

शांकर

Prof. S.K.R. Complete Works - 17

Writings on Śaṅkara's Advaita

Vidyālaṅkāra
Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao



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Writings
on
Śamkara's Advaita

Vidyāṅkara

Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao

JIVANMUKTI IN ADVAITA
CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADVAITA
ŚAMKARA - A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT OF ŚAMKARA
PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF ŚAMKARA

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
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About the Author



Prof S. K. Ramachandra Rao (1925-2006) was born in a conservative Mādhva Brahmin family. He studied sanskrit in a pāṭhaśāla in Nanjangud, and then learnt the prasthāna traya with bhasya under Pālghat Nārayaṇa Śāstri. He also studied Pāli and Tripiṭakas from Nārada Mahāthera of Sri Lanka, and learnt Tibetan in order to learn Tibetan Buddhism. He obtained an M.A. in Psychology from the Mysore University, and started his career as a research assistant in the Indian Institute of Science. He later headed the department of clinical psychology in NIMHANS in Bangalore.

A born teacher, he was a visiting professor at the Bangalore University teaching in the departments of psychology, philosophy, indology, social work and education. He headed the department of Indian culture at the Callison College, University of the Pacific, Bangalore Centre. He was a senior associate of the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, and was on the guest faculty of the Indian Institute of Management.

He was a member of the Karnataka State Lalita Kala Academy and Sangita Nritya Academy, had served on the Agama Board, Karnataka and was on the advisory committee of the T.T.D. He had been honored with the 1986 Karnataka Rajyotsava Award.

He was a prolific writer, artist, sculptor, musicologist, scholar and orator. He had written more than 150 books in English and Kannada apart from books in Sanskrit and Pāli on various aspects of traditional Indian Culture. His books on Iconography and on Tirupati were given the state Sahitya Academy awards. He had authored 17 volumes on the Rig Veda (English translation & analysis).

He had been honored with the titles Vidyāṅkara, Sangita Kalāratna, Vāchaspati, etc., and had received the Vedaratna Samman from the Swāmi Gangeshwaranandaji Trust, Mumbai.

Foreword

This book is a collection of three monographs and two small books written by Prof S. K. Ramachandra Rao at different stages in his multifaceted career. The three monographs are '*Psychological Speculations of Śaṅkara*' (1953), '*Śaṅkara, a Psychological Study*' and '*The Psychological Standpoint of Śaṅkara*' (date unknown). Prof S. K. R. submitted in the late 1940's a thesis for which the University of Mysore awarded the degree of M.A. This monograph was revised, enlarged and published as a small book - '*Śaṅkara, a Psychological Study*' in 1960 (Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore). The other two monographs were published when he was working in the Indian Institute of Science and later in the All India Institute of Mental Health (later renamed as NIMHANS) also deal mainly with the psychological viewpoint propounded by Śaṅkaracharya. Prof S. K. Ramachandra Rao felt that psychologists in India, by and large, ignored the traditional Indian concepts of psychology as explained in the various systems of philosophy, and instead mainly look to the west for inspiration. He therefore made a study of traditional Indian psychological thought, and these articles were written during that period.

The books in this collection are '*Jīvanmukti in Advaita*' (1979) and '*Consciousness in Advaita*' (1979). The Sri Abhinava Vidyateertha Swamigal

Scientific Research Committee, Madras had sponsored a research project on the study of consciousness in Advaita in an attempt to correlate traditional wisdom with modern scientific thought. Prof S. K. Ramachandra Rao was asked to take up this project. 'Consciousness in Advaita' is the first fascicule that was published in 1979. It is mainly a historical survey of source materials concerning the concept of consciousness in Advaita.

The second fascicule was also prepared and sent to the Academy by Prof Ramachandra Rao. But he was informed a few months later that the fascicule was not well received by the Sringeri Mutt Swami and the authorities as it contained a few references to the Kanchi Mutt, which they considered as their rival; if these references were removed, only then would it be taken up for publication. Prof S. K. R. was taken aback by such a partisan attitude; he characteristically refused to alter the manuscript. The research project came to a premature end, and the manuscript was not returned to the author. The family of Prof S. K. R. made an attempt to recover the manuscript, but without success.

Prof S. K. R. had delivered a lecture in Chennai in 1978 on the concept of Jivanmukti. As he had engaged himself fully in researching this particular aspect of advaita, he decided to bring out a book on Jivanmukti. This was published in 1979 by IBH Prakashana, Bangalore.

Prof S. K. R wrote two other books bearing on the origin and development of philosophical systems in India. They are **'The Origins of Indian Thought'** published by the Bangalore University in 1973, and **'Development of Psychological Thought in India'** published by Kavyalaya Publishers in 1962. These books are also being reprinted shortly.

A few changes in the layout have been made in this edition. The references had been relegated to the end of the books 'Consciousness in Advaita' and 'Jivanmukti in Advaita'. In this edition, they have been given in the same pages as footnotes. The contents page was missing in the 'Consciousness in Advaita'. I have added this in order to make the book more accessible to the reader.

It was decided to bring out this collection in a short span of time and I thank Vagartha for rising to the occasion and bringing out this book so nicely.

Bhadrapada Sukla Dwiteeya
19-8-2012.

Dr. S. R. Sudarshan

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JĪVANMUKTI IN ADVAITA

JĪVANMUKTI IN ADVAITA

Vidyāṅkārā

Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao

Indian philosophical thought and religious practices are primarily concerned with liberation, the ultimate freedom from all worldly ills as well as the state of absolute bliss. While all schools of *Vedanta* hold out this liberation or Mukti as the great ideal, *Advaita* holds that this goal is attainable in this very life, provided the right wisdom is obtained. This condition of liberation while one is still alive is called *Jīvanmukti*.

The present book, which was delivered as two lectures at Madras under the Dharmatma V. Vaidyasubrahmanya Iyer 61st birthday Endowment Lecture scheme, deals with the idea of *Jīvanmukti* as crystallized by Śaṅkara and later thinkers in the field of *Advaita*. It focusses attention on the relevance of the idea in the context of Indian thought in general.

समर्पणम्

तपस्विने नमस्तस्मै सन्ततानन्दसिन्धवे ।
जीवन्मुक्ताय गुरवे चन्द्रशेखरयोगिने ॥

अर्पिता च पदद्वन्द्वे माला चिन्तनरूपिणी ।
अङ्गीकरोतु कृपया चन्द्रशेखरभारती ।

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Jīvanmukti in Advaita

“Jīvanmukti, If we rightly understand the spirit of Indian Philosophy, is indeed the highest and most truly philosophical of all conceptions of deliverance, and may be said to represent a landmark in the history of philosophic thought in India.”

- Prof. M. Hiriyanna ¹

I. LIBERATION HERE AND NOW

Traditional Indian thought emerging from the Vedic corpus, whether orthodox or otherwise, centers round the idea of liberation. Liberation from what? The answer in *Vedānta* is: from *Sam̐sāra*. It is a peculiarly Indian word, which is hard to translate into any other language. However, it can roughly be rendered as ‘trans-migration’. The idea is that we wander about aimlessly in the world, obtaining innumerable births, and suffering untold miseries in the bargain. The idea refers to our phenomenal existence and involvement. There is, however, no suggestion that the world is wicked or that life is evil. In fact, human life is regarded as a welcome opportunity for working out ones destiny, for correcting ones errors, and for helping others. The idea of *saṁsāra* is by no means a crutch of the misanthrope ; it is a charter for adventure.

1. Prof. M. Hiriyanna : Reviews (Kāvyaśāla, Mysore, 1970) p.7

Why then must one get liberated from it ? Is *saṁsāra* in the nature of a bondage? Phenomenal existence means having a specific bodymind complex, and being involved in a particular material and social context; it means subjection to action and reaction. The need to work, the constraints that operate from within, the necessity of being subject to the feedback of what one does, and the unavoidable continuance of involvement in a round of births and deaths — these factors induce stress and strife in life.

A sense of being a helpless victim caught in the blind vortex of powerful currents of *karma* looms large in human existence. This dread and anxiety are inevitable aspects of *saṁsāra*. A deliverance from them is what is sought. In other words, the idea of liberation emphasizes the bondage character of phenomenal involvement or 'being-in-the-world' (*Dasein*) to use a modern expression, made popular by the Existentialists. 'Being' is freedom, but, 'being-in-the-world' is bondage, for 'being' is then constrained, confined and conditioned.

Closely associated with the idea of phenomenal involvement (*saṁsāra*) are two other ideas: the law of action and its feedback (*karma*) and the notion of fundamental ignorance or nescience (*avidyā* or *ajñāna*). Ignorance of reality in the ultimate analysis is the cause of phenomenal involvement; it is what necessitates action of all kinds so that the individual may survive as a specific 'being-in-the-world' (*jīva*). The law of action implies that whatever one does will necessarily bind him to a series of

reactions and keep him busy with the world. The 'being' thus becomes both by conviction and aspiration the 'being-in-the-world'.

And, being-in-the-world does not get exhausted in one life-time; it is actualized in a series of births. Death does not by itself put an end to phenomenal existence. It is only a link in the chain; it is a door through which the individual will pass into another unit of existence. Phenomenal existence and involvement never get wound up in the natural course. Liberation is an attempt to snap the chain, by undoing the *karma* - potentiality and by obviating its source, viz. the basic ignorance. Liberation thus relieves the individual from the necessity of phenomenal involvement. The being-in-the-world recovers its Being from the world. To be liberated is to *be*, to be no longer *in-the-world*.

The Indian word for liberation is '*mukti*' (or *mokṣa*) from the Sanskrit root which means 'to leave, to abandon, to give up'². What is given up here is the phenomenal involvement. But there is an argument in this context. Most thinkers insist that phenomenal involvement can be given up only when phenomenal existence is undone. As long as the individual continues to be, it is impossible for him not to be in the world.

Liberation truly means only the elimination of phenomenal existence with an automatic removal of involvement. Therefore, the physical death, which marks the cessation of phenomenal existence, is an inevitable

2. derived from the root 'muc' with 'bhāve kting.'

precondition for liberation, provided the individual has also in the meantime relieved himself of the *karma* -necessity and has removed the basic ignorance. This is technically known as 'liberation after death' (*videha-mukti*, liberation after the body has gone). The significance is that there is no more involvement in the world for the individual who has been liberated. That is to say, he will not be obliged to be born again. He is freed from phenomenal existence first, and the phenomenal involvement is thereby precluded.

This means that during one's life one can only make preparations for liberation, but liberation occurs only at death, and not earlier. Those who hold this view also introduce other details. One of them is that upon death, the individual who has made adequate preparations for liberation, will be transported to a supramundane plane of existence. Instead of returning to the phenomenal world, he will abide in that trans-phenomenal world until the end of the time-segment known as *kalpa*, and then gets liberated. This view of liberation can be described as the theory of deferred liberation.

There is the other view, which insists that liberation has meaning only when it is experienced during one's own life. Liberation after death can only be hypothetical and conjectural; it lacks experiential certainty. Phenomenal involvement and liberation are of course antithetical, but phenomenal existence and liberation are not. That it is possible for one to be liberated even while he is phenomenally existing is the main argument of this view,

which is technically known as 'liberation while one is still alive' (*jīvan-mukti*). The import here is that there can be phenomenal existence without involvement. This is liberation here and now; it does not wait for death. And after death, of course, there is no more becoming for him, no further phenomenal existence.

Liberation, according to this view, does not interfere with the phenomenal existence of the individual; it only eliminates his involvement in the world. This elimination will itself preclude further units of existence after the present unit has drawn to its close. From the moment of liberation till his death, he can consciously experience the state of liberation. He can be in the world, but not bound by it.

That it is possible for one to be freed from the fears and fetters of phenomenal involvement here and now, while one is still alive, is a grand idea that Indian culture evolved. In fact, it is one of the grandest ideas that human mind has been able to conjure up. It not only sets high store on human potentiality, but holds out a reasonable hope for every earnest seeker. It projects an integrated and meaningful image of man's destiny and provides the aspirant with sufficient motivation.

It is true that the more popular view is that liberation and physical life cannot co-exist, that phenomenal existence necessarily presupposes involvement, and that true liberation can only be after the individual's death. But there is ample evidence to show that the other view, viz., the

jīvan-mukti view, was not only older but traditionally more valid. We find the idea unmistakably expressed in the early *Upaniṣads* as well as in the *Bhagavad-gītā*. The *Vedāntasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa discusses this view, and approves it. It was accepted by the older school of Buddhism, by the defenders of the Sāṃkhya doctrine and by the votaries of Yoga.

A systematic formulation of the theory of *jīvan-mukti* as well as the essential details of the practice involved in it was the work of the great Śamkara (655-687 A.D.). *Advaita Vedānta* developed this theory into a doctrine, which is undoubtedly the most significant of its contributions to world thought. History records that numerous individuals who subscribed to *Advaita Vedānta*, have in their lives achieved this state of liberation, thus demonstrating the practical value of this doctrine. It is well-known that the previous pontiff of Śringeri, Śrī Śrī Chandraśekhara Bhārati Mahāswamigal, (1892 -1954), whose blessings I was fortunate enough to obtain, was an eloquent illustration of the idea of *jīvan-mukti* in our own times.

II. KARMA AND JÑĀNA

I have briefly referred to the role of *karma* in phenomenal existence and involvement. The Indian word implies not only whatever is done by way of physical acts, mental processes and vocal expressions, but also whatever impact, latent or manifest, such performance has on the individual. Action generates an impression; and every impression has a tendency as well as some energy, so that

it works itself out inevitably. The present life of each one of us is determined precisely by the actions and impressions pertaining to our prior lives. Our bodymind complex, our domestic situation, our immediate social surrounding, the material culture that is available to us, the opportunities for growth, the external environment, and the values that govern our individual and collective existence are aspects of the structure that *karma* determines for each one of us. Our phenomenal existence is the result of *karma*, and the co-ordinates of our involvement are also determined by *karma*. But the actions that we bring to bear on our involvement will determine our subsequent existence. Thus, existence-action - involvement-action-existence is the shape the chain of *karma* assumes.

It is usual to classify *karma* into three types. There is one type of *karma* which is in the nature of cumulative deposits (*sañchita*). The *karma* dispositions, introduced into our present lives as a sort of 'carry-over' from previous lives, narrow down our energies, attentions and opportunities; they determine our action tendencies and reaction patterns. The second kind refers to the present potentiatives for future actions (*āgāmī*). The *karma* in this case consists of latent tendencies that are likely to become manifest, provided conditions are favourable. Sometimes it is clubbed with the current action tendencies (*kriyamāṇa*). The third kind is the group of action-impressions that have been directly responsible for the structure and function of our present body-mind complex, and also for the developmental processes that may be occasioned in this

complex. This variety is distinguished from others in as much as the *karma* here has already begun to work itself out (*prārabdha*), like “an arrow that has been sped from the bow.”

As regards the undoing of the effect of *karma* which is necessary for liberation to occur, the first variety, viz., the accumulated variety, is easily handled. The *karma* of this kind gets erased or weakened by taking recourse to expiations and penances prescribed in the ritual-oriented scriptural texts, and by obtaining the wisdom that the knowledge-oriented scriptural texts provide. The second kind does not come into the picture, because its role is only relevant in the future. When the other two varieties of *karma* are weakened or undone, this one is automatically rendered ineffective. But the third variety, viz., the already begun-to-act variety, is beyond all methods of elimination. It must necessarily work itself out and it can in no way be interfered with. The course that it has taken can neither be altered nor revised.

When we talk of liberation and imply that the hold of *karma* has thereby been loosened, we mean that it is the ‘accumulated’ variety that has been made inactive. The power of the ‘yet-to-be’ *karma* dispositions will, by this very act, countered. There is an argument about what happens to the ‘already-begun’ variety. Those who insist that true liberation can only be an after-death affair argue that even this ‘already-begun’ *karma* (one of whose expressions is the present life) must be undone

before liberation can occur. But those who are in favour of *jīvan-mukti* hold that liberation will leave this *karma* untouched, and that liberation can still occur even while this *karma* is on.

All schools of Vedāntic thought in India agree that the chief factor in undoing the hold of *karma* and in bringing about liberation is the obtainment of intuitive wisdom concerning reality (*jñāna*). Even those Vedāntins (like Rāmānuja and Madhva) who advocate devotion as a valuable approach to liberation nevertheless emphasize the primacy of wisdom. *Advaita*, in particular, is uncompromising in its insistence upon wisdom as solely responsible for liberation. The light of wisdom annuls the darkness of ignorance, thus obviating the tantalizing hold of *karma*. Therefore, the discussion about liberation in *Advaita Vedānta* centers round whether liberation is immediate and instantaneous with the dawn of wisdom or liberation is deferred till the last vestige of *karma* is destroyed.

Śaṅkara contributes significantly towards the crystallization of the *jīvan-mukti* argument in Indian thought. It was he who recovered this ancient ideology from the Upaniṣadic texts and reconstructed the viewpoint on the basis of scriptural authority, reasoning, and his own personal experience.

III. THE MĪMĀMSĀ VIEWPOINT

Let me indicate briefly the background of this new line of thinking that Śaṁkara developed. Indian thought crystallized a comprehensive scheme of values quite early in its history. It classified the objectives of human existence in terms of personal and social values (*dharma*), economic and productive values (*artha*), hedonistic and reproductive values (*kama*), and spiritual values leading to liberation (*mokṣa*). Normal religious urges such as piety, moral earnestness and aspiration for heavenly rewards were included in the first group. Efforts to make and save money, as well as the urge to secure the material well-being of the individual distinguished the second group. Pleasures and pastimes, sex and survival, were the main elements in the third group.

The three together (known as *tri-varga*) adequately summed up the normal aspirations of a human being involved in society. The fourth category, viz., *mokṣa*, was not only an after-thought, but in a sense it negated the other three. It is reasonable to assume that at no time did it inspire the life and conduct of the majority of us, for it is undoubtedly abstract, almost impractical, and apparently hypothetical. But it is remarkable that its ideology has survived with an aura of glory, and has been accepted as a sort of utopian panacea for thousands of years, all through the vicissitudes of our intellectual and religious history. And, it must be recognized that a small section of our population has committed itself to this ideal in every generation. Even those of us who are inclined to resist a

serious commitment to it, nevertheless insist on holding it in high esteem. It is an archetype that has struck the deep chords of our collective existence.

From heavenly reward as a value (*dharma*) to liberation (*mokṣa*) was a leap that took several centuries, and involved a major change in our outlook. The early man could only think of an indefinite continuance of life here, or in some other region very similar to this one, with of course a greater share of pleasure and profit. The goal that was regarded as worthy of pursuit involved the idea of an actual physical transportation to an indisputably pleasant realm called heaven, where happiness was unadulterated with any touch of sorrow, and where there was no ailment, aging, or death.³

But the experience or enjoyment of this condition was considered as contingent upon the continuance of merit derived from the 'good' or socially elevating actions done here on earth. When the merit got exhausted by such enjoyment (as it is the case with any material wealth), there was an inevitable although undesirable relapse into this world of stress and distress.⁴ The rituals and sacrifices, worship and gifts that were calculated to secure such rewards came in course of time to be under-valued, for it is not in the power of these rewards to finally or fully eliminate the inherent ills of worldly existence, or to prevent a return to this dismal world here below.

3. Cf. *Kāṭha-Upaniṣad*, 1,1,12.

4. क्षीणे पुण्ये मर्त्यलोकं च्यवन्ति ।

This realization disabused the Indian mind of the longing for lasting comfort in an imaginary heaven, and replaced it with an urge to be genuinely and finally released from the baneful involvements of worldly existence. This was the genesis of the liberation or *mukti* idea. It was doubtless in the nature of a negative ideal. The early synonyms of *mukti* retained this negative flavour: *apavarga* (abandonment, shaking off), *nirvāṇa* (blowing out, passing away) and *kaivalya* (cutting loose, becoming isolated). The idea signified the ultimate and absolute cessation of all ills and ailments, incidental to, and inherent in, our life in the world. That it meant nothing more than this was clearly the *Nyāya* view.⁵

But the view also included the associated notion that thereby further involvement in the phenomenal world was precluded. It was not only the condition of getting loose from the phenomenal moorings, but also a 'non-return' (*apunarāvṛtti*). *Prāśastapāda*, the eminent *Nyāya* writer, likens this event to the burning fire being completely extinguished on the entire consumption of fuel.⁶ Not only does the fire then cease to burn, but there is no possibility of its being kindled again, for the fuel is gone.

Among the orthodox systems of thought, early *Mīmāṃsā* was still so preoccupied with *dharma* as the final

5. Cf. *Nyāya-bhāṣya* (1,1,22) refers to 21 kinds of pain and adds - तदत्यन्तविमोक्षोऽपवर्गः । Cp. Śaṅkara's remark - नवाना मात्मगुणानामत्यन्तानुत्पादो मोक्ष इति काणादाः । (VSB, 2,3,50)

6. निर्बीजस्यात्मनः शरीरादिनिवृत्तिः पुनः शरीराद्यनुत्पत्तौ दग्धेन्धननालवत् उपशमो मोक्ष इति ।

value and with the visions of delightful heavenly rewards that neither Jaimini nor Śabara-svāmin ever gave a serious thought to the idea of *mukti*. When, later, Kumārila-bhaṭṭa incorporated the idea into the *Mīmāṃsā* system, it was in the sense of preventing the assumption of another body, by entirely exhausting all actions together with their consequences, during this very life.⁷

He insisted that *mukti* was essentially negative in its conception, for it was a matter of undoing the present conditions of distress and preventing the return to this world. He precluded from the concept any notion of happiness: for him, it was nothing more than the absence of pain. Following him, Pārthasārathi-miśra defined liberation as 'dissolution of the self's painful entanglements with the phenomenal world.'⁸

Likewise, Śālikanātha speaks of liberation as irrevocable dissolution of the body,⁹ and the consequent total elimination of pain. Having a body-mind complex was the real source of misery, according to this school of thought; and when that was gone the goal was reached.

The inquiry, which was more or less academic, whether happiness could be anything more than the mere absence of misery had its impact on the practical issue

7. *Śloka-vārttika*, 108-110. Prabhākara held the same view. Cf. Śālikanātha : निःशेषधर्माधर्मपरिक्षयनिबन्धनो मोक्षः (*Prakaraṇa-pāñcikā*).

8. प्रपञ्चसबन्धविलयो मोक्षः ।

9. आत्मान्तिकस्तु देहोच्छेदः । (*Prakaraṇa Pāñcikā*)

whether or not man can profitably pursue happiness as the positive goal, independent of the implied avoidance of pain. Whatever the views held by *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā*, *Vedānta* affirmed that happiness was a positive value, and that spiritual life would be meaningless were it not so. The working postulate of *Vedānta* is that there is in man a fundamental urge to 'attain a thing of positive value.'¹⁰ It is not the desire to eliminate pain that sets him to work out his destiny, but the desire to obtain happiness, not the material or sensory happiness that is transient but the happiness that is constant and unsullied. Working out one's destiny is a constructive enterprise.

There is an Advaitic work of the thirteenth century which has not achieved the celebrity it merits. It is Rāmādvaya's *Vedānta-kaumudī*. We find in this work an interesting discussion of this problem.¹¹ The author rejects the *Nyāya* argument that avoidance of pain can be a self-sufficient human objective, and that the aspiration for liberation does not involve any inducement of happiness. He points out that even in daily life we have a distinct appreciation of happiness as something other than, and more than, mere absence of unhappiness. When, for instance, we are told: 'If you take this road, you will come to grief! But the other road is a happy one', the unhappiness on the first road may be due to difficulties like exposure to wild animals and robbers. The promised

10. इष्टाधिगमार्था प्रवृत्तिः ।

11. *Vedānta-kaumudī* (Ed. by Siddheswara Bhattachārya, Banaras Hindu University, 1873), p. 118-196.

happiness on the other road will no doubt involve the absence of the difficulties, but it may also have positive attractions such as the availability of conveniences like food and shelter. In the state of liberation, there would, of course, be the absence of misery that is incidental to phenomenal existence and involvement, but there is also the additional factor of happiness.

The stand taken by *Vedānta* emphasizes that the pursuit of liberation is a worthy endeavour in view of the positive value that it, entails, namely happiness. Citsukha, in fact, defines bondage (from which *mukti* is sought) as that which clouds the great bliss that is inherent in everyone of us; his commentator adds that wisdom is what dissolves this cloud. It is noteworthy that Citsukha does not make much of misery (*duhkha*) or its elimination in his discussion on *mukti*¹² He emphasizes the positive aspect thereof, which illustrates the characteristic position of *Vedānta*.

Now, happiness is a matter of degrees. Dharmarājādhvari the author of *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, distinguishes two kinds or degrees of happiness¹³: the happiness that is occasioned by bodily and sensory satisfactions (viz. the happiness that we are acquainted with in our daily life), and the happiness that is derived from liberation (when the Absolute is experienced). The former is 'surpassable' (*sātīśaya*), in the sense that it can be

12. *Tattva-pradīpikā*, p.570.

13. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* (ed. by S.S. Surya Narayana Sastrin, The Adyar Library, 1942), sections 3,4,5 & 6.

eliminated by a change in the conditions, and also in the sense that one could always conjure up the vision of a higher degree of happiness.

The latter, on the contrary, is 'unsurpassable' (*niratisāya*). Once it occurs, neither can it be eliminated, nor can it be excelled. There is no lapse of that happiness at any time or on any account. It can hardly be gainsaid that the pursuit of this happiness which is absolute, ultimate and immutable is what is especially or exclusively worthwhile for the serious seeker. *Vedānta* not only projects it as an ideal, but affirms that it is an attainable objective.

The author of the *Vedānta-sūtras* refers to the view of Jaimini that the liberated individual will enjoy bliss by becoming one with Godhead.¹⁴ He also points out, in the same context, that Auḍolomi held that the destiny of the liberated soul was to become pure thought, to become identified with basic consciousness. But Bādarāyaṇa's own view in the matter is that the two views are not conflicting: bliss and pure consciousness are not in fact mutually exclusive.

IV. LIBERATION AND DEATH

Is such an absolute happiness possible at all in this life, while the body-mind complex survives as it does, and is involved as it is in the phenomenal world? *Advaita Vedānta* affirms that it is possible. And this is the central point in

14. *Vedānta-sūtra*, 4,4,5 to 7.

the conception of *jīvan-mukti*. But most of the schools of Indian thought reject this possibility. We have seen that the *Nyāya* and *Mīmāṃsā* view of liberation was in terms of elimination of phenomenal existence. They argued that as long as the physical structure continues, bondage can never be said to be finally undone. It is impossible for the condition of liberation to co-exist with the continuance of the body-mind complex. But there were two schools of thought that held that the possibility of liberation while one is still phenomenally intact need not be ruled out: the *Sāṃkhya* and the *Yoga*.

The *Sāṃkhya* thinkers were impressed by the analogy of the potter's wheel which continues to revolve for a while even after the finished pot has been taken out of it.¹⁵ When the discriminating insight dawns, the seeds of *karma* become dry and barren, having got rid of the moisture of ignorance. Nevertheless the body-mind complex which is itself the effect of *karma* continues for some time, propelled by the momentum of past impressions (which, however, are beyond the reach of insight's influence). But the early *Sāṃkhya* books neither mention *jīvan-mukti*, nor do they consistently develop the doctrine. We find an explicit reference to *jīvan-mukti* only in the *Pravacana-bhāṣya*¹⁶ of Vijñāna-bhikṣu, a sixteenth century writer whose obvious interest was to reconcile *Sāṃkhya* with *Vedānta*.

15. *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, 67.

16. on *Sāṃkhya-sūtra*, 3, 77-83.

In the Yoga system, the *dharmameghasamādhi* which is the condition immediately preceding the final isolation (*kaivalya*) is described as the *jīvan-mukti* stage. The commentator Vyāsa in fact uses the expression: "the wise man becomes liberated even while he is alive."¹⁷ Actually, however, this is a condition prior to final release, which occurs only when the body falls. Therefore, the liberation spoken of here can properly be described as figurative (*gaṇa-mukti*) or as imminent (*āsanna-mukti*).

There appears to have been an old view that the moment of the dawn of liberating wisdom would coincide with physical death. Among the Theravāda Buddhists in Ceylon there is a belief that if a layman who becomes enlightened is not immediately ordained, he will die before the day is out. It must be remembered that ordination is tantamount to domestic and social death. The attempt to synchronize enlightenment with death may be seen also in the practice that was current in South India of taking 'śamnyāsa' just before one's death. Known as 'ātura-śamnyāsa' it was resorted to by pious laymen in extreme old age or in dire sickness. By a curious transposition, which was also convenient, the assumption of 'śamnyāsa' was symbolically the obtainment of the liberating wisdom. And rebirth would thereby be precluded!

Buddhism and *Advaita* are distinguished by their unequivocal espousal of the *jīvan-mukti* argument. They denied that enlightenment was strictly an after-death affair,

17. *Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 4, 30.

or that it was synchronous with death. Liberation need not necessarily be after death or at death. Continuance of life after enlightenment was not only a possibility; it was indeed the ideal that one must work for. The Buddhists call it 'nirvāṇa with the remnants of the structural base' (*sa-upādi-sesanibbāṇa*) as distinguished from its entire disappearance in *pari-nibbāṇa*. But they did not evolve a definite doctrine out of this concept, as *Advaita* did, although the 'arahat' ideal does approach the 'jīvanmukta' ideal in essential details.

Advaita based its thinking entirely on the *Upaniṣads*. There are numerous references in the early *Upaniṣads* confirming and describing the *jīvan-mukti* condition, although the word is not found anywhere among them. We must remember that the scriptural import is stronger than the scriptural texts, "*tātparyavatī hi śṛtiḥ pratyakṣād bhalevatī*" as the author of *Bhāmatī* says. The *Upaniṣads* speak of the wise man who is released while still alive as 'dhīra', 'muni', 'brahmavit', 'yuktātman', 'ātma-saṁsthā', and 'mahātman'.

The *Bhagavad-gītā* as the canonical successor to the *Upaniṣads* describes him as a 'sthita-prajña', 'brahma-bhūta', 'muni', and 'yoga-yuktātmā'. The *Vedānta-sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa which set out to define the synthetic viewpoint of the *Upaniṣads* presuppose an acquaintance with this ideal, though it goes unnamed. Bādarāyaṇa refers to two views regarding liberation, and seeks to reconcile them.¹⁸

18. *Vedānta-sūtra*, 4,4, 10 to 12.

The view ascribed to Bādari is that the condition of liberation entails the dissolution of the body-mind complex. Liberation, according to him, is impersonal and beyond individual awareness. Jaimini, on the other hand, held that the state of liberation can co-exist with the present bodymind complex. In other words, liberation can be personal and within ones experience. Bādarāyaṇa himself appears to have held that liberation could either be personal or impersonal, could be along with the body-mind complex or without it.

One of these views answers to the description of *jīvanmukti*, although the expression appears unfamiliar to Bādarāyaṇa. Indeed, it may appear remarkable that Śamkara himself does not use the word *jīvan-mukti* anywhere in his commentaries on the *Vedānta-sūtras* or on the ten *Upaniṣads*. And, to my knowledge, he uses the word but once in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*.¹⁹

The word as well as a description of that condition occurs in a late *Upaniṣad*, *Muktikopaniṣad*,²⁰ which, however, seems to be heavily indebted to the celebrated *Advaita* classic, *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha*. *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* is an enigmatic and mystical work which was probably composed contemporaneously with Śamkara's days, or more probably at a later date.²¹ It represents a queer fusion between classical *Advaita* and *Vijñāna-vāda* Buddhism.

19. *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya*, 6, 27. जीवन्मुक्तं ब्रह्मैव सर्वं इत्येवं निश्चयवन्तम् ।

20. *Muktikopaniṣad*, 2, 1

पुरुषस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वमुखदुःखादिलक्षणश्चित्तधर्मः ।

हेतुरूपत्वाद्बन्धो भवति । तन्निरोधेन जीवन्मुक्तिः ॥

21. S.N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (Cambridge, 1952), p. 231.

But the *Advaita* preached here is different in many details from the one taught by Śaṅkara. However, attempts were made in later times to reconcile the two points of view. An important attempt in this direction was *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, a thirteenth century manual ascribed popularly to Vidyāraṇya.²² This work is obviously inspired by *Yoga-vāsiṣṭha* and lays great emphasis on yogic practices. It is possible that the expression *jīvan-mukti* came into great vogue in the field of academic *Advaita*, as a result of the impact made by this book.

V. JÑĀNA INDISPENSABLE

To get an idea of the views earlier to Śaṅkara's days regarding liberation and salvation we have to turn to the discussion found in the fourth chapter of *Vedānta-sūtras*.²³ It deals with the relative merits and divergent fruits of worship (*upāsanā*) and wisdom (*jñāna*). As interpreted by Śaṅkara, two views of salvation for the worshippers are mentioned in the context. The first is Bādari's, which Śaṅkara appears inclined to accept as valid. It holds that one, who has been a pious worshipper, will, on death, pass on, through the way of gods, to the plane of Godhead (*Hiraṇya garbha*, or lower *brahman*, viz., the 'brahman' as

22. *Jīvan-mukti-viveka* of Śrī Vidyāraṇya (Ed. by S. Subramanya Sastri and T.R. Srinivas Ayyangar. The Theosophical Publ. House, 1935).

23. *Vedānta-sūtra* 4,3, 7 to 16. This comprises of two *adhikaraṇas*, according to Śaṅkara : *Kāryādhikaraṇa* (4, 3, 7 to 14) and *Apratikāmbānādhikaraṇa* (4,3,15 and 16). The former contains the views of Bādari and Jaimini.

effect), and there acquiring the liberating wisdom during the great dissolution at the end of the aeon, reaches the 'great and pure realm of *Viṣṇu*' (viz., final liberation). He will thus achieve the status of a non-returner to the phenomenal world. Śamkara describes this position as 'gradual liberation' (*krama-mukti*).²⁴

The second view is that of Jaimini, which insists that the worshipper is directly and finally liberated upon death. This may be described as the conventional '*videha-mukti*.' Śamkara, however, does not in the context employ this expression. Nor does he accept this position as meaningful. Worshipping a deity is a 'lower' *vidyā*, and it entails the worshipper to reach only the 'lower' *brahman* (or Godhead). Reaching this position is not the same as realizing the Absolute, which indeed is the true import of liberation.

These conflicting views notwithstanding, the *Vedānta-sūtras* believe that liberation is essentially realization (*sākṣātkāra*) of ones own true nature,²⁵ and that when this realization is had, there is no more return to the phenomenal world (*anāvṛtti*).²⁶ This is the most important consideration in any view regarding liberation. There is an unequivocal emphasis on wisdom, for realization is secured exclusively by wisdom (*jñāna*).

24. Śamkara's views on Krama-mukti can also be found in his comm. on *Vedānta-sūtra* 3,2,21; 3,3,1; 1,3,13 and 1,1,12. Cf. also his comm. on *Bhagavadgītā*, 8,24.

25. *Vedānta-sūtra*, 4,4,2.

26. *Ibid*, 4,4,22.

All schools of *Vedānta* are unanimous in affirming that wisdom alone is the means of attaining liberation. Bondage is due to basic and phenomenal ignorance (*avidyā*), and the involvement in the phenomenal world is derived entirely from this source. Ignorance can be removed only by wisdom; and, therefore, liberation is the direct result of wisdom. Śaṅkara speaks of 'immediate or instantaneous release' (*sadyo-mukti*) as the fruit of 'knowledge concerning the self (*ātma-jñāna*).''²⁷

This kind of liberation, according to him, is what is attained by those who are devoted to perfect *wisdom*.²⁸ Ānandagiri explains that release in this case is simultaneous with the arousal of wisdom (*jñāna-sama-kāla-mukti*); no time interval intervenes between becoming wise and getting released.

Ānandagiri poses a problem : "If such wisdom can indeed undo the basic and phenomenal ignorance and thereby eliminate all pressures exerted by *karma*, does not the body (which is one of the results of such pressure) fall automatically and instantaneously, when the liberating wisdom is occasioned ?"²⁹ In other words, will not enlightenment also necessitate immediate physical death? Will *sadyomukti* not also entail *sadyo-maraṇa* ? Does not liberation necessarily mean the absence of the body-mind complex?

27. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1,1,12. सद्योमुक्तिकारणमात्मज्ञानम् ।

28. *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya*, 5,27. Intro. Cf. also 8, 24.

(सद्योमुक्ति is explained as सद्य एव विमुच्यते)

29. Ibid, 4, 37, Introduction. Also see Śaṅkara's *Chāndogya-bhāṣya*, 6,14,2.

Śamkara concedes that liberation strictly means 'being without this complex,'³⁰ but denies that liberation is only for the dead and not for the living.³¹ 'Being without a body' in the classical description of liberation is to be taken in the sense of elimination of bodily bondage, which in fact is what is eliminated in liberation. The bondage is owing to *karma*, which in turn is due to ignorance. When ignorance is removed by wisdom, the bondage due to *karma* is also removed. The well-known and oft-quoted hymn in *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad* (2, 2, 8) emphasizes that liberation is freedom from the fetters of the heart, mind and *karma*:

भिद्यते हृदयग्रन्थिश्छिद्यन्ते सर्वसंशयाः ।
क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे ॥

"The knots of the heart snap; all doubts are cut asunder; and his *karmas* die out-when the Highest is beheld."

The description would be meaningless if we interpret that the undoing of *karmas* here involves the destruction of the physical body. *Karmas* in the context can only mean the *sañcita* and the '*āgami*' varieties, those that have not yet commenced to bear fruit. The '*prārabdha*' which is responsible for the bodymind complex is left untouched by the liberating insight.³² Since the actions responsible for

30. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1,1,4. Cf. *Ibid* 4,4,10.

31. Ānandagiri on *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya*, 5,26.

32. *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, 1st ch. Cf. Bhāratīrthā's *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* (Andhra Univ. Series 1941) 9, 32, (a), p.337.

bringing about the complex have already set out to fructify, they must necessarily work themselves out. Śaṅkara compares this with the arrow which has been shot; it can come to rest only when its force has been spent.³³

He discusses this problem at some length in his commentary on *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* (6,14,2). The Upanishadic text which has evoked this discussion is

तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्न विमोक्ष्येऽथ सम्पत्स्य इति ।

“There is only this much of delay-as long as he is not released (from the bonds of *avidyā*); and then he gets home!” Śaṅkara explains the condition : Until the body falls as a result of the exhaustion of the *karma* which has been responsible for bringing about the body.

He then gives the illustration of an arrow that has been shot at a target. It comes to rest only when the speed has run out, although it might have hit the mark in the mean time. It has no function after the target has been hit, but its momentum carries it on. Elsewhere,³⁴ he gives the example (given in the old *Sāṃkhya* text) of the potter's wheel continuing to revolve for some time after the pot has been finished. Even so, when the liberating wisdom has arisen, there is no more work for the saint to do, nor any other purpose for him to achieve.

But the body will continue until the *prārabdha* is exhausted. When, however, the body falls, there is no more

33. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 3,3,32. Cf. *Chāndogya Bhāṣya*, 6,14,2.

34. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 4,1,15.

returning to this phenomenal world. When an ordinary man dies, he returns. But when the enlightened saint dies, he does not. Śaṁkara takes the word '*atha*' (then) which occurs in the *Chāndogya* text above cited in the sense of 'immediately'; there is no time lag between 'bodily release' and 'getting home' (or obtainment of *mukti*). This is in a sense *sadyo-mukti*; but it is also tantamount to *jīvan-mukti*.

VI. THE ROLE OF PRĀRABDHA

It is argued that the purpose of the liberating wisdom is only to eliminate ignorance, and not to interfere with or destroy, the body.³⁵ And the wisdom liberates at once, without waiting for any changes to occur in the body or in the world at large. The presence or absence of the body-mind complex is therefore, irrelevant to the condition of liberation. There is no logical or psychological necessity that the moment of enlightenment and physical death should coincide.

It may be noted that the *prārabdha* which has brought into being the present physical existence is also responsible for the enlightenment that has dawned within the context of this particular phenomenal existence. There need not be an inherent conflict between the realization of Brahman and the operation of the *prārabdha*. There is, therefore, nothing unusual or impossible about the continuance of the body or the involvement of the saint in the phenomenal world, after enlightenment has been obtained.

35. *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, p.228.

There is a more important consideration. Should it happen that the moment of enlightenment coincides with the physical death of the saint, or if it is held that liberation is only an after-death affair, there would then be no authentic teacher of *Advaita* to tell us about the possibility and benefits of liberation. The tradition of the enlightened teacher communicating this wisdom to his discerning student would not be current at all.

Vimuktātman in his *Iṣṭasiddhi* holds that the very processes that bring about the enlightenment would also preserve the body for some time, so that the wisdom could be transmitted to others.³⁶ No one can possibly doubt that Śaṅkara himself was a *Jīvan-mukta* before he began teaching the *Advaita* doctrine. Prof. M. Hiriyanna has drawn our attention³⁷ to a passage in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Sūtras* of Bādarayaṇa, which suggests that *jīvan-mukti* was a matter of his own personal knowledge. Śaṅkara's words are:

“There need not be a dispute about whether the enlightened saint will preserve his body for sometime or not. How can one possibly deny another's personal experience of realization or (his reason for) preserving his body? This is precisely what is implied when the scriptural passage set out to describe the characteristics of the liberated saint.”³⁸

36. विद्वच्छरीरं परिपालयन्त्वेव विद्यार्थान्यपि कर्माणि किञ्चित्कालं यावता विद्यासन्तत्युच्छेदो न भवेत् ।

37. The Quest after Perfection, Mysore : Kāvyaśāla, 1952, p.72.

38. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 4,1,15.

It is by no means fantastic to assume that Śāmkara's immediate disciples benefitted by the master's golden touch. Intimate contact with a totally transformed person can readily prompt transformations in others. The disciples like Sureśvara and Padmapāda, who contributed much to stabilize the structure of *Advaita* teaching that Śāmkara constructed were most likely *jīvan-muktas* themselves. This tradition of conjoining personal experience with philosophical teaching must have continued for a length of time, although it is reasonable to guess that dilution of fervour was incidental to the passage of time

But now and then, there did come on the scene a *jīvan-mukta* who made a tremendous impact on the people around him. In recent memory, Sadaśiva-brahmendra and the late pontiff of Śringeri Śrī Śrī Chandraśekhara-bhāratīsvāmi were outstanding instances.

These instances clearly demonstrate that although enlightenment is possible in this very life, the condition of liberation and the ordinary condition of phenomenal involvement cannot co-exist.³⁹ Enlightenment will bring about a total transformation in the perspective of the individual. He may, for all practical intents, behave like an ordinary mortal; and he cannot help it because the *prārabdha* drags on. But his sense of the Real will not desert him at any time. Śāmkara gives an illustration; a person who suffers from an optical aberration and sees two

39. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha* (Bhāratīrtha), 9,32.

moons will continue to do so, even though he knows for certain that there is in actuality but one moon.⁴⁰

The enlightened saint knows that the real is a unity, but he involves himself albeit minimally in the world of multiplicity until the *prārabdha* ceases and the body falls dead. But this cautious involvement will not alter or diminish his enlightenment. Having been liberated (*mukta*), he can never become 'bound' (*baddha*) again. An individual, whether liberated or bound, cannot avoid involving himself in activities that are essential for survival. But a saint having freed himself from the fetters of phenomenal existence knows how to live in this world and yet not be of this world. His sole mission would be to lead other aspirants to the same state that he is in.

VII. SADYOMUKTI

From a discussion of concepts like *krama-mukti*, *sadyo-mukti*, *videha-mukti*, and *jīvan-mukti*, it should not be imagined that there are different kinds of liberation. Śaṅkara has unequivocally affirmed : "The fruit of liberation is of one shape only"⁴¹, unlike the results of *karma* which are various, relative to time, place and conditions of occurrence. Liberation is actually becoming one with the Absolute, and there is not a duality or multiplicity in the Absolute.⁴² The wisdom which alone is

40. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 4,1,15.

41. Ibid 1,1,24. एकरूपमेव फलं मोक्षम् । Also Cf. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1,4,13.

42. Ibid. 3,4,52.

the necessary and sufficient means of liberation is one ; and the fundamental and phenomenal ignorance which it eliminates is also one. It is meaningless, therefore, to think of varieties of or degrees in *mukti*.

It is true that Śāṁkara speaks of *krama-mukti*, *sadyo-mukti*, and, at least in one context, *jīvan-mukti*. But *krama-mukti*, which is the fruit of worship (or *upāsana*) can not really be regarded as *mukti* ; it is only a 'theological make-shift', as R. D. Ranade describes it.⁴³

Śāṁkara does not use the expression '*videha-mukti*' in his commentaries, but he appears to have been familiar with the idea, which perhaps was current during his days. He dismisses the idea as irrelevant and hypothetical. *Videha-mukti* is an inadequate idea ; for unless liberation has a relevance to our life here and now it ceases to be a value. Śāṁkara stresses this point at several place.

While summing up the famous *Muṇḍaka* passage describing the state of liberation, Śāṁkara says "they become brahman even while they are alive."⁴⁴ When he discusses the import of the passage "That thou art" (*tat tvam asi*),⁴⁵ he tells us that it cannot be taken to mean "You will become That when you die." Elsewhere,⁴⁶ he is clearer in his affirmation : "Here and now, he becomes the brahman, not at some time after his death."

43. R.D. Ranade : *Vedānta*, the Culmination of Indian Thought, Bombay : the Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan, 1970, p.167.

44. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 3,3,22.

45. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, 4,4,6. Cf. also *Kaṭha-upaniṣad-bhāṣya*, 2,2,1 and 2,1,14.

46. *Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad*, 3,2,6.

Sadyo-mukti is what, according to him, is the real import of liberation. It is liberation instantaneously achieved with the dawn of wisdom (*jñāna-sama-kāla-mukti*). And such liberation is meaningful only when it is achieved while the individual is still alive. *Sadyo-mukti* is often employed synonymously with *jīvan-mukti*.

The significance of *Videha mukti* is that it means that the saint will not be reborn, and that he will pass out of phenomenal existence. It is of course the ultimate fruit. But can it be a goal of human endeavour? The so-called 'bodylessness' in liberation is but figurative. 'Having a body' is ascribed to ignorance, and mistaking the body for one's own self is an aspect thereof. Thus, Śaṅkara argues, even while the saint is alive he cannot be said to have a body in the sense that the ordinary man has a body.⁴⁷ There is, then, no question of *mukti* being specially *videha* : it is *videha* in any case.

The conclusion from the foregoing discussion is that Śaṅkara regards *jīvan-mukti* as the only valid concept of *mukti*. It is probable that the apparent vehemence with which he argues in favour of this position was due to a mistaken interpretation that was being given during his days to *sadyo-mukti*. For instance, his elder contemporary, Maṇḍana, had propounded in his *Brahma-siddhi* the view that enlightenment will undo all *karma*, including the *prārabdha*.⁴⁸ Although he accepted *sadyo-mukti*, he actually

47. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1,1,4.

48. *Brahma-siddhi*, p.130 (Ed. by S. Kuppuswami Sastri)

meant by it liberation only *at death*. He made a distinction between *sthitaprajña* who is still an aspirant (*sādhaka*) and a perfectly liberated one (*siddha*), whose *prārabdha* has vanished. He conceded that the experience of saints cannot be dismissed as invalid, but he also pointed out that the 'latent impressions of nescience' continue till the event of physical death. However, the world appears to one whose latent impressions remain (although in an attenuated form), as a mere shadow, as things in a painting, or as objects made of clay or wood; there is no possibility of his getting involved in it. And, these latent impressions are too weak to occasion the renewal of physical existence for him. They disappear completely at death.

Although Maṇḍana called this the state of *jīvan-mukti*, it goes against the very substance of Śamkara's argument.⁴⁹ Bhāskara, who wrote his commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra* a century or so after Śamkara, nevertheless represents a view of *jīvan-mukti* that may have been current during Śamkara's days. He accepts two kinds or degrees of liberation: *sadyo-mukti* and *krama-mukti*, both as after-

49. This is the traditional view (e.g., Amalānanda's *Kalpataru*, 4,1,15). But a careful examination of views in *Brahma-siddhi* considered along with the commentaries, Ānanda-pūrṇa's *Bhāva-śuddhi* and Citsukha's *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā*, shows that there is a large agreement between his views and Śamkara's own views as suggested by the Editor of these commentaries, Anantakrishna Sastri (Sanskrit Introduction, Govt. Oriental Series CLXI, Madras 1963). There is a discussion about this matter in my forthcoming publication : Maṇḍana, a Study in Advaita.

death occurrences. He rejects *jīvan-mukti* as impossible, but concedes that the saint who is free from impurities and from impediments such as attachment, aversion and arrogance could be regarded 'as if liberated' even before death has overtaken him.

