instance, is the case with the wooden puppets'.⁴

'All activity is purposeful'.⁵ Śaṅkara illustrates: We see in the world activity such as the emergence of a house out of stone and wood and mortar and bricks: it is an orderly event which comes into being, not of its own accord, but to serve the 'purpose' of a human being endowed with consciousness.⁶ This is to say that all activity is *directed* by some purposeful, conscious being. The logic applies to the human body also. 'The functions of *vāyu* and the senses

are observed to be performed by a combination of causes and effects. This interdependence for the sake of a common objective is not possible without an independent conscious being'.⁷ What is now termed the total or the organismic response of the body, involving the organisation of different organs and their functions are due to the purposeful self directing the body and senses. Whenever thus consciousness is found there is also evident a purpose. A strange illustration is furnished by Śaṃkara:⁸ A man who desires eating a fruit sees it on top of a tree, which he climbs; but he slips and falls down. When we analyse this situation: Climbing up the tree is a voluntary act, deliberated by the individual for the purpose of plucking the fruit; whereas the fall is involuntary, forced upon the organism against its will by an accidental circumstance. Śaṃkara speaks of the first act (climbing up) as associated with consciousness, but not so the latter (fall); while the former satisfies a desire, the latter is detrimental to safety. Thus an activity implies consciousness, and consciousness purpose, and purpose has in view the benefit and well-being of the organism.

The above illustration also emphasises that desire is necessary for a purposeful act. 'Desire is the cause of a man's activity'.⁹ 'It is under the influence of desire that he performs . . . deeds'.¹⁰ 'He who desires to meet a human end has recourse to an action . . . as the means of getting at that end'.¹¹ Now what is desire and how does it cause action? Desire (*āśā*) is defined as longing 'for things not hitherto obtained'.¹² Elsewhere 'desire is concerning things to be acquired. . . . Desire consists of the two hankerings after the ends and means, visible or invisible'.¹³ In a similar vein, writes Knight Dunlop: 'Every . . . desire is a desire of something which is not yet actual. You do not desire what you already have or are now experiencing: you desire only what you have not or are not yet experiencing. . . The important or directive feature of desire therefore is the anticipatory thinking. Unless you think of something which is not yet, you do not desire it'.¹⁴ Desire is evidently a function of mind; the objective of the desire is also a mental

phenomenon. When the desire is translated into action, the deliberation by mind is essential: 'The organs start and stop their work in accordance with the deliberations of the *manas*'.¹⁵ Purposeful activity, therefore, involves the mental apprehension of the objective as well as the means to achieve it; briefly both the end and the means of the action are preconceived in mind.¹⁶ Purpose thus implies desire and desire in its turn the goal-of-action already in mind.

Śaṅkara draws a distinction between knowledge and action in the following way. 'An action is independent of the nature of existing things, and dependent on the energy of the actor's mind. . . . Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different instruments of cognition (like the senseorgans) and is conditioned by the nature of existing objects; knowledge can neither be "made" nor modified at will, but depends solely on things as they exist, and neither on Vedic authority nor on the mind of man'.¹⁷ The distinction drawn thus implies that the action is consequent on the deliberation of man, while knowledge is a receptive experience. Effort and volition are involved in action, and Śaṅkara's emphasis on 'freedom in action' reminds the student of modern psychology of McDougall's position, which in the words of Edwin G. Boring 'reveals the fact that they involve some degree of indeterminateness of freedom. . . . Nor can there be any doubt that this element of freedom is exactly what McDougall wished to preserve as the distinguishing mark of mind'.¹⁸ Śaṅkara's argument that action is consequent upon desire presumes that in it there is scope for alteration of behaviour and for selection: it is 'dependent upon the processes of man's mind'. Śaṅkara has an interesting observation to make concerning the relationship between desire and action. He writes: 'Desire manifests itself as a longing for some object, and if not interrupted, it takes a more definite form and becomes a resolve. Resolve is determination, which is followed by action. *What is resolved*, consequent on desire, is *worked out* by the particular activity that is calculated to reach the objective resolved upon'.¹⁹