There are thinkers even within the fold of Śaṅkara's *Advaita*, who do not seem entirely reconciled to the idea of *jīvan-mukti*. Notable among them is Sarvajñātman, who held that *sadyo-mukti* in the sense of undoing all *karma* including *prārabdha*, was the only valid view of liberation.⁵⁰ According to him, *sadyo-mukti* can only be *videha-mukti*. He explains away the reference to *jīvan-mukti* in scriptures as merely an eulogy of *brahmavidyā*,⁵¹ a mere expedient to encourage the aspirant.⁵² The author of *Pañca-daśī* also seems to take the same view.⁵³

Pratyag-rūpa, the commentator of Citsukha, quotes a passage; "If there is *mukti* at all, there is only the *jīvan-mukti*."⁵⁴ But when he undertakes to elaborate the discussion found in Citsukha concerning the 'little nescience' (*avidyā-leśa*) he points out that it continues during the *jīvan-mukti* state.⁵⁵ This 'little nescience', in the context of this passage, is not a left-over or a hang-over;

50. *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, 4, 38. Madhusūdana's commentary (*Sāra-samgraha*) summarizes the argument (Intro. to 4, 38.)

51. *Ibid.*, 4, 39.

52. But verses 40-45 in the same section appear to support the *jīvan-mukti* argument.

53. *Pañcha-daśī*, 4, 51, and 52.

54. *Tatvapradīpikā*

55. *Ibid.*

it is a distinct form of nescience. Nescience has three forms : the first makes for the belief that the world is real, the second conjures up conditions that encourage involvement in such a world, and the third (the 'little nescience') determines the objective forms that are presented to the knowing mind.

The first two are removed by the liberating wisdom, whereas the third survives this wisdom. It determines the kind of body that he will have and the character of the world that he has to deal with. It is suspended and rendered inoperative only during the state of absorption that the *jīvan-mukta* may engage himself in. But it is completely eradicated only when he dies, and this is referred to as 'utter isolation' (*kaivalya*).

Appaya-dīkṣita raises the discussion of this 'little nescience' (*avidyā-leśa*), due to the continuance of which the liberation must be regarded as *jīvan-mukti*.⁵⁶ He refers to several views, including that of Sarvajñātman mentioned above. All the views suggest that *jīvanmukti* is but partial or incomplete liberation; 'that the gain here is penultimate. Of the two powers of nescience, veiling the reality (*āvaraṇa*) and projecting the phenomenal world (*vikṣepa*), the saint who is said to be liberated while still alive would have eliminated the former but not the latter, for the latter is inherently involved in the body-mind complex and cannot disappear until death. Or one may think of this

56. *Śāstra-Siddhānta-leśa-Saṃgraha* (Ed. by S.R. Krishnamurti Sastri and N. Veezhinathan, Secunderabad, 1973). 4th Chapter. (Pp.365f).

condition as a pot in which garlic has been cooked. However well the pot is cleaned the smell of garlic would persist for a while.

The 'little nescience' may be regarded as similar to this peculiar 'hang-over' or as a continuing subliminal impression (*vāsanā-viśeṣa*) which is responsible for the survival of the body-mind complex. The third view cited here which perhaps is in greater accord with the classical position gives the analogy of a burnt cloth : the shape of the cloth is retained until breeze scatters it, but the substance is already gone. The troublesome nescience has been dispelled by wisdom, and it is rendered altogether inactive; but its dead form lingers for a while in the shape of the saint's body-mind complex.

Madhusūdana, who is impressed by the burnt cloth analogy, interprets 'little' (*leśa*) as the mere 'form' (*ākāra*),⁵⁷ as a subtle state of nescience which facilitates the appropriation of the body. He compares it with the 'apūrva' of the *Mīmāṃsakas*, which is the subtle remnant which contains the fruits of the sacrifice after the sacrifice is over; with the shiver that persists even after one knows that a rope has been mistaken for the snake; with the potter's wheel continuing to revolve even after the central shaft has been removed. He argues that it is possible for the effect to persist even after the cause has been eliminated.

57. *Advaita-siddhi* (Madhusūdana-sarasvatī), with the comm. of Gauḍa-Brahmānanda and Viṭṭaleśa, Nirṇaya Sagar Press, Bombay, 1937, Pp.890.

VIII. INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES

Bearing on the character and extent of the nescience that persists even after enlightenment, there is a discussion in the later *Advaita* texts, especially in the minor manuals such as *Tr̥pti-dīpikā*, ascribed to Vidyāraṇya (in *Pañcadaśī*). They highlight the individual differences in the lives of the *Jīvanmuktas* and their modes of conduct. Janaka, the king of *Mithilā*, as is well-known, was an enlightened person; but he lived amidst plenty and comfort. Yājñavalkya, the poor householder with two wives, was also enlightened. Śuka and Sanaka were ascetics who were enlightened; they led simple and austere lives. Vāmadeva was enlightened even when he was born, unlike others who achieved this state by effort and application. Rahū-gaṇa, Sikara-dhvaja and Priya-vrata were known to be bad characters, although they were enlightened.

There is a popular verse—

“Kṛṣṇa was a *yogi*, Śuka was an ascetic, Janaka was a king, Vasiṣṭha was an active hermit and *Karkaṭi* an eater of carcasses. The wisdom of all these was of one kind; but their involvements were diverse.”

To explain this difference, the texts mentioned above classify *prārabdha* into five types:

(1) ‘superior’, which will predispose the individual to withdraw from worldly involvement from the very moment of his birth, as it happened in the case of Vāmadeva;

(2) 'middling' which will initially prompt involvement in the world but will in due course encourage withdrawal, as in the cases of Śuka and Sanaka;

(3) 'inferior' which will make only for withdrawal, as in the case of Yājñavalkya;

(4) 'very inferior' which will initially prompt withdrawal but encourage in due course involvement, as in the case of Janaka; and

(5) 'exceedingly inferior', which will predispose the individual to folly, license and vice, as it happened in the cases of Alarka and others.

The difference in the *prārabdha*, however, does not mean that there is a difference in the quality of *jīvan-mukti*. Involvement in the world and participation in its pleasures cannot happen without desires on the part of the individual as well as favourable conditions, which are directly the results of *prārabdha*. A little of the desire may be deliberate (*icchā*), but much of it is conditioned by the peculiar physical constitution of the individual (*anicchā*); or it may be the result of pressures from others (*parecchā*). However, the whole discussion is of recent origin and in the nature of a minor problem.

As long as the individual is free from the delusion of bondage, no worldly involvement is likely to affect him. And his transactions in the world are not motivated by love and hate, and so will not bear fruit. He does not cling to the world or to life, and does not strive. He allows things

to take their natural course, and he looks forward to nothing. There is a natural tendency for him to withdraw from the world as much as he can. For, although the phenomenal involvement now does not alter the quality of his liberation, it will reduce the happiness that forms the core of that experience.

Yājñavalkya's decision to renounce the world is given as an illustration. Yājñavalkya was wise and liberated even when he lived as a house-holder. After he won laurels in the philosophical disputes in the court of Janaka, he decided to become a mendicant (*saṁnyāsin*) and withdraw from normal life. The reason for this decision was that although he was liberated in lay life, he could not experience the happiness of that liberation, because of his involvements. True happiness can be enjoyed only by renouncing. Greater the involvement in the transactional world, lesser is the possibility of the enjoyment of bliss of liberation. *Prārabdha* in any case will work itself out and get exhausted; but when it favours withdrawal, it will allow a greater measure of the experience of liberation.

Involvement in worldly affairs will not negate the state of liberation when once it has been attained, but will diminish the peculiar happiness that the state of liberation can provide. Even the liberated person has to utilise his psychophysical energy in his transactional behaviour. This energy gets fragmented and scattered when the person's involvement is excessive and diverse.

The enjoyment of bliss requires that energy which should be concentrated and total, and this presupposes withdrawal and detachment. It is, therefore, more usual for a *jīvan-mukta* to lead a life of isolation, austerity, and absorption. It is natural to expect the *prārabdha* which occasions the liberating wisdom also to create conditions that favour its experience as a state of supreme happiness.

IX. SIDDHA, NOT SĀDHYA

We may now go a little deeper into the implications of the concept of *jīvan-mukti* as crystallized by Śaṅkara. We shall see how the concept can make both life and the study of *Vedānta* meaningful. It is almost an axiomatic assumption that every man aspires to obtain freedom and happiness. Bondage and misery of any kind are undesirable, and all of man's effort in the ultimate analysis is directed towards eliminating them.

Vedānta recognizes this normal human urge towards freedom and happiness, and describes the obtainment of absolute freedom and highest happiness as *mukti*. *Advaita* goes a step further, and claims that this condition of absolute freedom and highest happiness is not something that must be obtained or achieved (*sādhya*), but a condition that is natural and is already present (*siddha*). Bondage and misery are merely coefficients of our ignorance of this true state of affairs, and this is due to our phenomenal involvement.

Śamkara draws our attention to an old story.⁵⁸ A prince, abandoned in a jungle as a babe, is picked up by a hunter. He grows into manhood, convinced that he is the hunter's son. Then some one reveals to him that he is in actuality a prince. When the boy discovers his true identity, he cannot be said to have then become the prince, for he never had ceased to be a prince he was always one.

Realization is really shaking off ones mistaken notions. Śamkara calls this the 'perfect insight' (*samyag-darśana*),⁵⁹ a matter of highest knowledge (*jñāna*). *Vedānta*, especially *Advaita*, insists that knowledge is the sole means of realization. And, knowledge is the removal of ignorance, and nothing more. Liberation is therefore described as 'the undoing of nescience' (*avidyāstamayo mokṣah*). It is not the obtainment of a new state of being, a transformation, a modification, or an effect.⁶⁰ It is merely the discovery of a condition that was always there, inalienably.

When, however, we speak of the 'occurrence' or obtainment of enlightenment, as if liberation was generated at a particular time, it is so only with reference to an earlier condition, and in the sense of removing the felt

58. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya*, 2,1,19. According to Ānandagiri the story is from Dravidācārya. Cf. Sureśvara's *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-vārtika*, 2,970-972.

59. E.g., in *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya*, 4,37 and 39. *Samyag-darśana* is explained in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya*, 2,4,5.

60. Not a भावान्तरापत्ति, उत्पाद्य, संस्कार्य, आप्य or विकार्य । Cf. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya*, 4,4,6 and *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 1,1,4.

bondage. Śaṅkara gives the example of our speaking about the health of a person when his disease is cured.⁶¹

Health is not a new condition that has been achieved; it is only the restitution of the natural or normal condition. It is the disease that is in the nature of a deviation or disturbance of this natural condition. There is, however, a difference with regard to liberation inasmuch as the ignorance will in no way actually disturb or distort the original condition of freedom and happiness. It only seems to do so. Whatever disturbance is felt, it is only apparent, and essentially unreal. In a real sense, there is no difference in the self in the two states of bondage and liberation.

If, in that case, there is no extraordinary condition that is achieved in liberation, why should the scriptures ask us to put forth all this effort in the direction of liberation? And what would, in that case, be the utility of scriptures at all ?

Śaṅkara poses this question, and answers:⁶² It is true that there is no extraordinary and novel condition that can be achieved by liberation; and as a matter of fact, there is no real difference between the 'bound' condition and the 'liberated' condition, for the self does not undergo any change whatsoever at any time. But liberation does achieve a positive purpose, and that is the removal of ignorance which projects falsely the 'bound' condition upon the 'ever liberated' condition.

61. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 4,4,2.

62. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya*, 4,4,6.

And such removal is accomplished by the wisdom occasioned by the scripture. Indeed, scriptures have their value only in this context; they have a purpose to fulfil only in the case of a 'bound' individual. When once he is liberated, scriptures lose their relevance and utility.⁶³

Accordingly, the talk of enlightenment and the effort towards enlightenment have relevance only at the phenomenal level. And that is the level at which we all operate. Although Gauḍapāda, at the transcendental level, says that there is neither bondage nor liberation, neither the seeker after liberation nor the liberated,⁶⁴ we cannot forget the phenomenal fact that we are bound, and we aspire to be liberated here and now.

In this context, *jīvan-mukti* meant to transform our entire orientation to life, our attitudes and our involvement in the world; and to enable us experience the joy of liberation and the joy of 'being' during our very lives. Liberation does not alter facts; it does not bring about a change in the world; nor does it even free us of our commitment to others around us. But our approach to ourselves and to the world undergoes a total change.

63. *Bhagavad-gītā-bhāṣya*, 13,2.

64. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 2, 32.

X. CONDITIONS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

There is a classical definition of *jīvan-mukti* given in *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, a work ascribed to Vidyāranya,⁶⁵ which perhaps is the only work that is entirely and exclusively devoted to this subject :

जीवतः पुरुषस्य कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्व सुखदुःखादिलक्षणश्चित्तधर्मः ।
क्लेशरूपत्वाद्बन्धो भवति । तस्य निवारणं मुक्तिः ॥

“A person that is alive has his consciousness characterized by such details as occasioning action, experiencing its results, feeling happy, and feeling unhappy. These details are sources of stress, and therefore they become fetters. The removal of these fetters is liberation while one is still alive.” In the fourth chapter of this work, among the concrete benefits of *jīvan-mukti* are listed: ‘protection of the acquired wisdom’ (*jñāna-rakṣā*), ‘absence of all discord’ (*viśaṃvādābhāva*), ‘removal of stress’ (*duḥkhanāśa*), and ‘joy in life’ (*sukhāvīrabhāva*). In other words, the liberated saint is wise, integrated, relaxed, and happy. His consciousness is unfettered and devoid of the sources of stress.

Technically, the liberated saint’s habitual mode of consciousness is called in later *Advaita* literature *brahmākāra-vṛtti*. This expression has become so important that it merits some elaborate consideration. A *vṛtti* is a mode of consciousness, a modality that has been

65. *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, p.9 (Sanskrit section), The same definition also occurs in the *Muktikopaniṣad*.

occasioned by an objective stimulation or by a dispositional prompting. It signifies the act of consciousness that 'flows out' as it were and assumes the form of the presented object. It is likened to a canal that draws water out in a line from the reservoir. Usually the modes are phenomenal; they assume forms of material objects and mental images. The purpose is to cope with the world as successfully as one can, by interpreting the objects for us.

There is a distinction made in the later history of *Advaita* between the object-conditioned consciousness of this sort (*phala-vyāpya*) and the process-oriented consciousness (*vṛtti-vyāpya*). The former *reveals* a concrete object by removing our specific ignorance with regard to that particular object; and it *relates* us with the outside world. In effect, it results in practical experience, helps us achieve a particular purpose.

The latter, on the other hand, is consciousness turned on itself, dissociated from the objective context. It is meant to reveal the undifferentiated and indeterminate Absolute (*brahman*) by removing our fundamental ignorance with regard to this reality. This will ultimately result in the consciousness whose form is that of the Absolute (*brahmā kāravṛtti*) breaking all barriers and limiting conditions.

This is said to result from the intuitive and total understanding of scriptural passages like 'That thou art' (*tat tvam asi*). The important element here is that the 'witness consciousness' (*sākṣi-caitanya*), a sort of non-participant

observer beyond the subject - object duality, will illumine both the modal consciousness and the mind which is the physical basis for it.

This illumination will immediately be followed by the elimination of nescience, which in its turn will remove the superimposition of the phenomenal presentation upon the pure consciousness. And as this happens, the process-oriented consciousness (which has now completed its purpose) itself ceases. It is in this sense that it has been called the 'final mode of consciousness' (*carama-vṛtti*) before liberation.

A discussion has ensued in several texts⁶⁶ concerning the description of this final mode. The prevailing view is that the Absolute towards which the modal consciousness is directed is naturally conditioned by that process, which is as yet a phenomenal event. But the enlightenment that this process occasions not only provides the individual with an intuitive realization of the Absolute (unconditioned by the process), but spontaneously dissolves that very process.

Thus by the wise utilization of a phenomenal (and, therefore, unreal) process, the transcendental reality is realized. An error has been made to yield a valid result (*saṁvādhbhrama*). It is like an individual who, mistaking the light emanating from a precious gem for the gem itself, reaches for it, and gets the gem. The light (which is

66. Cf. Madhusūdana's *Advaita-Siddhi*, Nṛsiṁhāśrama's *Vedānta-tattva-viveka*, Brahmananda's *Laghu-candrikā*, *Vedānta-kalpa-latā* etc.,

in fact not the gem) helps him to procure the gem. Likewise, the final mode of consciousness, although phenomenal, leads to reality.

XI. BRAHMĀKĀRA - VṚTTI

The import of this achievement is that liberation is to be viewed in terms of freeing the body-bound and individualized consciousness into the boundless expanse of self-vision. For one whose physical existence continues despite his liberation, this vision concerns the 'cosmic consciousness' (*īśvara*). In fact, the expression 'that' (*tat*) in the celebrated scriptural passage means, according to some, only this aspect of consciousness, even as 'thou' (*tvam*) refers to the individualized consciousness. The realization of the essential identity of the individual consciousness with the cosmic consciousness in their essential and fundamental aspect is the direct benefit of liberation. Śamkara says: "Not to know the nature of *īśvara* is bondage; to know his nature is liberation".⁶⁷

This is not the occasion to enter into a discussion concerning the place of *īśvara* (or *saguṇa-brahman*) in *Advaita* metaphysics. It would suffice our purpose here to note that *īśvara* (or Godhead) is responsible for the phenomenal framework within which the *jīva* (or the individual personality) functions. It is the cause as well as the content of the world. The two are only different aspects of the same reality, the former unclouded by ignorance but the latter distinguished by it (thus subjecting it to

67. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 3,2,5.

phenomenal fetters). *Īśvara* is the Absolute's image in the phenomenal firmament, while the *jīva* is the reflection of the same reality in the waters of our individual psychological outfit.⁶⁸

Godhead abides in the individual as witness and 'inner controller' (*antaryāmi*); he is the bridge between *being* (or the Absolute beyond time, space and causality) and *becoming* (or the phenomenal world). As cosmic consciousness he is the substratum, background, and core of the individualized consciousness. When the spiritual career of the individual reaches its fulfilment, the individualized consciousness will break through all the conditioning and limiting factors, and expand into cosmic consciousness. This is the significance of the expression *brahmākāra-vṛtti*.

Although the normal physical co-ordinates of individual existence continue for the individual that has achieved this liberation, there is a total transformation in his psychological moorings and relationships. The reason for this persistence at the existential level and transformation at the functional level is that the condition of *jīvan-mukti* is essentially an altered state of consciousness.

The change that occurs in a *jīvan-mukta* has been graphically described in several texts, especially in some Upaniṣadic passages, in *Bhagavadgītā*, and in *Yogavāsiṣṭha*. The descriptions are replete with suggestions regarding the

68. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, Section 8, Pp. 135.

transforming power of liberation. The individual's personal consciousness gets suddenly freed from the psychological barriers of customary cognitions as well as from the organismic need to survive as an individual in the world of distinctions and differentiations. He feels no longer bound to his ego or to the objects outside.

His consciousness, though most of the time individualised by his body and mind is nevertheless illumined by the direct experience of the essential unity of all experience at the level of cosmic consciousness (*brahmākāra-vṛtti*). The bubble of his ego is punctured, and it can no longer break down and build up the presented world in accordance with fancy, desire, or fear; as it would do in an ordinary individual. He will no longer be deluded, annoyed, lured or caught unawares by the world. The world for him would be like a serpent whose fangs have been taken out: it may bite, but cannot injure.

However, he would still have to live and move in the world, much as he did before enlightenment. The vital functions have to be carried out, and social relations have to continue. Although the appearance of everything has altered, he would still have to react to the appearances. He knows that this whole world is a mere phantasmagoria, but he has to live in it like any other person. Technically this necessity is known as "following that which has been sublated" (*bādhitānuvṛtti*). The example that Śaṅkara has given of a person with an optical aberration has already been cited. The person knows that there is only one moon,

but he cannot help seeing two of it, because his optical malady continues. Sureśvara gives another example: The man who is frightened by mistaking a rope for the snake, will continue to tremble for a while even after he is told that it is merely a rope.⁶⁹ The obvious explanation is that his liberation does not dissolve the reality of the world or his relatedness to it. His existential structure continues although the function has been transformed.

The liberating wisdom will eliminate the delusion that is responsible for phenomenal existence and involvement. The wisdom, free from doubt and error, occurs once, and nescience is instantaneously undone. There is no more delusion taunting the individual. But this liberating wisdom is only a mental process, as we have seen; it is a psychological modality. The happiness that results from it would disappear when other mental processes (with phenomenal involvement) intervene and suspend this modality.

The liberated individual has still to work out the remnants of his *prārabdha*, and therefore he transacts with the world. Although there is no danger of his losing his wisdom or being deluded again, he would miss the joy of liberation unless he repeats the initial mental modality that liberated him. In order to experience the bliss of liberation, he is advised repeatedly to cogitate on the identity of the individual consciousness with the cosmic one.

69. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, 4, 60.

The normal inclination of the *jīvan-mukta* would be to preserve and pursue the *brahmākāra-vṛtti*; for which, the stability and purity of mind are essential requisites. But it may so happen that the *prārabdha* may present him with diverse distractions, for it is impossible even for a liberated one to be unceasingly in a state of absorption. He is subject to the necessity of 'emerging out' (*vyutthāna*) to participate in the phenomenal world, so long as his embodied condition lingers on. Thus, he moves between the reality that he has realized and the unreality that he has sublated but has to concede.

XII. JĪVANMUKTI

The problem that would arise in this contingency is whether such an individual would still feel the normal moral responsibilities and discharge the usual social obligations, or whether he would withdraw completely from the norms and conventions of morality and social life. In the latter event, a further question would be whether his conduct would not be outlandish and erratic.

The answer that *Advaita* gives is that the individual who is liberated while living would, of course, not do anything that may be regarded as wicked or immoral. For, wicked or immoral conduct stems from phenomenal involvement in the shape of selfishness, and excessive attachment to physical existence and psychological satisfactions.

A liberated one is evidently freed from such involvement. His personal self tends to disappear, and he

no longer clings to life or to the world. He would give up even normal pleasures as unbecoming; how could he, like a dog, go to them again?⁷⁰ Śaṅkara points out that when a spiritual seeker gives up as burdensome even those rituals, which are prescribed in the scriptures, how could he indulge in actions which are obviously foolish and selfish?⁷¹

And, as an aspirant who is preparing himself for perfection, he would have rejected what social norms regard as wicked and immoral actions as detrimental to his own spiritual career; how could he regard them as worthy or permissible when he has now achieved his goal. One who would not think of eating poison even when he is hungry would of course not eat it when his belly is full after a festive lunch.⁷² Enlightenment and moral depravity can never go together.

The instances of *jīvan-muktas* (like Alarka and others) whose *prārabdhas* were 'exceedingly inferior' and who were given to licentious living have been given in some later manuals. This is only to illustrate the point that a liberated individual would go beyond 'good' and 'bad'; the import is that whatever his actions, they would in no way cloud his wisdom or prejudice his liberation.

The liberated individual would of course rise above the restrictive values of common morality, and reject the

70. Ibid, 4.62.

71. Intro. to *Aitareya-bhāṣya*. Cf. also *Chāndogya-bhāṣya* 2,23,1.

72. Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, 4,66. This is the verse from *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, 18, 220.

imperative character of social obligations. But to imagine that he would sink himself in vice, or become a menace to society, would be foolish. At the worst, we might characterize him as amoral and asocial, like a child. More frequently, the *jīvan-muktas* have been thoroughly austere and compassionate, and their conduct has been known to conform perfectly to social norms, because they are aware that they should set healthy standards for common men to follow. Sadānanda points out⁷³ that the virtues he reveals in his conduct are in the nature of 'ornaments' for him, and they become second nature to him. He has no use for them, but they gain in value because of him.

The liberated individual would have this additional sense of moral responsibility. Not being any longer involved in the phenomenal world and selfish, having turned his back on self-indulgence, he spends the rest of his life working for the welfare of mankind (*loka-saṁgraha*); he usually assumes the role of a teacher and guide.

This mission is regarded as so worthwhile indeed that a liberated individual may willingly get reborn to continue his mission, although his enlightenment would have freed him from this necessity.⁷⁴ The transformation that occurs in the liberated one's personality would involve the replacement of self-centeredness by generosity, altruism and compassion. He has a positive function to fulfil within the social context, and more often than otherwise, he would willingly discharge this responsibility.

73. *Vedānta-sāra*.

74. *Vedānta-sūtra-bhāṣya*, 3,3,3,32.

He would then consent to get involved in the phenomenal world, although he feels no compulsion to do so. And such involvement would not defile him or distort his vision of reality. But the value of altruism may not always be felt. When the situation present before him is incompatible with his own make-up, the liberated individual may spend the rest of his life in quiet contemplation and with a restricted involvement in his immediate surrounding.

Śaṅkara, in his prologue to the commentary on *Bhagavad-Gītā* refers to the 'approach' (*pravṛtti*) and 'withdrawal' (*nivṛtti*) tendencies. The saint would prefer the latter to the former. In the language of Arthur Deikman, he would prefer the 'receptive' mode to the 'action' mode. He accepts whatever comes along his way. He does not aspire or plan, design or programme. He does not seek to alter the world or strive to safeguard his own interests.

He is not even scared of death, the most potent and persistent of threats to man's composure. Action mode is emphasized in the phenomenal world in order to cling to life and fight against death in all possible ways. Death is regarded as something that is extremely annoying, disturbing and destructive. It comes to man in a variety of shapes, and man is continually busy combating it. The dread it occasions and the anxiety that it spreads are the prime motivations for man's phenomenal involvement. The thought of death keeps him tense and troubled. But the liberated one will look upon death as a perfectly natural event and rest relaxed.

The *Upaniṣads* frequently refer to the dread of death and describe the great goal of liberation as 'deathless' (*amṛta*). It is not liberation from physical death that is intended, but freedom from its dread. It is this dread that is the source of all evil. Our selfishness and wickedness are born out of our petty ego-sense, which is a counter-construct to battle with the dread of death. Immorality is basically a reaction to the deep fear that wells up from within. The saint who is liberated is also free from fear (*abhaya*), and is therefore devoid of the chief motivation for immoral conduct.

XIII. SAMNYĀSA AS MEANS

It is not so much the social norms of morality that bother the ordinary man; it is his own sense of what is right being stifled by what he is under a compulsion to repudiate. The normal man is divided against himself, and consequently sees the world as split and haphazard. But the saint who has achieved integrity in himself sees the world as unified and orderly. And he is not anxious about the future; he is in fact not concerned with it. He lives in the present and is quite satisfied with it.

It is a difficult exercise to cultivate an effective indifference to the past and the future. For most of us, the present is merely a meeting point of the past and the future. The present eludes us because the normal mind is busy calling up images from the past and conjuring up visions of the future. To encounter the present, a mood of relaxation is essential, and an attitude devoid of ego-

involvement is a help. The total and exclusive orientation to the present would necessarily involve the attitude of 'a non-participant observer', or in the language of *Vedānta*, of a 'mere witness' (sākṣī). Indian tradition advocates the development of this attitude as an indispensable aid in the spiritual career.

Śaṅkara's insistence on renunciation (*saṁnyāsa*) has often been misunderstood. It is frequently mistaken for the monastic style of living. Nothing was farther from Śaṅkara's intention. He nowhere justifies the abandonment of normal life, nor does he advocate a formal entry into, or confinement in, a monastic institution. Renunciation is an attitude, a dominant mode of approach to the phenomenal world. He means by it a willingness to give up everything in the world and also himself.

It is, for him, what we would now call a strategy. He follows the Upaniṣhadic ideology that a normal man busily engaged with the external environment would have little time, energy or facility to explore his own interior; and that he would not even be aware of the reality within himself. To become sensitive to the non-ordinary reality, within himself. To become sensitive to the non-ordinary reality, one must give up the preoccupation with the ordinary world. He should no longer be 'active' in the world; he should establish within himself the 'receptive' mode of transaction.

This aspect of the problem is well brought out in the distinction that is made in later *Advaita* thought between two kinds or degrees of renunciation : *vividīśāsamnyāsa* and *vidvatsamnyāsa*.⁷⁵ The former is renouncing in order to *know*, in order to obtain the wisdom concerning reality (*tattva-jñāna*). It is an encounter with ones own interior. The latter is the renunciation of one who is already a *knower*, one who has already obtained the wisdom.

Yājñavalkya's resolve to renounce is cited as the example of the latter. Renouncing of the worldly goals and pleasures is a necessary step to obtain wisdom. Renunciation means a positive effort towards minimising the external and internal distractions, so that one is free to marshal and focus his energy and attention on higher values. Turning ones back on the ephemeral is a preparation for directly apprehending the essential. Unless one gives up the clinging to the outside, he cannot enter into himself.

However, for the sense of renunciation to take root, one must engage himself in what is known as *karma-yoga* or doing ones duties without a selfish interest and in the spirit of dedication to Godhead. This would necessarily involve the eschewing of such unhelpful dispositions as lust, anger, and regret. In other words, the ascetic would have to free himself from phenomenal involvement and live in isolation before he can aspire to acquire the liberating wisdom.

75. *Jīvan-mukti-viveka*, Cf. i, Pp. 4-8. (Sanskrit Section).

When the renunciation in the first degree has served its purpose, viz., the obtainment of 'knowledge', the renunciant then becomes eligible to work for the ideal of liberation in this very life. Śaṅkara would describe this stage of the 'renunciation of the knower' - as 'abandonment of all possible action' (*sarva-karma saṁnyāsa*).

In contradistinction, the earlier renunciation may be described as 'abandonment of actions that are egoistic' (*karṣṭva-pūrvaka-karma-saṁnyāsa*), and the preparatory state of moral perfection as 'abandonment of the fruits of actions' (*karma-phala-saṁnyāsa*).

XIV. ISOLATION

The concept of *jīvan-mukti* is thus an adequate formulation of what in modern research on consciousness is called 'authentic living'. It points out that the true goal of man must be to live in perfect accord with himself, true to himself, without getting mixed up in a motley host of conflicting values and norms that crowd the world. Indian tradition always emphasizes the individual: it recognizes that each individual is unique, and that each individual must work out his destiny by himself.

The value it attaches to societal living or to social conformity is minimal. Phenomenal involvement can destroy not only the uniqueness of the individual but his initiative for encounter with himself. There is in it a very real danger inasmuch as the reality within is transferred to the arbitrary constructs that are in their nature unreal.

The phenomenal world is an elaborate apparatus for ordering our involvement, for confining our individual streams of consciousness in norms, goals and values that are socially approved and materially beneficial. The consciousness that is phenomenally involved is a matter of relations. Śaṁkara speaks of the 'I' and 'Thou' split (*yuṣmad-asmāt-pratyaya*) in our consciousness as responsible for phenomenal existence and involvement. The split symbolizes the fact that intentions are foisted upon relations. Intentions further engender the fragmentation of the individual: duality (*dvaita*) results inevitably in multiplicity (*nānātva*). Our life is thus lived amidst unreal irritations and enjoyments.

The scriptures warn us that reality is one and undivided; and that whoever sees it as dual or as multiple is not only deluded but gets bound to the phenomenal wheel of anxiety and involvement. To know reality, to experience its unity, to be liberated from the compulsive need to be involved, to be oneself truly and purely this is authentic living. And it is exactly this that is held out in *Vedānta* as the proper goal of human life.

Jīvan-mukti is a flash of transforming insight into the totality of individual existence in the phenomenal context. It is an intense awareness of a new dimension of being. When it is described as the suspension of the individual's gross physical existence (*sthūla*) as well as the psychological structure corresponding to it (*sūkṣma*), the suspension emphasizes that the 'active'- aspect of transactions based on motivations has yielded to the

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'receptive'. The 'differential' outlook makes way for the 'existential' outlook.

Modern research on the human brain has shown that its structure as well as function is dual, that what we have is a split brain. The 'anguish' of life is derived from this persistent dichotomy. The unity that we seek to achieve in life is based on illusions and strivings (what Śaṅkara would call *prātibhāsika* and *vyāvahārika*), and hence does not touch the root problem of duality.

Doubt and error are incidental to such a pursuit of unity. The unity that the *jīvan-mukta* achieves is a fundamental one; It negates all possibility of dichotomy and differentiation. This is what the Vedāntic texts describe as '*akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti*'. The definition of the *jīvan-mukta* given by Sadānanda ⁷⁶ is not only comprehensive but suggestive:

"The *jīvanmukta* is one who, by the wisdom obtained from the unitary apprehension of his own essential nature and by means of negating the ignorance that clouds the Real, has realized the undifferentiated Absolute, viz., his own nature; by also negating ignorance, its effects, accumulated *karma*, doubt and error he has freed himself from all fetters (that bind him to the phenomenal world); he rests in the Absolute."

76. जीवन्मुक्तो नाम स्वस्वरूपाखण्डज्ञानेन तदज्ञानबाधनाद्वारा स्वस्वरूपाखण्ड ब्रह्मणि साक्षात्कृते अज्ञानतत्कार्यसञ्चितकर्मसंशयादीनामपि बाधितत्वात् अखिलबन्धरहितो ब्रह्मनिष्ठः ।

The definition emphasizes that liberation is to be viewed in terms of eliminating all barriers that separate the individual personality from the Absolute undercurrent that is unitary. When the barriers are intuitively perceived as unreal, their hold on the mind is weakened; their bondage character vanishes.

But they continue to appear, as long as the *prārabdha* dispositions endure. But their mere appearance cannot be said to hold the individual captive. Nor is it true that the individual can altogether dispense with them. That is why Sadānanda draws a distinction between the *jīvan-mukta* who rests in the Absolute and the *Videha-mukta* who is the very Absolute, and whose only character is bliss.

The *jīvan-mukta* has isolated himself at the essential level but voluntarily and temporarily suspends his isolation at the transactional level. But the *videha-mukta* has isolated himself entirely and truly; there is no emerging out of it at any time or in any condition. Sadānanda describes this latter state, which is also the ultimate, as 'absolute isolation' (*parama-kaivalya*)⁷⁷.

It has been my endeavour to present before you some details concerning this great ideal in Indian thought. In conclusion, we should be grateful to Āchārya Śamkara for having recovered this ideal when it was all but lost sight of. It was his genius that crystallized this idea as the core-concept of *Advaita* and as the final ideal held out is the

77. Cf. *Vākya-vṛtti*, 52 and 53.

vedic tradition. Indeed, if we ignore the importance of this ideal and forget the message of the great Āchārya concerning its value and urgency, we would lose the opportunity that *Advaita* provides for us to fulfil here and now our destiny. *Jīvan-mukti* is an effective and sufficient answer to the complaint that *Advaita* is only a metaphysical system without a practical counter-part. The dynamics of *Advaita-sāadhanā* follows closely the Vedic framework. The development of R̥gvedic thought thus finds its fulfilment here. Veda and *Vedānta* constitute a continuum.

CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADVAITA

Study of Consciousness Project
Fascicule I

CONSCIOUSNESS IN ADVAITA
SOURCE MATERIAL AND METHODOLOGICAL
CONSIDERATIONS

Vidyāṅkārā

Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao

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FOREWORD

The Śrī Abhinava Vidyāthīrtha Swāmīgal Scientific Research Academy was formed as part of the 61st birthday celebrations of His Holiness Jagadguru Abhinava Vidyāthīrtha Swāmīgal of Śrīringeri Śārādā Pīṭam. It was felt that, apart from the usual celebrations consisting of religious functions and meetings to express devotion, a more permanent form should be given to the celebrations consistent with the lofty and transcendental objectives of *Sanātana Dharma*, the maintenance of which is the *raison-d'être* of the great Śārādā Pīṭam. From the time of Ādi Śankara down to the present day, the Pontiffs of the Śārādā Pīṭam have made significant contributions to the philosophy of Advaita by personal instruction and written interpretation. Several of the authoritative texts on the subjects like Śrī Sureswarāchārya's *Naiṣkarmya Siddhi* and the *Varttikas* and the numerous writings of the great Vidyāranya owe their existence to the spiritual insight and philosophical expertise of the saints who have adorned this Pīṭam.

But the interpretation of nature which is the cardinal characteristic of Western scientific knowledge has introduced a new methodology in all types of learning, including the rational and supra-rational realms of human experience and understanding. While during the 19th century, the so-called scientific outlook was confined to a mechanistic interpretation of an ever expanding knowledge over the physical world, more recent research seeks to probe into the workings of the human mind, which, in turn

consists of an examination of the areas of normal consciousness and of the unexplored boundaries of parapsychology. The great Śankarabhagavatpāda has explored this aspect of knowledge in a manner which is baffling to the layman but is a source of understanding to the psychologists. There is need, therefore, at the present time to reconcile the order of matter with the order of mind. Isolated research on such reconciliation has been attempted but no systematic exploration of these comparatively new areas of study has been undertaken.

One of the objectives of the Academy is to undertake the carrying on of systematic research and analysis of the scientific data and knowledge contained in the relevant ancient literature including the Vedās, Śāstras and other ancient literature in the light of modern science with a view to determine how far our ancient knowledge and wisdom is relevant to modern life and in solving various problems facing humanity.

This aim postulates both study and experimental verification by modern methods. Prof. Rao's attempt is in this definite direction and when completed will throw considerable light on the problem of consciousness as expounded by Śankara in relation to the new research on the subject. It is a welcome addition to the literature on the subject which, far from being a fanciful and non-scientific *terra incognita*, has come into its own as a subject for scientific research.

S. Y. Krishnaswamy

PREFACE

Exploration of Consciousness is now 'the game in the town'. Several scientific disciplines (including Psychology, Neurology, Neurophysiology, Psychopharmacology and Biology) are increasingly interested in the study of consciousness. Especially the dawn of Existential-Humanistic approach in recent years has emphasized the importance of subjective awareness : the increasing role that phenomenological outlook has been playing in modern thinking has focussed attention on a broader reality including personal consciousness as well as the perspective thereof. As Edgar Mitchell, the celebrated astronaut, pointed out, the exploration of inner space has become more relevant and urgent than that of the outer space, for the welfare of mankind.

In the wake of this academic activity, there has been not only a willingness but an eagerness to obtain help from what till now was branded as 'esoteric' knowledge. Thomas R. Blackburn has confessed : "Perhaps science has much to learn along this line from the disciplines as distinct from the content of oriental religions". It is well known that Indian contribution in this regard will be most valuable, for there has been in India an involvement with the dynamics of consciousness for well over five thousand years. In this long and impressive history, Śamkara's work in the seventh century constitutes a major landmark.

An inquiry has therefore been sponsored by Śri Abhinava *Vidyātīrtha Svāmīgal* Scientific Research Academy (SAVSSRA) to study scientifically and in depth the Advaitic

thinking with regard to consciousness. The investigation has been undertaken to document and analyze the relevant data, seek out the implications and relations, and reconstruct the theories so as to be relevant to modern work that is going on in the field. The study will also assess the scientific value of such theories, indicate correspondences, and obtain clues to solve the contemporary riddles.

The project, which is primarily psychological in orientation, has been planned with two objectives in view : to prepare a Source-Book (a Book of Readings) of all references to consciousness in Advaita literature ranging from *Gauḍapāda* in the sixth century to Appayya-dīkṣita in the sixteenth century ; and to examine with the aid of scientific methods the relevance and value of such material to strictly scientific thinking that has gone on in disciplines like Psychology and Neurology.

The first fascicule that is now being published is in the nature of a historical survey of source-materials in Advaita : it attempts to define not only the points of view that prevail in the field but to provide the speculative framework of Śaṅkara's system. It will also deal with methodological considerations and examine the relative merits of observation, reasoning, experience and scriptural testimony (or intuition). The fascicule is intended to prepare the ground for a proper appreciation of the contribution made by Advaita towards elucidating the problem of consciousness.

S. K. Ramachandra Rao

SOURCES OF ŚAMKARA'S THOUGHT

I. SAMPRADĀYA

Śamkara represents a phase of Indian thought that was at once creative and conservative. It was creative inasmuch as the implications, involvements and suggestions of traditional wisdom were drawn out, spelt out and defended with unprecedented clarity, skill and imagination. It was conservative in the sense that the essential frame-work of tradition which had by then tended to fall apart was consolidated, utilizing relentless reason and relying on uncontroverted experience.

Śamkara credits correct tradition (*sampradāya*) with high value. He rates it higher than erudition : "Although learned in all branches of knowledge, one who is ignorant of correct tradition is to be ignored as a fool." ¹ Whenever he quotes an authority approvingly, he prefaces the citation with such statements as "Here, the knowers of correct tradition tell a story," ² "Even so, the knower of correct tradition says," ³ "Here is what the venerable teacher who knew the correct tradition concerning the meaning of the Upaniṣads says," ⁴ or "And there are the words of the

-
1. BGB, 13, 2 असम्प्रदायवित् सर्वशास्त्रविदपि मूर्खवदुपेक्षणीयः ।
 2. BUB, 2, 1, 20 अत्र न सम्प्रदायविदः आख्यायिकामाचक्षते ।
 3. VSB, 1, 4, 14 तथा च सम्प्रदायविदो वदन्ति । (reference to Gauḍapāda)
 4. VSB, 2, 1, 9 अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः । (reference to Gauḍapāda)

venerable one who knows the correct tradition.”⁵ And his reason for insisting on the knowledge of correct tradition as preliminary to teaching as well as realization is given as follows : “Thus thinking (altogether incorrectly), the mean scholar claims to expound matters concerning the world and salvation and the meaning of scriptures, but he stifles himself (in the process). Being ignorant himself, he succeeds only in confounding others. Because he is alien to the correct tradition concerning the import of scriptures, he ignores what has been correctly taught (by the ancients) and causes such teaching to disappear : and adds out of his own imagination details not to be found in such teaching.”⁶

It is obvious that correct tradition, according to him, is directly rooted in the Vedic lore. The Veda is for him the paramount authority, and the highest court of appeal both for those who would lead a pious normal life and those who aspire for deliverance. He explains that “it is possible that whatever is not revealed to us was revealed to the wise men of ancient times It is not right that we should compare our own capacities with the capacities of those who could visualize the sacred hymns (*mantrās*) and associated passages (*brāhmaṇas*).”⁷ And, “all these men

5. BGB, 12, 13, तथा हि सम्प्रदायविदां वचनम् । (reference to Sundara-pāṇḍya)
6. BGB, 13, 2 एवं मन्वानो यः स पण्डितापसदः संसारमोक्षयोः शास्त्रस्य च अर्थवत्त्वं करोमीत्यात्महा, स्वयं मूढः अन्यांश्च व्यामोहयति शास्त्रार्थं सम्प्रदायरहितत्वात् श्रुतहानिमश्रुतकल्पनां कुर्वन् ।
7. VSB, 1,3,33 भवति हि अस्माकं अप्रत्यक्षमपि चिरन्तनानां प्रत्यक्षं.. ऋषीणां अपि मन्त्रब्राह्मणदर्शिनां समर्थं नास्मदीयेन सामर्थ्येनोपमातुंयुक्तम् ।

who imagine themselves to be learned cannot understand the import of scriptural texts even in a hundred years by regarding highly their own intelligence.”⁸

It is therefore that Śaṅkara lays down that no one may independently explore the significance of a scriptural text : a teacher is always needed to guide a seeker along the right path. Hence Śaṅkara speaks of ‘*guru-saṁpradāya*,’ the correct tradition as handed down by the teacher. “It is only through the succession of teachers and the continuity of their teaching that we can understand the highest truth and not by our own reasoning, intelligence or learning.”⁹ He frequently uses the expression “scripture and the instruction of teachers” (*śāstrācāryopadeśa*) as synonymous with correct tradition. He opens his commentary on *Taittirīya-upaniṣad* bowing to the ancient teachers who expounded the Upaniṣads with the aid of grammar, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Nyāya*.¹⁰

However, what he means by Vedic authority constituting correct tradition is the ‘*Vedānta*’ (the ‘Veda-end’) viz, the Upaniṣads as both the final phase of the Vedic lore and the real import towards which the Vedic lore strives. It is interesting that he employs the expression “*Vedānta*” in the plural, obviously meaning the Upaniṣads. He identifies himself as ‘one who upholds the Upaniṣads’

8. PUB, 4,5 न हि अभिमानेन वर्षशतेनापि श्रुत्यर्थे ज्ञातुं शक्यते सर्वैः पण्डितं मन्यैः ।

9. KnB, 1,3 ब्रह्म चैवमाचार्योपदेशपरम्परयैवाधिगन्तव्यं, न तर्कतः प्रवचनमेधाबहुश्रुतै तपोयज्ञादिभिश्च Cf also BGB, 18, 50, गुरुसम्प्रदायरहितानां.... KnB, 2, introduction : ब्रह्मवित्सम्प्रदायनिश्चयश्चोक्ताः ...

10. यैरिमे गुरुभिः पूर्वं पदवाक्यप्रमाणतः । व्याख्यातास्सर्ववेदान्तास्तान्नित्यं प्रणतोऽस्म्यहम् ॥

(*aupaniṣada*)¹¹ : and he speaks on behalf of all those who expound the Upaniṣads.¹² He defines the Upaniṣads as texts which lead the aspirant close to the highest reality.¹³ He uses the combined expression “the correct tradition of the import of the Upaniṣads.”¹⁴ And he insists that the Upaniṣads constitute the final purpose and import of the Vedic lore, and that is why he chose to write commentaries on the Upaniṣads, and on two other texts that depend almost entirely on the Upaniṣads, the *Bhagavad-gītā* and Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra*. This complex, according to him, represents the source-material for correct tradition.

The *leit-motif* of *Vedānta* is visualized by Śaṅkara as an urge towards emancipation (*mokṣha*), which is the sole purpose of knowing Brahman. All *Vedānta* is begun to eradicate the source of misery,¹⁵ and that source is the phenomenal involvement due to nescience. The message of *Vedantic* texts, therefore, is the postulation of the unity of Brahman, correct knowledge (the elimination of nescience) alone constituting the means thereof.¹⁶ This *Vedāntic*

11. VSB, 2,2,10.

12. BUB, 2,1,20, सर्वोपनिषत्सु हि विधीयते इत्यविप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वेषां उपनिषद्वादिनाम् ।

13. BUB, 2,1,20 उपनिषदुपसमीपं निगमयतीति अभिधायकः शब्द उपनिषदित्युच्यते । Also TUB, ब्रह्मविद्या उपनिषत्, सर्वाभ्यो विद्याभ्यः परमरहस्यम् । ...परं श्रेयः अस्यां निषण्णमिति । (...ब्रह्मणो वा उपगमयितृत्वात् ।)

14. VSB, 2,1,9 वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायवित् ।

15. VSB, Introduction अस्यानर्थहेतोः प्रहाणाय सर्वे वेदान्ता आरभ्यन्ते ।

16. Cf. BUB, 2,1,20, सर्वोपनिषत्सु हि विज्ञानात्मनः परमात्मना एकत्वप्रत्ययो विधीयते इत्यविप्रतिपत्तिः सर्वेषामुपनिषद्वादिनाम् ॥ Also VSB, 2,1,11, सम्यग्ज्ञानान्मोक्ष इति सर्वेषां मोक्षवादिनामभ्युपगमः ।

MUB, 3,2,6 अविद्यादिसंसारबन्धापनयमेव मोक्षमिच्छन्ति ब्रह्मविदः ।

tradition had been crystallized by Bādarāyaṇa (whom Śaṅkara addresses as "the venerable master," *bhagavān*) some centuries before Śaṅkara, in his *Vedānta-sūtras* (or *sūtras* concerning Upaniṣads), intended to reconcile the apparent differences in the Upaniṣadic texts and to formulate the unitary theory. And even this *sūtra*-tradition had fallen on evil days when the great Gauḍa-pāda (*parama-guru* of Śaṅkara) resuscitated it for posterity. Thus, Śaṅkara regards Gauḍa-pāda as the true representative of the correct tradition of *Vedānta*.¹⁷ And it is this tradition that he himself espouses, and undertakes to expound and defend.

II. BĀDARĀYAṆA AND UPAVARṢA

It is necessary to have a look at the religious atmosphere in the country at the time when Śaṅkara began his work of reform and revival. Within the traditional Vedic fold, there was a prevailing view that rituals alone constituted the royal road to the highest objective of man. The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā* which held the field and presented the above view relied on that part of the Veda which is generally known as '*karma-kāṇḍa*' (or portion relating to rituals). The authority of the Vedic lore was justified on the ground that in matters relating to *dharma* (religious conduct) and *mokṣha* (salvation) the normal transactions cannot be guides as they are in matters pertaining to wealth

17. Cf. His references to Gauḍapāda as '*sampradāya-vit*' (VSB, 1,4,14), '*Vedāntārtha-sampradāya-vit*' (VSB, 2,1,9), 'follower of the creator' (ChB, 7,12,1) and '*smṛti-kāra*' (ChB.2,23,1).

and pleasures.¹⁸ The *Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*, propounded by such eminent masters as Jaimini and Kumārila, undertook to interpret the notion of 'dharma' (religious conduct) as the essence of Vedic lore : it consisted of prescriptions for rituals of various kinds. They did not bother to inquire into the significance of Vedic hymns.¹⁹ In fact, they (in particular, Prabhākara and his camp) went so far as to equate ritualistic prescriptions with the purport of the Veda.²⁰

Jaimini had to wage a battle against the anti-Vedic and atheistic Buddhists in the centuries before our era. He was the author of the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, which sought to codify the Vedic sanctions of ritualistic behaviour. Śabara in the first century A.D., wrote a commentary on this work, and this commentary continued the *Mīmāṃsā* tradition for several centuries ; this has in a stream continued to our own day. But Kumārila's masterly exposition of the rationale and presumptions of *Mīmāṃsā* around 550 A.D., provided a firm framework for this way of thinking. His *Śloka-vārttika*, (on the first 'pada' of the first 'adhyāya' of Jaimini's *sūtra*, in metrical form), *Tantra-vārttika* (on the second and third 'padas' of the same work, in prose) and

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18. Kumārila on Jaimini 1,3,1, (*Tantra-vārttika*) -
यावद्धर्ममोक्षसम्बन्धि तद्वेदप्रभवम् । यत्त्वर्थसुखविषयं तल्लोकव्यवहारमिति
विवेक्तव्यम् ॥
19. *Śāstra-dīpikā* on Jaimini, 2,1,1.
तस्माद्धर्म इत्येव शस्त्रविषयो न वेदार्थ इति ।
20. Cf. Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī* (on Śabara) and Śālikanatha's *Rjū-vimalā* on *Bṛhatī* : धर्मशब्दश्च वेदार्थपरः ।

Tup-tikā were not only in the nature of an able defence of *Mīmāṃsā*, but were brilliant writings which influenced generations of thinkers and writers. It cannot be denied that even Śaṅkara was influenced by him, despite the different stand that he took.