The action is intended to satisfy a felt need or desire: the action should, therefore, be appropriate and sufficient to bring about the desired effect. When, however, for any reason, the action does not succeed in accomplishing the goal, there is an affective involvement. Śaṁkara observes: 'When one fails to attain a desired object, he gets confused'.²⁰ Action being intended to 'obtain pleasure and avoid pain in future',²¹ failure to accomplish the intended result causes pain; it is possible that such frustration results in anger.²²

The conception of organismic integration involving interdependence of parts is suggested by Śaṁkara as 'mutual helpfulness among parts'.²³ There is an interesting expression employed to signify the integrative principle: *dharma*, which is described as the 'honey' (*madhu*) of all beings;²⁴ just as different juices intermingle, lose their identity and result in honey giving a total, distinct and unified effect, even so the different parts and organs of a living being. Śaṁkara observes that in its general form this integrative principle directs the elements of which the body is composed and that in its special form it directs the complex of body and mind.²⁵

Instinct

There is no adequate equivalent in Sanskrit for the expression 'instinct'; nor is there a definite doctrine among Indian thinkers concerning this conception. Nevertheless occasionally we do come across references to, and suggestions of, the concept of instinct. Śaṁkara has some observations to make on this topic. He holds that man is fundamentally an animal,²⁶ but superior to other animals by virtue of the possession of higher intelligence. He writes: 'Man is most endowed with intelligence. He speaks what is known. . . . He knows what is to come. He sees the visible and the invisible worlds'.²⁷ But in matters of fundamental motivation, men and animals do not differ. Śaṁkara illustrates: Contrast for instance the behaviour of a cow when you approach it with an offer of fodder and its behaviour when you approach it flourishing before it a stick; similar, he says, is the contrast in man's behaviour when he sees

'hefty and ferocious fellows approaching him with shouts and brandishing swords' and his behaviour when he meets amiable, friendly folk. In one case, it is approach and in the other repulsion or withdrawal. The opening sentence of Śaṃkara's *Hastāmalakīya-bhāṣya* runs as follows: 'Every living being *instinctively* feels a desire for happiness and an aversion to unhappiness'. Desire means 'the experiencing of a sense-object which leads to pleasure or comfort'.²⁸ Aversion is its opposite: urge to escape from what threatens to involve the organism in misery or discomfort. The 'instinctive' act is not reasoned, argued or deliberated upon: 'It is well known', says Śaṃkara, 'that the behaviour of the animals is not reasoned or discriminated; men also proceed likewise'.²⁹ The instinctive act is determined by the very constitution of the organism (*sva-rasata eva*).

Emotion

Regarding the problem of emotions, there are a few desultory observations in Śaṃkara's writings. 'Affection' (*abhiṣvaṅga*), he defines as 'a special form of attachment and its characteristic is identification in sharing joys and miseries of those whom we like'.³⁰ Śaṃkara distinguishes between desire (*kāma*) and attachment (*rāga*): the former is concerned with objects which are not yet actual while the latter is with reference to those that are already actual, i.e., in the form of objective presentations.³¹ He lays emphasis on what he calls the 'affective pair'—'desire-aversion'. 'All living beings', he says, 'are susceptible to this pair'.³² The natural course of each sense is either attraction or repulsion: the former has pleasure before it while the latter pain. 'Desire, taking its rise, spreads its wings of attraction and urges man to act'.³³ Aversion causes the organism to move away. Pain, explains Śaṃkara, is due to 'non-attainment of some desired object';³⁴ and anger is consequent on the frustration arising from the blocking of some desire.³⁵ Another interesting observation of Śaṃkara is that, under the stress of some emotion 'one cannot know things as they truly are';³⁶ emotion interferes with the normal processes of perception and cognition.