But Kumārila confesses that the effect of the ascendance of *Mīmāṃsā* was indirect encouragement of atheism²¹. Jaimini, in fact, hardly involves God (*īśvara*) into his scheme, or even the spiritual 'never-before' (*apūrva*) for that matter. Śabara describes the non-human origin of the Vedic lore in terms of anonymity or inability to remember the author of the Himālayas or of the Veda. Kumārila too would rather consider omni-science and creatorhood of God as unnecessary ideas (*vitathas*). It is true that Śālikanātha brings in God in a somewhat significant way, but it is only as one whose existence has but to be inferred (*anumāna-gamya*). It is only the later *Mīmāṃsākas* like Āpa-deva, Nārāyaṇa, Laugākṣi-Bhāskara that admitted a merciful God who grants the highest good as reward for actions done in the spirit of devotion. But this is a later story, and when Śaṅkara lived and wrote, Kumārila's admission of atheism still held. It is natural, therefore, that Śaṅkara felt that the *Mīmāṃsākas* who clung closely to the prescriptive and liturgical aspects of the Veda missed the essential purport thereof. If the *Mīmāṃsākas* were inclined to ignore the

21. *Śloka-vārttika* (prelude) :

प्रायेणैव हि मीमांसा लोके लोकायतीकृता ।

तामास्तिकपथे नेतुमयं यत्नः कृतो मया ॥

Upaniṣads as insignificant supplements to the Vedic corpus, Śamkara held that it is only the Upaniṣads that constituted the crowning glory of Vedic thought ; and the importance attached to the '*Brāhmaṇa*' texts appeared to him inappropriate. This may be regarded as the recovery of correct tradition.

Although Śamkara was principally responsible for this recovery, two earlier attempts were significant. The first one was Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra* and the second was Gauḍa-pāda's *Māṇḍukya-kārikā*. Śamkara holds both Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda in the highest esteem ; he refers to the former as '*bhagavān*' (revered master) and to the latter as '*smṛti-kāra*' (author of a traditional text). A cloud of uncertainty hangs round the period and identity of Bādarāyaṇa. Dasgupta suggests that he lived about the second century B.C.²² Current tradition identifies him with Vyāsa : Vācaspati-miśra, for instance, refers to him as '*Vyāsa-pārāśarya*.' But Śamkara (also Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Yāmuna) refers to him only as Bādarāyaṇa, and knows his work as '*Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā*' or '*Vedānta-mīmāṃsā*'. Mīmāṃsā was regarded as one body of doctrines consisting of 20 sections, the first sixteen of which (considered as '*Pūrva-mīmāṃsā*' or earlier Mīmāṃsā) were ascribed to Jaimini and the last four (regarded as '*Uttara-mīmāṃsā*' or later Mīmāṃsā) to Bādarāyaṇa.

Bādarāyaṇa compiled his *Sūtra* (variously called *Brahmasūtra*, *Vedānta-sūtra*, *Uttara-mīmāṃsā-sūtra* and

22. S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, p.418

Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-sūtra, the last among which is preferred by Śaṅkara²³ to crystallise the Upaniṣadic thought and provide the framework for correct tradition. This work which is in four chapters and 555 aphorisms is neatly arranged in 191 topics (*adhikaraṇas*).²⁴ Bādarāyaṇa commences his work with an inquiry into the nature of the Absolute Real (*brahman*), in sharp contradistinction to Jaimini who formulates the inquiry into ritualistic conduct (*dharma*) as his major theme. While the latter concerned himself with worldly well-being and heavenly rewards as objectives of a house-holder, the former dealt with final liberation as the goal of a renunciant.²⁵ The style adopted

23. *Bhagavad-gītā* refers to “*Brahma-sūtra*” in 13, 5 (ब्रह्मसूत्रपदेशैव). Rāmānuja and Madhva see here the mention of Bādarāyaṇa’s work. But Śaṅkara’s explanation is ब्रह्मणः सूचकानि वाक्यानि ब्रह्मसूत्राणि, तैः पदैः ज्ञायते इति....

24. This is according to Śaṅkara. But the numbers vary according to different Commentators : for Rāmānuja 545 sūtras and 140 *adhikaraṇas*; for Madhva 534 and 123; for Nimbārka 549 and 161; for Śrīkaṇṭha 544 and 182; and for Vallabha 554 and 171. And, as is well known, varied standpoints have been ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa: *nirviśeṣa-advaita* by Śaṅkara, *bheda-abheda* by Bhāskara, *Viśiṣṭa-advaita* by Rāmānuja, *Dvaita-advaita* by Nimbārka, *Śaiva-viśiṣṭa-advaita* by Śrīkaṇṭha, *Śakti-viśiṣṭa-advaita* by Śrīpati, *Śuddha-advaita* by Vallabha, *avibhāga-advaita* by Vijñāna-bhikṣu, and *acintyābheda* by Baladeva.

25. It may be noted and Pāṇini refers to *Pārāśarya-bhikṣu-sūtra* which Vācaspati identifies with Bādarāyaṇa’s *sūtra*. The expression ‘*bhikṣu*’ refers to the renunciant monk for whom the work is meant. Śaṅkara confirms this orientation in his commentary.

by him provided the model for all subsequent philosophical writing : it involves the statement of an objection or *prima facie* view (*pūrva-pakṣa*), an answer to or a rebuttal of this stand (*uttara pakṣa*) and conclusion (*siddhānta*). A topic for discussion (*adhikaraṇa*) is five-limbed : the formulation of the problem, a reasonable doubt about it, the *prima-facie* view, the answer, and conclusion.²⁶ There can be little doubt that Bādarāyaṇa represents an important stage in scientific thinking and writing in India.

There appears to have been an elaborate commentary on all the twenty sections together by Baudhāyana (probably called *Kṛta-koṭi*) : and later appeared an abridgement of this commentary (*vṛtti*) by Upavarṣa. There is a suggestion that Upavarṣa was another name for Baudhāyana (as for instance, in *Vaijayantī nighaṇṭu*). Whatever the truth of the matter, Śamkara is respectful towards Upavarṣa and calls him 'bhagavān'²⁷ as he does Bādarāyaṇa himself. This is interesting because Śamkara calls even Jaimini and Śabara merely as 'teachers' (*ācārya*).²⁸

Upavarṣa appears to have lived around 200 A.D., and was the first to divide the Vedic lore into the ritualistic

26. विषयो विशयश्चैव पूर्वपक्षस्तथोत्तरम् ।

निर्णयश्चेति पञ्चाङ्गं शास्त्रेऽधिकरणं स्मृतम् ॥

27. VSB, 1,3,28 वर्णा एव तु शब्दा इति भगवानुपवर्षः; VSB, 3,3,53 - अत एव भगवतोपवर्षेण प्रथमे तन्त्रे.....

28. VSB, 3,2,40 जैमिनिस्त्वाचार्यः; VSB,3,3,53 आचार्येण शबरस्वामिना.

section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and 'wisdom-section' (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*). And perhaps his was the first commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's sūtras : Śaṁkara credits him with a *Śārīraka-sūtra-vṛtti* (no longer available). He was a Vedāntin who advocated the employment of the six means of valid knowledge that Advaita came to adopt in due course. It was he who began the discussion about self-validation (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*), and in a sense Advaita epistemology may be said to have begun with him. He emphasized that the postulation of 'self' as distinct both from the body and from mental processes is unavoidable. He argued that while the self cannot in any manner be revealed to another person, it cannot in any sense be denied by oneself. It is affirmed by introspection, but the introspective process itself cannot be regarded as self. Upavarṣa was also the pioneer with regard to the characteristic Advaita method of 'initial assumption and subsequent withdrawal' (*adhyāropa-apavāda*). It is unfortunate that his work has been lost almost beyond recovery : his views can only be guessed from the scanty references found in Śabara, *Śastra-dīpikā*, Śaṁkara, Rāmānuja and Yāmuna.²⁹

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29. Rāmānuja claims that Upavarṣa was his 'upa-jīvyā' (source, authority, or patron). Vedānta-deśika identifies him with Baudhāyana. Yāmuna mentions that he wrote a *vṛtti* on *Vedānta-sūtras*. There is a suggestion that Upavarṣa's theory of equal importance to *karma* and *jñāna* was adopted by Yādavaprakāśa, Rāmānuja's teacher. For reconstruction of Upavarṣa's views, Cf. Ganganatha Jha Commemoration Volume.

III. EARLIER ĀCĀRYAS

Both Jaimini and Bādarāyaṇa mention several earlier masters ; and among the names common to both the lists are Bādari, Āśmarathya, Kārṣṇajini and Kāśakṛtsna. Bādarāyaṇa mentions three earlier masters (whom Śaṁkara describes as 'ācāryas') as particularly important : Āśmarathya, Auḍulomi and Kāśakṛtsna.³⁰ Their views can in outline be reconstructed from the comments that Śaṁkara and Rāmānuja have appended. It is probable that they also wrote *sūtra*-works as Bādarāyaṇa later did ; but the character of their works cannot be ascertained. The context in which Bādarāyaṇa mentions them invites reference to the statement occurring in *Maitreyī-brāhmaṇa* of *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniṣad*. According to Śaṁkara (and Rāmānuja) this forms part of the sixth *adhikaraṇa* called 'Vākyānvaya.'

Āśmarathya appears to have held that while the individual self is not different from the highest Self, there exists a causeeffect relationship between them : the analogy suggested by Bhāmatī is that of the sparks flying out of fire.³¹ They are neither the same as the fire, nor are they

30. *Vedānta-sūtra*, 1,4,20-22 (in the 'vākyānvayādhikaraṇa'). Madhva suggests in his *Anuvyākhyāna* (1,4,28) that they were pupils of Bādarāyaṇa : स्वशिष्याणां प्रसिद्धयर्थं मतमात्मीयमंशतः । विज्ञातं तैर्जगादात्र तारतम्यं नृणां वदन् ॥

31. Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtra* : प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेर्लिङ्गमाश्मरथ्यः (1,4,20) Śaṁkara's comments : विज्ञानात्मपरमात्मनोरभेदाशेनोपक्रमणम् । Bhāmatī explains : यथा हि वह्नेः विकारा व्युच्चरन्तो विस्फुलिङ्गाः न वह्नेरत्यन्तं भिद्यन्ते तद्रूपनिरूपणत्वात् । नापि ततोऽत्यन्तमभिन्नाः वह्नेरिव

altogether different from it. They are at once identical with the fire and not identical. It can be viewed as a variety of 'difference-cum-non-difference' (*bheda abheda*) argument, probably continued later by *Bhartṛ-prapañca*. The individual self emerges from the highest Self and dissolves in it again. Auḍulomi (who has been mentioned thrice by Bādarāyaṇa)³² also held a similar view : "when it goes out of the body, the individual self assumes the nature of the highest Self."³³ Difference or non-difference between them depends upon the conditions of bondage (or involvement in the world) or

परस्परव्यावृत्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात् । परस्परं व्यावृत्त्यभावप्रसङ्गात् सर्वज्ञं प्रत्युपदेश-
वैयर्थ्याच्च । तस्मात्कथंचिद्भेदो जीवात्मानामभेदश्च ।

Kalpataru-parimalā adds : सत्यप्यभेदे भेदेनापि भाव्यम्; अत्यन्ताभेदे
अनुवाद्याविधेयभावाऽयोगमदित्याश्मरथ्यादिमतमिह मुख्यः पूर्वपक्ष इत्यर्थः ।

Śaṅkara, further notes : आश्मरथ्यस्य तु यद्यपि परस्मादनन्यत्वमभिप्रेतं
तथापि प्रतिज्ञासिद्धेरिति सापेक्षत्वाभिधानात् कार्यकारणभावः किमनभिप्रेत इति
गम्यते । (VSB, 1,4,22)

32. VSB, 1,4,21; 3,4,45; 4,4,6.

33. VS, 1,4,21 उत्क्रमिष्यत एवं भावादित्यौडुलोमिः । Śaṅkara's
comments : विज्ञानात्मन एव देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्धिसङ्घातोपाधिसम्पर्कात्
कलुषीभूतस्य ज्ञानध्यानादिसाधनानुष्ठानात्संप्रसन्नस्य देहादिसङ्घातादुत्क्रमिष्यत
परमात्मनैक्योपपत्तेः इदं अभेदेनोपक्रमणम् इत्यौडुलोमिराचार्यो मन्यते ॥

Bhāmatī explains : आचार्यदेशीयान्तरमतेन समाधत्ते - जीवो हि
परमात्मनोऽत्यन्तं भिन्नं एव सन् देहेन्द्रियमनोबुद्ध्युपाधानसम्पर्कात् सर्वदा कलुषः ।
तस्य च ज्ञानध्यानादिसाधनानुष्ठानात्संप्रसन्नस्य देहेन्द्रियादिसंघातादुत्क्रमिष्यतः
परमात्मनैक्योपपत्तेः इदं अभेदेनोपक्रमणम् ॥

Kalpataru adds : उपाधिसम्पर्को हेतुः कालुष्ये, न जीवपरभेदे । सर्वदेति
अनादिकाले । भेदेहेतोः गमकस्य संसारित्वादीश्वरविरुद्धधर्मस्य इत्यर्थः ॥

Śaṅkara, further, notes : औडुलोमिपक्षे पुनः स्पष्टमेवावस्थान्तरापेक्षौ
भेदाभेदौ गम्येते । (VSB, 1,4,22)

freedom. In the stage of bondage or phenomenal existence, the Self which is pure consciousness gets stained by its association with the physical and mental factors. But when it is cleansed by means such as intuitive wisdom and meditation, it becomes identical with the highest Self on its passing out of bodily existence. It will then resume its nature of pure consciousness.

Vācaspati introduces the third *ācārya*, viz, Kāśakṛtsna, with the words : "Having mentioned the views of these two 'almost-*ācāryas*' (*ācārya-deśīya*), and having been dissatisfied with them, Bādarāyaṇa gives the view of the '*ācārya*.' "³⁴ It must be noted, however, that Śaṅkara does not refer to the first two as 'almost-*ācāryas*' : he speaks of them also as *ācāryas*'. Nevertheless, Śaṅkara affirms that the views of Kāśakṛtsna are in accord with scriptural authority, and thus conform to Bādarāyaṇa's own views.³⁵ Kāśakṛtsna appears to have held the view that as the individual self abides in the highest Self, it is altogether

34. *Bhāmātī*, 1,4,22 Introduction तदेवं आचार्यदेशीयमतद्वयमुक्त्वा अत्रापरितुष्यन् आचार्यमतमाह सूत्रकारः ॥ Also, मतत्रयमुक्त्वा काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं साधुत्वेन निर्धारयति ।

35. VSB, 1,4,22 काशकृत्स्नस्याचार्यस्याविष्कृतः परमेश्वरो जीव नान्य इति मतम् । तत्र काशकृत्स्नीयं मतं श्रुत्यनुसारीति गम्यते । Rāmānuja also mentions that Kāśakṛtsna and Bādarāyaṇa hold identical views. Madhva thinks that the view of Āśmarathya refers to the aspirant for heaven, whose spirit of renunciation (*vairāgya*) has not sufficiently ripened; that Auḍulomi's view refers to one who is still walking along the path of *jijñāsā* and whose wisdom is yet to mature and that Kāśakṛtsna's view refers to the competent one (*adhikārī*), in whom both the spirit of renunciation and wisdom have matured.

non-different from it : and the assumption of a different form does not in anyway involve modification of the essence.³⁶ The apparent difference is ascribed by Vācaspati to nescience (*avidyā*), although neither the excerpts from Kāśakṛtsna himself nor Śaṅkara's comments thereon are explicit on this matter. It is possible that Śaṅkara was considerably influenced by Kāśakṛtsna.

The views of the first two *ācāryas*, supporting the theory of "difference-cum-non-difference" (*bheda-abheda*) appear to have found many able exponents in the centuries prior to Śaṅkara. And this can be regarded as the philosophical position generally held by the *Purāṇas*, which gained ascendance in popular imagination during the early centuries after Christ. God was regarded as immanent in the phenomenal world as well as transcendental to it. God was looked upon as the creator of the world while not undergoing any change whatsoever in Himself. Dasgupta suggests that even Bādarāyaṇa held this view.³⁷ It is, however, hard to maintain this position. But some important predecessors of Śaṅkara, like *Dramaḍa* and *Bhartr-*

36. VS, 1,4,22 अवस्थितेरिति काशकृत्स्नः ॥

Śaṅkara's comments : अस्यैव परमात्मनोऽनेनापि विज्ञानात्मभावेनावस्थानादुपपन्नमिदम भेदेनोपक्रमणमिति काशकृत्स्न आचार्यो मन्यते ॥

Bhāmatī explains : आत्यन्तिके हि जीवपरमात्मनोरभेदे तात्त्विकेऽनाद्यविद्योपाधिकल्पितो भेदः तत्त्वमसीति जीवात्मनो ब्रह्मभावतत्त्वोपदेशश्रवणमनननिदिध्यासनप्रकर्षपर्यन्तजन्मना साक्षात्कारेण विद्यया शक्यः समूलकांशं कार्षितुम् ॥

37. S. N. Dasgupta : op.cit, Vol. II, p.42.

prapañca sympathized with the *bheda-abheda* viewpoint. And it must be recognised that this paved the way for full-fledged Advaita to emerge.

There are two other 'ācāryas' who seem to have been important teachers before Bādarāyaṇa : Bādari³⁸ and Kārṣṇājini.³⁹ The views of Bādari mentioned by Bādarāyaṇa refer to the value of meritorious conduct and to the Absolute qualified by attributes that is sought by the aspirants. Śaṁkara approves of these views : and Vācaspati describes Bādari as 'the perceiver of truth' (*tattva-darśī*), 'the knower of what is good' (*sādhū-darśī*)⁴⁰ and 'the revered one' (*bhagavān*). It is possible that this teacher set up good character as more valuable than the ritualistic fulfilments that the *Mīmāṃsakas* were insisting upon. Kārṣṇājini brought out the relevance of subliminal inclinations (*anuśaya*) in the formation of character. Śaṁkara, in the context which brings up Bādari and Kārṣṇājini, says : "no one whose character is defective is

38. VS, 3,1,11 सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु बादरिः ॥ Also, 4,3,7 कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ॥

Śaṁkara's comments : । (4,3,7)

39. VS, 3,1,9 चरणादिति चेन्नोपलक्षणार्थेति काष्ण्णजिनिः ॥

Śaṁkara comments : तस्मात्कर्मैव शीलोपलक्षितमनुशयभूतं योन्यापत्तौ कारणमिति काष्ण्णजिनेर्मतम् । न हि कर्मणि सम्भवति शीलाद्योन्यापत्तिर्युक्ता । न हि पद्भ्यां पलायितुं पारयमाणो जानुभ्यां रंहितुमर्हति ॥ (VSB, 3,1,10)

40. Vācaspati draws an unfavourable comparison : तस्मात्साधुदर्शी स भगवान् बादरिरसाधुदर्शी जैमिनिरिति सिद्धम् ॥ (VSB, 4,3,7)

competent to perform rituals,” and quotes from Kumārila himself : “The scriptures do not sanctify one who is devoid of character.”⁴¹ These views were also held by the *Purāṇas*.

IV. APPROXIMATIONS TO ADVAITA

Among the teachers who preceded Śaṅkara there were many whose teachings smacked of Advaita : but they were all either inadequate formulations or inconsistent positions. Yāmuna perhaps gives expression to a tradition current during his days regarding the line of teachers when he speaks of the writings of “Ācārya Ṭaṅka, Bharṭṛ-prapañca, Bharṭṛ-mitra, Bharṭṛ-hari, Brahma-datta, Śaṅkara, Śrīvatsa, Bhāskara”⁴². Ṭaṅka (mentioned by Rāmānuja in *Vedārtha-saṁgraha*) was perhaps the same as Ātreya, or Brahma-nandin. He is reputed to have written a Vākya commentary on Chāndogya-Upaniṣad. About thirty sentences from it are available ; twenty-two of them are quoted in Viśiṣṭādvaita works and eight in Advaita works. Madhusūdana-sarasvatī explains that the ‘Ātreya’ mentioned by Sarvajñātman⁴³ is

41. VSB, 3,1,10 न हि सदाचारहीनः कश्चिदप्यधिकृतः स्यात् । ‘आचारहीनं न पुनन्ति वेदाः’ इत्यादि स्मृतिभ्यः । The quotation is from Kumārila’s *Śloka-vārtika*, 3,1,10

42. *Siddhi-traya*, आचार्यटङ्कभर्तृप्रपञ्चभर्तृमित्र भर्तृहरिब्रह्मदत्तशङ्कर श्रीवत्साङ्ग भास्करादिविरचितसितासिता विविधनिबन्धनश्रद्धाविप्रलुब्धबुद्धयो न यथावदन्यथा च...

43. *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka*, 3,217
अत्रेयवाक्यमपि संव्यवहारमात्रम् ।
कार्यं समस्तमिति नः कथमाबभूव ॥

Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī’s *Sāra-saṁgraha* introducing this verse, says : छान्दोग्यवाक्यकारेण ब्रह्मनन्दिनापि पूर्वपक्षेऽसतः सतश्चोत्पत्तौ दोषमुक्तत्वा संव्यवहारिकमायामयत्वपक्षेण समाधानमुक्तम् ॥

Brahma-nandin, author of Chāndogya-vākya. The reference obviously regards him as an Advaitin. But he is also claimed by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as an advocate of pariṇāmavāda and bhakti. Sarvajñātman tells us that he postulated pariṇāma-vāda as a preliminary step to Vivarta-vāda.⁴⁴

Bharṭṛ-prapañca was a more important thinker. Śāmkara refers to him about twenty times⁴⁵, frequently in his commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*. Sureśvara's *Vārttika* on this Upaniṣad also frequently cites him. But it is only to criticize, condemn and ridicule that they refer to him. He is reputed to have written a commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, but the extracts that Ānanda-giri included in his gloss on Śāmkara's *bhāṣya* on this Upaniṣad

44. *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*, 3, 226

पूर्वं विकारमुपवर्ण्य शनैः शनैस्तद्
दृष्टिं विसृज्य निकटं परिगृह्य तस्मात् ।
सर्वं विकारमथ संव्यवहारमात्र-
मद्वैतमेव परिरक्षति वाक्यकारः ॥

Madhusūdana explains :

परिणामवादो व्यवहारदृष्टिपालनाय वर्णनीय अत्यन्तभेद सत्यत्वेऽभिनिविष्टचित्तस्य
प्रथमत एव विवर्तवादे प्रवेशो दुर्घट इति तदभिनिवेशत्याजनाय व्यवहारदृष्टिं रक्षता
परिणामवादः प्रथमतः तमुपपादितः । पश्चात् तद्दृष्टिमपि युक्त्यसहत्वेन शनैः
शनैः त्याजयित्वा ततोऽपि निकटं विवर्तवादं उपवर्ण्य शुद्धाद्वैतं रक्षति स्म
ब्रह्मनन्दी ॥

45. *Buddhakara* : Q JMS, 1933-34, p.261; Prof. M. Hiriyanna collected the references in a paper presented at the Third Oriental Congress held at Madras in 1924. Cf. M. Hiriyanna : *Indian Philosophical Studies* (Kāvyaśāstra, Mysore), Part I, pp.70-94.

are all that have survived. He may have been an exponent of the theory of 'difference-cum-nondifference' (*bheda-abheda*), held along with the notion that the Absolute evolves (*pariṇāma*) into the phenomenal self. According to Śaṅkara, he gave the analogy of the tree being one and also many (in terms of the branches), and of the ocean being one and many (so far as waves are concerned). In its aspect as a unity, the wisdom leading to liberation becomes relevant ; and in its aspect of multiplicity, it justifies the common actions and ritualistic conduct.⁴⁶ He, thus, appears to have thought that *jñāna* and *karma* were together necessary to reach the highest goal of life. Śaṅkara, however, attacks his views as "contrary to both scriptural authority and reasoning,"⁴⁷ although it can be seen that Bhartṛ-prapañca inclines towards Advaita as the ultimate teaching.

Bhartṛ-prapañca was a strong advocate of evolutionary modification. The phenomenal world has been evolved in a eight-fold frame-work : the Brahman evolves into the individual self (*jīva*) and settles himself as the 'inner-controller' (*antaryāmin*); he also evolves into the unmanifest

46. BUB 2,1,14 नन्वनेकात्मकं ब्रह्म । यथा वृक्षोऽनेकशाखः, एवमनेकशक्तिप्रवृत्तियुक्तं ब्रह्म । अत एकत्वं नानात्वं चोभयमपि सत्यमेव । यथा 'वृक्ष' इत्येकत्वं, 'शाखाः' इति नानात्वम् । यथा च समुद्रात्मना एकत्वं, तेन तरङ्गात्मना नानात्वम् । तत्रैकत्वंशेन ज्ञानान्मोक्षव्यवहारः सेत्स्यति । नानात्वंशेन तु कर्मकाण्डाश्रयौ लौकिकवैदिकव्यवहारौ सेत्स्यतः । Cf. also BUB, 3,8,12; 5,1,1.

47. BUB, 5,1,1, श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च । also श्रुतिन्यायविरोधात् अनुपपन्नेयं कल्पना ॥

(*avyakta*), common principle (*sūtra*), and the cosmic deity (*virāt-devatā*); and finally he evolves into the species (*jāti*) and particular material objects (*piṇḍa*). These eight are regarded as the several conditions (*avasthās*) of the Absolute. His analysis of the relationship between the Absolute, God as the inner controller, and the phenomenal world is : the Absolute is like the ocean, unstirred, changeless ; when, however, there is a slight agitation on the surface of the ocean, a 'condition of being' occurs and God as the inner controller is like this. When the ocean is greatly agitated and is all waves and ripples, it represents the phenomenal self (*kshetrajā*).⁴⁸

Nothing can be known about Bharṭṛ-mitra, whom Yāmuna mentions, apart from the fact that Kumārila also refers to him. Bharṭṛ-hari is the celebrated grammarian and philosopher who propounded the theory of *Śabdādvaita* (sound as one and absolute). His influence on Maṇḍana was considerable ; and he has been quoted by thinkers of such diverse persuasions as Somānanda (*Śivadrṣṭi*), Śānta-rakṣita (*Tattva-saṁgraha*), Jayanta-bhaṭṭa (*Nyāyamañjarī*) and Vimuktātman (*Iṣṭa-siddhi*). He was principally responsible for the essentially grammatical but also philosophical doctrine of '*sphoṭa*' (sudden flash of

48. BUB, 3,8,12 अत्र च केचिदाचक्षते । परस्य महासमुद्रस्थानीयस्य ब्रह्मणोऽक्षरस्य अप्रचलितस्वरूपस्य ईषत्प्रचलितावस्थान्तर्यामी । अत्यन्त प्रचलितावस्था क्षेत्रज्ञो यः तं न वेदान्तर्यामिणम् । यथान्याः परयावस्थाः परिकल्पयन्ति । तथा अष्टावस्था ब्रह्मणो भवन्तीति वदन्ति ॥

perception).⁴⁹ There is no doubt that his great work, *Vākya-padīya*, formulates a kind of Advaita, but this has been severely criticized by Śaṅkara and Sureśvara.

Brahma-datta was another important thinker. It is conjectured that there was a commentary on Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra* from his pen.⁵⁰ Śaṅkara, Sureśvara and Vedānta-deśika refer to his views only to criticize him.⁵¹ Sureśvara's commentator, Jñānottama describes him as an exponent of the conjoint value of wisdom and ritualistic conduct in securing the highest end (*jñānakarma-samuccaya-vādin*)⁵². He appears to have held the view that the Upanishads contain two kinds of significant statements (*vākyas*): statements that are intended to generate wisdom

49. For details of this doctrine cf. S.K. Ramachandra Rao : Development of Psychological Thought in India, Kāvyaśāla, Mysore, 1962, pp.157-172.

50. About Brahma-datta, cf. M. Hiriyanna, (Ed), *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, Introduction, p. xxiii; also JOR, Madras, vol. II, 1928.

51. Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, (I.67, prose section) says :

केचित् स्वसम्प्रदायबलावष्टंभादाहुः - यदेतद्वेदान्तवाक्यादहं ब्रह्मेति विज्ञानं समुत्पद्यते, तच्चेव स्वोत्पात्रेमात्रेणाज्ञानं निरस्यति, किं तर्हि अहन्यहनि द्राघीयसा कालेन उपासीनस्य सतः भावनोपचयात् निःशेषमज्ञानमपगच्छति देवो भूत्वा देवानप्येतीति श्रुतेः ॥ The commentator Jñānāmṛta identifies the source as Brahma-datta (*Vidyā-surabhi*); Vedāntadeśika, *Sarvārthasiddhi* on *Tattvamuktākalāpa*.

52. Jñānottama : वाक्यजन्यज्ञानोत्तरकालीनभावनोत्कर्षात् भावनाजन्यसाक्षात्कारलक्षणज्ञानान्तरेणैव अज्ञानस्य निवृत्तेः ज्ञानाभ्यासदशायां ज्ञानस्य कर्मणा समुच्चयोपपत्तिः ॥ (*Chandrikā*)

(*jñāna*) and statements that prescribe worship (*upāsanā*). Statements like "That thou art" (*tat tvam asi*) illustrate the first kind ; "Self is to be seen, etc" (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyah*) could be an example of the latter. Brahma-datta considers the latter statements as superior to the former, as their relationship is one of part-and-whole (*aṅga-aṅgi*). Whatever the depth of wisdom arising from the Upaniṣadic statements, final liberation is impossible of attainment unless perfected by long and continuous meditation (worship, *upāsanā*). This cultivation (*bhāvanā*) must be life-long, for it is only after physical death that final liberation (*mokṣa*) can be attained. The fruits of liberation, in other words, can never be experienced while one is living : it is an *adrṣṭa-phala*. One can see that in all these, Śaṁkara differs from him sharply.

There is a more remarkable view that is ascribed to Brahmadata.⁵³ The Absolute (*brahman*) alone is eternal ; everything else is transient. The individual self (*jīva*) emerges out of the Absolute as a distinct entity, and is, therefore, subject to birth and death, i.e., transient. Śaṁkara refers to this view in VSB 3,2,17 as the *prima-facie* view, and criticizes it. But Brahma-datta seems to have taught a variety of Advaita, involving the concept of *māyā* ; but the individual self's emergence and dissolution vitiated the coherence of this teaching. We are told that this was the

53. Vedāntadeśikā : एकं ब्रह्मैव नित्यं, तदितरदखिलं तत्र जन्मादिभागित्यायातं तेन जीवोऽपि अचिदिव जनिमान् ।

older version of the theory of *māyā*, while Gauḍa-pāda and Śaṅkara represent the newer version.⁵⁴

Another prominent Vedāntin during the pre-Śaṅkara days was Draviḍa. Śaṅkara describes him as “the knower of scriptural tradition” (*āgama-vit*)⁵⁵ and “knower of correct tradition” (*sampradāya-vit*).⁵⁶ Śaṅkara quotes a solution offered by him in his *bhāṣya* on *Chāndogya-upaniṣad* and calls him an *ācārya*.⁵⁷ He is said to have written a commentary on the *Chāndogya-vākya* by Brahma-nandin (Ṭaṅka). There is some confusion about his identity with the Dramiḍācārya whom Rāmānuja refers to : it is probable that they were different. Draviḍa is said to have prepared a commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* and a gloss on Bādarāyaṇa’s *Vedānta-sūtra*. Neither, however, is now available. He appears to have been an exponent of the Advaita point of view, believing that the cosmological passages in the Upaniṣadic texts are not independent of the identity passages (like *tat tvam asi*), and that the affirmations (*etad vai tat*) and negations (*neti neti*) in the dialectics of

54. In *Śrūta-prakāśikā* a distinction is drawn between *jaran-māyāvādins* and *sākṣān-māyā-vādins*.

55. MKB, 2,32 ‘सिद्धं तु निवर्तकत्वात्’ इत्यागमविदां सूत्रम् ।

56. BUB, 2,1,20, अत्र च सम्प्रदायविदः आख्यायिकां सम्प्रचक्षते ।

Ānandagiri’s gloss identifies the reference with Draviḍācārya : तत्त्वमस्यादिवाक्यमैक्यपरं तच्छेषः सृष्ट्यादिवाक्यमित्युक्तेश्च द्रविडाचार्यसंमतिमाह Cf. for the story Sureśvara’s *Sambandha-vārttika*, verses 233-234.

57. CHB, 3,10,4 अत्रोक्तः परिहार आचार्यैः । Ānandagiri’s gloss identifies him as Draviḍa.

Advaita are related by a common thread, and the identity of the Self being established by negations. The story concerning the prince who from his birth was brought up by a hunter, and who therefore thought that he was indeed the hunter's son is ascribed to Draviḍa. The boy later discovered his true status, when told about it. The import of the story is that the individual self involved and led astray in the phenomenal world can recover its true and real identity by instructions from a teacher.

The last master that we have to consider in this context is Sundara-pāṇḍya. Several *kārikās* from his pen have been cited by Maṇḍana and Śaṃkara, Kumārila and Amalānanda. He is believed to have written a *Vārttika* on the entire *Mīmāṃsā* incorporating the quoted *kārikās*⁵⁸. Śaṃkara quotes three *kārikās*,⁵⁹ and Ātma-svarūpa, the author of the commentary *Prabodhapaṇḍhinī* on Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā*, identifies the source as Sundara-pāṇḍya.

58. Cf. JOR, Madras, Vol. II, p.156.

59. VSB, 1,1,4 अपि चाहुः -

गौणमिथ्यात्मनोऽसत्त्वे पुत्रदेहादिबाधनात् ।

सद्ब्रह्माहमित्येवं बोधे कार्यं कथं भवेत् ॥ १ ॥

अन्वेष्टव्यात्मविज्ञानात् प्राक्प्रमातृत्वमात्मनः ।

अनिष्टः स्यात्प्रमातृत्व पाप्मदोषादिवर्जितः ॥ २ ॥

देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत्प्रमाणत्वेन कल्पितः ।

लौकिकं तद्वदेवेदं प्रमाणं त्वात्मनिश्चयात् ॥ ३ ॥

Vācaspati describes this as ब्रह्मचिदां गाथा । It may be noted that a *kārikā* is a memorial verse which means much although clothed in slight metre :

कारिका तु स्वल्पवृत्तौ बहोरर्थस्य सूचनी । (Hemacandra).

These three verses clearly though cryptically enunciate the monistic position and suggest the idea of sublation as a result of enlightenment. He has contributed methodological precision to Advaita, which marks an improvement over Upavarṣa. We have seen that Upavarṣa suggested a six-fold approach to valid knowledge : but Sundara-pāṇḍya clubs the six means together under “ordinary sources of common knowledge” and holds that they are not only not useful in revealing the Self but lose their relevance and validity when the Self has been realized. He, therefore, commended the method, now well-known in Advaita : ‘initial assumption and subsequent withdrawal’ (*adhyāropa-apavāda*)⁶⁰. Śaṅkara quotes a line from his *kārikā*, describing it as “the words of the knower of correct tradition” :

“ अध्येरोपापवादाभ्यां निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते” ॥

“What is in itself not spread out (i.e., lacking in details and distinctions) can be spread out (i.e., described or explained) by the (method of initial) assumption and (subsequent) withdrawal.” It is interesting to note that Maṇḍana also quotes the same line in his *Brahma-siddhi*⁶¹, in support of the Upaniṣadic method of negation. It is a reconciliation of the positive and negative aspects of Advaita dialectics. It is unfortunate that neither do we know more about Sundara-pāṇḍya, nor have more of his *kārikās* survived.

60. BGB, 12,13.

61. *Brahma-siddhi*, p.26

V. GAUḌA-PĀDA AND MAṆḌANA

When we approach the days immediately anterior to Śaṁkara two figures command our attention : Gauḍa-pāda and Maṇḍana-miśra. As mentioned earlier, the two masters who recovered the correct tradition from the mass of Vedic lore before Śaṁkara were Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍa-pāda. It is remarkable that Śaṁkara singles out Gauḍa-pāda to credit him with this achievement ⁶². He speaks of him as 'the teacher of his teacher' (*parama-guru*) and as 'the most adored among all his adored ones' (*pūjyābhipūjya*). He also describes him as 'the knower of correct tradition', ⁶³ and as 'the knower of correct tradition concerning the import of the Upaniṣads'. ⁶⁴ He accords Gauḍa-pāda's work the status of a '*smṛti*' ⁶⁵, and considers this work in four sections as the 'very epitome of the essential teachings of the Upaniṣads.' ⁶⁶

Not much that is of historical value is known about Gauḍa-pāda. According to Ānanda-giri, he hailed from the Gauḍa country, went up to *Badarī* in the Himālayas, did penance there in the Nara-Nārāyaṇa hermitage and obtained

62. Śaṁkara at the end of MKB;

प्रज्ञावैशाखवेधक्षुभितजलनिधेर्वेदनाम्नोऽन्तरस्थं

भूतान्यालोक्य मग्नान्यविरतजननग्राहघोरे समुद्रे ।

कारुण्यादुद्धारामृतमिदममरैर्दुर्लभं भूतहेतोः

यस्तं पूज्याभिपूज्यं परमगुरुमुं पादपातैर्नतोऽस्मि ॥

63. VSB, 1,4,14, तथा च सम्प्रदायविदो वदन्ति । (quoting MK 1,15)

64. VSB, 2,1,9, अत्रोक्तं वेदान्तार्थसम्प्रदायविद्भिराचार्यैः । (quoting MK 1,16)

65. CHB, 2,23,1

66. MKB, at the beginning. वेदान्तार्थसारसङ्ग्रहभूतमिदं प्रकरणचतुष्टयम् ।

enlightenment ; he realized the Brahman that the Upaniṣads spoke of. Bālakṛṣṇāṇḍa-sarasvatī (author of a *Vārttika* on *Śārīrakamīmāṃsā*) mentions the banks of the river Hīrāvati in Kurukṣetra (Central India) as Gauḍa-pāda's birth-place, and he explains that 'Gauḍa' was the community to which he belonged ; he did penance for so long that people forgot his real name and he came to be known only after his community. Rāmabhadra-dikṣita, the author of *Patañjali-carita*, claims that Gauḍa-pāda was the great Patañjali's pupil. There is also a suggestion that 'Gauḍa' refers to an ancient school of Advaita that was prevalent in the Gauḍa country (northern part of Bengal). And many scholars make a surmise that he was a Buddhist, a point that is hotly debated. Whatever the veracity of all these conjectures, tradition believes that there was a break (*vicchitti*) in the teaching of Advaita after Śuka (son of Pārāśarya-vyāsa, who was a pupil and grandson of Śakti, the son and disciple of *Vasiṣṭha*), and that Gauḍa-pāda revived it. This account appears reliable.

Many works are ascribed to Gauḍa-pāda, among them a commentary on Īśvara-kṛṣṇa's *Sāṃkhya-kārikā*, another on *Uttaragītā*, still another on *Nṛsimha-tāpanīya-upaniṣad*, and some *Tāntrik* works like *Śrī-vidyā-ratna-sūtra* and *Subhagodaya*. But the work that has made him famous is the *kārikā* that he prepared on a short Upaniṣad, *Māṇḍūkya*, dealing with the three states of the phenomenal self. This *kārikā* is in four chapters, the first alone (*Āgama-prakarāṇa* the chapter dealing with scripture) being in the nature of a commentary to the Upaniṣad, the other three ('*Vaitathya*',

unreality, 'Advaita', unity, and 'Alāta-sānti', extinguishing the fire-brand) making an independent treatise. The purpose of the treatise appears to expound the truth that the three states of the phenomenal self are unreal and illusory and that the fourth one, *turiya*, (which is Gauḍa-pāda's name for the Upaniṣad's *caturtha*) alone is real. The first chapter points out that revelation is the only means for understanding the true nature of the self ; the second explains the illusory character of the phenomenal world by employing reason ; the third propounds the view that what is non-dual (*advaita*) is not illusory ; and the fourth is in the nature of a reply to the criticisms hurled at Advaita. Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya suggests that the four chapters were originally composed as independent books and that Śaṁkara brought them together into a book-form. Whatever the truth, Śaṁkara held this book in the highest esteem. In fact, he quotes only from Gauḍa-pāda's *kārikā* and not from the *Māṇḍūkya-Upaniṣad*.

There can be little doubt that Śaṁkara's philosophical position was greatly influenced by this work. The sources of Śaṁkara's thought can all be traced here. The doctrine of attributeless Brahman, the identity of the Absolute Self with the individual self, the idea of *māyā*, the dual aspect of Advaita methodology (*adhyāropa-apavāda*), grouping of the standpoints into phenomenal and transcendental, and the notion of transformation (*vivarta*) as against evolution (*pariṇāma*) are presented here in a nut-shell. Śaṁkara undertook the task of constructing an elaborate and consistent edifice on this rather slender foundation. He

fortified Advaita with philosophical, psychological and epistemological arguments and provided for it a wide scriptural base. It is interesting that Gauḍa-pāda nowhere quotes Bādarāyaṇa or refers to the *Vedānta-sūtras*. One of Śaṅkara's achievements consists in integrating Gauḍa-pāda's viewpoint with Bādarāyaṇa's general position.

About the time Gauḍa-pāda completed his life's work, there appeared on the scene another brilliant master who developed an Advaita viewpoint at variance with Gauḍa-pāda's. Śaṅkara perhaps had to combat this rival, and it must have been no easy matter, for this giant had been endeavouring to reconcile *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* and thus unify the Vedic tradition. Maṇḍana (or Maṇḍana-miśra) occupies a peculiar position in the field of Advaita. While Śaṅkara's own estimate of Maṇḍana's work can hardly be reconstructed, Sureśvara as the prime spokesman of Śaṅkara's Advaita, launched a vigorous attack on Maṇḍana's arguments. But in later Advaita, if Sureśvara was followed by Vimuktātman, Sarvajñātman, Prakāśātman and Ānandānubhava in this anti-Maṇḍana stand Vācaspati was followed by Ānanda-bodha ⁶⁷, Citsukha ⁶⁸, Madhusūdana-sarasvatī ⁶⁹ and Brahmānanda ⁷⁰ in his recognition of Maṇḍana as an authority in Advaita. Vidyāraṇya's *Vārttika-sāra* (summary of Sureśvara's *Vārttika*

67. *Nyāya-makaranda*, (css), quotes many times, and in very reverent expressions : e.g. तदाहुरत्रभवन्तो मण्डनमिश्राः (p.234) तदभिहितमाचार्यवर्यैः (256)

68. *Tattvapradīpikā* (NSP) p.140.

69. *Advaita-siddhi*, (NSP, 1917), इति ब्रह्मसिद्धिकारोक्तमपि साधु (p.316)

70. *Laghu-candrikā*, (NSP), p.326.

on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*) refers to the author of *Brahma-siddhi* as a great writer who knew the very secret of the Vedic lore (*veda-rahasya-vit*). The post-Śāṁkara development of Advaita bears the unmistakable influence of Maṇḍana.

Regarding the period in which the great trio (Gauḍa-pāda, Maṇḍana and Śāṁkara) flourished, we may accept the careful reckoning by Mahamahopadhyaya S. Kuppuswami Sastri : ⁷¹

Gauḍa-pāda	about	520-620 A.D.
Govinda	''	560-650 A.D.
Maṇḍana	''	615-695 A.D.
Śāṁkara	''	632-664 A.D.
Sureśvara	''	620-700 A.D.
Padmapāda	''	625-705 A.D.

Maṇḍana, thus, was a senior contemporary of Śāṁkara and junior contemporary of Gauḍa-pāda. Maṇḍana was extremely proficient in *Mīmāṃsā*, and was considered next only to Kumārila, his teacher : in the field of *Mīmāṃsā*, even such authorities as Pārthasārathi-miśra held Maṇḍana in high regard. He wrote three works on *Mīmāṃsā*, all of which became important : *Mīmāṃsānukramaṇika*, *Bhāvanā-viveka*, and *Vidhi-viveka*. He was an exponent of the *Sphoṭa* theory of the grammarians, and wrote a *siddhi*-work on the subject. His epistemological treatise, *Vibhrama-viveka*, is an

71. Based on T.R. Chintamani : "Date of Śāṁkarachārya and some of his predecessors", JOR, Madras, Vol. III, 1929, pp.39-56; cf *Brahma-siddhi*, Ed. by S. Kuppuswami Sastri, Introduction, p.lviii.

interesting dissertation on the psychological involvements of perceptual error.

His only *Vedāntic* work is *Brahma-siddhi*, a remarkable volume in four books treating of the nature of Absolute, the structure of reason, scriptural prescriptions, and spiritual fulfilment. We find him both loyal to, and critical of, Bhartṛ-hari and Kumārila. He accepts the *Viparīta-khyāti* of Kumārila (although with some reservations) and criticizes the *bheda-abheda* viewpoint of Bhartṛ-prapañca. What irked Śaṅkara and Sureśvara against him was his espousal of the cause of Bhartṛ-hari's *Śabdādvaita*. There were other points on which Śaṅkara and Sureśvara differed from him : multiplicity of nescience, need for continuing meditation (*prasamkhyāna*) to eliminate the last 'shiver' (*kampa*) of the projective aspect of nescience, the conjoint functioning of meditation and ritualistic action, and optional role of renunciation in securing the highest goal. But it must be recognized that he valiantly took up the cause of Advaita and sought to defend it by scriptural, logical, epistemological and philosophical arguments. And it is not unnatural that Vācaspati sought to reconcile the standpoint of Śaṅkara with that of Maṇḍana : the common points between them are in fact more numerous than differences. It would be foolhardy to assume that Śaṅkara was ignorant of *Brahma-siddhi* and that he was not to an extent influenced by it.

Maṇḍana relies heavily on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*-, *Chāndogya*, and *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣads*. He cites *Bhagavad-gītā* and

Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtra* very sparsely ; and Gauḍa-pāda's *Kārikā* has been quoted but once. His *Brahma-siddhi*, incidentally, inaugurated a series of *siddhi* works in Advaita : Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* (which was probably written as a rejoinder to *Brahma-siddhi*), Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, Jñānottama's *Jñāna-siddhi* (not available now, but mentioned in *Nayana-prasādinī* on Citsukha's *Tattvaprādīpikā*), Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*, Sadānanda's *Advaita-brahma-siddhi*, and Gaṅgādharendra's *Śvārājya-siddhi*. The expression '*siddhi*' as the title of the book signifies definitive ascertainment of a particular viewpoint after a critical examination of related arguments. We will have occasion to discuss the *Siddhi* literature again in the next section.

VI. TEXTUAL SOURCES

Śaṅkara endeavoured to reconstruct, preserve and propagate the correct tradition in order to help Hinduism survive. Although he styled his literary works as 'commentaries' (*bhāṣhyas*), his achievement was original, creative and lasting. He recognized the value of the Vedic lore and took this corpus as his primary source. He accepted the division of the Vedic lore into the former ritualistic section (*karma-kāṇḍa*) and the latter wisdom-section (*jñāna-kāṇḍa*) and pinned his faith on the latter division. He regarded himself as a votary of the Upaniṣads (*aupaniṣada*) and his main textual source was the Upaniṣadic complex. Paul Deussen has assiduously examined his references in

the *Vedāntasūtra-bhāṣya* ⁷² and finds that he has quoted the Upaniṣadic texts as many as 2000 times : of them, the references to *Chāndogya* (809) and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* (565) come to 1,374.

He also cites as authority the *Samhitā* texts of *Ṛgveda*, *Atharva Veda*, the '*Taittirīya*' and the '*Vājasaneyā*' recensions of *Kṛṣṇa* and *Śukla Yajurvedas* respectively ; he also cites the '*Maitrāyaṇīya*' recension of *Kṛṣṇa Yajurveda*. Among the '*Brāhmaṇa*' texts, he cites the *Aitareya* and the *Kauṣītaki* portions of *Ṛgveda*, the *Śatapatha* and the *Taittirīya* portions of *Yajurveda*, the *Chāndogya*, the *Pañca-vimśa*, the *Ṣaḍ-vimśa* and the *Tāṇḍya* texts of *Sāma-Veda*. Only two '*Āraṇyakas*' are cited by him : *Aitareya* from *Ṛgveda* and *Taittirīya* from *Yajurveda*. Among the Upaniṣads, besides those he has commented upon, he quotes *Kauṣītaki* (*Ṛgveda*), *Maitrāyaṇī* and *Śvetāśvatara* (*Yajurveda*) and *Jābāla* (*Atharva Veda*).

Although his reliance on *Purāṇas* for philosophical ascertainment is meagre, he does quote from a few of them : *Mārkaṇḍeya*, *Śiva*, *Viṣṇu* and *Vāyu*. The quotations however, are secondary and supportive, unlike the Upaniṣadic passages. He has a high regard for the '*Dharma-śāstra*' authorities ; he cites not only *Manu-smṛti* but *Āśvalāyana* and *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-sūtras*, *Āpastamba-dharma-sūtra* and *Parāśara-grhya-sūtras*. He is intimately acquainted with *Nyāya*, *Vaiśeṣika*, *Sāṃkhya* (as represented by *Īśvara-kṛṣṇa*) and *Yoga* systems, and quotes from the

72. Philosophy of the Upanishads, p.30.

sūtras belonging to them. He is, of course, conversant with the *Mīmāṃsā* literature, and cites from Śabara's *bhāṣya* on Jaimini, Kumārila's works and Prabhākara's *Bṛhatī*. His knowledge of Buddhist schools is considerable and it would appear that *Dharma-kīrti* was his main source. His acquaintance with the great logician Dignāga is suggested by a reference.⁷³

Śaṁkara's erudition is awe-inspiring. He was thoroughly well-informed about the entire range of philosophical systems and religious cults ; and he was singularly free from ethnocentric prejudices. In his writings he is found to consider carefully the merit of whatever system he deals with, weigh the arguments, and arrive at his own conclusions. He presents scriptural testimony to those who are inclined to respect it, but employs logic while dealing with others. No critic, however hostile, can arraign him for dogmatism. Śaṁkara, although steeped in orthodox tradition, is surprisingly open-minded. His criticism is always dignified, his language restrained but forceful, his style clear (like the waters of *Gaṅgā*, as Vācaspati describes it⁷⁴), and references apt and

73. He quotes a *kārikā* from Dignāga's *Ālambana-parikṣā* (now lost in the original but preserved in Tibetan and Chinese translations) in VSB, 2,2,28 "यदन्तर्ज्ञेयरूपं तु बहिर्वदवभासते ।"

74. *Bhāmatī*, introductory verse, 7 :
 आचार्यकृतिनिवेशनमप्यवधूतं वचोऽस्मदादीनाम् ।
 रथ्योदकमिव गङ्गाप्रवाहपातः पवित्रयति ॥

illuminating. It is not without reason that tradition regards three commentarial works (*bhāshya-traya*) as path makers ; Patañjali's *Mahā-bhāshya* on *Pāṇini*, Śabara's *Mīmāṃsā-bhāshya* on Jaimini, and Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka-bhāshya* on Bādarāyaṇa. While the impact of the former two was limited, the third provided the stimulus for an intellectual revolution and a spiritual renaissance in the country.

SOURCE-MATERIAL IN ADVAITA LITERATURE

1. ŚAMKARA'S WORK

Śamkara looks upon himself as essentially an interpreter, a '*bhāshyakāra*' (commentator), although many independent '*prakaraṇas*' (short tracts) are ascribed to him. His '*bhāshya*' works are all in prose :

(1) On the *Upaniṣads*, *Īśa*, *Kena*, *Kaṭha*, *Praśna*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Māṇḍūkya*, *Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*, *Chāndogya* and *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*.¹

These commentarial works have been annotated by a 13th century scholar, Ānanda-giri (also called Ānanda-jñāna).

(2) On Bādarāyaṇa's *Vedānta-sūtras*, also known as *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāshya*.² This is undoubtedly the *magnum opus* from Śamkara's pen. It is not only elaborate but an original treatise within the framework supplied by Bādarāyaṇa. There are numerous glosses and annotations on this important work of Śamkara, which will be mentioned later.

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1. *Upaniṣad-bhāṣya* : (1) Śamkara's commentary on the major Upaniṣads, with Ānanda-giri's gloss, Ed. by H.R. Bhagavat, Vol.II, Parts 1 and 2, Poona : Ashtekar, 1927. (2) In eleven volumes, with Ānandagiri's gloss, Ed. by V.G. Apte, Poona : ASG, 1937.
 2. *Brahmasūtra-Śamkara-bhāṣya* : with *Bhāmatī*, *Kalpataru*, *Parimalā* and Anantakṛṣṇa-Śāstri's *Ṭippaṇa*, Ed. by Anantakṛṣṇa-Śāstri, Bombay, NSP, 1860, Re-edited by Bhārgava-Śāstri.

(3) On the *Bhagavad-gīta*, which is traditionally a part of the great epic, *Mahābhārata*, and as such considered as a *Smṛti*. This commentary also has been annotated by Ānanda-giri, mentioned above.³

The three together constitute what is styled as '*Prasthānatraya*' or the three-fold source-texts. Literally '*prasthāna*' means a setting forth, a march, a departure, (*pra-sthā-lyuṭ*); but in a technical sense it is a system or method. The *Upaniṣads* are considered as '*śruti-prasthāna*' (the scriptural text), the *Bhagavad-gīta* '*smṛti-prasthāna*' (the epic text) and Bādarāyaṇa's work '*sūtra-prasthāna*' (the aphoristic text) or '*nyāya-prasthāna*' (the explanatory or argumentative text). These are the principal source-materials for the *Vedāntic* viewpoint, and these have been considered as the most authoritative and basic texts. They have provided the framework within which different *Vedāntic* schools of thought have developed.

There are many other independent manuals in the nature of dissertations (*prakaraṇas*) that are ascribed to Śaṅkara. Many among them are metrical in form. But it is impossible to vouchsafe incontrovertible authenticity to these works. It should be noted that even the classical Advaita writers have not regarded these works as authoritative, and have refrained from quoting from them in serious discussion. An exception, however, is

3. *Bhagavadgītā-Bhāṣyam*, with Ānandagiri's gloss (1) Poona, ASG, Series No.34. (2) in *Bhagavadgītā* with eleven commentaries, (First Collection), Bombay, Gujarati Printing Press, 1938.

'*Upadeśasāhasrī*',⁴ which has been regarded as a source-material by no less an eminent author than Sureśvara (in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*). This is an immense work in two parts, the first being in prose, dealing elaborately with the practical problems of study (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and contemplation (*nididhyāsana*), and the second being poetical, in nineteen sections. There is a fine commentary on this work by Rāmatīrtha called *Padayojanikā* ; and another, an anonymous *Bodhavidhi*. Another work ascribed to Śaṁkara, the *Daśaśloki* (the full title of the work is *Cidānanda-daśaśloki*), a short work consisting of not more than ten verses, has merited an elaborate commentary by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (around 1500 A.D.) known as *Siddhānta-bindu*, which came to be regarded as an independent philosophical text and as such evoked a large number of glosses such as Brahmānanda Sarasvatī's *Ratnāvali*, Nārāyaṇa's *Laghuṭīkā*, Puruṣottama's *Sandhidāna* and Pūrṇānanda's *Tattva-viveka*.

Śaṁkara's main thesis concerns the unitary and abstract character of Reality (*brahman*), its all-inclusiveness and imponderability. He rejected the Buddhist idealism which inclined towards nihilism, and which denied the existence of an absolute and unchanging reality. Śaṁkara recognizes Self (*ātman*) as the sole reality, self-evident and transcendent ; it is of the nature of pure consciousness. He took as his main stand experience, and argued that awareness not only suggests the presence of the phenomenal

4. *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*, with Rāma-tīrtha's *Pada-yojanikā*, Ed. by Kṛṣṇa Śāstri Navare, Bombay, Jagadīśvara Press, 1886.

world but also a world of subjectivity. Beyond these, however, is the self-revealed identity of pure-consciousness viz, the Self. In Śaṅkara's works, therefore, we find an elaborate analysis of consciousness. He distinguishes between pure-consciousness which is immediate (*aparoksha*), universal, unchanging and self-luminous (*svaprakāśa*), and the projected consciousness which is ego-bound, particular and dynamic. Basic to Śaṅkara's position is the dichotomy between the transcendental level of reality and the phenomenal (including the empirically real and the operatively illusory). There are different levels of reality. Closely connected with it is Śaṅkara's theory of 'superimposition' or 'projection' (*adhyāsa*): the superimposition of the objective phenomenal world as well as the subjective world on the transcendental and really non-participating Self, which he identifies with pure consciousness. Arising out of this notion of superimposition is the concept of illusoriness of the presentational world, or what in modern terminology is called the 'assumptive world', the ground for which is the fundamental, subtle, and natural confusion between the real and the unreal. In Śaṅkara's works there is a discussion of the process of projection. The chief method that he resorts to for ascertaining truth is that of 'deliberate ascription and subsequent withdrawal' (*adhyāropa-apavāda*).

The principal source-material from Śaṅkara's pen has gathered round it an immense literature ; commentaries, interpretations, and elucidations, as well as summaries. This literature which represents intense philosophical

activity for more than seven centuries reveals not only an orderly development of thought, but a profound concern for the fundamental problem of human existence. There is in it a synthesis of philosophical, psychological, epistemological and axiological speculations.

II. PADMAPĀDA AND THE VIVARAṆA SCHOOL

Śamkara's principal works have been from time to time interpreted, explained, defended and summarized by several eminent thinkers. Their writings are regarded as 'minor commentaries' (*vyākhyāna*). A minor commentary known as *vyākhyāna* (or *ṭikā*) purports to annotate the original work for the benefit of the average student, and also present, or defend, a particular viewpoint with an elaborate argumentative paraphernalia. The five features of a *vyākhyāna* are : the meaningful separation of words, contextual elucidation of the meaning of each word, dissolution of the compound words into their semantic components, proper arrangement of sentences, and defence against objections raised with regard to the original text.

Among the immediate disciples of Śamkara, two figure prominently in philosophical literature: Padmapāda and Sureśvara. Padmapāda began writing a detailed gloss on Śamkara's *bhāṣya* on five sections of *Vedānta-sūtra*, but the extant work deals with only the first four aphorisms (in nine sections called *varṇakas*). The work, however, is

called *Pañcapādikā*.⁵ This is undoubtedly the most important of the Advaita texts after Śaṅkara. Its greatness consists in having inaugurated a new line of thinking which was sustained for several generations. Among the commentaries inspired by this work, the earliest and the most illuminating has been the *Vivaraṇa* (*Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*) by Prakāśātman (around 1000 A.D.).⁶ He was a disciple of Ananyānubhava. This work can be described as the basic plank of what has been styled as the 'Vivaraṇa' point of view. The large number of glosses and annotations prepared on this work include : *Ṭikāratna* (*Samanvaya-sūtra-vivṛti*) by Ānanda pūrṇa (1275-1350) ; *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha* by Bhāratī-tīrtha (or Vidyaraṇya? 1350) ; *Rjvivaraṇa* by Sarvajña-viṣṇu (1350, teacher of the author of *Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha*) ; *Tattvadīpanam* by Akhaṇḍānanda (1350)⁷ who was a disciple of the famous

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5. *Pañcapādikā*, with with Ātmasvarūpa's *Prabodha-pariśodhini* and *Vijñānātma's Tātparyārtha-dyotini*, Ed. by S.S. Śāstri and S.R. Kṛṣṇamūrti, Madras, Govt. Oriental MSS Series, No.155, Part 1, 1958.
 6. *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa*, (1) with extracts from *Tattva-dīpana* and *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, Ed. by Rāma Śāstri Bhāgavat, Banaras, VSS, No.2, Lazarus & Co., 1892; (2) with Citsukha's *Tātparyadīpikā* and Nṛsiṁhāśrama's *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, Ed. by S.S. Śāstri and S.R. Kṛṣṇamūrti, Madras, Govt. Oriental MSS Series No.155, Part II, 1958.
 7. *Advaita-dīpanam*, Ed. by Rāma-Śāstri-Tailanga, Banaras, CSS, in 8 fascicules, 1901-1902.

glossator, Ānandagiri ; *Bhāva-dyotanikā* (*Vivaraṇa-tātparyadīpikā*) by the celebrated Citsukha ; *Vivaraṇa-bhāvaprakāśika* by Nṛsiṃhāśrama (around 1500 A.D.) ; *Vivaraṇa-darpaṇa* by Raṅgarājādhvarin (1580), father of the famous Appayya Dīkṣita; *Vivaraṇojjivini* of Yajñeśvara of Veṅgiṇāḍu (1600) ; and an anonymous *Vārttika*. Besides these works closely following the text of *Vivaraṇa*, there are many independent works expounding its point of view. Important among them are : *Nyāyaratna-dīpāvalī* of Ānandanubhava (12th century) ; *Vedānta-kaumudī* of Rāmādvaya (1300, which also occasionally assimilates the Bhāmatī viewpoint, and which has an annotation by Śeṣanṛsimha) ; *Tattvaśuddhi* by Jñānaghana ; and *Vivaraṇopanyāsa* (*Tātparyasaṃgraha*) by Rāmānanda Sarasvatī.⁸

However, the work that became as famous as the *Vivaraṇa* was *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*,⁹ which, contrary to the suggestion in the title, is a voluminous work. The authorship of this work is rather uncertain. Some ascribe it to Vidyāraṇya and others to Bhāratī-tīrtha. Perhaps it is a combined work, as *Pañcadaśī* also is reputed to be.

8. *Vivaraṇopanyāsa*, Ed. by Damodara Śāstri Sahasrabuddhe, Banaras, CSS, in 2 fascicules, 1900-1901.

9. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, (1) Ed. by Rāma-Śāstri-Tailanga, Banaras, VSS, No.7, 1893; (2) Ed. by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Sailesvar Sen, Waltair, Andhra University, 1941.

The other commentaries on *Pañcapādikā* include *Vedāntaratna-kośa* (*Pañcapādikā-ṭīkā*) by Nṛsimhāśrama (1500, also called Nṛsimhāśramin, disciple of Jagannāthāśrama, author of a commentary on *Vivaraṇa* and several independent treatises like *Bhedadhikkāra*¹⁰ and *Advaitatattva-viveka*¹¹) ; *Pañcapādikā-darpaṇa* by Amalānanda ; *Tātparya-dyotini* by Dharmarājadhvarin (17th century author of the celebrated *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* ; *Pañcapādikā-ṭīkā* by Ānandapurṇa, *Kaṇṭhīrava* by Vijñānavara, a *vyākhyā* by Vijñānavāsa-yati and a *Vivaraṇa* by Narendragiri. Most of these works have receded to the background by the celebrity attained by the *Vivaraṇa* and the *Samgraha*.

Padmapāda's interpretation of Śaṅkara furnished the model on which Prakāśātman constructed an elaborate, integrated and original thought-system, known as the '*Vivaraṇa-prasthāna*'. Its essential orientation is psychological and ontological. It claims to follow closely Śaṅkara's argument of 'superimposition' (*adhyāsa*), but makes some significant departures. Reality is one, absolute and is of the nature of pure consciousness. The material basis for the transactional world of appearance and multiplicity is nescience (*avidyā*), which is superimposed on

10. *Bheda-dhikkāra*, Ed. by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, University Dept. of Indian Philosophy, Bulletin, No.2, 1934.

11. *Vedāntatattva-viveka*, (with his own *Tattva-dīpana* and Agnihotra Yajva's *Pūraṇī*) Ed., by Narayanasvami Sastri, Mysore, Oriental Research Inst., No.96, 1955.

the Real. For Padmapāda, *avidyā*, *ajñāna* (ignorance), *māyā* (creative power), *prakṛti* (nature), *avyakta* (unmanifest), *agrahaṇa* (non-apprehension), *tamas* (darkness), and *nidrā* (sleep) are terms which are synonymous. They all refer to some inscrutable power, material in nature, which is located in the Absolute Real (*brahman*). It is responsible for the self-hood (*jīvatva*) which distinguishes each one of us. This nescience conceals the Real and distorts consciousness. It makes for the presentational world, which is essentially unreal, as well as the modes of consciousness such as the ego, which are also fundamentally unreal. Padmapāda interprets rather uniquely Śaṅkara's expression '*mithyājñāna*' to mean "false (*mithyā*) nescience (*ajñāna*)" : by 'false' he understands indeterminateness as well as negation, and by 'nescience' a material energy.

The *Vivaraṇa* school is distinguished by its theory of reflection (*pratibimba-vāda*), on the model of the face being reflected in the mirror. This model has been employed in the context of explaining the relationship between the Absolute Real and the individual self which represents the phenomenal presentation. The world flashes forth from the primary nescience (*avidyā*) in the form of the subtle seed of multiplicity, and the Absolute Real as a witness is reflected in it, as the moon in several stretches of water. Although the reflecting medium is material and inert, the reflection (individual self) is of the nature of consciousness. An important aspect of this view is the identity of self as reflection with the Absolute Real.

Padmapāda points out the possibility of one's being aware of oneself without the instrumentation of mind. He argues that consciousness itself is of the nature of illumination : one lamp does not need another lamp to show it. Mind (*antahkarana*) is a function of nescience, as life (*prāṇa*) is. Padmapāda has given us an elaborate account of the perpetual process as distinctive of the mind's function. While mind is an active expression of nescience, the nescience remains subliminal and inoperative in deep sleep. Padmapāda has made a detailed analysis of model consciousness in wakefulness, dream and sleep.

III. SUREŚVARA'S POSITION

Sureśvara, another immediate disciple of Śaṅkara, is famous as the author of *Vārttikas*. A *Vārttika* is a metrical work that proposes to inquire into not only what has been explicitly said, but what has been left unsaid and what has been inadequately or improperly said.¹² It is not merely an interpretative work ; it is almost in the nature of an independent work, but following a line of thought already enunciated and widely accepted. Sureśvara wrote two great *Vārttikas*, one on Śaṅkara's 'bhāṣya' on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upanīṣad*¹³ and another on *Taittirīya-upanīṣad*.¹⁴ The

12. उक्तानुक्तदुरुक्तानां चिन्ता यत्र प्रवर्तते । तं वार्तिकं प्राहुः वार्तिकज्ञा मनीषिणः ॥

13. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upanīṣad-bhāṣya-Vārttika*, with Ānandagiri's Gloss, *Śāstra-prakāśikā*. Ed. by V.G. Apte, Poona, ASG, No.16, 1937, in 3 Volumes, the First being *Sambandha-vārttika*.

14. *Taittirīya-Upanīṣad-bhāṣya-vārttika*, with Ānandagiri's gloss, Ed. by Hari Narayana Apte, Poona, ASG No. 13, 1911.

former, which is more voluminous, is an important source material (comprising more than 11,150 verses). It is preceded by an elaborate inquiry into the relation between ritualistic action and the liberating wisdom. It is known as the *Sambandha-vārttika* (called in the colophon, *Sambandha-bhāṣya*)¹⁵ and is a brilliant achievement ; it consists of 1,136 verses. The *Vārttika* has several glosses, *Śāstra-prakāśika* by Ānandagiri (Ānanda-jñāna), *Nyāya-kalpalatikā* by Ānanda-pūrṇa, *Nyāyatattva-vivaraṇa* and *Āraṇyavṛtti-sambandhōkti*. The first two have been summarised by Vidyāraṇya in his *Vārttika-sāra*, which was later abridged by Maheśa-tīrtha in his *Laghu-saṃgraha*.

Sureśvara also wrote an independent work *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, which is justly celebrated as a masterly treatise of the Advaitic viewpoint. The work which is metrical in form in four chapters appears to be intended as a criticism of the view expounded by Maṇḍana in his *Brahma-siddhi* that wisdom and rituals were together necessary for liberation. This work has several commentaries, the earliest being *Candrikā* by Jñānottama. The other commentaries are *Vidyā-surabhi* of Jñānamṛta, *Vivaraṇa* of Akhilātman, and *Sārārtha* of Rāmadatta. A gloss that has made use of Jñānottama's work extensively is Citsukha's *Bhāvatattva-prakāśika*. Sureśvara was intimately acquainted with Śamkara's position and was in perfect sympathy with it. He argues in this work that the Upaniṣadic texts provide us with, not mediate knowledge,

15. *Sambandha-vārttika*, Ed. and translated by T.M.P. Mahadevan, Madras University, 1958.

but direct intuitive insight into Brahman, while not abandoning the primary sense of the textual words (*jahallakṣaṇa*).

It is understandable and evident that Sureśvara closely follows Śaṅkara's line of thinking. Nescience, according to him, is the non-realization of the one Absolute Real. Like his contemporary Padmapāda, he too regards *avidyā* and *māyā* as synonymous expressions. As its aspects, he talks of non-knowledge (*ajñāna*), wrong-knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) and doubt (*saṁśaya*). The first aspect conceals the Real and the second projects the phenomenal world ; they came to be designated respectively as *āvaraṇa* and *vikshepa* in later Advaitic thought. The first aspect refers to its nature, while the second and third point out its functions. Nescience is located in the Absolute Real which is also its object ; the individual self cannot be its locus or object, as it is itself a creature of nescience. The nescience without its projective aspect can be experienced in deep sleep. However, nescience itself is a mere presentation, and the Real is not actually involved in it. It is a matter of appearance only (*ābhāsa*). He does not appear to favour the view (Padmapāda's) that nescience constitutes the material basis for this appearance. Sureśvara's main contribution consists in the employment of the traditional inquiry into the three conditions of the phenomenal self (waking, dream and sleep) supplementary to inner vision or intuition. Deep sleep suggested to him the lapse of nescience for the time being, and hence positive experience of self-hood. He held that such intuitive wisdom and emancipation are

indistinguishable. Sureśvara in his *Vārttika* also inquires exhaustively into the value and limitations of the sources of common valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*). While they are doubtless of value in so far as the transactional world (which is real until the realisation, *avicārita-sāmsiddha*) is concerned, they are of no value whatever where the Real is concerned, because their value is confined to the phenomenal appearance.

IV. VĀCASPATI AND THE BHĀMATĪ SCHOOL

Vācaspati (around 840 A.D.) exerted very great influence in systematizing the Advaitic concepts. This was in part due to the fact that it is only his commentary among early works that covers the entire text of Śaṁkara's *VSB*. Padmapāda's work, as we have seen, does not even go through the whole of the first *pāda* ; and Sureśvara did not attempt a commentary on *VSB* at all. Vācaspati hailed from Mithilā and was a contemporary of some unidentified king Nrga. He was a student of Trilocana and Mārthāṇḍatilaka-svāmi. He was an expert in all six systems of Indian philosophy, and has written treatises on each one of them. In the field of *Vedānta*, his *Bhāmatī* on Śaṁkara's *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* ¹⁶ and *Brahmatattva-samīkṣā* on Maṇḍanamīśra's *Brahma-siddhi* are well known, although it is only the former that has come down to us. *Bhāmatī* has an

16. *Bhāmatī*, (1) in *Brahmasūtra-Śaṁkara-bhāṣyam*, Ed. by Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri, Bombay, NSP, 1860; (2) only *Catussūtrī*, Ed. and translated by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja, Madras, TPH, Adyar, 1933.

important sub-commentary known as *Vedānta-kalpataru* by Amalānanda (1217-1260). This in turn has two glosses, *Kalpataru-parimalā* by Appayya-dīkṣita (around 1550), who was the author of as many as 400 works, and *Ābhoga* by Lakshmīnṛsiṃha (17th century).¹⁷ Of these two, *Kalpataru* became more popular, obviously because of the author's celebrity, and in course of time there were minor commentaries written on this work, like *Vedāntakalpataru-mañjarī* (or *Parimalārtha-saṃgraha* of Tāraka-brahmāśrama). The other commentary, *Ābhoga* has attracted little attention. Although apparently inspired by *Parimalā*, this work criticizes *Parimalā* often, and follows relatively an independent line of thinking. The author was an inhabitant of the Kṛṣṇā delta in Āndhra-pradeś, and was the son of Koṇḍabhaṭṭa. Besides *Ābhoga*, he seems to have written another work called *Tarka-pradīpa*. It has been customary in the South to study the 'five books of *Vedānta*' (*Vedānta-pañca-granthī*) : Bādarāyaṇa's *Sūtra*, Śaṃkara's *bhāṣya*, Bhāmatī, *Kalpataru* and *Parimalā*.

There are other commentaries on Bhāmatī like *Bhāmatī-tilaka* by Allāḷa-sūri (around 1700) ; *Ṛjuprakāśikā* by Akhaṇḍānandayati, which is a simple gloss closely following *Kalpataru* ; *Bhāmatī-bhāvadīpikā* by Acyuta-kṛṣṇa-tīrtha, who also wrote a commentary on *Siddhānta-leśa* and *Taittirīya-bhāṣya* ; *Bhāmatī-vyākhyā* by Śrīraṅgarāja ; and an anonymous *Bhāmatyukti-saṃgraha*.

17. *Ābhoga* on *Vedānta-Kalpataru*, MSS copy with Vidvān Pālghāt Nārāyaṇa Śāstri in Mysore.

The crystallization of the Advaita standpoint for popular edification was undertaken mainly by Vācaspati-miśra, Ānandagiri (about the middle of the 13th century) and Govindānanda (14th century). Ānandagiri (Ānanda-jñāna) was a monastic pupil of Śuddhānanda. He probably belonged to Gujarat, and his earlier name is said to have been Janārdana. He is variously described as having been the pontiff at *Dwārakā* and *Kāñcī*. He prepared faithful and helpful glosses, most of them called *Ṭippaṇas* on all the important works of Śamkara, and on the *Vārttikas* of Sureśvara. His gloss on Śamkara's *VSB*, is known as *Nyāyanirṇaya*, and the one on the *BGB* as *Vivecana*. He is also reputed to have written *Vivṛti* on Śamkara's *Upadeśa-sāhasrī*. An independent philosophical text called *Tattvāloka* is also ascribed to him. He appears to follow in essential details Vācaspati's *Bhāmatī*. This work was continued in *Bhāshya-ratnaprabhā* ascribed to Govindānanda. The real author of this short commentarial work was Rāmānanda, who ascribed the contents of the book to his teacher, Govindānanda. This work which is of great help to the students follows Ānandagiri closely. There is a commentary on this work by Pūrṇānanda which continues only as far as the fourth 'sutra'; another commentary by Acyuta-kṛṣṇāṇḍatīrtha also closes with the fourth 'sutra'. There seems to have been a prevalent view that the first four 'sutras' (*Catussūtrī*) contained the essence of the entire work, and that all relevant topics for discussion occur in them. There are many commentaries and annotations covering only this portion of Śamkara's *VSB*. Although

Vācaspati wrote his Bhāmatī on the entire work, it is more usual to study only the *Catussūtrī* portion thereof.

Vācaspati's position differs in many details from Sureśvara's as well as Padmapāda's, and he has adopted Maṇḍana's views to a considerable extent (although he differs from him in some details, as for instance, with regard to the utility of ritualistic action after the 'desire to know Brahman' arises). It would appear that he was interested in reconciling the views of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara, as, for instance, with regard to the status of God (*Īśvara*). That status in Maṇḍana's thought is almost insignificant, while Śaṅkara affords God a highly relevant status in his scheme. Vācaspati very ably effects a compromise on this issue. The Bhāmatī viewpoint may be considered to be an attempt to revive the most relevant contributions of Maṇḍana, taking a stand quite distinct from either Sureśvara's or Padmapāda's, and render them more meaningful within the grand model provided by Śaṅkara. This is especially significant in view of the fact that Sureśvara set himself severely against Maṇḍana. Among the notions taken directly from Maṇḍana and bodily incorporated in Śaṅkara's brand of Advaita was that the nescience (which is only an efficient cause of phenomena) has the individual self (*jīva*) as its locus and object, and not pure consciousness (or the Absolute Real). Nescience is both positive and indeterminable ; and it is individualized or specific to selves. Vācaspati holds, as Maṇḍana held, that nescience is diverse in accordance with the plurality of individual selves. There are as many nesciences as there

are individual selves; this view is opposed to the *Vivaraṇa* view that individualizations are only modal variations. Both Maṇḍana and Vācaspati accept two kinds of nescience : Psychological and Phenomenological. And explaining the relation between the Absolute Real and the individual self, Vācaspati postulates the theory of limitation (*avaccheda-vāda*), on the model of the jar limiting the space within it from the space around. One can see that all this is out of tune with Sureśvara's line of thought.

Further, Vācaspati denies that the scriptural passages can directly produce intuitive insight (Sureśvara's position); he emphasizes the need for contemplation (*nididhyāsana*). The value of ritualistic action is exhausted by the arousal of 'the desire to know Brahman'. The content of intuitive wisdom is the Absolute as enveloped by mind, which, in Vācaspati's view, is a sensefunction. Hence he underlines the importance of mind as the means of attaining the essential unity of the individual self with the Absolute Real. The notion of the 'enveloped Absolute' (*upahita-brahma*) is an interesting one in Vācaspati's theory. It can be noticed that the Bhāmatī viewpoint differs from the *Vivaraṇa* viewpoint on all these issues.

V. SARVAJÑĀTMAN

Among the independent treatises purporting to be commentaries on Śaṅkara's *VS*, *Samkṣepa-Śārīraka*¹⁸ by

18. *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* (1) with Rāmatīrtha's *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā*, Banaras, CSS, 1913; (2) with Nṛsimhāśrama's *Tattva-bodhinī*, Ed. by S.N. Sukla, Banaras, SBT Series, No.69, 1936.

Sarvajñātman holds a pre-eminent position. This is a poetical work of 1240 verses in various metres arranged in four chapters, following the four topics of the *Brahma-sūtra*. He is generally supposed to have been a native of *Gāndhāra* and a disciple of the great Sureśvara, though 'Deveśvara' to whom he refers in the work is not the 'Sureśvara' of *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* and *Vārttika* fame, but a disciple of some Devānanda who lived in Trivandrum around 1000 A.D. His name occurs in the Śringerī pontifical list, after Sureśvara, as Nityabodha-ghana. He is supposed to have been for some time the pontiff of *Kāñcī-Kāmakotī*.

This work is at once eminently readable and profound, and makes many original and bold contributions within the general Advaitic framework. There are several glosses on it, like *Siddhānta-dīpikā* by Viśva-veda which was the earliest ; the detailed *Tattva-bōdhini* by Nṛsimhāśrama (the author of a commentary on *Pañcapādikā*, already mentioned); *Anvayārtha-prakāśikā* by Rāmatirtha (around 1600), closely following *Viśvaveda's* works ; *Bhāvaprakāśa* by Prāgviṣṇu ; *Sāra-saṁgraha* by the great Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (on the lines of the works of *Viśvaveda* and *Prāgviṣṇu*) ; and *Subōdhini* by Agnicit-purushottama. There is also an anonymous (sometimes given as Vedānanda's) annotation known as *Saṁbandhōkti*. Sarvajñātman is said to be the author of another work, *Pañca-prakriyā* (in five sections), which was perhaps intended as a summary of *Samkṣepa-śārīraka*. However, the bulk of this work is devoted to the interpretation of the *Mahāvākyas*.

Sarvajñātman undertook to enunciate correctly and clearly all the major issues tackled by Śaṁkara, and sought to fix the exact import of the five fundamental concepts in Advaita - *sākshī*, witness ; *Īśvara*, God ; *avidyā*, nescience ; *jīva*, the individual self ; and *jagat*, the phenomenal world, in proper perspective. But his general orientation appears to be in favour of an integration of the approaches of Sureśvara and Padmapāda. He argues that the locus of nescience can only be the Absolute Real, for the individual self is but consequent on nescience. As regards the nature of 'witness', he subscribes (like Sureśvara) to the theory of utter unrelatedness (*ajāta-vāda*). And he regards nescience as unitary, and spells out the view that the individual self also is one (*ekajīva-vāda*). However, in order to explain the relation between God (associated with the projective power of nescience) and the individual self, he prefers the 'reflection theory' of Padmapāda to the 'appearance theory' of Sureśvara. He confirms Sureśvara's thesis regarding the capacity of the scriptural texts to produce directly the intuitive knowledge of the Absolute Real. An important contribution of Sarvajñātman consists in the distinction he has drawn between 'support' (*ādhāra*) and 'substratum' (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The former, which sustains a series of phenomenal appearances, is itself not real but wrongly imagined to discharge that function. The latter, however, is the pure and tranquil 'witness', altogether unaffected by the phenomenal presentations. Sarvajñātman's analysis of phenomenal consciousness, explanation of deep sleep as direct experience, and theory of reciprocity of

superimposition (*parasparādhyāsa*) are of great value in the scientific appraisal of *Vedānta*.

VI. ŚRĪ-HARṢA AND CITSUKHA

An interesting figure in the history of Advaita thought was Śrīharṣa (around 1150 A.D.) who was also a great poet (author of *Naishadha-carita*). He appears to have hailed from Bengal and was in the court of the king of Kanouj, probably Jayachandra. His dialectic skill and brilliance of exposition are illustrated in his voluminous *Khaṇḍana-khaṇḍakāḍya*, (also called *Anirvacanīya-sarvasva* because he establishes the doctrine of indescribability of phenomenal existence, refuting all possible arguments against it),¹⁹ which is primarily a disputational exercise. He claims to have made this work deliberately difficult in order to teach a lesson to those who arrogantly imagine themselves clever and think that they have no use for a teacher. The treatise is indeed a brain teaser : but there are helpful commentaries on it by Paramānanda, Bhavanātha, Raghunāthaśīrōmaṇi and Citsukha. The dialectical approach that he perfected found an able exponent in Citsukha, whose philosophical insight was better and whose style of writing was not so formidable as Śrīharṣa's.

Citsukha (c. 1220 A.D.) is an important writer whose *Tattva-pradīpikā* ²⁰ in four chapters (also called *Citsukhī*) is

19. *Khaṇḍana-Khaṇḍakāḍya*, with Ānanda-pūrṇa's *Khaṇḍanaphakkikāvi-bhāṣa*, Ed. by Ganganātha Jha, in several fascicules, Banaras CSS, 1904, 1907, 1909, 1910.
20. *Tattva-pradīpikā*, with Pratyagrūpa's *Nayana-prasādinī*, Ed. by Raghunātha Śāstri, Bombay, Panduranga Javaji, 1931.

justly celebrated as an able defence of Advaita thought. He was a disciple of Gauḍa-jñānottama (Satyānanda) of uncertain identity but himself a *Vedāntic* writer. He is said to be the author of *Advaya-siddhi* supposedly a defence of the 'Śabdādvaita' argument of Bharṭṛhari. Citsukha probably hailed from Āndhra country for he was a devotee of Narasimha of Simhācala. He was a prolific writer; besides the commentary on Śrīharṣa's treatise, he wrote a gloss on Śaṅkara's *Sūtra-Bhāṣya* entitled *Bhāṣyabhāva-prakāśika*, as well as an index of topics dealt with in the *Sūtra*, *Adhikaraṇa-mañjarī*, along with several other works. He wrote commentaries also on *Naishkarmya-siddhi* (Sureśvara) and *Nyāyamakaranda* (Ānandabōdha). There is an excellent commentary on *Tattvapradīpikā* called *Nayana-prasādinī* by one Pratyagrūpa or Pratyag-bhagavān (c. 1400 A.D.). It can be seen that Citsukha followed in the main the *Vivaraṇa* viewpoint.

Śrīharṣa's treatise is neatly divided into two parts : a prologue (*bhūmikā*) and the refutation of logical arguments, categories and definitions of realistic and dualistic schools, especially the *Nyāya*. The purpose of the dialectician is to prove that the phenomenal world is a mere unreal presentation. He also brings into bold relief the distinction between nihilism and Advaita. Citsukha has much the same achievement to his credit; and he contributes greatly to the crystallization of one of the core-concepts of Advaita, viz, the self-luminosity of the Self, whose essential nature is consciousness. His *Tattva-pradīpikā* is a brilliant book, and

makes numerous positive suggestions towards understanding the psychological involvements of Advaita.

Of the several standard works on which Citsukha has written commentaries, Ānandabōdha's *Nyāya-makaranda*²¹ in thirteen sections is of particular interest. Ānandabōdha wrote two other works *Pramāṇa-mālā* and *Nyāya-dīpāvalī*. The common approach in all these works is defence of Advaita by the employment of logical categories. *Nyāya-makaranda*, in particular, directs its attention towards establishing Advaita as a consistent, broadbased and positive system ; it seeks to resolve the differences within the system in addition to combating the attack from outside, especially from dualistic schools. It follows the *Mīmāṃsā* method of analysis and argument. Interesting is his attempt to integrate the two kinds of causality (efficient and material) in transfiguration (*vivarta*) ; his comparative consideration of the theory of 'error' while supporting the 'indeterminability' theory (*anirvacanīya*) is likewise a fascinating study. He establishes by reasoning that the phenomenal presentation is entirely founded on the Absolute Real. The method he has adopted in *Nyāya-dīpāvalī* to ascertain the reality of the phenomenal world appears to have provided the model for the approach of Madhusūdana-sarasvatī in his famous *Advaita-siddhi*.

21. *Nyāya-makaranda*, with Citsukha's *Vyākhyā*, Banaras, CSS.

VII. THE SIDDHI-WORKS

An interesting complex of Advaitic works can be called 'Siddhi' literature. There are six well-known works, whose titles end with 'siddhi', an expression meaning the establishment of a doctrinal standpoint after investigation and discussion. The model perhaps was provided by the celebrated work of Vasubandhu, *Vijñāptimātratā-siddhi*, a Buddhist treatise seeking to establish that bare consciousness was the sole reality. In the *Vedāntic* field, the earliest work of this nature was Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi*,²² which in due course was followed by nearly twenty 'siddhi' works. Maṇḍana himself wrote another 'siddhi' work, '*Sphoṭa-siddhi*' arguing in favour of the Sphoṭa-theory, which was vigorously attacked by Śaṁkara. Maṇḍana was a senior contemporary of Śaṁkara, and an younger contemporary of Prabhākara, whose *Bṛhati* has been criticized in this work. Although he sets out to establish scriptural authority, he holds that scriptural knowledge can only be indirect ; repeated contemplation (*prasamkhyāna*) holds the key to liberation. He also formulates the Advaitic standpoint ; he argues that Brahman is the only reality, and postulates nescience which hides him and which projects the phenomenal world. This work is in four chapters, dealing with Brahman, reasoning, instruction and accomplishment.

22. *Brahma-siddhi*, with Śaṁkhapāṇi's commentary, Ed. by S. Kuppaswāmi Śāstri, Madras, Govt. Oriental MSS series No.4, 1937. The commentaries of Ānandapūrṇa (*Bhāva-suddhi*) and Citsukha (*Abhiprāya-prakāśikā*), Ed. by N.S. Anantakrishna Sastri, Madras, Govt. Oriental MSS Library, 1963.

His chief sources are the *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavad-gītā* and *Bādarāyaṇa's Vedānta-sūtras*. Vācaspati, the commentator on Śaṅkara, is said to have written a commentary also on this work known as *Tattva-samikṣā* (now lost). It is well-known that Vācaspati has attempted to reconcile the views of Maṇḍana and Śaṅkara. Maṇḍana's theory of dual *avidyā* as well as his argument that the individual self (*jīva*) is the locus and object of *avidyā* have been adopted by Vācaspati, a position severely contended by other Advaitins. Citsukha's *Abhiprāya-prakāśikā* is another commentary on this work. The other commentaries are *Bhāva-śuddhi* by Ānanda-pūrṇa (Vidyāsāgara) and *Vyākhyā* by Śaṅkhapāṇi.

The second 'siddhi' was the famous *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*²³ of Sureśvara, who was a direct disciple of Śaṅkara. An account of this work has already been given. It must be mentioned that Citsukha wrote *Bhāvatattva-prakāśikā* as a commentary on this work.

The third was Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi* (around 1200 A.D.)²⁴ in eight sections, expounding the concept of nescience (*avidyā*) and discussing the theories of error. It is essentially an epistemological work and its interest lies in the two-fold view regarding the nature of the elimination of nescience (*avidyānivṛtti*) that it presents : that it is the 'fifth' mode (other than the four : real, unreal, real and

23. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, with jñānottama's *Candrikā*, Ed. by M. Hiriyanna, Bombay, Sanskrit and Prakrit Series No.38, 1925.

24. *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, Ed. by M. Hiriyanna, Baroda, Gaekwad Oriental Series, No.65, 1933.

unreal, and unspeakable) which can be eliminated by knowledge ; and that it is tantamount to the knowledge of the Absolute (*vidyā*) or the Pure Self. Vimuktātman's student, Ānandabōdha (author of *Nyāya-makaranda*) accepted the former view while Citsukha favoured the latter view. Elimination of nescience, he argues, is as indescribable as nescience itself. This work also explains transfiguration (*vivarta*) as the coordination of the two kinds of causality : efficient and material. And the nescience has been regarded in this work as both subjective and objective (involving all phenomena), thus controverting Maṇḍana's view that it is only subjective. Vimuktātman was a disciple of Avyayātman.

It would appear that for a long time these three *siddhis* were the only ones that held the field. So says Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (around 1500 A.D.), the author of the fourth 'siddhi' work, *Advaita-siddhi*.²⁵ There is a traditional suggestion that Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi* establishes Brahman as reality (*sat*), Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* establishes Brahman as pure consciousness (*cit*), Vimuktātman's *Iṣṭa-siddhi* argues that Brahman is of the nature of bliss (*ānanda*), and that Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi*, following as the fourth, seeks to formulate Brahman as all three at once (*saccidānanda*).

25. *Advaita-siddhi*, (1) with *Guru-candrikā*, Ed. by D. Srinivasachar, Mysore, UOL, in 3 volumes, 1933, 1937, 1940; (2) with *Gauḍa-Brahmānandī*, *Viṭṭalesīya* and Balabhadra's *Siddhi-vyākhyā*, Ed. by Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstri, Bombay, NSP, 1937.

However, *Advaita-siddhi* is essentially a polemic work, answering the criticisms levelled on Advaita by Vyāsātīrtha's *Nyāyāmṛta*. This voluminous work enjoyed great popularity during the centuries that followed, partly because of the celebrity of the author and partly because the work attempts a grand synthesis of different viewpoints prevalent in Advaita. It follows the line indicated by Citsukha.

Madhusūdana, perhaps a native of Bengal, was a disciple of Visveśvara Sarasvatī. He was a prolific writer, and more than ten works from his pen have been influential in moulding the thought and argument of subsequent writers. His chief celebrity rests on his valiant attempt to reconcile devotion (*bhakti*) with Advaita, especially in his *Bhakti-rasāyana* and his gloss on Śaṇḍilya's *Sūtras*. His commentary on Śaṅkara's *Daśa-śloki*, is regarded, as already mentioned, almost as an independent treatise : *Siddhānta-bindu*. He also prepared a summary and explanation of Sarvajñātman's *Samkshepa-śārīraka*. A well-known commentary on *Advaita-siddhi* has been *Laghu-Candrikā* by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī of the Gauḍa region (the work is celebrated as *Gauḍa-Brahmānandī*). There is an elaborate gloss on this commentary by Viṭṭhaleśa-upādhyāya. There is also another commentary (called merely *Vyākhyā*), by Madhusūdana's own student Balabhadra. There are two other minor commentaries, *Upanyāsa* and *Ṭikā*, on this great work.

Closely following the structure of *Advaita-siddhi*, but not so voluminous or original is Sadānanda-yati's *Advaita-*

brahma-siddhi. Sadānanda, whose *Vedānta-sāra* ²⁶ has been popular as a primer among students of Advaita-Vedānta, was probably a junior contemporary of Madhusūdana. His 'siddhi' is principally a defence of Advaita against attacks by Vedāntins of different persuasions. Like Madhusūdana, Sadānanda also seeks to evolve a compromise between divergent views held in the Advaita field. An important contribution of Sadānanda in this work is the distinction he draws between the idealism of Yogācāra Buddhists (who deny objective reality altogether) and the idealism of Śaṅkara (who recognises objective reality independent of subjective processes).

A more recent 'siddhi' work is *Svārāja-siddhi* ²⁷ by Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī (around 1826 A.D.). This work is brief and metrical ; it is essentially a description of the state of liberation. There is a commentary on this work called *Kaivalya-kalpadruma*.

VIII. RĀMĀDVAYA AND VIDYĀRĀṆYA

Two important thinkers who flourished around 1300 A.D. are Rāmādvaya and Vidyārāṇya. Rāmādvaya, who was an earlier writer, is the author of *Vedānta-kaumudī* (with

26. *Vedānta-sāra*. (1) with Nṛsiṃha's *Subodhinī* and Rāmātīrtha's *Vidvanmanorañjanī*, Bombay, NSP, 1925; (2) with Āpadeva's *Bālabodhinī*, Ed. by K.S. Aiyer, Srirangam, SVVP, 1911; (3) Ed. and translated by M. Hiriyanna, Poona, Oriental Book Agency, 1929.

27. *Svārāja-siddhi*, Paper MSS in Śrī Śivagangā Maṭha Library, transcribed around 1902.

his own commentary *Bhāvadīpikā*), an important work in the field of Advaita.²⁸ Dr. S. N. Dasgupta rightly feels that this work is very much under the influence of the author of *Prakaṭārtha*, who, according to this authority, lived in the latter half of the twelfth century.²⁹ *Prakaṭārtha* or *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa*,³⁰ whose authorship is anonymous, is in the nature of a commentary on Śaṅkara's *VSB*. It is found to criticize Vācaspati frequently. The work traces the source of the phenomenal world to the association (*sambandha*) of indeterminable *māyā* with pure consciousness (*cinmātra*); nescience for him is the material cause, and, as such, positive. It distinguishes between *māyā* (which influences God or *Īśvara*) and *ajñāna* (which influences the individual self or *jīva*). In Rāmādvaya's *Vedānta-kaumudī*, we find a detailed treatment of the perceptual process, following the scheme provided in *Prakaṭārtha*. This treatment accords with the *Vivaraṇa* theory of perception. Rāmādvaya's work reveals an acceptance of Kumārila's views regarding self-validation of knowledge and a rejection of the views found in *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* (Dharmarāja) concerning valid knowledge. His work abounds in epistemological and psychological insights.

28. *Vedānta-Kaumudī* (with *Bhāva-dīpikā*), Ed. by Rādheśyām Caturvedi Banaras, Banaras Hindu University Research Publication, Vol. IX, 1973.

29. S.N. Dasgupta : A History of Indian Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, 1952, Vol. II, p.205 & Pp.196,197.

30. *Prakaṭārtha-vivaraṇa*, Vol. I and II, Ed. by T.R. Chintāmaṇi, Madras, University Sanskrit Series, 1936 and 1939.

There is some confusion about the identity of the author (authors) of two important works on Advaita Vedānta : *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* and *Pañcadaśī*. Tradition has ascribed the former to Bhāratī-tīrtha and the latter to Vidyāraṇya ; it also indicates that Bhāratī-tīrtha was the teacher of Vidyāraṇya. There is also a supposition that the two together composed *Pañcadaśī* (the five *viveka* sections by Bhāratī-tīrtha and the rest by Vidyāraṇya). But there is an increasing suspicion that the two names referred to the same person. Whatever the truth, Śaṅkarānanda was the teacher of the author (or authors) of these two works. *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha*, as we have seen earlier, is an independent gloss on *Pañcapādikā-vivaraṇa* and an important core-text for the *Vivaraṇa* School. It is obviously a work meant for scholars ; the style is learned and presentation of topics rather terse.

Pañcadaśī,³¹ on the other hand has become a popular manual of Advaita-Vedānta over centuries. A book in fifteen chapters (as the title indicates), it is written in a lucid style, and the major topics of Advaita Vedānta are dealt with in a perfectly edifying manner. While *Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṃgraha* is definitely a partisan exercise, *Pañcadaśī* is more broad-based. Although following *Vivaraṇa* in the main, it accommodates the views of other authorities also, especially Sarvajñātman. It may be seen that the individual selves are regarded here as appearances of pure consciousness (*cidābhāsa*), as Sureśvara held. The analysis

31. *Pañcadaśī*, with Rāmakṛṣṇa's commentary, Bombay, NSP, 1949.

of 'witness' consciousness is not only elaborate but eclectic. There have been several commentaries and glosses on this work, widely used among which are those of Rāmakṛṣṇa (*Tātparya-bodhinī*) and Nīscaladāsa (*Vṛtti-prabhākara*). Three other works, *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā*,³² *Anubhūti-prakāśa* and *Jīvanmuktiviveka*³³ are also generally ascribed to the authorship of the author(s) of *Pañcadaśī*.