Memory

'As we find in life pieces of cloth dyed yellow, so in the experience of objects mind gets tinged with impressions: the man in this circumstance is said to be attached, even as the cloth is dyed'.³⁷ Śaṁkara speaks of memory (*smṛti*) as a 'property of the internal organ',³⁸ or as a function of mind,³⁹ consequent on original perception.⁴⁰ Man is engaged in perceptions and actions; but 'no attribute is ever seen to come or go without effecting a change in what is connected with it'.⁴¹ In other words, no experience, however slight, fails to leave its impress upon the organism. 'Impression is a kind of modification'⁴² of the mind and it is never completely effaced therefrom.⁴³ No experience is wholly lost; it is conserved in the form of impressions (*vāsanā*). This doctrine echoes Richard Semon's theory of mnemes.

But is this impression an exact reproduction of the objects or events experienced? 'The colouring varies sometimes according to the objects presented to the mind and sometimes according to the tendencies of the mind itself'.⁴⁴ Here is a line of distinction drawn between 'pure memory' (as in the case of recognition or *pratyabhijñā* where the mind passively ecphorises what is conserved) and what we now term images which 'are seldom exact copies of past experience' and which are 'creative rather than imitative'. Further, the impressions are not uniform: they are conditioned by the nature of the objective presentation as well as by the intensity of the experience;⁴⁵ some impressions are bright and some dull.

There is also a consideration as to how the reactivation of the impressions happens. 'That recognition occurs, the observing and remembering person being one, is well known to all . . . ; the person . . . is distinctly aware that it is the same person which yesterday had a certain sensation that today remembers that sensation'.⁴⁶ The first requisite in memory is the endurance of a mental state through two or more successive moments. It also implies that 'the mind grasps the similarity' of the two moments; the 'subject (is)

able mentally to grasp the two similar things'. Śaṃkara challenges the *Vaiṇāṣika* doctrine which maintains that there is no enduring subject to connect two experiences; when an experience similar to the one whose impressions are already in the mind occurs, it is the subject which actively *recognises* this similarity. Recognition is the foundation of memory.

The impressions left by an experience are said to be 'full of tendencies'⁴⁷ and therefore they 'participate in the initiation of fresh actions, and also in bringing past actions to fruition. . . . Without such impressions, action is impossible; and the results of past actions are not achieved'.⁴⁸ Revival of past experience as memory is necessary for actions to become more efficient, and thus memory occupies an important status in man's life. It is essential for continuous thought processes and symbolisms. The value of memory in communication has been well brought out by Śaṃkara in the following statement: 'When people assemble and start conversing they would hear no words, no, they would not even think, if they did not have memory, for one could think of an object only if he could remember it; both thought and cognition are impossible without memory'.⁴⁹

REFERENCES

- ¹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśāstra*, 1.6.3.
- ² *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.2.
- ³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśāstra*, 3.4.1.
- ⁵ 'Prayojanatvāt pravṛttinām': see *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.32.
- ⁶ *Kaṭhabhāṣya*, 5.5.
- ⁷ *Taittirīyabhāṣya*.
- ⁸ *Chāndogyaśāstra*, 5.10.6.
- ⁹ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśāstra*, 1.4.16.
- ¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 4.4.5.
- ¹¹ *Bhagavadgītāśāstra*, 7.1.
- ¹² *Chāndogyaśāstra*, 7.14.1.
- ¹³ *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśāstra*, 1.4.17.
- ¹⁴ C. Griffith: *Principles of Systematic Psychology*, 1943, p. 602.