IX. RECENT ADVAITA LITERATURE

Besides the standard and widely read commentaries and glosses on Śaṅkara's *VSB* mentioned above, there are others which are also of considerable importance and interest : *Bhāva-prakāśikā*, a short work by Citsukha following Bhāmatī and *Vivaraṇa* ; *Brahmasūtra-dīpikā* by Śaṅkarānanda (1330), who was a disciple of Vidyā-tīrtha and a teacher of Vidyāraṇya and who has written *Vṛtti* on all the *Upaniṣads*, *Gītā* and the *Sūtrabhāṣya* ; *Vidyāśrī* by Jñānottama who was a disciple of Jñāna-ghana (around 1000 A.D., this is a commentary only on the first two *pādas*); *Brahmavidyābharaṇa*,³⁴ a careful and insightful work by Cidvilāsa (Advaitānanda Sarasvatī, a pontiff at Kāñcī); *Prakṛtārtha-vivaraṇa*, a deep study by Anubhūtiśvarūpa ; *Adhikaraṇa-ratnamālā* (*Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā*) by Mādhava

32. *Vaiyāsika-nyāyamālā*, (of Bhāratī-tīrtha), Poona, ASG, No.23, 1813.

33. *Jīvanmukti-viveka*, (Vidyāraṇya), Ed. by S. Subrahmanya Sastri, and T.R. Srinivasa Ayyangar, Madras, TPH, Adyar, 1935.

34. *Brahmavidyābharaṇa*, Ed. by S.R. Krishnamurthy Sastri, Madras, Sanskrit Education Society, 1976.

(1333 A.D., the author of *Veda-bhāṣhya*) ; *Subodhinī* by Rāmachandrayati, a work in easy and lucid style covering only the first four 'sūtras' ; *Śārīraka-nyāyarakṣamaṇi* by Appayya-dīkṣita (around 1572, this work covers only the first *adhyāya* of the 'sūtra' following Bhāmatī) ; *Śārīraka-mīmāṃsā-bhāṣhya-vārttika* by Nārāyaṇa Sarasvatī, a disciple of Govindānanda (the author of *Ratnaprabhā*), which is only a gloss despite the title; *Vedāntasūtravyākhyā (Chando-tīkā)* by Sanmitra-bhava of Mithilā (during the days of the emperor Shahjahan); *Nyāyamañjarī* by Appayya Dīkṣita (around 1572, a work of 182 verses in different metres) ; *Śaṁkara-pādabhūṣaṇa-prakāśikā* by Subrahmaṇyāgnicit ; *Kutūhalaṁ* by Kṛṣṇānanda Sarasvatī (an explanation for the first 24 sūtras) ; *Padayojanā (Brahmāmṛtavaraṣiṇī)* by Sadāśivendra, a disciple of Svayamprakāśa ; *Vedānta-bhāṣya-pratipadyāni* by the great grammarian Nāgeśa-bhaṭṭa ; *Sūtrārtha-cintāmaṇi* (a poetical work) by Vāñcheśvara (author of the well-known *Mahiṣa-śataka*) ; and *Advaita-prakāśa* by Durgāprasāda-yati (in nine sections in the form of a dialogue between a teacher and his pupil). There are several *vṛttis* among which may be mentioned *Sūtra-vṛtti* by Śaṁkarānanda, *Mitāksharā* by the great logician Annambhaṭṭa (around 1650, following Bhāmatī), *Tattvaparakāśika (Laghu-sūtravṛtti)* by Sadāśiva-brahmendra (1800), *Advaitasūtrārtha-paddhati* by Kṛṣṇāvadadhūta Paṇḍita (a writer of Mādhva persuasion who has given faithful exposition of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita also), and the works of Vijñānendra (*Vākya-vṛtti*), Rāmakimkara, Brahmānanda (*Muktāvalī*), and

Subrahmaṇya-kavi (*Ratnāvalī*). Among recent writers on the Advaitic presentation of *Brahmasūtra* the noteworthy are : Kuraṅgulam Kṛṣṇa-śāstrī (*Brahmasūtrānugūṇya-vṛtti*), Venkaṭarāghava-śāstrī (*Bhāshyagāmbhīrya-nirṇayamaṇḍana*), Raghunātha-śāstrī (*Vedāntanyāya-mālikā*), and Nūraṇi Anantakṛṣṇa-śāstrī (*Śārīraka-bhāshya-ṭippaṇi*).

X. PRAKĀŚĀNANDA

Prakāśānanda (early 16th century) enjoys a peculiar position in the history of Advaitic thought. His *Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī*³⁵ is a bold attempt to push the argument of super-imposition to an extreme degree. He attacked valiantly the citadel of traditional Advaita theories and alienated the sympathy of most of the Samkarites. In a bid to formulate the strict theory of nescience, he brought Advaita dangerously close to the subjective idealism of *Vijñānavāda* Buddhists. He held the strange view (altogether unsupported by Śaṅkara or by other classical Advaita authors) that things of the world exist only as long as they are perceived. The world does not exist when not cognized; and the object is not independent of our awareness of it (*pratīti*). Consciousness, however, is ever-present, and is the sole reality. He did not accept the usual Advaitic explanation of the phenomenal world as 'transformation' (*vivarta*) : according to him, it was only meant as a 'teaching aid for beginners' (little children, *bālavyutpatti prayojanatvāt*). It is to be remembered that generally Advaita would accept the theory of 'modification' (*pariṇāma*) as

35. *Vedānta-Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Banaras, The Pandit, 1889.

preliminary to 'transformation' (*vivarta*), which alone matters. Prakāśānanda rejects this position. Neither the Absolute Real nor nescience can in any sense be regarded as responsible for the world, which in reality does not at all exist. Nescience is merely subjective, which disappears like mist when the sun of realization dawns.

This view is technically known as '*dr̥ṣṭi-sr̥ṣṭi*' theory, the theory that things arise when perceived and disappear when not perceived. Prakāśānanda relentlessly controverts the earlier thinkers in the field of Advaita, especially Sarvajñātman and Prakāśātman ; and though he cites Sureśvara approvingly he derives his inspiration from Maṇḍana. Dasgupta traces the influence of *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (which reads more like a *Vijñānavāda* than an Advaitic text) in Prakāśānanda's work.³⁶ There is a commentary on this work by Nānā-dīkṣita, known as *Siddhāntapradīpikā*, where it is mentioned that the pupils and followers of Prakāśānanda filled the entire country. But the fact is that Prakāśānanda's work was generally ignored by subsequent generations of thinkers. Among the few writers that have bothered to refer to him, Appayya-dīkṣita was perhaps the only one that is noteworthy. We know very little about Prakāśānanda. It is claimed that he was a pupil of Advaitānanda, who wrote *Brahmavidyābharaṇa* as a commentary on Śamkara's *Sūtra-bhāṣya*. Besides *Siddhānta-muktāvalī*, Prakāśānanda has written several Tāntrik manuals : *Tantrarāja-ṭīkā*, *Manoramā*,

36. S.N. Dasgupta, Op.cit. Vol. I, p.482.

Mahālakṣmī-paddhati and *Tārā-bhakti-taraṅgiṇī*. It is only the last mentioned work that has acquired some measure of celebrity.

XI. COMPROMISES

Although different viewpoints have been foisted on the basic framework of Śaṅkara's Advaita, the essential argument of the unity of the Absolute Real despite the apparent presentation of the phenomenal world has persisted. The chief areas of controversy have been mainly psychological, and attempts have been made to reconcile the differences and evolve compromise positions. Outstanding among them are Sadānanda's *Vedānta-sāra*, Dharmarāja-adhvārī's *Vedānta-paribhāṣa* ³⁷ (an excellent epistemological handbook, dealing with the six means of valid knowledge accepted in Advaita, and clearly formulating some of the main ideas of Advaita-Vedānta), Madhusūdana's *Advaita-siddhi* and Appayya-dīkṣita's *Siddhānta-leśa saṁgraha* ³⁸ (where an account of divergent views has been given).

It is unfortunate that barring the major source-books, much of Advaita literature has not as yet appeared in print.

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37. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā* (1) with Rāmakṛṣṇa's *Śikhāmaṇi* and Amaradāsa's *Maṇiprabhā*, Bombay, Sri Venkatesvara Press, 1911; (2) with *Paribhāṣā-prakāśikā*, Ed. by Anantakṛṣṇa Śāstrī, Calcutta University Publications : (3) Ed. and translated by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, TPH, Adyar, 1942.
38. *Siddhānta-leśa-saṁgraha*, Ed., and translated by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, University Dept. of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 1935 and Vol. II, 1937.

Valuable commentaries, glosses and independent manuals are in hundreds, but most of them are buried in manuscript collections here and there. The remarkable feature of many of these commentaries and manuals is the originality of thinking alongside an incisive analysis. One will discover that within Advaita there are broad but not absolute agreements. In this context, their publication is an urgent need in order to reconstruct the developement of core-concepts in Advaita.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

I. SUBJECTIVISM IN INDIAN THOUGHT

Science and philosophy are concerned with explaining and understanding reality. Explanations involve the determination of causal relationships, while understanding refers to the role of reality in the behaviour of individuals.¹ The former claims an adherence to objectivity, but the latter concedes a subjective organisation of what Sherrington would call 'the exteroceptor field'. The restriction of science to explanation has resulted in a near crisis in the field of science, especially in the sciences dealing with human behaviour ; and a heavy subjective bias for understanding has rendered philosophy rather obsolete in the modern context. It is being increasingly realized that the world is neither strictly objective, nor merely subjective. The current phenomenological expression, 'life-world' (*Lebenswelt*),² describes the proper subject-matter of scientific and philosophical inquiry adequately. It eliminates the errors of both 'psychologism' and 'objectivism', which are both essentially belief-systems.

It is interesting that Indian thought steers clear of these difficulties by rejecting the dualistic outlook on man, the outlook that man has a double nature, that bodily activities

1. The distinction is due to Edouard Claparede, Foreword to F.J.J. Buytendijk's book, *Psychologie des Animaux*, cited in George Thines, *Phenomenology and the Science of Behaviour*, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1977, p.143.
2. The Expression was coined by Edmund Husserl.

and mental processes belong to two different systems. Both are alike involved in what, after Husserl, may be described as "the constitution of consciousness". It is this phenomenological implication that led Indian thought to look with suspicion upon "controlled parametric procedure" or the experimental method. Although its approach was empirical, it remained largely at the descriptive level. But the keenness of analysis and the maturity of epistemological thinking that we find here are remarkable.

That science did not develop in India as conspicuously as philosophy did may also be ascribed to the same reason. The phenomenological commitment of the Indian mind prevented it from the error of 'objectivism', which incidentally was the sole condition for the emergence of positive sciences elsewhere. Strasser rightly makes a distinction between 'objectivity' and 'objectivism'.³ Objectivism is a belief in the independent existence of the objective world and its impingement on the conscious subject, wholly determining the latter's cognitive processes. Objectivity, on the other hand, emphasizes the role of the subjective approach in determining the nature of the presented or perceived world. Indian thought considered objectivity as important in our endeavour to understand and explain reality. And in this context it developed an elaborate epistemological enthusiasm. There was in some quarters of Indian thought a predilection for 'subjectivism',

3. S. Strasser : Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, Pittsburg, 1963, p.67.

an opposite error. The belief, illustrated by *Vijñāna-vāda*, *Yogācāra*, and at least one school of Advaita Vedānta, that the so-called objective world is really determined only by the psychological processes, has further vitiated the development of a scientific temperament in India. While the Indian mind successfully checked 'objectivism', it could not escape the inroad of 'subjectivism'. This will be evident from the methodological considerations we are about to embark upon.

II. EPISTEMOLOGICAL INQUIRY

Neither philosophy nor science bothers much about the fact that man knows the world. It is a matter that is taken for granted; it is an uncritical assumption. Man's very being is inevitably a matter of encounter with reality; he must be related with other objects and persons in the external world for having any sort of life at all. Cognition is inherent in man's being. The world around has unavoidable cognitive dimensions. The complex world that looms large outside him is 'simply there', and is 'revealed' to him in ordinary perception. But whether what we know is correct at all, whether our cognitions are complete, pragmatic and valid, and how and why errors are caused would be problems. The chief function of philosophy and science appears to be to correct the common-sense views concerning reality. It is natural for the common man to mistake the exact nature of the surrounding world, to be ignorant of his own true nature, and to misconstrue the real relations between himself and the world around him. He frequently ignores

that objects do not merely exist but stimulate in characteristic ways.

He does not devote sufficient thought to the matter, even granting that he has the necessary intellectual equipment and ability to do so. Nor is he trained to look upon the objective events or the subjective processes that occur within himself, in a critical manner, and with an eye for veracity. The notions of utility and practical efficiency are what normally guide not only his behaviour but his cognitions as well. Philosophy seeks to think deeply and examine critically so as to reveal reality and confirm its validity ; it seeks also to define the most effective relation of man with the world. Science has the same objectives. It is therefore that both philosophy and science have to devote careful thought to the problem of methodology. For unless the method is correct, what is known and got cannot be regarded as valid.

More than mere encounter with the 'objective world' understanding of the 'lived world' becomes important in philosophy as well as in science. The world should get into better focus, so that it is dealt with better. Relevant here is the distinction that Bertrand Russell made between acquaintance (with objects etc.) and knowledge (of relations etc.). The empirical acquaintance of reality may be functional, and of practical utility, but it cannot by itself guarantee the validity of what is presented to us. It is necessary that the presentation must be represented in our understanding by a conceptual apparatus that is at once

appropriate and efficient. It is a matter of construction, or what is now styled 'epistemic reduction'.

Discussions of methodological considerations in Indian thought (especially in *Nyāya*, *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*) point to a similar conclusion. It is important to remember that Indian philosophy is both a theoretical structure and a practical discipline. It not only seeks to help us understand the reality that we encounter, but attempts to define to our advantage our commitment to it. It is thus that epistemic reduction is sought to be achieved. Further, it recognises that reality is relative to man's understanding. It had necessarily to make use of logic, psychology and epistemology heavily, much more significantly than philosophy has done elsewhere. The purpose of Indian philosophy is an intellectual reconstruction of the reality that is encountered, and it provides a methodology by means of which the immanent principle within the experience (which supports the encounter) could be discovered. 'Perceiving' and 'measuring' (verifying) are distinct acts, and the method is an attempt to check each by the other.

Thus, methodology in Indian philosophy has a set of encounter-correctives (such as sense-perception, inference, reasoning and verbal testimony) as well as a set of subjective-correctives (such as study, reflection and meditation ; *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*.) One can see that the major emphasis here is on subjectively oriented analysis of the experienced encounter, on the pragmatic

assessment of the 'lived world'. The objective methods and the subjective methods constitute a continuum. Further, Indian thought has recognised that scriptural authority (*śruti*) is the point of contact between the two methods. Methodological considerations in *Vedānta* naturally gather round *śruti*. But, as we shall see, *śruti* is regarded more as an intuitional appraisal and a transcendental reflection than as a mere scriptural testimony. Intuition which connects experience with explanation is held out as the highest authority. But this does not obviate the value of other normal methods like observation, inference and reason.

Knowledge concerning the world, derived from the usual empirical methods, may be correct (in the sense of corresponding with facts or facilitating successful activity) or incorrect. Correct knowledge is doubtless desirable, for it will be effective as well as satisfying. Incorrect knowledge, on the other hand, may lead us to failure, or bring distress. However, it is not always that we can be sure of the correctness of our knowledge ; for many are the variables that are involved, such as the sensory data, psychological intentions and acts. Objective inquiry should be instituted regarding what constitutes correctness of knowledge, what methods bring about valid and effective knowledge, and what the possible sources of error are. This inquiry is fundamental to all systems of Indian philosophy.

III. VALID KNOWLEDGE

Correct or valid knowledge is called in Indian thought '*pramā*' which is defined as 'awareness of a thing as it

really is.⁴ Contrarily, incorrect or invalid knowledge is called 'apramā' or 'bhrama' (illusion or misapprehension). Correct knowledge is further described as that which is free from factors that bring about misapprehension. And these factors (*doṣa*) are various ; some are intra-individual such as biliousness (*pitta*), and some extra-individual, like insufficient illumination. Indian thought is concerned with what generates correct knowledge as well as with what causes incorrect knowledge. And, unlike in the usual scientific enterprises, there is not that constant or necessary reference to sensory data. Correctness or otherwise is here more a matter a phenomenal reality. It comprehends both natural phenomena and the factual details of 'the lived world'.

The sources of correct knowledge are collectively known as *pramāṇa* (the cause of *pramā*).⁵ It is a method, an empirical device to ascertain the veracity of a piece of knowledge that has already been acquired. It is largely a deductive method of analysis but involves an element of intuition. How do we know what we know ? And what are the evidences for the correctness of what we know ? It is the question of a certain pressure towards 'truth', which is both cognitive and effective. The Śaṅkhyan thinkers defined truth as the mode of knowledge agreeing entirely

4. प्रमीयते इति । प्र+माङ्गाने+अनश्चोपसर्गे (Pāṇini 3.3.106) इति अङ् । टाप् । यथार्थज्ञानम् । Nyāya : तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानम् । भ्रमज्ञानभिन्नम् ।
5. प्रमीयते विश्वं अनेन इति । प्रमायाः कारणम् । प्र+मा+ल्युट् (भावे) or प्र+मा+ल्युः (कर्तरि) Udyotakara defines it as 'cause of knowledge' (उपलब्धिहेतुः)

with the mode of the object ; cognitive-objective correspondence is the criterion of truth, according to them. There is here a suggestion of objectivism and of a dichotomy between the psychological processes and sensory apprehension. The *Nyāya* philosophy, on the other hand, points out that what is true must be effective ; if we can act on that knowledge and successfully have our objective attained or desire fulfilled, then the knowledge is correct. Utility, in other words, is the criterion of truth. The *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* would go deeper into the problem, and spell out novelty and freedom from contradiction as criteria of truth.⁶

The notion that valid knowledge must be something which is not already known to us would exclude memory or recollection which are merely subjective phenomena. It emphasizes objectivity. Memory is reactivation of certain residual impressions already present in our minds as a result of previous knowledge and is a property of the subject ; and as such it cannot be regarded as 'objective' in the strict sense of the term. The content of recollection may,

6. VP 1. तत्र प्रमाकारणं प्रमाणम् । तत्र स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वं अनधिगता बाधितार्थविषयकज्ञानत्वम् । It is to be noted that Rāmādvaya does not accept the condition of 'anadhigata' as necessary (*Vedānta Kaumudi*, p.213, अज्ञातज्ञापनं प्रमाणमिति तदसारम् ।) According to him, यथार्थानुभवः प्रमा, or it is the experience which does not wrongly represent its object. For Dharmarāja, the non-contradiction is a subjective measure, but for Rāmādvaya it is objective in the sense that it involves the absence of wrong representation. (also of S.N. Dasgupta, op.cit. Vol.2, p.212-3)

however, be true ; but it cannot be treated as a process of valid knowledge. Even the thinkers of the Prabhākara school, who accept memory as valid knowledge, make a distinction between current experience (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smṛti*). The other criterion insists that valid knowledge must be such that it is impossible for it to be contradicted by other concurrent or subsequent acts of knowledge. In other words, constancy in time and space is a necessary feature of valid knowledge. We will have occasion to revert to the discussion of this aspect later on.

Whatever contributes to such knowledge can be regarded as a *pramāṇa*. It is usual to take this expression to signify methods as 'instruments' (*karāṇa*) of valid knowledge. By 'instrument' is meant a cause that is specific or unique regarding its structure and function (*asādhāraṇa-kāraṇa*), and also an operation (*vyāpāra*) of the sense-organs or mind.⁷ The concept of *pramāṇa* as a method that we normally employ in order to obtain new and true information concerning something in the 'lived world' has engaged the Indian mind since very ancient times. It is not so much a prescriptive concept as a normative one. That is why the Indian texts that deal with *pramāṇa* invariably analyse the usual processes, both sensory and psychological, that are involved in the obtainment of knowledge, valid or otherwise. Understandably, they do not indicate any unusual procedures for occasioning usual

7. Rāmakṛṣṇa's *Śikhāmaṇī* on the above : असाधारणकारणत्वे सति व्यापारवत्त्वे कारणत्वम् ।

experiences ; they only point out the merits and limitations of each process. They seek to analyse the value of each method, its scope and function. The purpose of a method is only to reveal the facts, and it cannot be said that facts cease to exist in the absence of a method.⁸ The *pramāṇa* does not generate a fact, it is only a means of it being experienced. The factual existence of a thing is not regarded as a mere function of the method employed, although it is accepted that objectivity undergoes an epistemic reduction. With due regard to the areas of the 'lived world' the *pramāṇas* have their own limited fields of operation ; their validity is limited to what they can possibly reveal.⁹ This justifies the multiplicity of methods that we employ to check on our experiences.

Methodological considerations weigh importantly with *Vedānta*. Among the Indian systems of thought it was *Mīmāṃsā* that highlighted the importance of valid knowledge and carefully enunciated the processes by which it was obtained. This was rather strange because *Mīmāṃsā* was almost exclusively concerned with the performance of rituals and sacrifices as prescribed in the *Veda*, and therefore, only one method, viz, scriptural testimony, would have sufficed its purpose. As a matter of fact, it heavily relies on this method alone. But the brilliant thinkers, Śābara-svāmin, Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Prabhākara-

8. Cf. Sureśvara BUV 3,8,113.

सर्वं हि मानं लोकेऽस्मिन् वस्त्वभिव्यक्तिसाधनम् ।

तदभावेऽनभिव्यक्तं वस्तु नास्तीति दुर्वचः ।

9. Sureśvara, SV.245, स्वमेयमात्रश्रुत्वात् मितेर्नान्यत्र मानता ।

miśra ¹⁰ provided an epistemological framework which was remarkable for its logical rigour and psychological insight. The background for this enterprise can be seen in the *Sāṃkhya* system ; but its acceptance of scriptural testimony was so inadequate and perfunctory that the *Mīmāṃsā*

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10. Jaimini who can be regarded as the first author who formulated the *Mīmāṃsā* viewpoint defended the Vedic authority against the Buddhists. His *Sūtras* were commented upon by Śabarasvāmin (above the first century B.C.), who expounded the *Mīmāṃsā* position very ably and elaborately. The argument was later fortified by Kumārila-bhaṭṭa whose *Śloka-vārttika*, *Tantra-vārttika* and *Ṭup-ṭikā* are monuments of his prodigious intellect and incisive analysis. It is here that we find a systematic examination of the sources of valid knowledge. Among his students, Maṇḍana-miśra (author of *Vidhi-viveka* and *Bhāva-viveka* in the field of *Mīmāṃsā*) and Uṃbeka (*Śloka-vārttika-tātparya-ṭikā*) upheld the viewpoint ably. Pārthasārathi-miśra (around 1300 A.D.) whose fame rests on his *Śāstra-dīpikā*, defended Kumārila's arguments (also in his *Nyāya-vārttika* on Kumārila's *Śloka-vārttika*) and in his *Tarka-ratna* on Kumārila's *Ṭup-ṭikā*. Mādhava (*Nyāyamālā-vistara*), Khaṇḍa-deva (*Bhāṭṭa-dīpikā*) and Āpa-deva (*mīmāṃsā-nyāya-prakāśa*) are great names in this line. Prabhākara miśra who was supposed to be a student of Kumārila, was responsible for a different direction in the *Mīmāṃsā* way of thinking (known as 'guru-mata' in contradistinction to Kumārila's position, known as 'Bhāṭṭa-mata'). His *Bṛhat* and *Laghvī* were attempts to reinterpret Śabara-svāmin. His student Śālika-nātha (10th century) wrote *Rju-vimalā* on *Bṛhatī* and *Dīpa-śikhā* on *Laghvī* and popularised Prabhākara's views. However, his independent work, *Prakarāṇa-pāñcikā*, is a more celebrated work. Murāri-miśra struck out a third line.

thinkers were provoked to institute a thorough examination of all the available methods. The word '*mīmāṃsā*' signifies "careful examination by the employment of reason", "an intensive exercise of the mind".¹¹

It is well-known that the Indian materialists (Cārvākas or Lokāyatās) accepted only one source of valid knowledge, viz, sense-perception (*pratyakṣa*) or direct observation.¹² They relied exclusively on the ultimacy of sensory data, and their knowledge was confined to the world of physical phenomena. They were strictly empirical in their approach ; they dismissed subjective experiences beyond sensations as irrelevant for scientific inquiry. The *Vaiśeṣikas*, who were the early physicists of India,¹³ considered deductive analysis

11. "Vedic Exegesis" by Srimat Anirvan, The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol.I, p.316 (The Ramakrishna Mission, Institute of Culture, Calcutta, 1970).

12. Cf. Rāmakṛṣṇa's *Śikhāmaṇi* on VP Ch. I. प्रत्यक्षमेकं प्रमाणमिति चार्वाकाः, प्रत्यक्षानुमाने इति काणादसौगतमतानुसारिणः, शब्देन सह त्रीणि प्रमाणानीति साङ्ख्याः, प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानशब्दाः प्रमाणानीति नैयायिकाः, अर्थापत्त्या सह प्रमाणानि पञ्चेति प्राभाकराः, एवं प्रमाणविभागमन्यथा व्याचक्षते।
cf. also a traditional account :
प्रत्यक्षमेकं चार्वाकाः काणादसौगतौ पुनः ।
अनुमानं च तच्चापि साङ्ख्यं शब्दं च ते उभे ॥
न्यायैकदेशिनोऽप्येवं उपमानं च केवलम् ।
अर्थापत्त्या सहितानि चत्वार्याहुः प्राभाकराः ॥
अभावषष्ठान्येतानि भाट्टा वेदान्तिनस्तथा ।
सम्भवैतिह्ययुक्तानि त्विति पौराणिका जगुः ॥

13. S.N. Dasgupta suggests that *Vaiśeṣikas* represented an early school of Mīmāṃsā thought. cf. A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol.I, p.280-285.

or reasoning (*anumāna*, inference) as an additional method of acquiring valid knowledge. They not only set out to explain the nature and characteristics of physical substances (for which they employed the first method), but posited a soul (which could only be inferred). The Buddhists too, although for a different reason, admitted inference as a valid method. The *Sāṃkhyan* thinkers, however, conceded that verbal testimony (*śabda*, in an extended sense, scriptural authority) can also occasion valid knowledge, in addition to sense-perception and inference. These thinkers were essentially psychological in their approach and orientation. Being also atheistic in general outlook, they confined verbal testimony to the words of an unerring authority (*āpta-vacana*) in matters pertaining to daily life.

The *Nyāya* system was essentially logistic in its orientation.¹⁴ And its interest in epistemology was naturally deep and extensive. It made careful investigation into the sources and content of valid knowledge. Of the sixteen

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14. The *Nyāya-sūtra* of Gotama-Akṣapāda (about 300 B.C.) was commented upon by Vātsyāyana (fifth century), who in turn was annotated by Udyotakara (about 600 A.D.) in his *Nyāya-vārttika*, on which Vācaspati-miśra (about 800 A.D.) prepared his *Tātparyatīkā*. Later, Udayana (about 899 A.D.) wrote a gloss called *Parīśuddhi* on Vācaspati's work and an other independent work called *Kusumāñjali*. Amongst great writers belonging to his system Jayantabhaṭṭa (about 850 A.D. *Nyāyamañjarī*), Viśvanātha (*Bhāṣyā*) were well-known. The neo-Nyāya (*Navya-nyāya*) system developed by Gaṅgeśa-upādhyāya (around 1200 A.D.) dealt almost exclusively with the four methods of Nyāya, especially inference.

subjects this system sets out to examine, *pramāṇa* (method) and *prameya* (objectivity) are the first and second. The *Nyāya* writers examine several possible methods or sources of knowledge, and arrive at a four-fold classification : sense-perception, inference, verbal testimony and analogy. All other methods could be accommodated in one or the other of these four. It is interesting that they regarded analogy (*upamāna*) as an independent method, while the *Vaiseshikas* included it under verbal testimony, which was in turn classified under inference. *Vātsyāyana* highlighted the association of verbal behaviour with objective presentations.¹⁵ The *Nyāya* argument was that the four methods differ from each other with regard to the major collocations (*sāmagrī*) that are involved in the production of valid knowledge.¹⁶ These collocations includes physical, physiological and psychological processes. And the type of experience that they generate also contributes to the distinctions between the four methods. This in a sense anticipates the Husserlian conception of 'regional ontologies'.

Of the two major lines of *Mīmāṃsā* thinking, the line inaugurated by *Prabhākara* accepts 'presumption' (*arthāpatti*) in addition to the four detailed by the *Nyāya* system. This method helps in knowing a thing which is not directly available for sense-perception, inference, verbal

15. समारख्या सम्बन्धप्रतिपत्तिरूपमानः ।

16. *Nyāya-mañjari* अव्यभिचारिणीमसन्दिग्धार्थोपलब्धिं विदधती बोधाबोधस्वभावा सामग्री प्रमाणम् । Also, cf. सामग्रीभेदात् फलभेदाच्च प्रमाणभेदः ।

testimony, or comparison, but which is implied in the knowledge derived from any of these four. It had only to be spelt out. The other line, headed by Kumārila, adds 'non-apprehension' (*anupalabdhi* or *abhāva*) to the list of five. This method of getting to know the non-existence of a thing is regarded as an independent source of knowledge, and as a positive process. *Vedānta* accepts this latter *Mīmāṃsā* position of six methods which are productive of valid knowledge.¹⁷

IV. THE ROLE OF INTUITION

Of the six systems mentioned above, barring *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta*, the others rely heavily on argumentation; they are described as 'reason-dominant' (*yukti-pradhāna*). It is not that *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* do not employ reason or arguments, but their ultimate reliance is on scriptural testimony (*śruti-pradhāna*) derived from transcendental analysis and intuition. Their employment of reasoning is subordinate to scriptural authority ; the purpose of reason here is to interpret scriptural texts. Although, among the other four systems, *Sāṃkhya* and *Nyāya* accept verbal testimony as a source of valid knowledge, they do not accord it the same value as *Mīmāṃsā* and *Vedānta* do ; scriptural authority for them is not very different in quality or value from the words of a trustworthy person in daily life. It may be noted that the *Vaiśeṣika* system regarded

17. व्यवहारे भाट्टिनयः VP deals with these six methods in considerable detail. cf. Swāmi Satprakāśānanda, *Methods of knowledge*, Advaita Āśrama, Calcutta, 1974.

the Vedas as composed by human beings, albeit superior to us,¹⁸ and it is likely that the *Nyāya* system held a similar view. Vātsyāyana, the *Nyāya* commentator, defined verbal testimony (*śabda*) as originating in a trustworthy person (*āpta*), and mentions that it does not matter if he is a sage, an āryan, or an outsider (*mleccha*). That is to say, reliance on testimony applies to the daily transactions as well as to things beyond our normal apprehension (which strictly constitute the scope of scriptures). It is true that the *Nyāya* thinkers accorded verbal testimony an independent status (unlike their *Vaiśeṣika*-counterparts, who included it under inference) ; but this was only because the way valid knowledge was produced in this case was different.

A reaction to this outlook on scriptural testimony can be found in the *Mīmāṃsā* of the Prabhākara persuasion, which would confine this method to the authority to the Vedas, especially those portions that are prescriptive (regarding performance of sacrifices). However, the *Mīmāṃsā* ascription of authority to the Vedic texts was rather paradoxical. The *Nyāya* acceptance of Vedic authority involved the belief that the Vedas were derived from the infallible *Īśvara* (God) ; but the early *Mīmāṃsā* thinkers did not believe in the necessity of postulating God as a creator or as omniscient. They were impressed only with the high antiquity of the Vedic record.¹⁹ The Veda is

18. *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras*, 2,1,18; 6,1,1 and 2.

19. कथं पुनरपौरुषेयं वेदानाम्? पुरुषस्य कर्तुरस्मरणात् । (*Śloka-vārttika*)
Śabara-svāmin held that the authors of the Veda are beyond recollection even as the creator of the Himalayan

for them in the nature of a revelation to sages of superior equipment. It may be remembered that the *Mīmāṃsā* outlook was essentially empirical and pragmatic.

Kumārila would extend the concept of verbal authority to include the testimony of all trustworthy persons, contrary to Prabhākara's views. It was necessary, therefore, to classify this source of valid knowledge into two groups : (1) personal (*pauruṣeya*) or transactional (*laukika*), and (2) impersonal (*apauruṣeya*) or scriptural (*vaidika*). The scriptural authority contained in the Veda was looked upon as composed of prescriptive texts (*vidhāyaka-vākyas*) or injunctions with regard to the performance of sacrifices and rites, and passages which were merely informative (*siddhārthaka-vākyas*) or telling us about what is already there. The *Mīmāṃsā* pragmatism was inclined to accept the former and practically reject the latter group of passages. Since the main objective of the *Mīmāṃsā* system was to interpret and elucidate the Vedic passages that dealt with rituals, the 'Brahmana' portion of the Veda was naturally regarded as having paramount authority.

ranges. Kumārila argued that omniscience and creatorhood of god are needless conjecture (*vitathas*). Śālikanātha and Nandikeśvara believed that God's existence had only to be inferred (*anumāngamya*). Nārāyaṇa bhaṭṭa, Āpadeva and Laugākṣi-bhāskara, however, accepted the compassionate God who granted the highest reward to actions done with a feeling of dedication. But it was a moot point with the *Mīmāṃsakas* whether God was the author of the Veda. In any case, their reliance on Vedic authority was not on this count.

The *Vedānta*, on the other hand, tilted in favour of the authority of 'informative' passages of the Veda, viz, the *Upaniṣads*, almost to the exclusion of the other group of passages.²⁰ The reason for this preference was that the kind of knowledge that was sought was available only in these texts. The argument about the authorship of the Veda became essentially irrelevant in this context, although discussions about it went on in the Vedāntic manuals.

In any case, for the *Mīmāṃsā* as well as the *Vedānta* systems, scriptural authority surpassed the authority of the other five sources of valid knowledge. In the words of Manu, who echoes the *Mīmāṃsā* attitude : "For those who are concerned with knowing about the canons of conduct (*dharma*), scripture is the highest authority."²¹ It is, in other words, a self-sufficient authority ; the other five methods of obtaining correct knowledge can only lead to this authority. Reason here plays a role that is subordinate to revelation ; reason must be employed only to interpret revelation. There is no question of getting revelation confirmed by reason or by observation.

Each of the five methods has its own sphere of functioning ; each supplements the other, and, altogether, they contribute to what may be described as empirical knowledge. In practice, however, there are only three principal methods : sense-perception (observation), inference (deductive reasoning), and scriptural authority

20. Cf. *Pañcapādikā*, P.95-96.

21. Manu, 2, 13, धर्मं जिज्ञास्यमानानां प्रमाणं परमं श्रुतिः ।

(intuition). Presumption and non-apprehension are included under inference.²² And inference by definition depends on sense-perception. Thus, the only two independent sources of valid knowledge are observation and intuition. And obviously their spheres of operation are distinct, we can almost say, mutually exclusive. The former prevails in the realm of empirical transactions while the latter guides transcendental attitudes and processes. Sense-perception (and the other four methods) is the chief method that we normally employ in matters pertaining to acquisition of wealth, obtainment of pleasures, and social conduct. Kumārila is definite that the jurisdiction of scripture does not extend so far, for its only concerns are religious practices and emancipation.²³

These methods have been neatly grouped in term of their 'regional ontologies' into two categories : those that inform us about the transactional details of the outer world, and those that let us know about the transcendental reality.²⁴ The former tells us about Becoming in the world,

22. Cf. Kullūka-bhaṭṭa on Manu, 12, 105.

23. Kumārila's *Tantra-vārttika* on Jaimini 1,3,1 :

यावद्धर्ममोक्षसम्बन्धि तद्वेदप्रभवम् । तत्त्वार्थसुखविषयं तल्लोकव्यवहारमिति विवेक्तव्यम् ।

24. *Vedānta-paribhāṣā*, 8,1, एवं निरूपितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं द्विविधम् । व्यावहारिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं, पारमार्थिकतत्त्वावेदकं चेति । तत्र ब्रह्मस्वरूपावगाहिप्रमाणव्यतिरिक्तानां सर्वप्रमाणानामाद्यं प्रामाण्यं, तद्विषयाणां व्यवहारदशायां बाधाभावात् । द्वितीयं तु जीवब्रह्मैक्यपराणां "सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीत्" इत्यादीनां "तत्त्वमसि" इत्यन्तानां तद्विषयस्य जीवपरैक्यस्य कालत्रयाबाध्यत्वात् ॥

while the latter provides the knowledge of Being. Sense-perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumāna*), comparison (*upamāna*), 'presumption' (*arthāpatti*) and non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*), and verbal testimony of a reliable person (*āpta-vākya*) are included under the first category ; whereas scriptural testimony (*śabda*) alone constitutes the second. The dichotomy of the methodological categories does not involve any difference in degrees of validity. The transactional methods are as valid as the transcendental method; but their spheres of operation differ. Effective functioning is relative to the proper sphere.

All the six methods are equally valid, and there can be no question of degrees of validity. However, there is recognition of dependence and independence among the methods. Inference, for instance, is dependent upon sense-perception ; and presumption, on inference. Sense-perception is not dependent on any other method ; as also scriptural testimony. And the two methods are recognised in Vedānta as primary sources of valid knowledge, the former as far as the transactional world is concerned, and the latter with regard to the transcendental reality. The purpose of a method is to define its object clearly and specifically, to illumine the object, and it does not direct in any way any action pertaining to it ; that is to say, consideration of utility here is irrelevant. Utility depends upon the object and not on the method.²⁵ Sense-perception

25. Cf. *Sambandha-vārttika*, 717.

प्रमाणयत्तं एतावत्स्वप्नमेयाभासनम् ।

कार्याकार्यता वाऽत्र मेयामेयता न मानतः ॥

is the guide for understanding the world while Scripture helps us to appreciate the significance of reality.

It is important to recognize that Advaita subscribes to realism at the transactional level. Śaṃkara is an unrelenting critic of the *Yogācāra* rejection of objective reality.²⁶ He admits consciousness as the fundamental reality, but concedes that the phenomenal world of objects and events also has a reality independent of the conscious processes. It is not a mere insubstantial projection of the mind, nor a fleeting reconstruction of subjective experiences. Śaṃkara's opposition to 'psychologism' has often been misunderstood. It is generally imagined that he dismissed the world as a phantasm, as a mere dream, as an illusion. Nothing can be farther than the truth. If that indeed was his stand, he had little reason to combat fiercely the Buddhist position. As will be shown later, Śaṃkara not only accepted the phenomenal reality of the world, but even admitted the role of Godhead (*Īśvara*) in its emergence, subsistence and dissolution. It is sufficient here for us to note that Śaṃkara regards the normal sources of correct knowledge with

26. VSB, 2,2,28 cf. for an account of the fundamental differences between Śaṃkara's idealism and Yogācāra idealism, *Advaita-brahma-siddhi* of Sadānanda-yati. Nṛsiṃhāśrama's *Bheda-dhikkāra* takes an extreme view and denies reality even in the phenomenal context. This, according to Prof. Hiriyanna, is contrary to Śaṃkara's position (cf. VSB 1,1,4) and more in accord with Maṇḍana's. Nṛsiṃhāśrama's eagerness was to show that the scriptural testimony and common experience are not in conflict with each other.

regard to the world we live in as valid.²⁷ His scientific temperament is revealed when he roundly tells us : “Even a hundred scriptural passages will not become authoritative when they, for instance, announce that fire is cool or dark!”²⁸

But, among the tests of truth, Vedānta rejected practical efficiency (*samartha-pravṛttijanakatva*, Nyāya and Prabhākara), correspondence with objective form (*sārūpya*, Kumārila) and coherence (*saṁvādi*) as absolute or universal. These three have limited fields of operation, and the validity of the tests is relative and conditional. The most reliable test, however, is ‘absence of contradiction’ (*bādhārāhityam*).²⁹ This does not refer merely to earlier knowledge being contradicted by later knowledge, but to the experiences at one plane of reality being contradicted by those at another plane. If non-contradiction in all three phases of time (past, present and future) is one aspect of this test, the impossibility of sublation at another level of

27. VSB, 2,1,14 यावद्वि सात्यात्म्यैकत्वप्रतिपत्तिः तावत्प्रमाणप्रमेयफललक्षणेषु विकारेषु अनृतत्वबुद्धिर्न कस्यचिदुत्पद्यते । also Ibid, 2,2,28 उपलभ्यते हि प्रतिप्रत्ययं बाह्योऽर्थः । ननु नाहमेव ब्रवीमि न किञ्चिदर्थमुपलभे इति । किन्तु उपलब्धिव्यतिरिक्तं नोपलभते इति ब्रवीमि । Also, प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वको सम्भवासम्भवौ ।

28. BGB, 18,66 न हि श्रुतिशतमपि शीतोऽग्निरप्रकाशो वा इति ब्रुवत्प्रामाण्यमुपैति । Also, VSB, 43, 14. न ह्यसत्यपि सम्भवे मुख्यस्यैवार्थस्य ग्रहणमिति कश्चिदाज्ञापयिता विद्यते ।

29. *Pañcadaśī*, 3, 29. “सत्यं बाधशून्यत्वम् ।” The commentator, Rāmākṛṣṇa quotes : “सत्यमबाध्यं, बाध्यं मिथ्येति तद्विवेकः” इति पूर्वाचार्यैरुक्तत्वात् ।

reality was the other, and more important, aspect. The phenomenal world can be shown by experience as well as argument as subject to such sublation. The methods that provide us with valid knowledge about such a world cannot, therefore, be regarded as passing this test. The *Vedānta* is positive that when the phenomenal involvement ceases and when the empirically presented world is sublated by the transcendental experience, the methods including scriptural testimony lose their value as well as validity.³⁰ The operation and applicability of the methods are confined to the realm of 'nescience' which is responsible for the phenomenal world.

Viewed from this position, the grouping of the methods into deductive-analytical (sense-perception, inference, analogy, presumption and non-apprehension) and intuitive (scriptural testimony) becomes meaningful. While the former are thoroughly irrelevant with regard to the condition subsequent to realization, and are only distantly helpful in bringing about this condition, the latter not only continues to have some relevance even in this condition but contributes considerably to its emergence. Scriptural testimony would survive the other methods, and in this

30. Cf. BGB, 2,69, न ह्यात्मस्वरूपाधिगमे सति पुनः प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारः सम्भवति । प्रमातृत्वं हि आत्मनः निवर्तयति अन्त्यं प्रमाणं निवर्तयदेव च अप्रमाणीभवति, स्वप्नकालप्रमाणमिव प्रबोधे ॥ Also योऽयं लौकिको वैदिकश्च व्यवहारः स उत्पन्नविवेकज्ञानस्य स्थितप्रज्ञस्य अविद्याकार्यत्वात् अविद्यानिवृत्तौ निवर्तते । (Ibid) cf. also op.cit. 13,2 तथा नः क्षेत्रज्ञानां ईश्वरैकत्वे सति शास्त्रानर्थक्यं भवतु, अविद्याविषये च अर्थवत्त्वम् । यथा द्वैतिनां सर्वेषां बन्धावस्थायामेव शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वं, न मुक्तावस्थायाम् । एवम् ।

sense it is called 'final or ultimate authority' (*antyam pramāṇam*), for its merit consists in being founded not on common cognitive processes but upon the intuitive genius of the sages. While the *Mīmāṃsā* insists on our sole reliance on Scripture in matters pertaining to religious life, the *Vedānta* refuses to be so dogmatic. Śāṁkara concedes : "In inquiries concerning religious conduct, it may be that Scripture is the sole authority. But it cannot be so in our investigation into reality. Here, Scripture as well as other sources of knowledge such as phenomenal experience become valid, according to necessity. For, after all, the purpose of such investigation is to end in transcendental experience and to inform us about reality."³¹ The *Vedānta* would recommend a conjoint approach : scripture (*śruti*) and reason (*yukti* or *tarka*).

Śāṁkara's appreciation of the value of Scripture has already been mentioned. "Scriptural authority in its own sphere is not dependent upon any other method, even as the sun's in the matter of illumining forms of objects."³² It is the highest court of appeal for him. Other methods may lead up to the highest wisdom, but the ultimate method

31. VSB, 1,1,2. न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किन्तु श्रुत्यादयः अनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिव प्रमाणम् । अनुभावसानत्वाद्भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य ।

32. VSB, 2,1,1, वेदस्य हि निरपेक्षं स्वार्थं प्रामाण्यं रवेरिवरूपविषये ।
cf. also 4,1,3. प्रत्यक्षाद्यभावे श्रुतेरप्यभावप्रसङ्गः इति चेन्न ।
also SW. Vol.1, p.303-304 न हीदं अतिगम्भीरं भावयाथात्म्यं मुक्तिनिबन्धनं आगमान्तरेण उत्प्रेक्षितुमपि शक्यम् । (p.339) अतीन्द्रियार्थेषु विषयेषु श्रुतिः नः प्रमाणम् ।

is only this.³³ The methods can be grouped into two kinds. The first includes those that are valid with regard to the details of the phenomenal reality or the transactional world; and coming under this head are all the methods barring scriptural testimony. The second, viz, the scriptural testimony, is designed to make known the absolute.³⁴ It is derived from intuition and transcendental reflection that transforms facts into essences, and brings order into what is desultory and diverse. It lifts our empirical understanding above the objective world bound by space and time. The distinction is owing to the different nature of the 'regional ontologies'. The Absolute is not knowable by any means other than the Scripture.

But Śaṅkara does not credit Scripture with absolute validity, for the simple reason that the Scripture is not regarded by him as 'eternal' or as 'immutable'. The Nyāya system held that the Veda was the word of God who was omniscient ; hence, according to it, the validity of the Veda. The Mīmāṃsā system which does not ascribe the production of the Veda to God, nevertheless, held that the Veda was 'eternal' and free from all defects inherent in human intellect. For the Vedānta, however, the Veda is not 'eternal', for it obviously originated.³⁵ There can indeed be

33. VSB, 2,1,4, अपि च अन्त्यमिदं प्रमाणं आत्मैकत्वस्य प्रतिपादकं नातःपरं किञ्चिदाकाङ्क्ष्यमस्ति सर्वात्मैकत्वविषयत्वादवगतेः ।

34. VP, 8,1, एवं निरूपितानां प्रमाणानां प्रामाण्यं द्विविधम् । व्यावहारिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं पारमार्थिकतत्त्वावेदकत्वं च इति ।

35. Ibid, 4, 47-49. तत्र वेदान्तानां नित्यसर्वज्ञपरमेश्वरप्रणीतत्वेन प्रामाण्यमिति नैयायिकाः । वेदानां नित्यत्वेन निरस्तसमस्तपुद्गलतया प्रामाण्यमिति मीमांसकाः । अस्माकं तु मते वेदो न नित्यः, उत्पत्तिमत्त्वात् । नापि वेदानां त्रिक्षण व्यवस्थायित्वम्।

nothing eternal other than the Brahman. The impersonal composition of the Veda too is accepted in a limited framework : the Veda is not a product of any normal human mind according to its own independent will and fancy. It is not a subjective fabrication. Citsukha would even contend that the Vedic passages are of human origin because they are after all verbal formulations,³⁶ and verbal formulations are obviously human in origination. But that does not mean that the Veda can be classed with other literary productions. The source of Vedic wisdom is intuition, and it is intuition that can guide us in matters concerning transcendental phenomena. It is also true, as Vācaspati suggests,³⁷ intuition does not depend on sense-perception and other methods even in matters of empirical import.

Śaṅkara, however, attached especial importance to Scripture, and he is careful to uphold its authenticity and authority.³⁸ He is aware that reason has limited value, when employed by itself. Reason itself can show that reason is unreliable and unfounded; it can be mere speculation, unless intuition restrains it.³⁹ Human intellect has natural

36. Citsukha, TP, p.269, वेदवाक्यानि पौरुषेयाणि वाक्यत्वात् ।

37. *Bhāmātī*, p.9.

38. Cf. his remarks, VSB, 2,1,42, ततश्च वेदस्य प्रामाण्यमीयात्, and VSB, 3,3,31, यद्यन्यत्राश्रूयमाणापि गतिर्विद्यान्तरं गच्छेत् श्रुत्यादीनां प्रामाण्यं हीयेत सर्वार्थत्वप्रसङ्गात् ।

39. VSB, 2,1,11. एतदपि हि तर्काणां अप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्कैरेव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते । Also, निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनाः तर्का अप्रतिष्ठा भवन्ति । उत्प्रेक्षाया निरङ्कुशत्वात् ।

limitations and can easily go astray. But it is impossible to proceed in life without utilizing reason.⁴⁰ Further, however august and paramount the authority of Scripture, it can provide us only with partial intuitions, for an ordinary mind can never fathom the full implications of the Scripture even in a hundred years.⁴¹ And when the meaning of the Scripture is not clear, or when there are apparent contradictions among scriptural passages, one must necessarily rely on reason to understand and appreciate the real and complete import.⁴² In this sense, reason can aid intuition. But Śaṅkara warns that reason can be futile if it is barren (*śuṣka-tarka*), viz, when it is devoid of intuition. He speaks of the value of reason blessed by intuition that becomes an aspect of experience⁴³; otherwise, reason can end up in vain surmises.