- 15 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 6.1.5.
- 16 *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.1.4.
- 17 *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.4.
- 18 Boring, E. G. : *A History of Experimental Psychology*, Appleton-Century Co., 1929, p. 460.
- 19 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 4.4.5.
- 20 *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.14.2.
- 21 *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.11.
- 22 *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 5.23.
- 23 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 2.5. Preface.
- 24 *Ibid.*, 2.5.11.
- 25 *Ibid.*
- 26 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 1.4.17.
- 27 *Taittirīyabhāṣya*.
- 28 *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 5.2.3.
- 29 *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, Introduction.
- 30 *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.9.
- 31 *Ibid.*, 7.11.
- 32 *Ibid.*, 7.27.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 3.37.
- 34 *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.17.1.
- 35 *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 3.37.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 7.27.
- 37 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 2.3.6.
- 38 *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.13.1.
- 39 *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.12.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 2.2.25.
- 41 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 1.4.7.
- 42 *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.30.
- 43 *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 6.9.3.
- 44 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 2.3.6.
- 45 *Ibid.*
- 46 *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.25.
- 47 *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.
- 48 *Bṛhadāraṇyakaśhāṣya*, 4.4.2.
- 49 *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.13.2.

POPULAR ESSAYS IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY—PROF.

M. HIRIYANNA. *Demy 8vo. Cloth.* Rs. 5.00; 9s. \$ 1.80.

Prof. Hiriyananna was a master of his subject, and he presents his learning and his insight with a directness and clarity which render his work uniformly illuminating.

—*The Hibbert Journal*

These essays throw additional light on several topics dealt with in the author's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy* and can be read as a supplement to that work.

Even advanced students of philosophy will stand to gain immensely by reading this book.

—*The Hindu*

Prof. Hiriyananna's scholarship is obvious as we read on . . . the book is excellently produced.

—*The Indian Express*

. . . here is a book that should not be missed . . . the presentation has a charm of its own; . . . this handsome and moderately priced volume.

—*The Bombay Chronicle*

The contributions are brief and illuminating. He (Prof. Hiriyananna) has also the capacity to interpret ideas in such a way as to make them attractive to the modern man.

—*The Hindustan Times*

THE QUEST AFTER PERFECTION—PROF. M. HIRIYANNA.

Demy 8vo. Cloth. Rs. 5.00; 9s. \$ 1.80.

The excellent bouquet of fine ideas we heartily commend to all those who are interested in Philosophy.

—*The Hindu*

The essays are stimulating and will repay careful study and thought.

—*The Hindustan Times*

. . . a valuable framework of Vedantic ethics. The profound truths of the vedanta are presented here in a very simple manner.

—*Prabuddha Bharata*

... a very valuable contribution to modern philosophical literature. . . . The philosophy outlined here has a calm unruffled dignity of its own, that attracts as well as soothes the tormented minds of many human beings.

—*The Bombay Chronicle*

... the two precious volumes made from papers published here and there by the late Prof. Hiriyanṇa. I am a warm admirer of him . . . these volumes . . . are perfectly edited and printed.

—*L. Renou*

These two small volumes contain some of the shorter essays of one of the most respected authorities of Indian philosophy. . .

Professor Hiriyanṇa wrote with deep knowledge and great enthusiasm. The author's personality emerges from these essays—that of a man of great moral earnestness, with a deep love of his country's religious and philosophical heritage, which he interprets in twentieth century terms, in accordance with the needs of his compatriots as he conceived them. These two books are . . . very cheap and well produced, and should be of value and help to the many English and American readers in whom Indian philosophy awakens sympathetic interest.

—*Luzac's Oriental List and Book Review*

Philosophy for him (Prof. Hiriyanṇa) is not merely a view of life but a way of life as well. . . .

—*Vedanta Kesari*

... whatever he (Prof. Hiriyanṇa) wrote was excellent and worth preserving . . . the volumes . . . are excellent in their contents as in external appearance.

—*The Aryan Path*

ART EXPERIENCE—PROF. M. HIRIYANNA. *Demy 8vo. Cloth*
Rs. 6.00; 10s. 6d. \$ 2.00.

These illuminating essays . . . should prove especially interesting to Western aesthetes; and they offer all modern artists some basic ideas, very much needed by them at the present time.

—*The Aryan Path*

The great merit of Prof. Hiriyanṇa's articles on Indian aesthetics lies in the fact that, after a penetrating analysis of

the fundamental concepts, envisaged from a traditional point of view, he interprets them succinctly to the modern man.