The role of reason as an aid to intuition has been elucidated by Padmapāda and his followers. Scripture (transcendental intuition) can at first provide only indirect knowledge; reason will transform this into direct experience. Indirect knowledge (intellectual appreciation) is

40. Ibid., सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः ।

41. PUB, 4,5, न ह्यभिमानेन वर्षशतेनापि श्रुत्यर्थो ज्ञातुं शक्यते सर्वैः पण्डितं मन्यैः । Also VSB, 2,1,1, परतन्त्रप्रज्ञास्तु प्रायेण जनाः स्वातन्त्र्येण श्रुत्यर्थमवधारयितुं अशक्नुवन्तः.... ।

42. VSB, 4,1,5, सन्दिग्धे तु तस्मिन् तन्निर्णयं प्रति लौकिकोऽपि न्याय आश्रयणीयः, न विरुध्यते ।

43. VSB, 2,16, श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यत्र तर्को अनुभवाङ्गत्वेनाश्रीयते । Also VSB, 1,1,2, श्रुत्या एव च साहाय्यत्वेन तर्कस्य अभ्युपेतत्वात् । also अनुमानमपि वेदान्तवाक्याविरोधि प्रमाणं भवत् ।

prevented from maturing into experience by the 'sense of the impossible' (*asambhāvana*) and the wrong notions of ego-involvements (*viparīta-bhāvanā*). Reason can remove these obstructions.⁴⁴ It is indeed possible for Scripture to furnish us with complete and effective knowledge, but due to certain defects inherent in human nature this possibility is vitiated. Reason is employed to overcome this limitation, and when the limitation is overcome, Scripture's capacity to generate complete knowledge is reassured. Prakāśātman points out that reason not only removes the obstacles in this way, but helps stabilise the knowledge that intuition brings about.⁴⁵ He argues that it is not the function of reason to produce transcendental understanding. That is the unique function of Scripture. But the value of reason is that it can convince one of the possibility of such understanding.⁴⁶

44. PP, p.39. अथ कोऽयं तर्को नाम । युक्तिः । ननु पर्याय एषः । स्वरूप-मभिधीयताम् । इदमुच्यते । प्रमाणशक्तिविषयतत्सम्भवपरिच्छेदात्मा प्रत्ययः । ..क.. तर्कस्योपयोगः । विषयासम्भवाशङ्कयाम् । तथानुभवफलानुत्पत्तौ तत्सम्भव-प्रदर्शनमुखेन फलप्रतिबन्धविगमे । Also, p.76 तस्माद् ब्रह्मज्ञा-सोपन्यासमुखेन वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरण निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते ।.. तैर्वेदान्तैरविरोधी तर्को युक्तिरूपकरणमिति कर्तव्यासहकारिकारणमिति यावत् । अथवा तर्कोऽनुमानं वेदान्तैरविरुद्धं तदर्थप्रतीतेरेव दृढत्वहेतु-तयोपकरणमस्या इत्यर्थः ॥ 4th Vāṇaka, 1st Sūtra.

45. PPV, p.171 तथातथाविधत्वसामान्यतोदर्शनेनार्थ विरोधबुद्ध्या च पुरुषदोषेणान्यथाज्ञानान्युत्पद्यते शब्दाच्च तत्त्वज्ञानमेवोत्पद्यते । ततश्च शब्दात् पुरुषदोषाच्च बहुषु परस्परविरोधिषु ज्ञानेषु जातेषु शब्दशक्तितात्पर्यावधारणं पुरुषदोषापनयनेन प्रतिपक्षज्ञानान्तरमात्रं निवर्तयति । निवृत्ते च प्रतिबन्धे शब्दादेव तत्त्वज्ञानं जायते । जातं वा निश्चलमवतिष्ठते ॥

46. Ibid, p.221, ज्ञानानन्दसर्वज्ञप्रत्यगात्मभूतं ब्रह्म निश्चाययितुमसमर्था अपि युक्तयः शब्दावगते ब्रह्मणि सामान्यद्वारेण सम्भावनावुद्भिहेतवो भवन्ति ।

Thus Vedānta strikes a neat balance between the group of methods of deductive reasoning and intuition. Each is employed as a corrective to the other. The shortcomings of the former have very well been appreciated, but its relevance to systematization of knowledge has also been recognized. The correct appraisal of the empirical situation is necessary for taking an intuitive leap into the transcendental existence. And Śaṅkara makes it clear that Scripture based on intuition does not set out to alter the things as they are ; its business is only to reveal what lies hidden. Should scriptural passages start saying things that are contrary to our perceptual experience, they lose their credibility. No method can be valid when it is contradicted by other methods. Each method is unique and valid inasmuch as it makes known what are not made known by other methods.⁴⁷ Each method has its own well-defined 'region' of operation, and valid methods do not come into conflict with each other. Intuition comes under suspicion when it is contradicted by reason ; and, likewise one has to take care that reason is upheld by intuition. Further, Śaṅkara points out that transcendental intuition can be adequately communicated only by taking recourse to

47. BUB, 2,1,20 न शास्त्रं पदार्थानन्यथाकर्तुं प्रवृत्तम् । किं तर्हि ? यथा भूतानां अज्ञातानां ज्ञापने । न हि अग्निः शीतः आदित्यो न तपति इति वा दृष्टान्तशतेनापि प्रतिपादयितुं शक्यं प्रमाणान्तरेण अन्यथाधिगतत्वाद्ब्रह्मणः । न च प्रमाणं प्रमाणान्तरेण विरुध्यते । प्रमाणान्तराविषयमेव प्रमाणान्तरं ज्ञापयति॥

empirical methods of understanding.⁴⁸ Reason and intuition have thus to be employed as complementary to each other.

In a very real sense, however, all the methods including scriptural testimony are relevant only in the phenomenal context. "This entire business of using a method and knowing an object, whether it is empirical or scriptural, presupposes the phenomenal existence of self" ; "we do admit that even scriptural testimony ceases to be authentic when this phenomenal existence has been transcended."⁴⁹ A cogent argument has been advanced. There can be no method such as sense-perception and inference without dependence on sense-organs ; and senseorgans cannot exist and function apart from the body enlivened by consciousness. And unless all these conditions are satisfied, the self cannot be regarded as a subject (a knower, employing a method) ; and unless there be a subject, it is meaningless to speak of a method. Therefore, all the methods as also Scripture have only a phenomenal relevance.⁵⁰

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48. Ibid. न च लौकिकपदपदार्थाश्रयव्यतिरेकेण आगमेन शक्यं अज्ञातं वस्त्वन्तर-
मवगमयितुम् । Also, BUB, 3,9,7. तस्माद्युक्तं वेदवाक्यार्थनिर्णयाय
विचारयितुम् ॥
49. VSB, *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* : तमेतदविद्याख्यामात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं
पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः । VSB, 4,1,3,
इष्यत एवमस्माभिः श्रुतेरप्यभावः प्रबोधे ॥
50. *Adhyāsa-bhāṣya* : न हि इन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः सम्भवति । न
अनध्यस्तात्मभावेन देहेन कश्चिद् व्याप्रियते । न च एतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन् असति
असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्वमुपपद्यते । न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति ।
तस्मात् अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च ॥

THE VEDĀNTIC PARADIGM

I. WHAT IS A PARADIGM?

The old world outlook on science is illustrated when Oswald Kuelpe (1862-1915) identified science with physical science. Psychology set out to become an image of Physics, the master model, and therefore, considered mediate experience alone as its proper subject-matter. It was, however, conceded that conscious phenomena were the existential reals as far as Psychology was concerned. But there was obviously no way of an outsider directly getting at them ; they could be reached only indirectly, inferentially, and perhaps with the aid of introspective reports. The world of uncanny consciousness had obviously to be distinguished from the world of observable objects and measurable events. When, in 1874, Wilhelm Wundt (1832-1933) inaugurated the scientific study of consciousness, Psychology for him was a sort of 'mental chemistry' viz, Psychology was an aspect of Chemistry! He was impressed by the supposition that the content of consciousness was sensory. He was, therefore, concerned with sensations as mental 'elements', much as details in Chemistry.

Wolfgang Kohler's plea that Psychology should deal with 'direct and immediate experience' fell on deaf ears, as by then scientific Psychology had dedicated itself to the task of exploring the experiences in a person as if they were objective data. Psychology aspired to outstrip Physics and

Chemistry in scientific rigour. Needless to say, it failed. But the irony of the situation is that even when Physics and other disciplines found it necessary to relax the old probabilistic patterns, Psychology stuck to the old and outmoded model with a persistence that was unwarranted.

The framework of scientific method that Psychology seeks to fit itself into, severely limits the scope of introspection, and it seeks to eliminate speculation altogether. The framework emphasized that observation was essentially a search and that its merit consisted in its public nature (that is to say, worthwhile observation had to be replicable). Theorizing had to be logical so that the phenomena observed could be consistently and satisfactorily accounted for. Even the logical structure of the formulated theory had to conform to the norm of public reason. The theorizing activity was effective only in so far as observable consequences could be predicted within several probabilistic limits of accuracy. This general framework, tried and honoured in the physical sciences, was totally borrowed by Psychology, whose subject-matter, however, did not entirely satisfy the requirements of this framework.

The famous formulation of Krause (quoted and immortalized by the eminent physical scientist, Ernst Mach) brings out the peculiarity of the phenomena sought to be scientifically studied in Psychology :

“The Problem : To carry out the self-inspection of the Ego.

Solution : It is carried out immediately.”

In other words, there is no problem in introspection. It is direct and immediate experience ; and, for the same reason, its value for scientific study was limited. Subjective and inarticulate introspection which is a normal and familiar process among human beings was of little practical value for the laboratory-oriented Psychologist. To be useful, introspection had to be 'scientific' ; that is to say, objective. Immediate experience had somehow to be projected as mediate experience : thoughts and feelings had to appear like atoms and geological specimens. Introspection had to be 'scientific', methodical and objective. Otherwise, it came dangerously close to speculation. And is not speculation a sworn enemy of science ?

There has, however, been a change in the outlook during the past two decades. Here is what an eminent psychologist, Edwin G. Boring, writes :

"In both Physiology and Psychology there is a strong and healthy tradition against what is called 'speculation' and naive epistemology holds that science espouses observation and rejects speculation. Nevertheless, I am convinced that careful consideration does not support a strict opposition between observation and speculation."¹

Without a precisely delimited and stable area of study, psychologists busied themselves with adapting the experimental methods and models of more or less empirical science ; there was necessarily a disciplinary drift. There were multiple hypotheses, made more competitive than

1. The Physical Dimensions of Consciousness, Dover, N.Y. 1963, p.XI.

compatible. In the circumstances, it was unavoidable that Psychology should develop what Edward O. Wilson calls 'the Advocacy method' (*Sociobiology*, Belknap, Harvard 1977, p. 28), selecting and arranging the evidence in the most persuasive manner possible. Each theorist considered it his legitimate duty and scientific responsibility to defend or rebut, in part or whole, a particular hypothesis by a planned pattern of observation and experiments.

There has been a tendency of late to resort to what is now described as 'sensuous activity' approach as complementary to the classical observation-experimental method in Psychology. A major provocative influence came from the celebrated astronaut, who later turned mystical, Dr. Edgar Mitchell. His involvement in the space-programme suggested to him that exploration of the outer space was less important than the understanding of the inner space, for the welfare and progress of mankind. The motivation, of course, cannot strictly be called scientific, for a scientist's major concern must be to reveal reality and extend man's understanding. But Psychology is a practical discipline as much as a theoretical one. In an address before the American Psychiatric Association in Dallas in 1972, he declared: "Science has reached that point in its growth where the experimenter could no longer eliminate himself from his experiment". What he meant by science here was scientific Psychology.

The unavoidable observer-involvement in observation and the consequent interference with the objectivity and

veracity of what is observed became evident first in the work of Physicists, and soon became a problem in Physical Science. The workers in these fields tried methods of minimising this involvement, of measuring the amount of interference and of constructing probabilistic models, which took into account this involvement and interference. Psychology had to tackle this problem from the earliest days of its scientific career. When, however, it realized that the problem was not solved even by most rigorous experimental conditions in physical sciences, it began to recognize that such involvement and interference were themselves the subjectmatters of psychological inquiry.

Consequent on this recognition there has been an interest in the so-called esoteric Psychologies of the Eastern religions, principally *Vedānta*, Yoga and Buddhism (especially Zen and Tibetan methods). Thomas B. Blackburn voices the feelings of the present-day psychologists when he says : "Perhaps science has much to learn along this line from the disciplines as distinct from the content of Oriental religions". He was referring to the understanding of the modes of human consciousness.

Thomas S. Kuhn popularized the concept of the scientific paradigm in recent years.² Basically, a paradigm is a pattern, a model, an exemplar. But as used in science, it is a framework within which explanation as well as understanding of facts could be neatly fitted. It seeks not only to set the boundary of accepted and permissible

2. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1962.

inquiry, and thus formulate the scope, but also to provide a model for the organization of the information obtained during the inquiry. A paradigm is thus the basic requirement to guide an inquiry, to direct the methods and approaches employed in it, and to integrate the findings of the several workers in the same field. Therefore, the chief merit of a paradigm lies in its being shared by all the members of a scientific community. It facilitates joint exploration into a commonly accepted and neatly delimited field of inquiry. It is a technique by means of which scientific efforts could be co-ordinated. Kuhn refers to the "blinding function" of a paradigm. A paradigm blinds in the sense that the inquirer's attention is narrowed down to a specific area of inquiry, and preserves him from distractions and meanderings. A paradigm has its own procedures and categories of thought in a specific pattern. In this sense, a paradigm serves as a road-map for the inquirer.

II. THE METHOD IN ADVAITA

Vedānta has developed its own paradigms, according to what G. C. Williams calls 'the ground-rules' or doctrines (*Adaptation and Natural Selection*, Princeton, 1966), which it espouses. The influence of the Advocacy Method as well as the multiple hypothesis has been quite considerable in this field : and arguments are often reduced to semantic skills and verbal exercises. Nevertheless, concept-formation has been very much in evidence. It is curious that development of theory in *Vedānta* follows 'the postulational-deductive' method of contemporary celebrity. A *Vedāntic*

theory seeks first to identify the parameters, then determine and define the relations between them, and finally constructs a workable model, not only to understand reality but to accomplish the religious goal as well. For in India, theory is a handmaid to *Sādhana*. A paradigm in this context defines the traditional hypothesis and provides a workable model so as to prevent conceptual drift.

The paradigm adopted by *Advaita Vedānta* is technically styled as “(initial) assumption and (subsequent) withdrawal or rejection” (*adhyāropa-apavāda*). Sadānanda (around 1500 A.D.), the author of the well-known *Vedānta-sāra*, describes this as a ‘*nyāya*’, a scheme, plan or method. *Veṅkaṭa-nātha*, disciple of Rāmabrahmānanda-tīrtha (called Abhinava-Śaṅkarācārya) in his gloss on Śaṅkara’s *BGB* also calls this a ‘*nyāya*’ for the sake of ascertainment of Brahman, who is beyond description and imagination.³ Raghunātha’s *Laukika-nyāya-saṁgraha* lists this as one of the 334 *nyayas*.⁴ It is obvious that in later Advaita thought

3. *Brahmānanda-giri-tīkā*, on *BGB*, 13, 13.

4. Cited in Śabdakalpādruma, Vol. 2, p.933. The popular ‘maxims’ (*laukika-nyāyas*) employed in literary, grammatical and philosophical works have been compiled by several writers, the most prominent among whom are Raghunātha (*Laukika-nyāya-saṁgraha*) and Tārānātha (*Vācaspatyam*). An article in Pandit (1867) by Jhalkikar Vamana Acharya contained a list of them. A recent and valuable collection, with annotations in English, is Col. G.A. Jacob’s in three ‘Handfuls’ or parts (*Laukika-nyāyāṇjalih*, Bombay 1925). The ‘*Adhyāropa-nyāya*’ is to be found in the second part of this collection (p.2). The word न्याय is derived from नि+इन् (नियमेन ईयन्ते or नीयन्ते प्राप्यन्ते विवक्षितार्थो येन)

this paradigm has been accorded the honoured status of an accepted method. But Śāṁkara himself nowhere mentions that it is a *nyāya*. In fact, the only place where he mentions the method explicitly is in a citation in his commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*⁵ :

“And these are the words of the knower(s) of the right traditional method of teaching ... ‘By (initial) assumption and (later) withdrawal or rejection, the undifferentiated and-unextended is shown up’.”

It is hard to identify the source of this formulation. The glossator, Ānanda-giri. merely remarks :

“Here is a concurrence from elders that a knowable, although unreal, can indeed be helpful in bringing about knowledge.”

It may be noted that the celebrated elder contemporary of Śāṁkara, Maṇḍana, also cites the same half-verse.⁶ There has been a suggestion that this statement is from a *vārttika* (now lost) of Sundara-panḍya, an earlier thinker towards whom Śāṁkara's attitude was reverential. This thinker is said to have prepared *vārttikas* on both *Pūrva-mīmāṁsā* and *Uttara-mīmāṁsā* ; and he has been quoted by Kumārila also (an older contemporary of Śāṁkara). Śāṁkara has quoted three verses towards the close of his

5. BGB, 13, 13 : तथा हि सम्प्रदायविदां वचनम्-‘अध्यारोपापवादेन निष्प्रपञ्चं प्रपञ्च्यते । Ānanda-giri comments : मिथ्यारूपमपि ज्ञेयवस्तु ज्ञानोपयोगीत्यत्र वृद्धसम्मतिमाह.....।
6. *Brahma-siddhi*, p.26. The commentary explains : परमार्थतो निष्प्रपञ्चमेव ब्रह्म तदविद्यया प्रपञ्चस्याध्यारोपेण तदपवादेन तन्निषेधेन च प्रपञ्च्यते व्याख्यायते इत्यर्थः ॥

commentary on the fourth 'sutra' of the *Vedānta-sūtras* (1-1-4) with a respectful "And it is said" (*apicāhuh*). Vācaspati's Bhāmātī on this describes the three verses as 'the inspired utterance of the knower(s) of Brahman' (*brahmaidām-gāthā*). But Ātma-svarūpa, the author of *Prabodha-parīśodhinī*, a gloss on *Pañcapādikā*, has occasion to cite the same verses and mention that they are from Sundara-pāṇḍya. And curiously, these three verses also involve the method that we are now considering.

It is interesting to note that Śaṅkara has called this method 'traditional'. Of course, his illustrious predecessor Gauḍapāda, has extensively employed this method in his treatment of the states of consciousness and their parallelism to the units of the mystic syllable Om (*Kārikā* on *Māṇḍūkya-upaniśad*), although nowhere mentioning it by name. He refers (3,26) to the method of negation (*neti neti*, 'not this, not this') employed in *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-upaniśad* (2,3,6) ; and he speaks of the 'denial' (*apahnavā*) of 'erroneous personal constructions' (*vikalpas*). In the field of Vedānta, he appears to have been the earliest known writer to employ the well-known illustration of the rope in darkness being mistaken for a snake (2,17). This mistaking, according to him is an erroneous personal construction (*vikalpa*), which is negated when light is brought.

The earliest traceable reference to this method, however, is to be found in *Saddharma-laṅkāvatāra-sūtra*, a celebrated Buddhist text of *Vijñāna-vāda* persuasion. This

important work was translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra as early as 443 A.D. ; it is claimed that Āśvaghoṣa quotes from this work, and therefore the work may be assigned to the first century A.D. The work mentions the method by name (2, 25, 135) but substitutes '*samāropa*' for *adhyāropa* ; however, with little change in the meaning.⁷ But the material to be found there is altogether insufficient to reconstruct the framework of the method in the *Vijñāna-vāda* context. Incidentally, we find in this work the illustration of the whirling fire-band (10, 5, 443), which Gauḍapāda also employed (*alāta*).

It may be proper to ascribe the original formulation of this method to the *Upaniṣadic* thinkers by whom the Buddhist *Vijñāna-vāda* as well as the *Advaita Vedānta* were influenced greatly. Śaṁkara inherited this traditional method from Gauḍapāda, who attempted a synthesis of Buddhist and *Vedāntic* viewpoints. And, during Gauḍapāda's days, the method must have been so widely used that he did not think it necessary to make a formal mention of the method. Even Śaṁkara refrains from such a formal description of the method, which he employs so consistently and brilliantly. Nor do we find the method being mentioned by name by the immediate disciples of Śaṁkara like Sureśvara and Padmapāda, although they have clearly adopted the method. It is in the *Samkshepasārīraka* (of Sarvajñātman, around 1000 A.D.) that we find an early discussion of the merits of this method (2, 253).

7. सर्वधर्माः सदसत्पक्षविगताः समारोपापवादैश्च बालः विकल्पन्ते, न त्वार्यैः ।

The expression *adhyāropa*⁸ is taken to mean 'superimposition', 'wrong imputation', 'attribution (*ad-tribuere*, to assign, to ascribe) of a false characteristic', 'assumption of some nature or feature', or 'supposition'. It is a near equivalent to the Scholastic 'praedicamentale' (as distinguished from 'substance'). It is essentially a psychological construction, a projection, an assumption only for examination and falsification. It denotes the empirical framework, constructed by our sense-organs and mind, which in reality does not exist as such. The other word *apavāda* means 'negation', 'withdrawal', 'denial', 'rescission', 'elimination' of what has been imputed, attributed, assumed or superimposed. This is the result of superior knowledge, a knowledge of things as they are.⁹ It is denial not of the substance itself, but of the particular attribute that has been constructed or projected on it. The purpose of the denial is not to assert or confirm the existence of a contrary or opposite attribute, but to lead gradually to the understanding that the substance as such is to be distinguished from the same substance as endowed with attributes. Tārānātha's *Vācaspatyam* suggests '*bādhakah*' (sublation) as synonymous with '*apavādah*'. It may be construed as phenomenological reduction of an 'accident' (in the Scholastic sense, an attribute which is not an invariable aspect or part of the essence).

8. अधि+आ+रह् (णिच् भावे अच्); अप+वद् (भावे घञ्)

9. VSB, 3,3,9.

Sadānanda defines: “*Adhyāropa* is to project or assume a snake in a rope that is in reality not a snake at all.”¹⁰ And he clarifies that by substance is here meant that which is not affected in any way by the three-fold time, (past, present and future), or in other words, which does not undergo any change whatsoever due to the passage of time. The word refers to the Brahman, the solely real. Non-substance, on the other hand, is the entire phenomenal complex, in which each one of us is involved. If substance is consciousness, non-substance is the absence of it ; the former is spirit (*cetana*) while the latter is inert (*jaḍa*).¹¹ Therefore, the objective of right knowledge must be the substance devoid of all attribution, because attributions and assumptions are the chief source of all misery of phenomenal existence. Although the rope appears like a snake, it is only a rope ; its snake-like appearance was merely a transformation (*vivarta*), untrue and short-lived, for when light is brought the snake-like appearance instantaneously vanishes. The phenomenal world, likewise, is a transformation of the Brahman-substance into an extended world of objects in space and time with the experiencing ego as the vortex. *Apavāda* is annulling or dissolving this appearance, so that the true nature of substance is revealed. It is the falsification of false appearances. Even as the rope which was always so will appear as it really is in the presence of light, the Brahman's

10. VS असर्पभूते रज्जौ सर्पारोपवत् वस्तुन्यवस्त्वारोपः । कालत्रयानपाय्यात्मैव वस्तुशब्दार्थः ।

11. वस्तु सच्चिदानन्दरूपं ब्रह्म, अवस्तु अज्ञानादिसकलजडसमूहः ।

real nature will dawn when ignorance is undone by intuition aided by scriptural testimony and reason in accordance with it.

The method is justified by the fact that there can be no other way of apprehending the real nature of Brahman. In fact, the very habits of our thinking and the modes of our speaking necessitate the adoption of this method. It is not only the ignorant man-in-the-street that finds this method unavoidable ; even a sage that knows and wants to teach finds it necessary and expedient. But the latter knows that the assumptions he has to make are in essence unreal ; he does not get deceived by them.

Technically this is called 'conformity with the sublated', a conventional acceptance of what one knows to be false, a sort of 'make-believe'. Śaṅkara refers to the occasional appearance of the sky as dark or red ; the wise know that the sky is really neither dark nor red, while the ordinary folk easily believe that it is so.¹² This conventional conformity is involved in the method adopted by the Advaita masters to teach the highest truth. This is the context in which Śaṅkara cites the formulation of this method ascribed to Sundara-pāṇḍya :

उपाधिकृतं मिथ्यारूपमपि अस्तित्वाधिगमाय ज्ञेयधर्मवत् परिकल्प्य उच्यते ।

The import is that the teacher here assumes for the moment that what really do not exist do indeed exist, and considers such existence as if it were an attribute of what

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The import is that the teacher here assumes for the moment that what really do not exist do indeed exist, and considers such existence as if it were an attribute of what

really exists. Else where, he draws our attention to the usual method of teaching numbers and letters to little children.¹³ The teacher makes marks on the paper with ink and asks the child to recognize in them numbers and letters. The child perceives the forms but learns to sublimate them and perceive the abstract numbers and letters that they symbolize. Likewise, the scriptures describe the Absolute as the creator of the phenomenal world and attribute several traits like 'truth', 'knowledge', 'infinity', and 'bliss' to this attributeless Absolute, only to lead the inquirer to sublimate them and arrive at the transcendental knowledge.

Advaita examines in this context other methods of knowledge such as observation, inference, analogy, presumption and testimony, and holds that it is only scriptural testimony (*āgama*) that can lead us to this transcendental knowledge. Śamkara points out that scripture is not creative in nature but is only revelatory (*jñāpaka*)¹⁴, it cannot add to anything that already is, but is designed to eliminate the veil that normally obscures it. It is only this method that can give us a glimpse of the

13. Ibid, 4,4,23. There is another 'nyāya' known as 'rekhā-gavaya-nyāya' which is relevant in this context. A man of the town who has not seen a wild bovine animal (gavaya) seeks to know what it is like from a forester; the forester draws a picture of the animal and the townsman takes the very lines to be the animal. Later when he goes to the forest and actually sees the animal, the knowledge will dawn on him that the animal is different from the picture.

14. BUB, 1,4,10 etc.,

transcendental reality : all other methods are valid only in the phenomenal realm.¹⁵ Scriptural knowledge coupled with intuitive understanding will enable an individual ultimately to reject the fundamental assumption that engenders in a sequence all other assumptions.

This fundamental assumption is known in Vedānta as *avidyā* or ignorance. It is the natural tendency on the part of all beings to project an assumptive world and also get involved in it. When that is there, all other erroneous assumptions gain ground and bring about phenomenological distress. Synonyms of ignorance (*avidyā*) are : superimposition (*adhyāsa*), projection or assumption (*adhyāropa*), inversion (*viparyaya*), error (*viparyāsa*), delusion (*bhrānti*), infatuation (*moha*), mistaken conception (*mithyā-pratyaya*), darkness (*tamas*), and wrong apprehension (*anyathā-grahana*). The purpose of *Vedānta* is to undo this distress by loosening the hold of the assumptive world. *Vedānta* prescribes the method of *adhyāropa-apavāda*, to theoretically appreciate the distinction between the 'that' (*tat*, the assumptive world) and the 'thou' (*tvam*, the conscious substance after the elimination of all assumptions).¹⁶ This is a necessary prelude for practical *sādhana*.

15. VSB (*Adhyāsa-bhāṣya*), अविद्यावद्विषयाण्येव प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणादीनि शास्त्रादीनि । cf. BGB, 2,18.

16. BUB, 3,5,1, Also, VS, आभ्यां अध्यारोपापवादाभ्यां तत्त्वं पदार्थशोधनमपि सिद्ध्यति ।

III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL ATTITUDE

Advaita makes a distinction between the transactional attitude (*lokadṛṣṭi*) and the scriptural attitude (*śāstradṛṣṭi*).¹⁷ The former is regarded as a creature of *avidyā* : the mind mixes up the real and the assumptive. The latter, on the other hand, seeks to distinguish between the two, with the help of reason based on intuition and guided by scriptural testimony. It provides us with the transcendently real. If the former binds, the latter liberates. The transactional attitude makes for involvement (*pravṛtti*), for it abounds in assumptions, while the scriptural brings about withdrawal (*nivṛtti*), for it seeks to reject all assumptions. The common ground for both attitudes, however, is experience (*anubhava*). Śamkara describes the experiential content in the transactional context as natural, inborn or inherent. By contrast, that in the other is cultivated. Experience at the transactional level is psychological and sensory (*pratyayānubhava*), while experience at the other level is that of the 'witness' (*sākṣhyānubhava*). For the latter, Scripture alone is the authority,¹⁸ for the Scripture is concerned with teaching the method of rejecting all the assumptions of the transactional attitude.¹⁹ Scripture is an aid to move from the phenomenological level to the transcendental level of reality.

17. BUB, 3,5,1.

18. VSB, 2,1,6.

19. VSB, 1,1,4 & GB, 2,18.

In other words, the phenomenological attitude is an illustration of natural *adhyāropa* while the transcendental is deliberate *apavāda*. Advaita distinguishes between the transactional (*vyāvahārika*) and the projected (*prātibhāsika*) levels in the phenomenological attitude. The waking stage is an example of the former, and dream of the latter. In the waking state, there is an external reality and the individual responds to it ; the world cannot strictly be called an assumption (*adhyāropa*), and cannot in the normal sense be sublated altogether (*apavāda*). Dream, on the other hand, is both projected (or assumed) and sublated. The initial procedure outlined by Gauḍapāda is to transform the waking level to the dream level, by the technique of deliberate assumption and rejection. This is calculated to facilitate the final rejection of all assumptions when wisdom matures. The individual passes from the transactional level to the transcendental level, which passage is the intended outcome in the scriptural texts.

It is to be noted that scriptural texts themselves speak of some attributes as applicable to the Absolute, which in reality and by implication is utterly devoid of all attribution.²⁰ The texts here are said to adopt the common-sense method (or the transactional method) of deliberate assumption, however, only to be sublated by reason and deep reflection (*manana* and *nididhyāsana*). Advaita, therefore, regards the scriptural passages that emphasize

20. e.g., BU, 3,9,28; 3,4,2,1,19; CHU, 3,19,1,7,2,3; TU, 2,1; 2,7 & 8; AU, 1,1.

negation (or denial or sublation) as more important.²¹ In fact, when an *Upaniṣad* questions "Who now is our *ātman* and who is *brahman*?", Śaṅkara explains : "By the word *brahman*, the *ātman* as limited by psychic constructs is negated ; and by the word *ātman*, the adorability of the *brahman* such as that of the Sun, altogether different from the self, is negated"²²

Sureśvara, following the master closely, argues that the Self is not the sense of that word nor the import of a sentence, and that its real nature is ascertained only by the scriptural passages that negate.²³ The *Nyāya-tattva-vivaraṇa* commenting on this verse from *Sambandha-vārttika*, explains : 'the true nature of the Self is determined by negating all senses of words and imports of sentences by such scriptural suggestions as 'Not this, Not this'.'

The well-known story of the prince who had been brought up as a hunter from early childhood has been cited by Śaṅkara as from a 'knower of tradition', (who has been identified by Ānanda-giri with Dramiḍācārya ²⁴). He had imagined himself to be truly a hunter by birth and profession until it was revealed to him that he was in actuality a prince. He had never been a hunter, and was always a prince ; but this prince-idea was absent from him until the moment it arose as a result of revelation.

21. e.g., BU, 3,9,36 also cf. VSB, 3,2,22; & SV, 1046.

22. CHU, 5,11,1

23. SV, 462

24. BUB, 2,1,20; also cf. SV, 233, 234.

His hunter-hood which was an error, was an assumption, and it was negated by the prince-idea, which corresponded to truth.

The paradigm, however, does not lay stress on the mere act of negation or sublation. It is not to be construed as a negative procedure. As Sarvajñātman rightly points out,²⁵ the negative method will not lead us to the ascertainment of the true nature of reality ; it can only bring to our attention the non-existence of the phenomenal world. This is in fact the purpose of the paradigm as contained in Sundara-pāṇḍya's statement. Sarvajñātman pleads that positive and suggestive statements in the Scripture (like "I am brahman") are more effective than the negative statements (like 'Not this, Not this'). What is important is what remains over when all possible sublations have been effected ; what, in other words, cannot be sublated or negated. This is otherwise called the method of 'residual reality' (*pāriśeṣya-nyāya*). By eliminating all ascriptions the natural state is revealed.

An excellent application of this method is to be found in the *Upaniṣadic* treatment of the three conditions of life, viz, waking, dreaming and sleeping. Gauḍapāda's *kārikā* on *Māṇḍūkya-upaniṣad* takes this up as the main theme, and shows how the method is employed to arrive at the 'fourth' (*turiya*) condition by sublating sequentially the other three. It is really not a condition, but is known so by continuing the conventional usage. The phenomenality that obtains in

the three conditions is negated in the fourth, which persists when everything else is sublated. By a residual reasoning, this only is *real* while the others are mere assumptions or constructions (*vikalpa*).

Other illustrations of this method are also derived from the *Upaniṣads*. But the suggestions contained in them are elaborated by Śamkara, who also explains the methodological involvement. Examples are : (1) the assumption that the Absolute is the 'lord', thus negating its subordinate position, and the later formulation that it is in fact everything, thereby denying the 'lordship'²⁶ ; (2) the assumption that 'all this' is the Absolute, worthy of adoration, and the later formulation that it is not that but the one spirit that energizes it that is worthy of adoration²⁷ ; (3) the assumption that the Absolute is the cause of the phenomenal world, and the subsequent claim that the effect is illusory, thus denying the causal role of the Absolute²⁸ ; (4) the assumption that the Self is the only 'knowable' (*jñeya*), thus excluding all other knowables, and the later postulation that the Self is really the 'knower' (*jñātr*)²⁹ ; (5) the assumption that the Self is the 'knower', thus denying the preceding assumption, and later sublating it with the claim that the Self is a mere 'witness' (*saksi*)³⁰ ; (6) sublation of this assumption by denying validity of

26. IU, 1 & 6.

27. KnU, 1,2-8.

28. KtU, 2,20; SU, 2,4,1; BU, 7,1; TU,2,6.

29. BU, 2,4,5; SU, 1,11, MaitU, 6, 7.

30. KtU, 6,13; BU, 2,4,14.

duality, which obtains only at the phenomenal level ³¹ ; (7) the assumption that the Absolute can be understood only with the aid of scriptural testimony, thereby denying the utility of all other normal methods of knowing such as observation and reason ³², and the later formulation that it is impossible to ascertain the Absolute by verbal or mental processes.³³

The credit for discovering this *Upaniṣadic* method and for defining this *Vedāntic* paradigm must be shared by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. The elaboration and extensive application of this method were of course the achievement of Śaṅkara. It is to be noted that it is only Sureśvara among Śaṅkara's early followers who was fascinated by the potentiality of this method. His references to this method in his *Vārttikas* as well as in his *Naīṣkarṃya-siddhi* are both numerous and highly suggestive. It is curious that the later thinkers and writers in the field of Advaita were rather lukewarm in their appreciation of this most remarkable paradigm developed in Indian tradition, although other *nyāyas* have been frequently utilized by them.³⁴

31. MandU, 7; MundU, 2,2,10.

32. MundU, 1,2,12,13; KtU, 2,9; VSB, 1,1,4 & 2,1,6; GB, 13,34.

33. BU, 2,4,14; KnU, 1,3.

34. Such as 'chāyā-pīśāci-nyāya' (Nṛsimha-sarasvatī's commentary on VS), 'īṣyamāṇa-pradhāna-nyāya' (VKP), 'rekhā-gavaya-nyāya' (op.cit. and Vācaspati's *Tātparyā-ṭīkā*), 'baka-bandhana-nyāya' (PPV and *Tattva-dīpana* on it), 'praśajya-pratiṣedha' (BUV), 'jala-kataka-reṇu-nyāya' (op.cit), 'vyādha-rājaputra-nyāya' (BUB, BUV, and SL), 'śākhā-candra-nyāya' (TUV and VPS), 'kaṇṭha-cāmikara-nyāya' (VP and *Ātmatattva-viveka*) and 'tusha-khaṇḍana-nyāya' or 'piṣṭa-peṣaṇa-nyāya' (Padmapāda and Sureśvara).

IV. THE MODEL AND METAPHOR

The employment of a *nyāya* becomes justified when the matter under consideration is vague and controvertial ³⁵ ; presumably when the doubt or problem can hardly be resolved by any other means. There is a conventional explanation of the expression 'nyāya' used in this context: that it is 'an illustration' (*dṛṣṭānta*). It is in this sense that literary works and grammatical works (principally Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* and Kaiyata's gloss) often employ the word. But the earlier and more numerous and more meaningful employment of *nyāyas* was by the *Mīmāṃsaka* writers (like Śabara, Kumārila, Udayana and Āpastamba). And they regard a *nyāya* as more forceful than a mere analogy : it formulates in a nut-shell an entire argument, it epitomizes a whole viewpoint. The merit of a *nyāya* consists in that it is directly derived from common experience and daily life ; and its source frequently is folklore. It, therefore, admits of ready appreciation. In fact *Pañcatantra*, *Hitopadeśa*, and Jain and Buddhist fables have provided a considerable number of *nyāyas*. While, therefore, analogy or illustration is of course involved (as in *rajjū-sarpa* and *śukti-rajata*), the argument or methodological precision becomes all important in a

35. This is itself regarded as a 'nyāya' : "Saṁdigdhe nyāyah pravartata iti nyāyāt..." (Jñānottama's commentary on Sureśvara's NS, 4,3).

'nyāya' like the *adhyāropa-apavāda* or *prasajya-pratiṣedha* ³⁶ which is entirely methodological in its import.

The theory formation in *Advaita* has not only employed the above paradigm but has utilized as a supplement to it the descriptive model of the piece of rope appearing as a serpent in insufficient light (*raju-sarpa*). Like the *nyāya*, this model also has been drawn from the world of common experience. It illustrates an essential analogy with what is sought to be explained, viz, the theory of transformation (*vivarta*) with regard to the phenomenal world. The rope's appearance as a serpent is not a mere illusion. It involves the psychological processes of transformation and projection, while the physical datum remains unaltered. The serpent seems to emerge out of the rope during inadequate

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36. The latter occurs often in *Advaita* works, and was first used by Sureśvara in *BUV*, 3,9,73. It is an interesting counterpart of the paradigm we are here considering. It seeks to evoke an interest in a specific situation or particular attribute, and after or attribute is negated. *Vācaspatyam* explains the maxim thus : प्रसज्य प्रसक्तिं सम्पाद्य आरोप्य इति यावत् प्रतिषेधः । अत्यन्ताभावे । 'प्रसक्तं हि प्रतिषेध्यत इति न्यायेन आरोपितप्रसङ्गस्यैव निषेधः । तेन वायौ रूपं नास्तीत्यादावपि वायौ रूपारोपं कृत्वा एव निषेधः नञा बोध्यत इति विवेकः ॥ (cf. Jacob's collection, 2, p.49-50). For an account of the rope-snake model, cf. *VS*B, 1,4,6. यथा कश्चित् सन्तमसे पतितां काश्चिद्रज्जुं अहिं मन्यमानः भीतो वेपमानः पलायते । तं च अपरो ब्रूयात् "मा भैषीः, नायं अहिः रज्जुरेव" इति । स च तदपश्रुत्य अहिकृतं भयं उत्सृजेत् । वेपथुं पलायनं च । न तु अहिवुद्धिकाले तदपगमकाले च वस्तुनः कश्चिद्विशेषः स्यात् ।

illumination, and dissolve into it when light is brought in. The serpent was never in reality there at all ; it lacks the status of an objective datum. And the rope as a physical reality was always there, even while the serpent appeared in its place. The serpent could not have been presented without this physical foundation, and therefore it cannot be classed under a total illusion (*alīka*). It had reality as its ground, but the misapprehension was due to its appearance as something other than its own true nature. The rope was the reality and the snake a presentation on that basis. The former is an existential datum while the latter is an experiential detail. The serpent-status is a super-imposition or an assumption (*adhyāropa*), and its subsequent annulment is an illustration of withdrawal (*apavāda*). The model thus supplements the paradigm.

The model involves some identity of structure between the common experience illustrated by the model and the phenomenal actuality to be intuitively understood. The model employs something already known and something that is popularly appreciated to drive home a point that is at once abstract and real. There is, however, no perfect analogy ; and an argument is not an evidence. The rope-serpent model is not employed in Advaita as an argument; its purpose is to illustrate. Analogy involved in the model is limited, and is not meant to provide a prototype of what is sought to be explained. It is true that in many later and minor works on Advaita, this model or its equivalent, the shell-and-silver (*śukti-rajata*), takes the place of the principal argument ; and the discussion carries the

impression that the model has been more important than what it seeks to represent. It is necessary to abstract from the model what is called 'the positive analogy'. The model is observational, but what it represents is non-observational. The notion of 'transformation' (vivarta) is what Bertrand Russell would call "a logical construction".

The "rope-serpent" model in Advaita is not what Mary Hesse calls "a dead metaphor".³⁷ It is a real description, and it facilitates passage from the observable to the actual, from the factual to the theoretical. It has been of great significance as an aid to theory-formation in Advaita. Śaṅkara's merit consists in the elaborate and consistent interpretations that he provided for an axiomatic system that the Upaniṣadic texts contained. And in so doing, he contributed significantly to the Indian theory-formation.³⁸

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37. "Forces and Fields", Models and Analogies in Science, Thomas Nelson, cf. Dudley Shapere : Philosophical Problems of Natural Science, Macmillan Co., N.Y. 1965.
38. For the importance of theory-formation in modern science, cf. Carl Hempel "The Theoretician's Dilemma", in H. Fiegl et al. (Ed), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. II, 1958.

ASG	Ānandāśrama Sanskrita Granthāvali
CSS	Chowkhāmbā Sanskrit Series
NSP	Nirṇaya Sāgar Press
SBT	Sarasvatī Bhavan Texts
SVVP	Śrī Vāṇivilāsa Press
TPH	Theosophical Publishing House
VOL	University Oriental Library
VSS	Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series.

ADDITIONAL SOURCE-MATERIAL ON METHODS.

1. *Vedānta-Kaumudī* quoting Kumārila says (p.61)
तदाहुः - अज्ञातज्ञापनशक्तिः प्रामाण्यम् । तच्च सर्वलौकिकवैदिकप्रमाणानां
स्वारसिकमित्यर्थः ।
(The means of knowledge is valid inasmuch as it lets us know a hitherto unknown matter. This is the very essence of all means of knowing, mundane or religious).
2. सर्वं हि मानं लोकेऽस्मिन् वस्त्वभिव्यक्तिसाधनम् ।
तदभावेऽनभिव्यक्तं वस्तु नास्तीति दुर्वचः ।
(Sureśvara, BUBC, 3,8,113)
Ānanda-giri explains :
न हि दीपाभावे तदभिव्यङ्ग्यं घटादि तमसावृतं नास्तीति सुवचनमिति हि
शब्दार्थः ।
(In the absence of light, the pot which could have been revealed by it is hidden in darkness, but it does not cease to exist just because there is no light)
3. स्वमेयमात्रशूरत्वात् मितेर्नान्यत्र मानता ।
(Sureśvara, SV, 245)
(A method is valid only with regard to what can be known by it.)
4. श्रुत्यसम्भवे च लक्षणाश्रयणं न्याय्यमेव । (VSB, 3,1,22)
(It is indeed reasonable to accept the secondary import of scriptural text in case literal interpretation appears meaningless).
5. न चानुमानं प्रत्यक्षविरोधे प्रामाण्यं लभते । (BUB, 2,1,20)
प्रत्यक्षविरोधेऽनुमानस्याप्रामाण्यात् । (BUB, 4,3,6)
(Inference does not become valid when it goes against what is got from perception).
6. न च दृष्टिविरोधः केनचिदप्यभ्युपगम्यते । न च दृष्टेऽनुपपन्नं नाम
दृष्टत्वादेव । (BUB, 1,4,10)
(No one can reasonably contradict what is seen; there can be nothing unreal in the seen, because of the very fact of being seen).

7. न हि क्वचित्साक्षाद्वस्तुधर्मस्यापोद्री द्रष्टा कर्त्री वा ब्रह्मविद्या । अविद्यायास्तु सर्वत्रैव निवर्तिका दृश्यते । ... न तु पारमार्थिकं वस्तु कर्तुं निवर्तयितुं वार्हति ब्रह्मविद्या । (BUB, 1,4,10)

(The wisdom concerning the Absolute is nowhere seen to contradict the nature of what is actually existent, nor to create (any existent thing); it only eliminates ignorance with regard to it..... The wisdom concerning the Absolute is not capable of creating or eliminating any thing that really exists.)

8. तस्माद्यथानुभवं तत्त्वमभ्युपगच्छद्भिः बहिरेवावभासत इत्यध्यवसितम् । नायं साधुरध्यवसायो यतः प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्तिपूर्वकौ सम्भवासम्भवाववधार्यते, न पुनः सम्भवासम्भवपूर्विकं प्रमाणप्रवृत्त्यप्रवृत्ती । यद्धि प्रत्यक्षादिनामन्यतमेनापि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तत्सम्भवति । यत्तु न केनचिदपि प्रमाणेनोपलभ्यते तन्न सम्भवति । ... असति विषये विषयसारूप्यानुपपत्तेः, बहिरुपलब्धेः विषयस्य । (VSB, 2,2,28)

(It stands to reason that those who see an actual object should refer it to an outside source, and not say that it only appears to be so. It is an untenable judgement to deny external reality altogether and make our perceptions deal with merely appearances. For, the criterion for the presence of an external object rests with the operation of the means of knowing. Whatever is apprehended by a means of knowing must indeed exist, and whatever is not so apprehended must be unreal : If objects did not exist actually, it would be impossible for cognitions to assume the objective forms and objects are in fact cognized to be existing outside us.)

9. ज्ञेयाभिमुखस्यापि ज्ञानं कदाचिज्जायते कदाचिन्न जायते । तस्मात्तं प्रति ज्ञानविषय एव दर्शयितव्यो ज्ञापयितुकामेन । तस्मिन्दर्शिते स्वयमेव यथाविषयं यथाप्रमाणं च ज्ञानमुत्पद्यते । न च प्रमाणान्तरेणान्यथाप्रसिद्धेऽन्यथाज्ञानं नियुक्तस्याप्युपपद्यते । यदि पुनर्नियुक्तोऽहमित्यन्यथाज्ञानं कुर्यान्न तु तज्ज्ञानं, किं तर्हि ? मानसी सा क्रिया स्वयमेव चेदन्यथोत्पद्यते, भ्रान्तिरेव स्यात् । ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यं यथाभूतविषयं च, न तन्नियोगशतेनापि कारयितुं शक्यते ।

न च प्रतिषेधशतेनापि वारयितुं शक्यते । न हि तत्पुरुषतन्त्रं, वस्तुतन्त्रमेव हि तत् । (VSB, 3,2,21)

(A person may be confronted with an object of knowledge, yet the knowledge may sometimes arise and sometimes not. Therefore any one who wishes to let this person know must only tell about the object. And when he is told, his knowledge will arise in accordance with the nature of the object (subtle or otherwise) and also in proportion to his capacities of knowing. Then no instruction contrary to the object's nature can be convincing. If in case such instruction is believed in, that would not then be a piece of knowledge but a mere mental act; it may in fact be an illusion. For knowledge is always occasioned by the means of knowing and is tied to the object as it is; and not even a hundred injunctions can arouse it, nor can a hundred prohibitions prevent its arousal. Knowledge depends on the object and not on the individual's fancy).

10. ध्यानं चिन्तनं यद्यपि मानसं; तथाऽपि पुरुषेण कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं, पुरुषतन्त्रत्वात्, ज्ञानं तु प्रमाणजन्यम् । अतो ज्ञानं कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुमशक्यम् । केवलं वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् । न चोदनातन्त्रम् । नापि पुरुषतन्त्रम् । तस्मान्मानसत्वेऽपि, ज्ञानस्य महद्वैलक्षण्यम् । यथा च 'पुरुषो वाव गौतमाग्निः' 'योषा वाव गौतमाग्निः' (छान्दो. ५-७, ८-१) इत्यत्र योषित्पुरुषयोरग्निबुद्धिर्मानसी भवति । केवलचोदनाजन्यत्वात्क्रियैव सा, पुरुषतन्त्रा च । या तु प्रसिद्धेऽग्नावग्निबुद्धिः, न सा चोदनातन्त्रा । नापि पुरुषतन्त्रा । किं तर्हि ? प्रत्यक्षविषयवस्तुतन्त्रैवेति ज्ञानमेवैतन्न क्रिया । एवं सर्वप्रमाणविषयवस्तु वेदितव्यम् । (VSB, 1,1,4)

(Contemplation, being a reflection, is a mental act. But it is possible to do it one way or an other, or not do it at all, for it is a matter that depends upon the individual. Not so is knowledge, because it is occasioned by the means of knowing. When the means are valid, they refer to an object that is actually existing; and the individual's preferences are of no significance here. Knowledge thus is different from contemplation.)