—*Adyar Library Bulletin*

The writings of the late Prof. M. Hiriyanna have roused the greatest interest and admiration of Western Philosophers and aestheticians; and this volume, will be welcomed by all those interested in the application of Prof. Hiriyanna's theories to all the arts and to that of poetry in particular.

—*Luzac's Oriental List and Book Review*

... the present volume carries fifteen contributions on topics of Indian aesthetics, a subject now gaining increasing attention and in whose study the late Mr. Hiriyanna was a pioneer ... While it is generally true that whatever this *mita-bhāshi* wrote was valuable, it is all the more valuable in the present case, as we have so little of literature on Indian aesthetics.

The essays in this highly stimulating volume. . .

—*The Hindu*

The essays reveal wide scholarship and insight into the distinctive features of Indian thought on the subject.

—*The Hindustan Times*

The book has been born of the author's deep learning of Indian philosophy . . . He feels through the book ; *Art Experience* is a delightful work.

—*The Indian Review*

The discussions in the book . . . are thought-provoking.

—*The Sunday Standard*

Art Experience is written in an idiom which is ripe and lucid, and deals with many facets of this vast subject.

Prof. Hiriyanna's interpretation of Sanskrit poetics is certainly very cogent and revealing . . . his own approach to the subject is thoroughly idealistic.

—*The Illustrated Weekly of India*

SANSKRIT STUDIES—PROF. M. HIRIYANNA. Demy 8vo.

Rs. 4.00 ; 7s. 6d. \$ 1.50.

His writings are marked by directness, clarity, precision and simple and lucid expression. They are as stimulating to the scholar as they are informative to the beginner.

The book is excellently printed and well produced. . . . Every lover of Sanskrit will derive pleasure and profit from it.

—*The Aryan Path*

Prof. Hiriyantha was a gifted Sanskrit scholar and he had a rare gift of appreciating the literary and philosophical aspects of all literature.

The book is well printed and readers will feel thankful to the publishers for making the essays of the late Prof. Hiriyantha available in book form.

—*The Sunday Standard*

In the present collection, nine of Prof. Hiriyantha's occasional addresses, papers and reviews are carefully edited and put together to make a stimulating introduction to the multiverses of Sanskrit literature.

This is the work of a ripe scholar and critic, and merits reverent reading.

—*The Hindustan Times*

The nature of Prof. Hiriyantha's writing was such that the student could hardly afford to ignore any form of it, whether it had appeared as review or preface or an address to a College Society.

—*The Indian Express*

INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 1—PROF.

M. HIRIYANNA. *Demy 8vo. Cloth.* Rs. 7.50; 12s. 6d. \$ 2.50.

The Kavyalaya Publishers have once more put students of Indian Philosophy under deep obligation by bringing forth this well-printed volume of nineteen studies by the late Prof. M. Hiriyantha.

Even the most complicated problems of Philosophy become quite intelligible and interesting in his hands. The ideas have become part of Prof. Hiriyantha's personality and he knows exactly at which point to strike at a problem in order to make it reveal itself. His writings, therefore, even on what is often considered to be the dry subject of philosophy, provide the reader with an experience that is derived from a piece of art.

—*Adyar Library Bulletin*

The fifth collection of Prof. Hiriyanṇa's papers may be said to be a definitive edition.

... on thoroughly abstruse subjects the Prof. writes with Berkleyan ease and clarity.

—*The Indian Review*

Prof. M. Hiriyanṇa's calm and cogent writing with its clear grasp and lucid exposition is a delightful lamp by which many a student can guide himself in the still much unexplored realms of Indian thought.

—*The Aryan Path*

Prof. M. Hiriyanṇa had been, and still is, the most brilliant teacher of Indian Philosophy. . . He combined a great deal of knowledge with a rare gift for lucid exposition.

On a whole this collection is an useful supplement to Hiriyanṇa's own 'Outlines of Indian Philosophy.'

It is gratifying to note that the Publishers have been able to bring their performance in book-production close to European standards.

—*Indian Council for Cultural Relations*

The volume . . . forms a very valuable addition to the Indian philosophical literature. The book is well got-up and this handy volume is a necessity in every Library.

—*The Vedanta Kesari*

A good number of articles that have been brought together in the present publication relate to Indian epistemology. Epistemology is the most difficult of the branches of philosophy.

This is a book which every student of Indian Philosophy must read.

—*The Hindu*

The late Mysore Hiriyanṇa was surely a giant among scholars of philosophical Sanskrit; in addition he was able to report his conclusions in the kind of English prose which is grammatically and stylistically acceptable to the academic Philosophical tradition of America and Britain. This happy combination of talents makes Prof. M. Hiriyanṇa's works the best introduction to Indian Philosophy for the Anglo-American reader now in print.

—*American Journal of Oriental Research*

DADABHAI NAOROJI: The Grand Old Man of India—
R. P. MASANI. (Abbr. Ed.) With a Foreword by Mahatma
Gandhi. Cr. 8vo. Rs. 2.50 (Cloth Rs. 4).

I have always been a hero-worshipper. And so Dadabhai became real Dada to me. . . The Story of a life so noble and yet so simple. . . May it be an inspiration to the reader even as Dadabhai living was to me.

—From Mahatma Gandhi's Foreword

An abridgment of Sir R. P. Masani's biography of Dadabhai Naoroji will be welcomed . . . is a worthy addition to the few biographies of Indian leaders.

—The Sunday Standard

The Story of Dadabhai Naoroji's life . . . must remain a source of perennial inspiration to Indians of all ages.

—The Times of India

India is none too rich in biographical literature and Rustum Masani's work on the G.O.M. of India is among the few good political biographies.

—The Hindu

It is very well printed, and will serve admirably for the enlightenment of school children.

—Mysindia

SO I BECAME A TEACHER—SYED HAFIZUDDIN. Cr. 8vo.
Rs. 2.50 (Cloth Rs. 4).

This small, yet attractive book is the story of a High School Teacher. It is perhaps the first of its kind—a teacher writing his autobiography in the form of a story. . . It is a happy hour that one spends reading Mr. Hafizuddin's book in the arm chair.

—Educational India

This brochure narrates the personal experiences of the author as a member of the teaching profession but he does not feel sorry for having entered the teaching line. How is that? The reader will find an answer by reading through the book.

—The South Indian Teacher

ŚAMKARA: A Psychological Study

S. K. RAMACHANDRA RAO

In this work the author discusses the various psychological problems raised and solved by Śamkara in his philosophical works. Though Śamkara lived and wrote in an age when psychology was a distant cry, his writings reveal remarkable psychological insight, a rich treasure of interesting speculations concerning man and his nature. These have been studied by the author under the following heads: *The Ideological Stand-point*; *Sensation: Its Mechanism and Function*; *Mind and Consciousness*; *The Psychology of Self*; *States of the Self*; and *The Motivational Problem*.

The author was, for a period, Research Assistant in Social Sciences at the Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore. He is at present, Reader in Psychology and in charge of the Department at the All India Institute of Mental Health, Bangalore.

The author has had the advantage of studying Vedāntic texts in the traditional manner, and Buddhistic works under well-known Ceylonese monks. His acquaintance with Sanskrit, Pali and Ardha-Magadhi has helped him to place his studies on firm ground. His publications include, besides many research monographs in the fields of Industrial and Social Psychology and Indology, *Introduction to Mathematical Psychology*, *Studies in Indian Psychology*, *Elements of early Buddhist Psychology* etc. He is now at work on *A Brief History of Indian Psychology* covering India's psychological speculations through the ages. The work is expected to be published shortly.

The author's interests include painting and poetry, music and modelling.

Cr. 8vo. pp. xii + 74

Price: ~~Rs. 3.00, Cloth~~, Rs. 5.00 ✓

KAVYALAYA * PUBLISHERS * MYSORE