11. स्वविषयशूराणि हि प्रमाणानि श्रोत्रादिवत् । (BUB, 2,1,20)
(The means of knowing are competent only with regard to their own distinct fields, like the ear (which can apprehend only sounds).
12. वेदान्तवाक्यमीमांसा तदविरोधितर्कोपकरणं निःश्रेयसप्रयोजना प्रस्तूयते । (SW. Vol.I,p.9)
(The ultimate good is commended to be served by an inquiry into the Upanishadic texts, helped by reasoning that does not go against them.)
13. तदपि श्रवणव्यतिरेकेण मननं विदधच्छब्द एव तर्कमप्यादत्तव्यं दर्शयतीत्युक्तम् । नानेन मिषेण शुष्कतर्कस्यात्रात्मलाभः सम्भवति । श्रुत्यनुगृहीत एव ह्यात्र तर्कोऽनुभवाद्भवेनाश्रीयते ॥ (VSB, 2,1,6)
(They argue that scriptures themselves commend reflection in addition to, and different from, textual study (hearing), and then they accord an honourable place to reasoning. But, this pretext cannot help empty reasoning justifying itself. It is only when reasoning is in perfect accord with scriptural testimony that it can claim a place as a valid method, even that as auxiliary to experience.)
14. श्रुत्यैव च सहायत्वेन तर्कस्याभ्युपेतत्वात् ।
(Even the scriptures accept reason as an aid.)
15. न धर्मजिज्ञासायामिव श्रुत्यादय एव प्रमाणं ब्रह्मजिज्ञासायाम् । किंतु श्रुत्यादयोऽनुभवादयश्च यथासम्भवमिह प्रमाणम्, अनुभवावसानत्वाद्भूतवस्तुविषयत्वाच्च ब्रह्मज्ञानस्य । कर्तव्ये हि विषये नानुभवापेक्षास्तीति श्रुत्यादीनामेव प्रामाण्यं स्यात्पुरुषाधीनात्मलाभत्वाच्च कर्तव्यस्य । कर्तुमकर्तुमन्यथा वा कर्तुं शक्यं लौकिकं वैदिकं च कर्म, यथाश्चेन गच्छति, पद्भ्यामन्यथा वा, न वा गच्छतीति । तथा 'अतिरात्रे षोडशिनं गृह्णाति, नातिरात्रे षोडशिनम्', 'उदिते जुहोति' इति । विधिप्रतिषेधाश्चात्रार्थवन्तः स्युः विकल्पोत्सर्गापवादाश्च । न तु वस्तुत्वेनैव नास्तीति वा विकल्प्यते । विकल्पास्तु पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षाः । न वस्तुयाथात्म्यज्ञानं पुरुषबुद्ध्यपेक्षम् । किं तर्हि, वस्तुतन्त्रमेव तत् । न हि स्थाणावेकस्मिन् स्थाणुर्वा पुरुषोऽन्यो वेति तत्त्वज्ञानं भवति । तत्र पुरुषोऽन्यो वेति मिथ्याज्ञानम् । स्थाणुरेवेति तत्त्वज्ञानं, वस्तुतन्त्रत्वात् । एवं भूतवस्तुविषयाणां प्रामाण्यं वस्तुतन्त्रम् । तत्रैवं सति ब्रह्मज्ञानमपि वस्तुतन्त्रमेव, भूतवस्तुविषयत्वात् ॥ VSB, 1,1,2)

(In the case of inquiry into religious conduct, scriptural testimony alone is relevant and valid; but not so with regard to inquiry into the Absolute. Here scriptural testimony as also intuitional experience (and other methods) become applicable whenever necessary (or in so far as they are possible), because such inquiry should culminate in the realization of the Absolute, an already existing principle. In the matter of duties, there is not this dependence on intuitional experience, and scripture would suffice as the valid means; and religious conduct is dependent upon man for its source. Religious action, also ordinary behaviour, may be done or not done, and if done it may be done in one way or another. A man may decide to travel or not to travel, and if he decides to travel he may go on foot or he may ride on a horse. Similar is the case with regard to sacrifices. Choice in method is possible in these matters, and choice depends on individuals (their needs and fancies). But knowledge of an existent real does not admit of such choice; it depends on the thing itself and not the individual's fancies.)

16. इतश्च नागमगम्येऽर्थे केवलेन तर्केण प्रत्यवस्थातव्यम् । तस्मिन् निरागमाः पुरुषोत्प्रेक्षामात्रनिबन्धनास्तर्का अप्रतिष्ठिता भवन्ति । उत्प्रेक्षायाः निरङ्कुशत्वात् । तथा हि कैश्चिदभियुक्तैर्यत्रेनोत्प्रेक्षितास्तर्का अभियुक्ततैरन्यैराभास्यमाना दृश्यन्ते । तैरप्युत्प्रेक्षिताः सन्तः ततोऽन्यैराभास्यन्त इति न प्रतिष्ठितस्तर्क एव नास्तीति शक्यते वक्तुम् । एतदपि हि तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वं तर्केणैव प्रतिष्ठाप्यते । केषाञ्चित् तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वदर्शनेन अन्येषामपि तज्जातीयकानां तर्काणामप्रतिष्ठितत्वकल्पनात् । सर्वतर्काप्रतिष्ठायां च लोकव्यवहारोच्छेदप्रसङ्गः । अतीतवर्तमानाध्वसाम्येन ह्यनागतेऽप्यध्वनि सुखदुःखप्राप्तिपरिहाराय प्रवर्तमानो लोको दृश्यते । श्रुत्यर्थविप्रतिपत्तौ चार्थाभासनिराकरणेन सम्यगर्थनिर्धारणं तर्केणैव वाक्यवृत्तिनिरूपणरूपेण क्रियते । ... अयमेव तर्कस्यालङ्कारो यदप्रतिष्ठितत्वं नाम । एवं हि सावद्यतर्कपरित्यागेन निरवद्यस्तर्क प्रतिपत्तव्यो भवति । न हि पूर्वजो मूढ आसीदित्यात्मनापि मूढेन भवितव्यमिति किञ्चिदस्ति प्रमाणम् ॥ (VSB, 2,1,11)

(When matters can be understood only by scriptural testimony, mere reasoning should not be called in to contradict them. Reasoning based only on human ingenuity and not supported by scriptural tradition can be very inconclusive, for man's imagination is unrestrained. Reasonings of a very clever person are seen to be proved erroneous by persons cleverer than him, and the findings of these cleverer persons can likewise be thrown out by persons far more clever than them. It is unwise therefore to rely on reasoning as all-too-well-founded or decisively conclusive, for there is vast individual difference in the abilities of people.... But (there is here a suggestion of a *prima facie* view) if it is argued that there can possibly be no reasoning which is conclusive, it must be noted that even this inconclusiveness of reasoning is established by reasoning alone! In fact, if all reasoning were to be inconclusive, normal transactions in the world would come to an end. People ordinarily plan their future course of action on the basis of (reasoning based on) past experiences and present occurrences. In cases where scriptural texts contradict each other, it is reasoning that we should resort to in order to figure out the proper import of the texts and to avoid wrong and superficial conclusions. The inconclusive character of reasoning is in fact the embellishment of reasoning. Were it not so, the fallacious arguments could never be contradicted nor the correct ones upheld. There is no sense in saying that a person must be stupid just because his ancestors were stupid!).

17. तमेतमविद्याख्यमात्मानात्मनोरितरेतराध्यासं पुरस्कृत्य सर्वे प्रमाणप्रमेय-
व्यवहारा लौकिका वैदिकाश्च प्रवृत्ताः ; सर्वाणि च शास्त्राणि विधिप्रतिषेध-
मोक्षपराणि । कथं पुनरविद्यावद्विषयाणि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि
चेति? उच्यते, देहेन्द्रियादिष्वहंममाभिमानरहितस्य प्रमातृत्वानुपपत्तौ प्रमाण-
प्रवृत्त्यनुपपत्तेः । न हीन्द्रियाण्यनुपादाय प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहारः संभवति । न
चाधिष्ठानमन्तरेणेन्द्रियाणां व्यवहारः संभवति । न चानध्यस्तात्मभावेन

देहेन कश्चिद्व्यप्रियते । न चैतस्मिन्सर्वस्मिन्नसति असङ्गस्यात्मनः प्रमातृत्व-
मुपपद्यते । न च प्रमातृत्वमन्तरेण प्रमाणप्रवृत्तिरस्ति । तस्मादविद्या-
वद्विषयाण्येव । प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणानि शास्त्राणि च । पश्चादिभिश्चा-
विशेषात् । तथा हि पश्चादयः शब्दादिभिः श्रोत्रादीनां सम्बन्धे सति,
शब्दादिविज्ञाने प्रतिकूले जाते ततो निवर्तन्ते, अनुकूले च प्रवर्तन्ते ; यथा
दण्डोद्यतकरं पुरुषमभिमुखमुपलभ्य मां हन्तुमयमिच्छतीति पलायितुमारभन्ते,
हरिततृणपूर्णपाणिमुपलभ्य तं प्रत्यभिमुखी भवन्ति ; एवं पुरुषा अपि
व्युत्पन्नचित्ताः क्रूरदृष्टीनाक्रोशतः खड्गोद्यतकरान् बलवत उपलभ्य ततो
निवर्तन्ते, तद्विपरीतान्प्रति प्रवर्तन्ते च प्रसिद्धोऽविवेकपुररसः प्रत्यक्षादि-
व्यवहारः, तत्सामान्यदर्शनाद्युत्पत्तिमतामपि पुरुषाणां प्रत्यक्षादिव्यवहार-
स्तत्कालः समान इति निश्चीयते ॥ (VSB, 1,1,1)

(Contingent upon reciprocal superimposition all worldly conduct and religious action, which in their turn depend upon the means of knowing and the objects of knowledge, go on.... For one on whose body there is no superimposition of "I" and "mine", neither the desire to know can be known, nor will there be any scope for the operation of the means of knowing. There can be no sense-organs unless there is a body as their support. And no one can function without a superimposition of the self on the body. In the absence of all this, the subjective percipience for the self (who is by nature untainted) is impossible; and without such a subjective percipience the talk of means of knowing is meaningless. Therefore, all means of knowing including scripture presume some one that is subject to nescience.

This is so with regard to human beings as with regard to the animals. Their approach and avoidance tendencies are dependent upon their sensory apprehensions; human beings and animals alike employ means of knowing. Although animals lack fine discrimination, and humans are endowed with it, it does not make a difference as regards the employment of the means of knowing.)

18. न ह्यात्मागन्तुकः कस्यचित्, स्वयंप्रसिद्धत्वात् । न ह्यात्माऽऽत्मनः प्रमाणमपेक्ष्य सिध्यति । तस्य हि प्रत्यक्षादीनि प्रमाणान्यप्रसिद्धप्रमेयसिद्धय उपादीयन्ते । न ह्याकाशादयः पदार्थाः प्रमाणादिव्यवहाराश्रयत्वात् प्रागेव प्रमाणादिव्यवहारात्सिध्यति ॥ (VSB, 2,3,7)

(The self of no man is adventitious, for it is self-evident. Its assumption cannot therefore be made dependent upon means of knowing; in fact, it is the self that employs these means of knowing such as perception to ascertain the existence of things not yet known. The existence of self is thus established even before the means of knowledge begin to operate.)

ŚAMKARA

A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

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A PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY

Vidyāṅkārā

Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao

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TO MY WIFE

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INTRODUCTION

Śaṅkara (or Śaṅkarācārya as he is known to Indians) is the brightest star in the firmament of India's intellect. The dazzling brilliance of his mind has survived the passage of centuries; its influence has been both wide-spread and profound. The fact that he, a mere human monk, was soon deified and considered by a large section of Indian population as an incarnation of the god Śiva himself is ample illustration of his hold on the nation's imagination. The impact of his personality was felt all over the country; his erudition and intellectual eminence were recognised even during his life-time (which incidentally was very brief); his intuition and genius have since won him an abiding celebrity. As a philosopher, as a thinker, as a scholar, as a writer and as a poet, his greatness was titanic; as an orator, as a debater and as an organiser, his eminence was of no mean order. He indeed belonged to a race of men that occur rarely and when they do, hold the world in wonder.

There is conflicting evidence concerning the date of Śaṅkara. While there is an orthodox opinion which places him in a very distant past, long before the birth of Christ, there are scholars ready to assign him to the tenth century after Christ. But there are several historical facts which facilitate an approximate fixing of his date and time: his contemporaneity, for instance, with Kumārila and

Dharmakīrti (whose dates are nearly definitely fixed), his visit to Nepal during the reign of King Vṛṣadeva, his mention in his works of the Kerala King Bālavarmān, his meeting with another illustrious philosopher, Gauḍapāda; his having been a teacher of Maṇḍana-miśra, who was also a student with the poet Bhavabhūti and the philosopher Prabhākara under Kumārila. After a close examination of all these evidences, modern scholarship has assigned 655-687 A.D. as dates marking the beginning and close of Śamkara's life. The influence that stemmed out of this exceedingly brief span of thirty-two years of his earthly existence is incredibly immense.

Born in an interior village in Kerala (southernmost province of India) as the only son of a poor Brahmin couple he soon acquired proficiency in Vedic lore. He distinguished himself as a child prodigy and at eight he was conversant with metaphysical doctrines! Even during boyhood he took to the life of a wandering mendicant, moved out of his home and settled down for a while as a student under Govindapāda on the banks of Narmadā (in the present Andhra province). His inquiring turn of mind prompted a critical study of the Vedāntic literature as it then prevailed, and a serious consideration of the conflicting ideologies current in the country at that time. The Vedic religion had deteriorated into a medley of superstitious dogmas and meaningless rituals; the high ideals of the ancestral sages were crumbling into shreds; the Jaina and Buddhist

protestants were aiming vital blows into the body of orthodoxy, which was already diseased with its own corruptions; in the absence of a healthy religious atmosphere, pernicious primitive cults with horrid and shameful rites were springing up with renewed vigour; the people at large were confused and were being duped and misguided into errors and regrets. It was indeed a terrible situation, and the times called for a saviour. And Śamkara undertook to answer the call. He expounded the true standpoint of the ancestral religion, and determined to propagate it. He travelled all over the country, lecturing and discussing, repudiating and persuading, writing and teaching.

Born as he was in a southern corner of India he established his supremacy even in Kashmir and drew near him devoted and brilliant pupils from all over the land. He strode across the stage like a giant and left behind him an immortal trail of glory. His end is shrouded in legendary mystery.

The important literary productions of Śamkara are in the nature of commentaries on Vedāntic scriptures: on the *Vedānta-Sūtras* of *Bādarayaṇa*, on the ten principal *Upaniṣads* and on the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Of these, the first is the most magnificent work, a bulky treatise exhibiting erudition, profundity and consummate skill in exposition. This work stimulated an excellent commentary on itself,

Bhāmātī, by Vācaspatimiśra (c. 840 A.D.) which in turn was commented upon by Amalānanda (c. 1247 A.D.) in his *Kalpataru*, which again was exquisitely annotated by Appaya Dīkṣita (c. 1600) in his *Parimalā*. This grand work of Śaṁkara established a rich tradition of philosophical thought. Besides the commentaries, numerous independent treatises in poetic style of which *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi* and *Upadeśasāhasri* are justly famous, are ascribed to Śaṁkara.

Śaṁkara had the good fortune of being the teacher of several brilliant students: Maṇḍana, the author of a *Vārttika* on Śaṁkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, and of the excellent tract, *Brahmasiddhi*; Sureśvara, the author of *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*; Padmapāda, the great author of *Pañcapādikā* were junior contemporaries of Śaṁkara. He also inspired a long succession of excellent minds: Vācaspatimiśra wrote Bhāmātī as a commentary on Śaṁkara's *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, and *Tattvasamīkṣā* as a commentary on Maṇḍana's *Brahmasiddhi*. Sureśvara's pupil, Sarvajñātman (c. 850 A.D.), in his lucid treatise *Samkṣepaśārīraka*, explained the essential philosophical standpoint of Śaṁkara, and formulated the problems involved in it. Ānandabodha (c. eleventh century), Śrīharṣa (c. twelfth century), Citsukha (c. 1220), Ānandajñāna (thirteenth century), the anonymous author of *Prakāṣārthavivarāṇa* (c. 1200), Vimuktātman (c. 1200), Vidyāraṇya (about 1350), Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī (1500), and Appayadīkṣita (about 1550) are important names in the

history of the Śamkara school of thought: they helped Śamkara's ideas to expand and deepen, and also corrected, added and amended the original doctrines.

The particular view-point which Śamkara upheld is a highly subtle and intricate metaphysical doctrine styled as *Advaita-vāda* or Non-dualism. It affirms the one Real without a second, and rejects the phenomenal world as but an illusory distortion, which is explained by the theory of 'projection' (*māyā*). While expounding this theory Śamkara discusses at great length the psychological processes at work in both perception and projection.

An attempt has here been made to construct the psychological standpoint of *Advaita-vāda* as contained principally in the works of Śamkara. The standpoint has of course been enriched enormously by the later writers belonging to this school, but for purposes of this monograph attention is confined to Śamkara's own writings. I have elsewhere endeavoured to delineate the interesting but intricate speculations of the post-Śamkara advaitins concerning the problems of self, of consciousness, of perceptual processes and errors.

The substance of this monograph was submitted over ten years ago to the University of Mysore as a thesis for which the degree of Master of Arts was awarded. Since then from time to time I have recast the writing, and the present publication is vastly different from the thesis as it was

submitted. I have excluded all metaphysical matter, and have avoided the temptation to cite Western parallels and modern equivalents of many of Śaṁkara's conceptions.

I must acknowledge the inspiration I received from the celebrated and saintly scholar of this country, Professor M. Hiriyanna; the encouragement I received from my teacher, Professor B. Kuppuswami; the interested attention which was accorded my work by my erstwhile chief, Dr M. V. Govindaswamy; and the promptness with which my friend, Mr K. Chidambaram, took up this work for publication.

S.K.R

1. THE IDEOLOGICAL STANDPOINT

Evolution

Reality has two aspects: existence, the precise nature of which eludes our comprehension; and its phenomenal appearance which forms the locus and data of our experience. Philosophical doctrines apart, this division implies that the universe as is presented to us does not comprehend the whole reality. The universe is vast, infinitely vaster than our imaginations can construct or our reasoning apprehend; but reality is vaster still, for it includes everything that *is* and suffers nothing beyond.

The Indian argument known as *vivarta-vāda*, which is peculiar to the *Advaitic* system of thought, holds that the 'real' did not produce the phenomena, but was itself transformed into the latter:¹ the transformation was not sudden, but gradual; not helter-skelter, but orderly. This position signifies that (1) the phenomenal processes develop spontaneously and do not depend upon an extraneous force either for their sustenance or progression;² (2) the phenomena all agree in their essential identity, the apparent diversity being due to modes of progression by differentiation; and (3) the phenomenal development is not

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1. *Śaṅkṣepaśārīraka* has this verse :
vivartavādasya hi pūrvabhūmī-
vedāntavāde pariṇāmapadaḥ;
vyavasthite'smin pariṇāmapade
svayaṁ samāyāti vivartavadaḥ.
 2. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.4.23

blind or mechanical. The world, in other words, is not a chance creation; it subserves some purpose. This is suggested by the fact that changes in the world are found to assume the form of ascent (*āroha*), progression, evolution, or a continuous, consistent movement to higher and higher forms.³ The world on the surface is not uniform; there is diversity, there is change; but it is not chaotic, there always obtains an order. A pattern runs through diversity and changes obey certain recognisable laws.

Śamkara recognises that evolution started from non-life and passed on to life; as an explanation he suggests that the 'Self' seeks increasingly wider expressions and moves from more limited to less limited possibilities. The substance that was a mere lump of matter tends to become endowed with life: alive, alert and active. At some stage of evolution this passage was accomplished but involved no break in the evolutionary chain. Non-life and life are not two different orders of existence; they are but two stages in the long evolutionary procession. It was non-life in fact that became life in order to achieve superior possibilities; it became more complicated and more specialised so as 'to conquer higher and higher worlds'. Life is no special creation, it is as much an evolute as non-life is. 'We must assume', writes Śamkara, 'that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is at present seen to develop: by means of names and forms ...

3. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 1.9.2. '*Paramparam variyo viśiṣṭataram asya jīvanam bhavati, viduṣo drṣṭam phalam adrṣṭam ca paro'variyaḥ, uttarottara-viśiṣṭatarān eva lokān jayati.*'

for we have no reason to make assumptions contrary to what is actually observed at present'.⁴ The world started from obscure beginnings and has gradually been evolving and expanding; in such a process, life and nonlife are two major patterns that have come to stay. The former is what we call the animate kingdom (*jangama*) which comprehends innumerable species of living creatures, and the latter is the inanimate world (*sthāvara*), consisting of countless things and objects.

Both kingdoms are alike constituted by elements and their compounds. The entire universe is represented as falling into three compact categories: elements which are the ultimate constituent units of all matter; compounds which we see around us in the form of 'bodies'; and sense organs that 'shine'.⁵ Elements are styled as causes (*kāraṇa*), bodies as effects (*kārya*) and senseorgans as instruments (*karaṇa*). Of elements, two classes are recognised: subtle and gross. There are five subtle elements and the order of their emergence is as follows: from the Absolute-in-unmanifest-state proceeded ether (*ākāśa*), from it air (*vāyu*) and thence fire (*tejas*), from it water (*āp*) and finally earth (*pr̥thivī*). Each is characterised by a distinctive quality: sound, energy, heat-light, taste and smell, in order. These qualities constitute the entire stuff of the elements and hence the term, *tanmātra* ('that only'), has come into currency. These subtle elements intermix in various proportions and bring about the 'gross' elements by a

4. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.4.15

5. 'devaḥ' from the root div., to shine : 'dyotanād devaḥ'.

process known as *pañcīkaraṇa*.⁶ The attributes of the five gross-elements are: *ākāśa*-sound; *vāyu*-sound and energy; *tejas*-sound, energy and heat-light; *āp*-sound, energy, heat-light and taste; and *prthivī*-sound, energy, heat-light, taste and smell. These combine and form compounds in our everyday life; the difference between compounds is due to the variance in the proportions of the five elements. These compounds interact and produce the body in the course of evolutionary development. And with body as basis, the senseorgans (*indriyasthānas*) emerge.

What is the nature of evolution? How does evolution proceed? Śaṅkara postulates progress by differentiation: he speaks of the unmanifest Absolute as the greatest and most common universal and all phenomena as systems of universal differentiations (*sāmānya-viśeṣas*). The Absolute is the ground of all this phenomena; it is a differentiation (*viśeṣa*) of nothing. It is the highest and most general genus (*sarvasāmānya*); all other differentiations spring from it. Each differentiation, however, serves as a *sāmānya* for further differentiations. 'The *sāmānya* supports the *viśeṣas* by endowing on them its own nature'.⁷ In fact, Śaṅkara speaks of the *sāmānya* as the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the differentiation which is an effect (*kārya*); it is also an accepted tenet of his theory that the effect is essentially of the same nature as the cause. *Sāmānya* is the basic nature (*svarūpa*) while differentiations are but modifications

6. Cf. Sadāśiva Brahmendra's *Pañcīkaraṇa*, Srirangam, 1906.

7. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.4.7, Kokilesvar Sastri: Introduction to Advaita Philosophy, 1926, p.30

(*vikriyās*)⁸ thereof. Vācaspatimīśra, the great commentator on Śaṅkara, speaks of the supporter-supported (*ādhāra-ādheya*) relationship between them.⁹ Śaṅkara also illustrates the point that we observe in the world, the *viśeṣas* springing from the *sāmānya*, as for instance, pot from mud. From the general the particulars are bred, and from each particular further particulars are obtained, even as from the main stem of the tree spring forth the major shoots, from each of which, shootlets issue. The universe is therefore a long and continuous series of differentiations. However, the serial differentiation (*pāramparya-gati*) is always progressive, not regressive: evolution therefore involves an increase in the number of species of beings.

But multitudinous differentiations do not affect the fundamental unity of the universe; modifications do not alter the essential nature. On the surface the universe appears to be torn into innumerable categories, but deep below we find one stream running through them all. The principle underlying evolution continues unimpaired through all the variety of evolutes; the basic pattern is not obscured in the network of manifold species, types and kinds; at all levels of evolution, the same principle operates. Evolution is continuous and continuously progressive also because new and specialised forms are assumed without forsaking the basic principle.¹⁰ The different species and individuals

8. 'Viśeṣas tu vikriyā', Śaṅkaragranthāvaliḥ, Vol. VI., p.117 (Śrīraṅgam).

9. *Bhāmati*, p.176

10. *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, 2.6

are 'knit' (*anusyūta*)¹¹ in it to form an unbroken series : unity amidst the diversity.

How is continuity in this evolving universe maintained? Śaṁkara explicitly denies any extraneous control: the universe proceeds by its own activity and is 'held together by the stream of work and impressions of innumerable beings in combination'.¹² The universe is a series of actions and results and it is this chain of work-result-impression that maintains continuity in evolution. In other words, activity in the universe is a positive and basic fact; by virtue of this activity, every creature continually becomes another and thus evolution proceeds. 'The self (as agent of action previously) becomes that which is affected by action at the same time, owing to modification. The self although in full existence previous to action, modifies itself into something special (i.e., self of the effect)'.¹³ Every action leaves its impression by modifying the organism to an extent. The organism after the action is not identical with the organism before: action will continuously transform the organism despite the thread of identity running through it. Activity at no time ceases during the life-course of an organism and hence continuity in the consequent modifications. How are the modifications effected and retained? Śaṁkara suggests as an explanation the role of impressions (*vāsanā*). The organism engages itself in an act and achieves an appropriate result, whether or not intended. This involves

11. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 7.7

12. *Bṛhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 1.5.2

13. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.4.26

an experience and so the internal psychic instrument is involved; the experience expresses itself as a function of this instrument. At the end of this experience, the function will settle down in an abbreviated form as an impression. Every action is accompanied by a result and every result by virtue of modifying the internal organ is conserved as an impression. These impressions, says Śamkara, 'take part in initiating fresh actions as well as in bringing past action to fruition'.¹⁴

Organism

'Matter', says Śamkara, 'is the essence of all living creatures';¹⁵ and the organism is 'a material aggregate endowed with life'. The Sanskrit word for life is *prāṇa* : *pra* means 'motion' and *āna* is 'that which pervades activity of all kind'.¹⁶ That is to say, an organism moves and acts: locomotion and action are the chief marks of life: Śamkara elsewhere¹⁷ speaks of awareness (*caitanya*) as the essential attribute of life, suggesting that an organism at whatever stages of evolution, is aware of itself in relation to the surrounding world. And this awareness is never found to lapse during the life-course of an organism. Life is also the earliest of bodily functions, for it attains maturity the moment it appears, at the conceptional stage of the organism while all other functions have a history before they mature and inevitably await the maturity of the

14. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.4.3

15. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 1.7.2

16. *Ibid.*, 5.2.1

17. *Ibid.*, 3.14.2

respective organs.¹⁸ It is not the activity of any one organ, but the total function of the body. Śaṁkara admits that 'it does not transcend the body'.¹⁹ The vital current abides in the body filling every particle thereof, and cannot exist independently of the body.

Life is said to possess two powers : of knowledge and of action.²⁰ An organism *knows*, or is aware of, the surrounding facts and also *acts* to establish adequate contact with them; the organism, in other words, knows and keeps its place in the world. It is with this twofold purpose in view that sensory and other organs and functions are employed as tools and agents. Life thus is the prime vital force in the body keeping every tissue alive, regulating and directing the inner mechanism and allowing various functions to take place both inside and outside the body.²¹ Our different organs owe their capacity to perform their respective tasks to this fundamental function; with *prāṇa* intact, we know the outer world and behave in an appropriate manner.

This prime vital current, *prāṇa*, in the body is manifested in five different aspects. The first and the most elementary aspect is the simple function of 'forward movement' or respiration: 'it is the energy which directly

18. Ibid., 5.1.1

19. Ibid., 3.12.3

20. Ibid., 3.14.2

21. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 2.7

controls the process of inhaling and exhaling'.²² The second function is termed *apāna* or 'backward movement'; and is described as the energy responsible for clearing the body of waste materials like excreta and urine. The third is *vyāna*, which is supposed to mediate between the above two functions: 'It circulates energy throughout the entire nervous system'.²³ And this plays an important role in acts where physical prowess and strength are employed. Fourthly, *udāna* or 'ascending function' is the principle of wearing out or death: it is ultimately responsible for the passing out of life from the body. And finally, *samāna* is the energy active in assimilation and digestion; it is also responsible for the distribution of digested food (food-juices) 'equally' throughout the body. Śamkara speaks of it as the agent in reducing all food and drink to an 'equilibrium', and also as linked with 'the internal psychic organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*).²⁴ These five represent different offices of the same prime vital force (*mukhya-prāṇa*), and embody the basic operations that help the bodily preservation and growth.

During sleep, the senseorgans and mind which are the chief instruments of transaction with the outer world, do not function; but the vital current continues to be active, for without it the sleep would be interminable, the body would be said to have died. The continuity between waking,

22. Sircar, M.N. : System of the Vedantic Thought and Culture, p.139

23. Ibid., p. 140.

24. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.13.4

sleeping and re-waking is maintained by the incessant activity of this vital current. But there is no means by which it can directly transact with phenomena, for nothing is an 'object' to it; hence it is not an instrument as the senseorgans are.²⁵ The function of life is to keep the body-machine fit to transact with things and events that occur in the world; and the actual working of the body-machine is looked after by different special 'agents' such as the senseorgans, which inevitably presuppose the presence of life.

25. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.19.

II. SENSATION : ITS MECHANISM AND FUNCTION

Body and Senses

The physical frame of man is technically described as 'the ephemeral conglomeration of effect-instruments'.¹ Śaṅkara explains: All emanations of nature are included by the term 'effect'. Effect is always an evolute or modification, and that which undergoes modifications or from which effects arise, is termed the 'cause', namely nature. And the term 'effect' includes not only the physical body but all emanations of nature such as elements, sensory objects (*atigrahas*) and other modifications of nature. The term 'instrument' includes not only the group of ten senses, two aspects of mind and the vital current, but all attributes born of nature and are of the description of pleasure, pain and ignorance.² The instruments are located and lodged in the body and can have no existence independent of it; it is impossible for them to quit the body at pleasure or re-enter it at will.³ It is likewise true that the body cannot function without the senses; it is in fact the senses that 'move' the body,⁴ which by itself is inert. While thus the body serves as the basis or ground (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the senses to be and to act, senses function as managers or directors for the body in its multifarious activities. The physical frame of

1. 'Kāryakāraṇasaṃghāta'.

2. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.20

3. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.1.15

4. *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṃgraha*, 537.

man-or of any organism, for that matter-is in this way an integrated whole wherein are indistinguishably welded together the body and senses.

In the delineation of the origin of the physical frame Śāṁkara closely follows the earlier speculations. The subtle elements, ether, air, fire, water and earth came out in gradual succession from the great unmanifest Absolute. Owing to the three-fold functions of illumination (*sattva*), movement (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*) each element becomes possessed of two powers, viz., of knowledge and of action, thus becoming responsible for the emanation of two senses each. Hence are derived the five cognitive senses: sound, sight, touch, taste and smell, and five conative functions: speech, prehension, locomotion, excretion and generation. By the predominance of the cognitive aspect the internal organ (*antahkaraṇa*) emerges with its twofold form of *buddhi* and *manas*, and by the predominance of the active aspect the vital current emerges with its fivefold functions of *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*. All these constitute the 'subtle body' (*sūkṣma-śarīra*). But this being incapable of either existing or functioning independently, nature took resort to the process of *pañcīkaraṇa* and brought forth the 'gross body' (*sthūla-śarīra*). In this were lodged the members of the 'subtle body', for this was specially designed for 'enjoying', i.e., transacting with the world.⁵ Śāṁkara speaks of the 'gross body' as the locus of experience or enjoyment of the world (*bhogāyatana*)

5. *Siddhāntabindu* (Madhusūdana-Sarasvatī), p.58.

and the 'subtle body' as the means of experience (*bhogasādhana*).⁶

Although the body is the locus and senses are the means of experience, they are however not the real experiencers.⁷ The argument in this behalf is as follows: We have three states of experience, namely, waking, dream and sleep; all of them are equally experiences. If body should be the experiencer, then experience should be confined to the waking state for in the other two states the role played by the body is almost nil. If, on the other hand, we assume the senses to be experiencers we must exclude sleep from experience, for there the senses cease to function. And also, if each senseorgan were independent, sight and touch may never synchronise, and memory, perception, wish etc., fail to be connected. The eye sees the bell and the ear hears the ringing sound; but a statement like 'the sound comes from the bell' or 'I hear the bell ringing', would be unjustified. If each sense were an experiencer in its own right, then correspondence or coordination would be impossible. But, in the words of Troland, the very concept of experience implies 'a distinctive system of elements and processes occurring in point-to-point correlation with the higher coordinative phases of nervous action'⁸ in an organism. Experience is a system, its essential functions being coincidence, correspondence, correlation and coordination. We find,

6. *Ātmabodha*, 13,14.

7. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.15.

8. Troland, L.T.: Psychophysiology, Vol.1,1929, p.86.

therefore, that experience, for which the body is meant and the senses are employed, necessitates the assumption of some entity, remaining in the body pervading it and the senses, and also exerting a unifying influence: this is the 'self' (*jīva*), the real experiencer. '*Jīva*', says Śaṅkara, 'is of the nature of consciousness, lord of the body and bearer of the senses'.⁹ The self is to be construed as the conscious principle in the physical frame responsible for its unified action; the 'light' of self being there, this physical lump of effect-instruments functions as alive and conscious.¹⁰

The self is conceived as fitted with five sheaths or coverings (*koṣās*), in a manner like Pandora's boxes. The outermost covering is the physical body (*annamayakoṣa*) and the innermost is the utter and undifferentiated satisfaction that we have in deep, dreamless sleep (*ānandamayakoṣa*); in between the two are three coverings *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *vijñānamaya*.¹¹ The outermost covering, the gross body (*sthūladeha*), is *annamaya* because it is supposed to be produced by food (*anna*) eaten by the parents and nourished by food; it would collapse if deprived of food. It is through this covering that the self transacts with the world; it is physical and tangible. More internal than this is the *prāṇamayakoṣa*, the covering of life, comprising the fivefold vital functions together with five active senses; these are lodged in the body and are neither gross nor external. The body is immediately influenced and controlled by this

9. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.6.

10. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.7

11. *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, 443-447.

covering: as a tree moves its branches in diverse directions, blown by the wind, even so the body engages itself in diverse activities being animated by the vital current and activated by the five active senses.¹² Further interior is the *manomayaakoṣa*, the covering of Mind, constituted by the mind and five cognitive senses. Here are detailed the major experiencing instruments: eye, ear, skin, nose and tongue, and mind as the controller of these. This covering is responsible for our various mental activities like thinking, willing, doubting, feeling happy or sad, and desiring things. The predominance of mind over the senses is an interesting speculation, as also the notion that this covering immediately controls the system of vital currents. And this in turn is directed by a covering more internal to it, the *vijñānamayaakoṣa*. The form of the internal psychic instrument known as *buddhi* (intellect) is the center of this covering: it not only serves as a base for all senses in their respective functions, but is responsible also for the ego-feeling. It is at this level that the ego springs up to identify itself with all the actions of senses and body, evident in such assertions as 'I see', 'I go', 'I am happy'.¹³ The most internal of coverings, the *ānandamaya*, is immediate to the self. It is unfortunate that the Sanskrit word *ānanda* has no satisfactory synonym in English. It is not 'bliss' as is frequently translated, for bliss is happiness which is essentially an activity of the mind; it signifies rather an indescribable sense of satisfaction, an unqualified feeling of

12. Ibid., 381-384.

13. Ibid., 350-351.

complete comfort. This is characterised as the natural state of self and its nearest approach is the state of deep and dreamless sleep, marked by absolute tranquillity consequent on the cessation of all bodily and sensory activities.

Constitution

The physical body is a material aggregate, produced by physical processes; it is constituted of the same stuff as the rest of the universe, namely the five *pañcīkṛta* elements. The ancient account of the process at its production is quaint, if somewhat absurd also. The gross elements enter into the constitution of the body in the following manner: *earth* becomes bone, flesh, nerves, skin and hair; *water* becomes bile, blood, semen, secretions and sweat; *fire* becomes hunger, thirst, sleep, beauty and indolence; *air* turns into contraction, expansion and motion; the *ether* transforms itself into the spaces of the stomach, heart, neck and head.¹⁴ While the account may be dismissed as amusing at its best, it may be of interest to speculate on the rationale of the quality of space being made responsible for the 'cavities' of head, heart and stomach; the qualities of space and energy for the various bodily movements internal and outward; the qualities of space, energy, heat and light for digestion of food, assimilation, fatigue and need for bodily comfort (hunger, thirst, sleep and indolence); the qualities of space, energy, heat-light and taste for the liquid components of our body (blood, bile, secretions, semen, sweat and urine); and finally all the five attributes for the solid material in our body such as bone and flesh.

The *Aitareya-Upaniṣad*¹⁵ offers another account of the bodily constitution, equally incapable of satisfying our rational demands. Fire becoming speech (*vāk*) entered the mouth; air became life (*prāṇa*) and entered the nostrils; the sun becoming sight entered the eyes; ether or directions (*disaḥ*) becoming audition entered the ears; earth- (the text has *oṣadha-vanaspatayaḥ*, which symbolise earth) - becoming the hairy portion (*loma*) entered the skin; the moon becoming mind entered the heart; the death becoming *apāna* entered the navel (*nābhi*), which according to Śaṁkara is the place where all the vital currents of the body are tied;¹⁶ and finally water becoming semen entered the organ of procreation.

In his treatment of the senses, Śaṁkara follows an ancient distinction between sense-function (*indriya-vṛtti*) and sense-structure (*indriya-sthāna*). Function being the 'capacity to perceive the respective objects'¹⁷ is said to belong to the 'subtle body'; but structures being a sort of gate allowing the functions to flow out into the world and allowing likewise the sensations from the external world to flow in, belong to the 'gross body'. In any sensory experience the following occur: the sense-organ, the sense-function and the sense-object.

14. Sircar, M.N.: *Comparative Studies of Vedantism*, 1927, p.126.

15. *Khaṇḍa* 2.

16. *Aitareyabhāṣya*, II. '*Sarvaprāṇabandhanasthāna*'

17. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.17.

Each senseorgan reveals the senseobjects of a particular type and its constitution therefore is akin to that of the senseobject. 'The organs are of the same category as the objects: the organs are but modes of the objects in order to perceive them, as light (which is but a mode of colour) is an instrument for revealing all colours. Similarly organs are but modes of all particular objects in order to perceive them, as in the case of the lamp'.¹⁸ The emergence of each sense from its particular causal element presupposes its capacity toprehend the objects of that particular elemental group. To put it simply, the eye cannot grasp sound, nor the nose form, due to the mere fact that their constitutions are different, that there is nothing common between eye and sound or between nose and form. 'By the portion of ether in it, ear grasps sound, its nature; by the portion of air in it, skin grasps touch, its nature; by the portion of fire in it, eye grasps form, its nature; by the portion of water in it, tongue grasps taste, its nature; by the portion of earth in it, nose grasps smell, its nature; by the portion of ether, the organ of speech makes speech movements; by the portion of air, the organ of locomotion makes for movements; by the portion of fire the hands grasp, worship etc.; by the portion of water, the kidneys expel urine and semen; by the portion of earth, the bowels expel excreta'.¹⁹ Each senseorgan, therefore, serves as an exit for its function and as an entrance for its object, because it is in

18. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.4.11.

19. *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha*, 411-416.

continuity with both of them by way of common causation and common constitution.

Specialisation

The sense according to the Śamkara school of thought, is neither the physical organ (*golaka*) as the Buddhists hold, nor the capacity (*Śakti*) of that physical and visible organ as the Mimāmsakas hold, but a distinct function having its locus in the senseorgan.²⁰ It is also pointed out that sense experience need not always or necessarily imply, or depend upon, a senseorgan; the sense is essentially a function and its particular organ is nothing more than a seat (*sthāna*). Śamkara, however, believes that 'senses begin to function only when their special seats, such as eye and ear, are formed'.²¹ Experience prior to the emergence of individual senseorgans is *en masse*, comprising of undifferentiated amorphous sensations. On the emergence of a senseorgan, certain details forming an aspect of the field of experience are selected and thus the field comes to be structured. The underlying thought in this speculation strongly suggests a correspondence to our own idea of a stimulus as 'the differentiated field of incident energy' in a local environment.²² In an act of vision, for instance, the eye selects the visible forms and excludes other sensations like sound or touch which, however, are likewise selected by other organs like ear or skin. The eye is so constituted as

20. *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha* (Bharatīrtha), 4th varṇaka.

21. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.8.

22. Zigler, M.: *Encyclopaedia of Psychology*.

to be sensitive only to the radiant energy of the surrounding world; and the ear only to the vibratory stimulation. The sense thus implies specialisation, and hence a more efficient manner of knowing the world than the primitive *en masse* experience.

Although the experience reported by each sense is peculiar and distinct from others, there is no need on that account to postulate a multiplicity of experiencers. The eye indeed is different from the ear in both structure and function; but the subject who sees and hears may be the same. I see a table, approach and touch it: I have now perceived the object through two experiences-visual and tactual. But I am understood when I say that I have touched the table that I saw. Such a statement, however, would be meaningless were the senses the final experiencers or had there not been the notion of 'I'. There obtains, in other words, in any purposeful and meaningful act something common between different sense experiences that integrate them and give unity for the act. This something is a sort of central office which directs various sub-offices in diverse ways in order to run the entire organisation in an integrated and coordinated way; the chief manager works through different subordinate managers, each of whom controls his particular department, unlike their chief who has the ensemble of all departments in view. In like manner the various senses and their particular experiences are rendered meaningful by means of a central sense, the mind (*manas*). 'The senses perform their functions when grasped by

mind'.²³ The *Kātha Upaniṣad* illustrates the position with a homely and forceful simile: senses are horses tied to the body-chariot; the intellect (*buddhi*) is the charioteer, the mind (*manas*) acts as the reins through which the sense-horses are controlled, and self is the lord of the chariot.

Pressing the above metaphor further, the subordinate managers, although managers so far as their particular departments are concerned, are not managers in the sense that they can function at will and independently: their actions and movements are both caused and controlled by their common chief. This common control is the means of integration. Even so the senses, although experiencers in their limited fields, have no will of their own and hence may be described as 'inert' (*acetana*), even as an axe is but an instrument and does not act independently.²⁴ Apart from an agent no instrument can function; a pen does not 'write of its own accord, an axe does not hew wood all by itself. Senses in their original state are elemental, material and mechanical; and in this state they cannot function, neither see nor hear nor taste nor smell. The ability to apprehend is endowed on them by the vital current (*prāṇa*) when it enters into, and enlivens, them.

Doors of Perception

Senses have been described as mere instruments (*karaṇas*) at the disposal of *manas*. And *manas*, as will be evident in the next section is guided by *buddhi*; and these

23. *Kenabhāṣya*, 3.3.

24. *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, 543, 545.

two together constitute the internal psychic instrument (*antahkaraṇa*), whose purpose the senses serve. The psychic instrument is internal, whereas the objects of experience are located outside in the world; and experience is impossible without a contact between the two. It is the function of sense to establish this contact: it mediates between the two and this capacity is due to its location in the periphery of the body, a meeting-point of the inner agent and the outerworld. Sense in this sense is described as the 'door' (*dvāra*) through which the items of experience may pass. In this body, says Śaṁkara, the senses are located in order to function as doors of experience (*upalabdhidvārāṇi*). Had there been no senses, the agent of experience, (the internal organ) would be blind, a disabled prisoner in the windowless cage of the body, and the external world would have been there as an eternal virgin. 'When they are withdrawn, the individual self is not noticed at all; it is only when they occupy their respective positions in the body that the individual self is noticed as experiencing objects'.²⁵

How do the senses function as doors of experience? Śaṁkara answers: 'Sound is the object of hearing; it stimulates the ear, its senseorgan; when thus the ear is stimulated, discrimination arises in mind and through mind one engages in outward action'.²⁶ In this account are involved three important ideas. First, the object somehow

25. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.2.1

26. *Ibid.*, 4.3.5

makes itself felt by the senseorgan which functions as a receptor: if it is light, it sends out rays through ether which the eye catches; if it is sound, it sends out waves through air which the ear grasps. The senseorgan is doubtless the preliminary requisite, for without the senses there is no possibility of any experience at all.²⁷ Second, the sensory apprehension is then transformed into the mental, when we become aware of the objective presentation. At this stage the sense passes its responsibility to the mind which functions as the central psychic exchange: the mind by its contact with the senseorgan cognises the sensation as belonging to a particular class: form, sound, taste etc. And finally, the mental comprehension is translated back into a physical process leading to behaviour in relation to the cognised object: an 'activity gradient'.

That sensation is an essential aspect of perception is emphasised by the notions that the senses function only in the presence of their respective objects and that the faculty of grasping the object is peculiar only to the senses and not to any other bodily instruments.²⁸ The sense, however, functions only in the 'present'.²⁹ I cannot now perceive, for instance, the star that was there yesterday, nor can I now witness the eclipse that might happen two years hence. Another requisite for perception is the location of the object in the actual space before the perceiving agent, in the field of his vision; the Tower of London does indeed

27. Cf. *Bhāmātī*, p.47.

28. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.19.

29. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 8.12.5

exist in the present time, but I cannot perceive it because it falls beyond my field of vision. We speak of a temporal and spatial psychophysical simultaneity as indispensable for perception; it is technically termed '*indriyārthasannikarṣa*' (contact between object and sense). The third requisite for perception is that the object should be '*abhivyaktiyogya*', capable of being perceived: no one, for instance, can perceive ether, nor can one perceive the details of the sun. 'Senses comprehend existing things having name and form'.³⁰ Unless these three conditions are satisfied there can be no perception, for the possibility of sensation is barred and perception is founded on sensation; mind can cognise only on the report of sensations.

In perception the internal-organ assumes the form or mode (*vṛtti*) of the object and streams out through the sense outlet in order to pervade the object. When the *vṛtti* coincides with the object, perceptual knowledge is said to arise. Thus the sense organ serves not merely as a gate for the sensations to stream in, but functions also as an outlet for the 'mode of the internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti*) to flow out to meet the object and 'pervade' it. We have here the rudiments of the transactional theory of perception.

Senses enlighten, says Śamkara:³¹ they illumine objects and bring them into our view even as a lamp makes visible the objects that were hitherto enveloped in darkness. They also determine the special object of a sense. The senses are

30. *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, 2.6

31. *Īśāvāsyabhāṣya*, 1.4

instruments at the disposal of mind for cognising and communing with the outer world. As to the conditions under which the senses function, three of them may be noted. First, the senses begin to function only when their special organic seats like eye, ear etc., are formed; otherwise cognition will be *en masse*. Next, the senses are not spontaneous in their function; they must be 'grasped by the mind' before they function. They are said to become fit for action when the vital force (termed *Angīrasa*) which is the common 'self' of all the senses, animates them. And finally, the senses function when the object is spatially within reach, temporarily coexistent and has adequate receptivity.

III. MIND AND CONSCIOUSNESS

Attention

Senses are said to be 'superior to the gross body as they are subtler, more internal and have a wider field of action';¹ nevertheless they are merely 'instruments' and are incapable of spontaneous action. 'The functioning of the senses is an impossibility but for the control (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the 'internal organ' (*antaḥkaraṇa*).² In contradistinction to the external organs of sense, which are externally located (on the periphery of the body in direct contact with the objective world), the internal organ is lodged within the body, and its contact with the world is only indirect, through the former. The senses function at the behest of this internal organ which, although superior to the senses in the pattern of constitution, is equally physical and material. While the *tāmasic* aspect of the five elements combine to form the body, and the *rājasic* aspect the senses, only *sāttvic* or fine and subtle aspect of the elements unite in the production of the internal organ. The *tāmasic* predominance makes the body most concrete and gross, while the *sāttvic* predominance renders the internal organ abstract and subtle. In between are placed the senses (characterised by *rājasic* predominance); they are located in the former and serve as instruments for the latter. The highly subtle constitution of the internal organ makes it an excellent agent for knowledge.³

1. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 3.42.

2. *Bhāmatī*, p.47.

3. *Siddhāntabindu* (Madhusūdana), p.56.

In reality, the internal organ is not one organ but two organs: 'mind' (*manas*) and 'intellect' (*buddhi*). Sometimes the internal organ is said to be fourfold: *manas*, *buddhi*, *ahamkāra* (egoity), and *citta* (thought).⁴ Śamkara writes: 'The internal organ is variously termed *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta*, *viññāna* (knowledge) etc. This difference in nomenclature is due sometimes to the difference in the modifications of the internal organ'.⁵

The following passage from Śamkara is worthy of close examination: 'There is a doubt regarding the existence and nature of mind.... There is a mind apart from the external senseorgans like the ear. For it is well known that even when there is a connexion between the external organ, the object and the self, a man does not perceive the object which may be just in front... therefore it is understood that something else, viz., the internal organ called mind, which joins itself to the objects of all the organs, exists, in the absence of which the other organs, eye etc., fail to perceive their respective objects, form etc., although they have the capacity to do so, and in the presence of which they succeed in it'.⁶ Śamkara, it will be seen, considers here the objection that the mind is a superfluous and irrelevant hypothesis and attempts to answer it. He inclines to accept hypothesis of mind on the ground that an act of perception is incomplete without its intervention. The senseorgan might be in an excellent condition, the object might be

4. *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasārasaṅgraha*, 344.

5. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.34

6. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.5.3

quite fit for perception (*abhivyakti-yogya*) and there might even be a contact between the organ and the object. All this accomplishes only the first phase of the perceiving activity; the more important phase, however, is the transformation of this physical sensation into a 'mental discrimination'-which, in fact, is what gives the quality of perception to the bare sensation. What Śāmkara means by 'mind' in this context is attentivity. The senseorgan no doubt selects its objects out of a medley of chaotic presentations; although it is by nature thus selective, the selected elements fail to be 'meaningful' unless we attend to them. We perceive an object when attention ushers it to the focus of the field of consciousness. Senses succeed in their task of selection when mind attends. Śāmkara offers this fact of attention in successful selection as evidence for the existence of mind.

But mind is not just 'sensory attention', 'primarily involuntary and passive'.⁷ It is not attention in the sense that it is not an act but an attitude (*vorhalten*); it is attention in the sense that 'objects exist for us only in so far as we are attentive to them' (A. Messer). It is an active 'flowing out' in order to assume the mode of the objective presentation. Although the mode (*vṛtti*) is meant for fact-awareness, It is not merely a passively receptive experience, but an active process. Śāmkara speaks of it as 'exercising its own independent function toward objects'.⁸

7. Ward, J.: *Psychological Principles*, Cambridge 1918. p.69.

8. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.14.2

Common Sense

Mind, like the senses, is an instrument employed for acquiring knowledge of the external world. But unlike the senses, it is not confined to this or that particular class of objects: 'its sphere includes all external objects, and therefore, it (mind) is equally connected-with all the sense organs'.⁹ It is common to all the senses: 'it is the common instrument of the different manifestations of the power of knowledge',¹⁰ such as eye or ear. It is no doubt the eye that sees and the ear that hears-for activity does exist where it is seen-but the eye or ear has no power of its own to see or to hear; its apparent power is only 'reflected' from mind. Mind therefore knows all objects of the external world through the instrumentality of different senseorgans each of which is sensitive to a particular phase of the phenomenal world. The senses are complementary to each other and together they open up a comprehensive view of the external world. Behind each senseorgan is the mind, uniformly and equally occurring; it is not, however, distributed amongst them, but it is the uniform, undifferentiated background from which diverse figures emerge. Just as there is no possibility of figures occurring apart from the ground, even so senses fail to function, bereft of mind.¹¹ Mind is spoken of as the 'chief whom the other organs follow';¹² 'eye and other senses are under

9. *Kenabhāṣya*, 1.6.

10. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.4.7.

11. Cf. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 2.21.

12. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.4.17.

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the control of the mind, the highest of senses'.¹³ Śamkara also speaks of the 'separate use of the one mind along with each sense'.¹⁴

Thus mind, although an instrument of cognition like the senses, is 'superior' to the senses in as much as it is the prerequisite for the sense to function, and also the ultimate authority (relatively) in matters of cognition. Mind is termed the 'substratum of the experience of all such organs' (*āyatana*) and the 'substratum of the objects cognised by the senses for the sake of the person in the shape of perceptions'.¹⁵ It is 'superior' because it 'has all other senses and objects for its play of activity; this is the means whereby the knower knows everything....' Functions of mind consist of internal and external objects and serve as means of perception to the self.¹⁶ There is still another point of superiority that mind enjoys over the senses. The latter function only in the present, that is to say, in the presence of their appropriate objects. But mind can function not only in the present but in the past and future as well; and functions even when the external object-so essential for sense to function-is not ready at hand. Mind, in other words, can remember (function in the past), anticipate (function in the future) and imagine (function without the external object). Its function is not dependent

13. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.2.

14. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 15.9.

15. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.15.1

16. *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 5.2.

upon, though conditioned by, the external things of the world. In this sense it transcends the scope of the senses.

The need for mind is felt by the organism because of the limited scope wherein senses operate. The sense can only perceive the objects, it cannot retain them in the form of traces for future use; nor can it anticipate. Mind's existence is justified also as the means of 'distinguishing between perceptions; the sense organ alone cannot do this'.¹⁷ It is therefore often termed as eye of the eye, ear of the ear etc. 'By this one mind becoming the eye he sees'.¹⁸

Mind then is the prime instrument of cognition directing the other senseorgans to gather information from the outer world. The sense functions only with the cooperation of the mind, which cooperation is absolutely essential for 'right perception of the objects';¹⁹ the senses in this wise are benefited by the 'discriminative wisdom' with which mind is endowed. The senses are so constituted as to prehend the external objects; 'the senses by nature have only external things as objects'.²⁰ The knowledge of the exact nature of the things (*vastu-yāthātmya-jñāna*) should depend on the nature of things and not on one's imagination (*na puruṣabuddhyāpekṣaṁ, vastu-tantrameva*). Mind both by its constitution and location cannot directly come into contact with the external things and without such contact

17. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.5.4.

18. *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 5.2.

19. *Chāndogya*bhāṣya, 4.16.1.

20. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.2

no knowledge arises. In the dream state, for instance, when mind alone functions, the senses being at rest, there is no cognition of the outer world; for 'mind can do nothing without the help of the senses'.²¹ While senses are considered *pramāṇas* (sources of valid knowledge) mind is said to be but an auxiliary to a *pramāṇa*. Senses look to the mind for control and direction; mind looks to the senses for the supply of actual information from the physical world. Each without the other would be crippled and disabled, together they get to cognise the world. This fact is emphasised by the concept of body as '*kārya-kāraṇa-samghāta*' and mind is considered to be physical (*bhautika*) as much as other senses are. They are together looked upon as *dhātus*, as they support the body.²²

Modes of Mind

Mind is defined as 'that by which one thinks'²³ and thinking implies a power of reflection, by which power it 'urges the senseorgan towards its appropriate object'.²⁴ Thus cognition arises by the mind-directed sense contacting the object. Elsewhere,²⁵ mind is defined as 'the inner organ characterised by deliberation etc., possessing the power to reflect on the effects'. Although mind in conjunction with the senses perceives the outer world only, in its independent capacity its functions are manifold and various.

21. *Bhedadhikāra* (Nṛsimhāśramī), p.19.

22. *Kāthabhāṣya*, 2.2.0

23. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.18.1

24. *Ibid.*, 7.3.1.

25. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.2.1

'The modes of the activity of mind', says Śamkara, 'are desire, volition, deliberation, faith, negligence, boldness, timidity, shame, intelligence, fear etc.'²⁶ In an old *Upaniṣad*,²⁷ we get the following list of such psychological modes:

consciousness (*saṁjñāna*)
 direction (*ājñāna*)
 knowledge (*viññāna*)
 wisdom (*prajñāna*)
 retentivity (*medha*)
 perception of objects through the senses (*dṛṣṭi*),
 perseverance (*dhṛti*)
 thought (*mati*)
 imagination (*manīṣā*)
 distress, i.e., when ill etc. (*jūti*)
 recollection (*smṛti*)
 thinking of forms (*saṁkalpa*)
 application (*kratu*)
 self-preservation (*asu*)
 desire (*kāma*)
 sex-love (*vaśa*)

Elsewhere²⁸ some more functions are catalogued:

doubt (*vicikitsā*)
 faith or belief in unseen things and events (*śraddhā*)
 shame (*hrīḥ* or *lajjā*)
 fear (*bhaya*)
 intelligence (*dhīḥ*)

26. *Kenabhāṣya*, 1.6.

27. *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, 5.2.

28. *Bṛhadāranyakabhāṣya*, 1.5.4

All these are termed 'forms or modes of mind' (*manasaḥ rūpāṇi*); they are different varieties of the thinking process. Consciousness is simple awareness that enters into all other mental functions. Direction is the agency in the sense-function. Knowledge is of the outer world without the use of senses. Wisdom is the ability to discriminate. Retentivity is bringing the past experiences to bear on the present. Perseverance is the function of will, which is employed when fatigue has set in. Thought is perception of the internal objects or inward consideration of outer objects. Imagination is perception in the absence of external objects; this, however, is not hallucination for here is a voluntary perception and full understanding of the imaginary contents of the act, as in the case of artistic production. Distress is described as the mental state consequent on some physical injury or disease. Recollection is bringing into the present awareness traces of the experience of past events. *Samkalpa* is determining the form of the objects; this function is involved when we say, for instance, 'This is a circle', or 'It is a very hot day'. Application is a mental function in so far as it is mentally directed; it implies orientation, and that in turn discrimination. It is curious to note that self-preservation has been characterised as a mental state. Desire is longing for an object not got: 'Desire residing in the internal organ', says Śamkara, 'one remembers what one wants to remember and remembering the form of the object of desire one attains to memory'.²⁹ Sex-love is desire for the other

29. *Chândogyabhāṣya*, 7.14.1

sex for purposes of procreation. Doubt is oscillation: indecision as regards a course of action. Faith is belief in things and events although not cognised by senses. Intelligence is 'the faculty of realising at the proper moment, and of ascertaining the purposes of past and future events; this is the source of will'.³⁰ Shame is the feeling resulting from a reflection on past acts, prohibited or ignoble. Fear is the 'imaginative aversion' to causes of misery or danger. Anger is defined as enmity to causes of misery; and it is said to result when desire is frustrated.³¹ In the *Bhagavadgītā-bhāṣya* Śamkara defines perseverance as 'the patient attitude: a special attitude of mind which removes the exhaustion of body and senses when they are exhausted and, upheld by which act, they no longer feel exhausted'.³²

There is in one of the *Upaniṣads*³³ an interesting discussion regarding the relative priority or 'superiority' of the different functions of mind. After the premise that 'man acts and experiences only when mind obtains', will is affirmed as 'superior' to mere reflection; will is 'mind to do' (*cikīrṣā-buddhi*), and doing is meaningful only when it follows reflection. 'When one understands, he wills'; and the mindstuff (*citta*) is the source of will. Superior to mindstuff is contemplation; the former is mere understanding while the latter is 'continuous uninterrupted reflection'.

30. Ibid., 7.5.1

31. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 5.23

32. Op. cit., 16.3.

33. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, 7.4.1. seq.

Knowledge is superior still, for 'contemplation is caused by knowledge'. Superior to it, however, is 'power' which means the 'intuitive faculty' (*pratibhāna*) of mind. After a break in this chain of mental states by the interpolation of the elements, the thread is resumed with memory. Desire is superior to memory for there can be no memory without desire. Superior to memory is the life-principle (*prāṇa*), for 'everything centres in it as spokes in the nave of the wheel'. The above account acquires some meaning if superiority is taken in the sense of complexity. For instance, will is a more complex phenomenon than mere understanding, intelligence than will, contemplation than intelligence, knowledge than contemplation and so on. We may indeed speak of mental states as simple and complex, the complex states being composed of simpler ones.

What is the role of mind in cognition? Śamkara answers: The physical object as a presentational detail of the outer world impinges on a senseorgan which apprehends the stimulation, provided mind attends. This apprehension is then deposited in mind, which, owing to the predominance of *rajas* is always active except in deep sleep. The mind now is said to 'flow out' through the sense avenue and assume the form of the object presented. The form thus assumed by the mind (or the modality of mind) is termed a *vṛtti*. Mind in all beings is well known to be possessed of consciousness'³⁴ — which latter is described as a passive witness (*sākṣī*) and as the real subject. Cognition is impossible unless the subject-object

differentiation obtains: the subject 'extends' to the objective presentation. Śamkara's position is stated thus: 'The object is not mental, for it is a *presentation* to the subject. Yet it is private, its existence is not vouched for by others... (it is) constructed by the individual and remains for him alone'.³⁵ In an instance of cognition three entities are thus necessary: the object (*viśaya*), the subject (*pramāṭr*) and the subjective modification (*vr̥tti*).³⁶ The object stimulates the senseorgan and thus creates disturbances in the subject, or more properly in the mind; mind by its very constitution is dynamic and is 'increasingly active in receiving the forms of objects'. A mental counterpart of the object is constructed in the shape of a *vr̥tti*. The object, however, is cognised not as a mental image but as extended in space and time, as a physical object. 'In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea... that of which we are conscious cannot but exist. That the outward thing exists apart from consciousness has necessarily to be accepted because of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody when perceiving a post or a wall is conscious of his perceptions only, but all men are conscious of posts and walls as objects of their perception... general consciousness testifies to the existence of the external world'.³⁷ The idea indeed has the form of the object which is apprehended as external. Śamkara opposes the Buddhist argument that idea and object are identical.

35. M. Hiriyanna, Preface to *Iṣṭasiddhi*, G.O.S. Baroda.

36. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāja, University of Calcutta. P.44.

37. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.28.

Śamkara also discusses the function of mind from another standpoint.³⁸ Suppose there were no mind, all that exist being the self, the senses and the senseobjects. The following alternatives then would obtain: (1) The objects are designed to stimulate the senses; the senses are designed to receive the impressions from objects; the self is of the nature of uninterrupted consciousness; and therefore the result would be continuous perception; (2) in case the conjunction of self, senses and objects is ineffective there would be continuous non-perception; or (3) since neither perception nor non perception is continuous, 'obstacles' in the way either of self or of senseorgans must be assumed. As in experience we find actually that we perceive sometimes, do not perceive at other times and the assumption of obstacles in the way of self and senses being fantastic, we should, argues Śamkara, posit 'the existence of some subtle organ mediating between the self on the one hand and senses and their objects on the other.

He argues for the existence of mind from still another standpoint. 'Impossibility of the simultaneity of knowledge through various senseorgans is an indication of the existence of mind. Simultaneity of knowledge through all the senses is contradicted by experience'.³⁹ Śamkara is found to anticipate the later problem of the division of attention involving diverse sensations. Can we listen to a piece of music as well as see a picture at the same time?

38. Ibid., 2.3.32.

39. *Aitareyabhāṣya*, 4 (preface).

Śamkara answers in the negative. By implication, even a sense-perception is not a part behavior, it is the behavior of the organism as a whole—a total reaction; and, as such, only one sense can engage the organism at a time. This is because in the operation of each senseorgan mind is necessarily involved; and mind being one it functions with one senseorgan at a time. Śamkara's position compares well with the law of derived properties, formulated by R. H. Wheeler : 'Parts derive their properties from the whole.... The function of a given organ is derived through dynamic relationship between that organ and the body-as-a-whole'.⁴⁰ (Śamkara's 'mind' would-be an equivalent of Wheeler's body-as-a-whole.) Śamkara describes mind as the *āyatana*: and his statement that the 'senseorgans (i.e., parts) function only when grasped by mind (i.e., whole)'⁴¹ implies fully the Wheeler law. Śamkara argues that senseorgans are but parts which derive their power to function from mind (the 'whole'); if the senseorgans (parts) could function independently, numerous senseorgans could function simultaneously, and as this possibility is contradicted by experience, the existence of some whole which conditions the function of each senseorgan, should be assumed.

In the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (5.1) there occurs a story -concerning the dispute between eye, ear, speech, mind and *prāṇa* as to which of them was the best. It was agreed that each of them was to go out of the body one at a time, and

40. The Laws of Human Nature, Nisbet, Cambridge, 1931. p.74.

41. *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 4 (preface).

that organ without which man could not live was to be adjudged as the best. First, the eye went out, but on its return it found the man living-only as blind men do; the ear went out but it left the man only deaf but alive all the same; then speech went out but man lived on, as if dumb; then mind went out and the Scripture says that man continued to live, but 'just as children do, without mind'. The rest of the story is of no interest to us; what is noteworthy is the suggestion that only adults have mind but not children. Śamkara, however, appreciates the gross error of such a suggestion and interprets 'without mind' (*amanasaḥ*) to mean 'with undeveloped mind' (*aprarūḍha manasaḥ*). This interpretation further suggests that mind gradually develops and attains maturity in the adult stage of human life.

In the same *Upaniṣad* (6.5.1) there is an account of how the food eaten is transformed into different parts of the body: the 'gross' part of the food is said to become faeces, the 'middle' part flesh and the 'subtle' part mind. Śamkara's comment on this account is interesting: he argues against any part of food actually becoming mind and explains the textual 'becomes mind' to mean 'helps mind to grow'.

Explaining the important role of mind in the life of man, Śamkara remarks: The ability of the body to do many things generally depends upon mind; it is well known in the world that men with strong minds pass for strong men.⁴²

42. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 6.7.1.

The *Buddhi*

Mind can function when *buddhi* (intellect) shines within. *Buddhi* is said to be the 'rudiment of elements from which mind originates'.⁴³ Even as mind controls the senses, *buddhi* controls the mind. 'Mind can think, because it is enlightened by the *buddhi* shining within; mind is thus capable of its activity'.⁴⁴ It pervades mind and the senses. Śamkara explains that it is the instrument that helps us in everything like a lamp in darkness. 'Every object is perceived only as associated with the light of the *buddhi*, as objects in the dark are lightened up by a lamp placed in front: the other organs are but channels for it'.⁴⁵

The word *buddhi* needs an explanation as it does not admit of an exact English equivalent. While the frequent rendering of it as 'intellect' or 'intelligence' would philosophically serve the purpose, it should be borne in mind that it is neither a faculty nor a mental state. The word has been imported into Vedānta from the Sāṅkhyan ideology, and its strict connotation implies the pre-mental condition of consciousness.

There are accounts in the old texts of the ascending degrees of subtlety: the grossest part of our equipment is the body; 'higher in order' are the senses-subtler than the former; and subtler still is the mind; next is *buddhi* and the subtlest is the Self.⁴⁶ 'The *buddhi* is transparent and

43. *Kāṭhābhāṣya*, 3.10

44. *Kenābhāṣya*, 1.6.

45. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.7

46. *Kāṭha Upaniṣad*, 3.10.

next to Self: it easily catches the reflection of the Self. Next is mind (*manas*), which catches the reflection of Self through *buddhi*; then come the organs through contact with *manas*; and lastly the body, through the organs'.⁴⁷ The *buddhi* is subtler and more 'internal' than mind but grosser and more 'external' than the Self; its position is between Self and mind: it directs the mind but is directed by Self. The senseorgan has a limited scope in the apprehension of objects; the scope of mind is larger, for it comprehends the objects of all the senses and also the 'internal objects' (thoughts).⁴⁸ But *buddhi* has everything (with the exception of self) included in its scope. Just as a senseorgan functions as a door for the mind, even so the mind is a door for the *buddhi*. It is so 'internal' and so indispensable in all experience that it is sometimes mistaken for Self, 'because it pervades mind and other senses'.

In the picturesque account of the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* the body is compared to a chariot, the senses to the horses, the objects to the path on which the chariot moves; the Self is the lord of this chariot but *buddhi* is the actual charioteer. 'Body', says Śamkara commenting on this account, 'is mainly guided by *buddhi*, for everything done by the body is generally done by *buddhi*'.⁴⁹ In the above account, mind is likened to the reins which the driver has in his hands; it is no doubt the rein (mind) that controls and directs the horses (senses), but independent of the

47. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.7.

48. *Kaṭhabhāṣya*, 3.13.

49. *Ibid.*, 3.3.

driver (*buddhi*) it cannot function. The master (the Self) is but a passive spectator (*sākṣi*); although the command for action and ultimate responsibility rest with him.

Tattva-samāsa, the oldest known *Sāṅkhya* work, reads: 'And what is called *buddhi*? *Buddhi* is ascertainment (*adhyavasāya*). It is that through which there is in regard to a cow etc., the conviction (*pratipatti*): 'This is so and so, not otherwise; this is a cow, not a horse; this is a post, not a man. Such is *buddhi*, the most wonderful phase of nature'. Śamkara has imported this view into his system. The *buddhi* is of the nature of determination or ascertainment (*niścayātmikā*); it is, he says, 'our authority in the comprehending of the real nature of existence and non-existence'.⁵⁰ Elsewhere,⁵¹ he says that *buddhi* is so called because it determines the object (*arthasya niścayāt*). In another place;⁵² *buddhi* is spoken of as the 'capacity to discriminate' (*vivekaśakti*). The *buddhi*, in other words, reveals the nature of objects, fixes them in the outer world, and determines our relation with them. But Śamkara anticipates an objection: is it only when anything is perceived by the instruments of cognition (viz., mind and senses) that it is reputed in the world to exist? He answers: 'The *buddhi* even in the ultimate analysis of all objects of perception, is still pregnant with a belief in the existence of something'.⁵³ But what is it that the *buddhi* determines?

50. Ibid. 6.12.

51. *Sarvavedāntasiddhāntasaṃgraha*, verse 345.

52. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 7.10.

53. *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 6.12.

Is it the nature of the object or the mere existence of the object? Śāmkara's anticipated objection has indeed a point. If *buddhi* determines everything about the object, what are mind and senses there for? Śāmkara admits the important role of the senses in the objective specification; he also recognises the contribution of mind towards cognition. What then is *buddhi*'s contribution, being at the back of and 'prior to' both mind and the senses? Senses function (i.e., apprehend the object) only when directed by mind, and mind functions (i.e., directs the senses) only when illumined by the *buddhi* within. Does the following statement of R. H. Wheeler reflect Śāmkara's views on the subject? 'Original consciousness is a relatively homogeneous, undifferentiated field, potentially visual, auditory, kinesthetic, tactual, olfactory, all in one. Out of this relatively homogeneous total field there emerge forms that are figured upon a ground'.⁵⁴

The *buddhi* is also said to generate egoity (*ahamkāra*) or the notion of 'I'.⁵⁵ *Buddhi* is held to be inert, 'unconscious' (*acetana*), and it cannot generate anything that is 'conscious' (*cetana*); but the very nature of Self is consciousness. Vidyāranya explains the position of Śāmkara by distinguishing between the two forms of the internal organ: the function of 'I' and the function of 'this'.⁵⁶ The

54. R.H. Wheeler, op. cit., p.127.

55. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.5.

56. *Pañcadaśī*, p. 162.

former, he says, is *vijñāna* (a mode of the *buddhi*) and the latter is mind (*manas*). Śaṅkara writes: 'The individual Self pervades the *buddhi* with a reflection of its own manifested consciousness', so that we are 'conscious' of the 'I'. The *buddhi* then precedes all mental activity. The process of seeing a tree or hearing a tune tacitly assumes the 'I' that sees the tree or hears the tune. Consciousness in a sense precedes cognition. The function of *buddhi* is to offer the subjective frame of reference to a process of experience.

IV. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SELF

Experience

What is the evidence for assuming the existence of Self? Is not the body itself the experiencer? Why postulate a principle other than the body? Śamkara anticipates this objection in his comments on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* (2.1.15). Ajātaśatru accompanied by Gārgya approaches a sleeping man and tries to wake him up by calling out 'O Paṇḍaravāsa!' 'O Rājan!' But the sleeper does not get up, whereupon Ajātaśatru moves the man by his hand and wakes him up. Here the problem posed is: Who now is the experiencer? Is *ear* the experiencer? Or is *body* the experiencer? Or shall we point to something else as the experiencer? Śamkara explains that the 'function of the experiencer is to grasp (enjoy) the appropriate object that has approached'.¹ If ear were the experiencer, then why were the words of Ajātaśatru not grasped, for the ear would continue in sleeping and waking states alike? If body were the experiencer, why should pushing cause a difference in the state, for, pushing or not pushing, the body would remain the same? How is it that only after waking up does he understand that Ajātaśatru is addressing him, and not while asleep? The conditions that are constant and common between the two states (waking and sleeping) are: the ear, the body and Ajātaśatru's words. Where does the difference in the Paṇḍaravāsa's response come in? The act of pushing

1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya* (Mādhavānanda's Tr.)
Advaita Āśrama, Māyāvati, Almora. p.273.

made the body different from what it was before, Śamkara notes: it endowed the body with consciousness, activity, a different look, etc.; in other words, the act, of perception suggests an entity besides the body and senses.

Involved in an act of experience are the body, the senses and mind, and the vital force (*prāṇa*). The problem at issue is whether any of these can successfully play the role of an experiencer; and if so, to postulate Self would be unnecessary. The body can hold no claim, for were it the experiencer, then, pushing or not pushing would not make any difference as regards awakening since it remains the same. Nor have the senses and mind any claim for experiencership, for 'in that case it would be difficult to connect memory, perception, wish etc. What one person has seen, another cannot recollect or wish or recognise'.² The vital force cannot be the experiencer, for were it so, 'its organs should never cease to function' (as they do in sleep). Thus we should, according to Śamkara, postulate a *subject* which is the real experiencer, apart from the body. Although we do not perceive or apprehend the self, its existence must be inferred;³ and 'the body (the aggregate) is not the Self'.⁴ Unless we posit the Self, our experience (both its causation and its unity) would remain inexplicable.

Mary Calkins, one of the chief exponents of Self-psychology in the West has similar views. She writes, for

2. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.1.4

3. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.14.

4. *Psychological Review*, 1906, XIII, p.63 f.

instance, 'All experience is the experience of some Self and it is meaningless apart from it'.⁵ Charles S. Myers recognises that Self is 'involved in the action of apperception, thinking, willing, imagining etc'.⁶ Śāṁkara's insistence on the Self as the experiencer, and body, senses and mind as only instruments finds its Western counterpart in G. F. Stout's statement: 'Its (body's) attitudes and movements, so far as they differ from those of other material things, appear to be initiated by something inside the organism. They follow on volitions, emotions, painful and pleasant sensations, and the like. These experiences would constitute the inner self, and the body as it presents itself to the external observer is their instrument used in a way more or less analogous to that in which other material instruments are used'.⁷ 'The purpose of the Self', says Śāṁkara, 'is served by the aggregate of gross and subtle bodies'.

Self is a 'principle distinct from the body and senses, making the latter function';⁸ 'it inwardly rules the complex of senses';⁹ the internal organ and the modes thereof are its objects'.¹⁰ It is the witness of the states of consciousness, seeing, hearing, thinking and knowing.¹¹ This standpoint agrees well with that of the variety of Self-psychologists,

5. British J of Psychology, 1913, p.137 f.

6. Stout, op. cit., p. 661-662.

7. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.5.14

8. *Ibid.*, 3.4.1

9. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.19.

10. *Vedāntasiddhāntasārasaṁgraha*, verse 457.

11. *Muṇḍakabhāṣya*, 2.2.6.

who, according to A. H. B. Allen, 'hold the existence of a "pure" self, an existent in mental life different in kind from any particular acts or particular contents. Such a self could be defined in the following way: It is that to which contents are present as objects, and which is able to act in various ways towards, and take up various attitudes towards these objects. It has a certain continuity greater than that of any of its separate acts, and maintains its identity through these acts. It is also to a greater or lesser degree aware of itself in both these aspects, i.e., aware of itself as other than its objects, and of its continuous self-identity in various acts.'¹²

Ego

Apart from the inferential evidence for the existence of 'self' is there any other evidence, more direct and immediate? Yes, says Śaṁkara: Is there anybody that can say, without involving himself in self-contradiction, that 'he is not'?, that *he* does not exist? 'Everyone believes in the existence of Self';¹³ no other proof seems necessary. This argument however leads us to a difficult problem: Is ego—the 'I'—the same as Self? If it is not, what relation does one bear to the other?. Two separate terms are used to denote Self and ego: *jīva* and *ātman*. 'Jīva is conscious, lord of the body and bearer of the vital force; and this (view) has popular consent and is in accord with the radical meaning of the word. Now how could *he* become the Self

12. The Self in Psychology, Kegan Paul, 1936, p. 24.

13. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.

of this *pradhāna* (body) which is not conscious? The Self, however, is (a being's) own nature; and so it being conscious cannot be the nature of the non-conscious body (*pradhāna*)'.¹⁴

We often make statements like 'I go'. Let us pause to consider what the 'I' here stands for. What is it that *goes*? Observation points to the body. Shall we then justifiably identify the 'I' with the body? If so, then obviously we cannot escape the corollary that changes in the body should concomitantly imply changes in the 'I'. But is this in our experience or observation? The little body of the child changes and, as years roll by, changes into an unrecognisably different form of the old man; has the 'I' undergone these changes? Suppose a man loses his leg in an accident; does his 'I' also lose a part thereof? The healthy body becomes ill; but is there any corresponding healthy 'I' becoming an ill 'I'? Thus we find this factor 'I' relatively constant, despite the mutability and changeability of the body. We cannot, therefore, reasonably identify the 'I' with the body. We also make a statement

14. 'Jīva... (is).... the intelligent (principle) which rules over the body and sustains the vital airs. How could such a principle be the self of the non-intelligent *pradhāna*? By 'self' we understand (a being's) own nature, and it is clear that the intelligent *jīva* cannot constitute the nature of the non-intelligent *pradhāna*. If, on the other hand, we refer the whole chapter to the intelligent *Brahman*, to which thought in its primary sense belongs, the use of the word 'self' with reference to the *jīva* is quite adequate.' *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.6.

like 'I see'. What is it that *sees*? The eye. Is 'I' the same as the eye? Nothing then would prevent us from speaking of the nose as 'I', the ear as 'I' and so on; and we should thus postulate as many 'I's' as there are senseorgans. But this is not supported by our experience: we always experience a single 'I'; we say, e.g., "I" that saw this apple am now touching it'. This dismisses the hypothesis that senseorgan is the 'I'. Consider a different set of illustrations as when we say 'I am unhappy' when our wives or children are ill; what is it that is unhappy? It is certainly not the body nor the senses of the man making that remark: what is meant here is the extension of the personal 'I' on to the social plane or to employ an expression of Śaṁkara, the 'I' is superimposed on outside qualities. Men identify themselves with their wives and children in practical, social affairs; but no argument is needed to prove that each man retains his 'I' in a personal capacity. We have an 'ego', distinct from the physical and the social environments—the physical, consisting of the immediate factors like the body and senseorgans and other factors like the physical objects; and the social in the form of family, communities, state and so on. This environmental aspect is described as 'this' (*idam*) or object, in contradistinction to the 'I' (*aḥam*), or subject. 'This' however refers to the concrete objects, beyond itself; does 'I' also likewise refer to something beyond itself?

It is interesting to note that Śaṁkara considers both 'I' and 'this' as mere concepts (*pratyaya*), or notions having their specific fields of reference: the former has the subject

characterised by consciousness as its 'field' while the latter has objects as its 'field'. They are divergent in their nature and the difference is said to be as much as between light and darkness. The object is in simple terms 'a thing': physical, inert, incapable of voluntary movement, lacking in sentience; but the Self is dynamic, full of life and equipped with consciousness. The distinction between the two fields is best illustrated by the fact that 'we know the world' but 'the world does not know us'. The relation in which the ego stands to the object is compared to that of a light to an object: the former enlightens and in its light appears the latter. What is relevant to our inquiry is the view that the expression 'I' refers to the Self. We shall henceforth use the word 'ego' to mean the 'I' or the notion of the Self, and the word 'Self' to mean what the ego refers to.

In the Śāṁkara system of thought, ego is looked upon as a function of the internal organ and this function is termed *viññāna*, as opposed to its other function, namely that of 'this' (*manas*); whereas Self is, by definition, the 'subject of the notion of 'I' (*ahampratya-yaviśayin*). Thus the notion of 'I' is contingent upon the function of the internal organ. When, for instance, in sleep the internal organ ceases to function egoity lapses.¹⁵ The self, needless to say, continues even in sleep, although it cannot be denoted as 'I'. The self as related to the environment, and bearing the

15. 'Egoity is not the self, because of its non-presentation in sleep' *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, 1941, Andhra University, p. 121.

notion of 'I', is termed the *Jīva*. *Jīva*, we may say, is the individual self characterised by the individuating factor, viz., internal organ, in both of its forms 'I' and 'this' (*antaḥkaraṇopādhiviśiṣṭa*). The *ātman* however is 'pure and undifferentiated Self'. The root of all this diversity lies in the limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*), chief of which is the internal organ, capable of (and intended for) presenting the world to us. An organism, therefore, is equipped, besides the 'pure Self', with an empirical self also, peculiar and private to that organism, constituted supposedly of the attitudes, thoughts, memories etc., of that organism. The empirical self implies its individuality, and its function is always in relation to the environment; in other words, it is practically the subject. It is this that is designated as 'I' or ego. It is a 'knower' (of the world), whereas the pure Self is a mere witness.¹⁶ It should not, however, be interpreted that there is a duality of 'selves', one pure and the other empirical. They are but two aspects of the same principle :¹⁷ pure Self is the designation given to the Self in its transcendental nature whereas the empirical self signifies relatedness to the world. The empirical aspect emerges and functions because of the internal organ; and egoity or the notion of 'I' is in fact a function of the internal organ.

In the *Muṇḍakopaniṣad* ¹⁸ there occurs this description:
 'Two inseparable companions of fine plumage perch on the

16. Citsukha emphasises the difference between *Draṣṭṛ* (seer) and *Pramāṭṛ* (cogniser). Cf. *Tattvapradīpikā*.

17. 'The Self within is one only; two internal selves are not possible'. (*Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.21)

18. Op. cit., 3.1.1.

self-same tree. One of the two feeds on the delicious fruit, while the other, not tasting of it, looks on'. Śamkara takes the two birds in this passage to mean the empirical self and the pure Self: the former is involved in everyday actions while the latter is 'pure, intelligent (conscious) and free in his nature . . . he is the director of both the eater and the thing eaten by the fact of his mere existence as the eternal witness'.¹⁹ Again in the *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya* (I.2.II), commenting on the '*Kāṭhāvalli*' statement he remarks: The 'two entered into the cave' mentions the duality of 'the individual soul and the highest Self' in the body; and he appears to view this duality as similar to the duality of 'mind and the individual soul'. The distinction between the two phases of the Self lies in that one is an active agent in cognition and other processes, while the other is a 'passive' witness of these processes.

An explanation is offered by Vācaspatimiśra concerning Śamkara's views on ego-self problem: 'The conscious self appears in the concept "I" as agent and enjoyer. And for that (self) which is indifferent there cannot occur the capacity either to act or to enjoy. And for that aggregate of the effect (the body) and the organs, i.e., the intellect etc., to which belong the capacities to act and enjoy, there is no consciousness. Hence it is the conscious self that linked to the aggregate of all effect (the body) and the organs, gains capacity to act and enjoy: though self-manifest, yet by inter-mixture with objects like the intellect etc., it somehow' becomes the object of the concept "I",

19. Ibid., p. 135, *bhāṣya* on the above.

the substrate of the "I-ness" and is (variously) designated individual self (*jīva*), creature (*jantu*), or knower of the field (*kṣetrajñā*). The *jīva* indeed is not different from the conscious self . . . the *jīva*, though self-manifest, because of being nondifferent from the intelligent self, is yet made by the concept "I" fit for empirical usage as agent and enjoyer; hence it is said to be the basis of the concept "I".²⁰ Ego, therefore, is an agent of Self, attending to the actual affairs of the body machine, while Self like the owner has direct contact only with his agent, namely ego, and not with the instruments like mind and senses. Thus, although the existence of Self is pointed out by our egoity, our notion of 'I' is not an attribute of Self.

The Self

The Self is viewed as 'extremely subtle, lodged in the inmost recess (of the body). being concealed by the modifications of consciousness that are caused by worldly objects';²¹ it is 'the witness of all the several processes of the *internal organ*'.²² 'The word "self" in its primary meaning refers to what is conscious only'.²³ 'This *ātman* is itself the light that is pure consciousness, and reveals everything by its own nature of illumination'.²⁴ Self is the inmost and the most intimate entity in any organism; it is to be distinguished from mind and its processes and other

20. *Bhāmātī*, pp. 40-41.

21. *Kāthabhāṣya*, 2.12.

22. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.

23. *Ibid.*

24. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*; 4.3.21.

vital operations of the body all of which are witnessed by it as objective presentations. Unlike the material, physical stuff that has assumed the form of the subtle and gross body, the nature of Self is consciousness (*caitanya*).

Self, then, is the inner principle of consciousness in a living being.²⁵ It is described as the 'light which is different from one's body and organs, and which illumines them like the external lights such as the sun, but is itself not illumined by anything else'.²⁶ In the darkness we cannot perceive anything, although objects are present. When, however, a lamp is brought (or the sun shines) the objects, which were all the while there but invisible now *appear* to us; our eyes are able to catch the forms of the objects in the presence of some source of light. Just as the eye does not function in the absence of light, even so no organ (sense or mind) functions without the aid of self. The objects around us, the body, the senses, the vital current, and the mind are all inert being purely material, physical, and composed of parts. Without the light of the self, the collection of body and organs is a mere meaningless confusion. It is an aggregate like a heap of stones; it becomes an organism only when the Self *organises* this inert and material mass. Self being there, functioning as consciousness, the 'blind' senses catch up the 'dumb' objects and present them to the mind to determine, define and interpret, which presentation is grasped by the ego at a subsequent phase. This 'booming buzzing confusion' of varied objects scattered helter-skelter

25. *Kāthabhāṣya*, 3.10.

26. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.6.

without an order, with-out a scheme, without a meaning, transforms itself into an orderly, meaningful 'presentation' only so long as it is *experienced*. 'Self is of the nature of experience' .²⁷ In Śamkara's psychology consciousness (*saṁvit*) and experience (*upalabdhi*) are synonymous.

The consciousness that is Self is 'homogeneous and unbroken'.²⁸ The 'relative' condition of the self which we find around us and characterise as 'I', 'You', 'Mr X' and so on is brought about by the limiting adjuncts such as the internal organ and the body. And there is an unbroken continuity in consciousness: like the light which illumines the objects without a break or pause. When in sleep there is an apparent cessation of this continuity, the absence of actual cognitive processes is due to the absence of objects, and not to the absence of consciousness — even as, notes Śamkara, the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated, not to the absence of its own nature.²⁹

The Self endures through different states of body and mind. It is the unchanging ground from which variegated structures emerge: cognitions, experience, ideas, images and memories. The Self is described as 'the witness of perceptions, pure and unconditioned'.³⁰ The activity that is seen in reality belongs to the body and no activity fails to make some change in what is associated with it; the

27. *Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha*, I.XCI (p.116).

28. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.20.

29. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.18.

30. *Īśāvāsyabhāṣya*, 1.6.

body (including mind) is, therefore, continually changing. Self, however, is the constant amidst the variables; it endures all changes that affect body and mind.

Śamkara affirms the impossibility of the existence of self independent of body.³¹ He even suggests that self and body should be viewed as 'non-different'.³² The self cannot be conceived as 'without mind', for 'mind constitutes (its) limiting adjunct'³³ and 'as long as this self is in the *samsāra* state, ... so long (its) connection with the *buddhi* does not cease'.³⁴ Its relation with the senses is likewise clarified: 'By their (ref. to senses) being *grahas* (seized) is meant that they are bonds by which the individual soul is tied'.³⁵ The *prāṇas* or the vital currents are also connected with the individual self.³⁶ Thus the self is limited to, and defined by, this aggregate-of-body-and-organs. The latter is well known to be inert (*acetana*) and incapable, therefore, of any action of its own accord; it acts only when the self confined to this 'city' illumines and thus directs. The body, of course, is observed to act; activity *does* belong to it — for activity belongs to where it is observed — but the purpose of activity does not belong there but to the self. The self *makes* the body act although it does not itself act. This, however, is not a paradox for a thing which is itself devoid of motion may nevertheless move other things. The magnet

31. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.2.3.

32. *Ibid.*, 4.3.14.

33. *Ibid.*, 1.3.14.

34. *Ibid.*, 2.3.30.

35. *Ibid.*, 2.4.6.

36. *Ibid.*, 2.4.17.

is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron'.³⁷ The self is the director of all bodily actions, and is therefore styled as the Internal Ruler, and the Lord of city (body). 'The self is capable of inwardly ruling the complex of the organs of action as it is the *enjoyer*'.³⁸

How does Self function as the agent of action? The answer is: By illumining. Śamkara explains: 'Consciousness (*buddhi*), being transparent and next to Self, easily catches the reflection of self . . . next comes *manas* which catches the reflection of Self through consciousness; then the organs through contact with mind; and lastly the body through the organs. Thus the Self successively illumines with its own consciousness the entire aggregate of body and organs'.³⁹ When the body is ready to act, the senses open their gates to the outer world, the mind is primed to receive the impressions of forms and names, the vital current is alert and intellect is busy in its managerial office: cognition results. In the case of movements or actions, motor organs will take the place of senses.

Agency of self in action being thus settled, what about the self's experiencership? Even as *buddhi* is practically the 'actor', it is also the experiencer practically and self only indirectly acts or experiences. The self is said to be 'of the nature of the essence of *buddhi*'s qualities, because qualities such as desire, aversion, pleasure, pain and so on, constitute the essence, i.e., the principal characteristics of

37. Ibid., 2.2.2.

38. Ibid., 1.2.19

39. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.7.

the self so long as it is implicated in trans-migratory existence.⁴⁰

Introspection

The process of self-observation known as introspection has gained currency in Western Psychology as a method of unearthing mental data; Angell long ago defined it as the direct observation of one's own mental processes.⁴¹ The subject or the observer was to direct his attention on to a psychological process during its very course. This has raised a serious doubt whether such a procedure is possible at all, whether what we get thereby is what we aim at, whether we are only chasing one fiction by another. Stout held that introspection is a 'special development of the explicit self consciousness'. Introspection in the English language is a tame word; it merely means a 'looking within' which, however, is not objectionable or impossible, for only mental processes are involved. But *selbstbeobachtung* in German is troublesome: 'Self' stares us in the face like the mysterious grin of the cheshire cat in the Wonderland of Alice. Even Self is quite mysterious; and to make it *observe itself* would make matters worse. The genius of Wundt, the resourcefulness of Titchener and the labour of the Wurzburg men like Kulpa, Marbe, Watt and Ach struggled to find for introspection a proper place in scientific psychology, despite its baffling metaphysical implications. Indeed for several decades introspection was employed as

40. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.29.

41. Moore, J.S. : *Foundations of Psychology*, 1821, p.42.

a major method in psychology. Latterly, however, when the Wundtian Self lost its hold on the psychologist's interest, introspection came to refer only to the mental processes. The Behaviourists took objection even to mind and its processes and rejected introspection altogether. At present, introspection as a method has merely a historical value and in use, it only means a 'reflection upon one's experience'.

Śamkara has comments to make on introspection as a method of self-observation. The problem of the Self observing itself means for him the subject becoming an object of itself. He rejects the possibility of introspection on two counts: the nature of Self and the nature of observation. Observation or cognition is contingent upon the duality of subject-object, which is bridged by senseorgans and the mind. We observe a tree because the object which is 'out there' and the Self which is within are connected by the mind streaming out through the senses. But Self is beyond both senses and mind :⁴² Thus even if self were to be an object there would be no possibility of its observation, owing to the absence of the instruments of observation. 'As fire does not burn itself, so Self does not know itself, and the knower can have no knowledge of a thing that is not its object'.⁴³ 'If it be suggested', Śamkara further observes, 'that the Self can be both the knower and the knowable, we argue that it is impossible, for Self is altogether indivisible'; and 'it cannot be that the Self reaches to itself, because there is no difference within the

42. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 3.9.26.

43. *Ibid.*, 2.4.14.

Self'.⁴⁴ The familiar objection that is raised against introspection that it implies the duplication of Self is admirably stated by Śaṁkara: 'All that is thinkable cannot be thought of except by the thinker (i.e., the self), mind being only an instrument. If so, what would be the result? ... That which thinks of all will only be the thinker and never the thinkable; and there is no other thinker of the thinker when Self is to be thought of by the Self. Or, the same *Ātman* should be divided into two forms as the thinker and the thinkable, just as a bamboo is split into two: this is absurd'.⁴⁵ Hence the impossibility of introspection.

He also suggests the unnaturalness of such a process. He asserts that our instruments of observation are by nature characterised by an out-going tendency.⁴⁶ We naturally, and for the major part of our lives, think of the outer world, and sometimes when we turn our attention to 'ourselves' we are concerned with mental acts and attitudes — which are, of course, objective to, and different from, the self, or the observer. 'Nor has the thinker any time left to *think* of himself as he is always engaged in *thinking* of the thinkable'.⁴⁷ Besides only one mental activity can occur at a time : When one thinks of something, he cannot think of another thing at the same time. Attempting to bring about a process, where and when another has already been on is futile.⁴⁸ All introspection is at best a retrospection only.

44. *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, second valli.

45. *Ibid.*

46. *Ibid.*

47. *Aitareyabhāṣya*.

48. *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 4.1.

But Śamkara does not reject the possibility of observing our mental processes. And this, because the *observer* happens to be the Self while the *observed* are the modifications of the internal organ, which are but objects for the Self. Mind, however, cannot observe its own processes, as it is not in the nature of mind to be an observer; it is meant only to convey the facts of the outer world to the Self. And Self cannot observe itself as it cannot at once be object and subject. Further, mind cannot observe the Self because it is inert and objectively oriented. But nothing prevents the Self from being the observer of mental processes. Śamkara holds that the Self 'is the witness of all the modifications of the internal organ'.⁴⁹ 'Thus if introspection is defined as the 'observation of mental processes' it is a possibility, according to Śamkara, for there is distinction between the subject and object. His view about the Self is succinctly stated thus: 'It can neither be striven after, nor avoided'.⁵⁰

Self-Psychology

In the West there are psychologists who are styled as self-psychologists, prominent among whom are Mary Calkins, William Stern, James Ward, Francis Aveling, Franz Brentano and G. F. Stout. There are others like Charles Spearman and William McDougall, who employ the concept of Self but refrain from making a dogma of it. We may in passing consider the chief tenets of their views.

49. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.1.

50. *Ibid.*, 1.1.4

Self-psychology, according to Mary Calkins, has three basic conceptions: Self, object, and the Self's relation or attitude towards its objects. Like Śaṁkara, she also points to experience as the infallible evidence for the existence of Self; all experience is the experience of some Self and is meaningless apart from that Self. 'Anything less than self-consciousness would not be consciousness at all. To be conscious is to be conscious of a conscious self'.⁵¹ She differs, however, from Śaṁkara in identifying the 'I' with the Self; she defines Self as what everyone means by such expressions as 'I am ashamed of myself', 'I appeal to you, yourself';⁵² and introspection is her court of appeal. Śaṁkara's way of ascertaining the existence of Self is different: 'Self is not, in any person's case, adventitious, not established through the so-called instruments of apprehension: It rather is self established . . . the Self, as being the abode of energy that acts through the instruments of apprehension, is itself established previously to that energy. And to refute such a self-established entity is impossible . . . for it is the essential nature of him who refutes'.⁵³ And further Śaṁkara regards Self as not identical with the 'I' but as the 'object of the notion 'I'. The Self, according to Calkins, possesses these properties : (1) a totality, by which is meant a psychophysical organism; (Śaṁkara also writes: 'the body, senseorgans, Mind and the

51. Psychological Review, 1906, XIII. p. 68.

52. History of Psychology in Autobiography,
(Ed. Carl Murchison). Vol. I. 1930, 45 f.

53. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.7.

Intellect ... it is all these that creatures name as self') ;⁵⁴ (2) uniqueness, in the sense that 'I am I' and 'you are you' (Śamkara ascribes this individuality to the limiting adjuncts); (3) identity, or persistence through various states of the body and mind; (4) changingness, in the sense that the 'I' of the child will undergo a series of changes before it becomes the 'I' of the adult; (Śamkara recognises change but ascribes it to the body and mind and not to the Self); and (5) relatedness to the objects or consciousness. Calkins, however, appears to hold that consciousness is always a relatedness to an object while Śamkara admits the possibility of consciousness even when relatedness does not obtain.

E. A. McGamble corrects Calkins in favour of Śamkara regarding her introspective evidence. He writes that Self is evidenced not 'by introspection, but *in* introspection. . . The Self is the introspector. When I can see my own eyes without a mirror, then I shall be able to find my own self by introspection'.⁵⁵

The subject, says James Ward, is 'at first as always, that which lives, which thinks, and feels and acts, which attends to and is pleased by its sensations and movements';⁵⁶ that is to say, experiencer. Morton Prince in a strong plea for the recognition of consciousness in the study of psychology says that consciousness is 'a cause of

54. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.18.1.

55. *Psychological Bulletin*, 12, p.196.

56. *Mind*, 1887, Oct., p. 567.

the bodily reactions through which the needs of the organism are fulfilled',⁵⁷ William McDougall approaches the problem of Self thus: 'The most general and fundamental facts about experience as we know it or enjoy it, are two. First, experience or experiencing is always experiencing of something, it is always a thinking about some object even when, as in psychologising that object is itself an experiencing or thinking. Secondly, all experience or thinking is the experience or thinking of *someone*, some subject, some person, some organism ... whenever we refer to a fact of experience, we imply *someone* thinking of *something*'. 'Experiencing is an activity of some being who experiences something or somewhat'.⁵⁸ Scheerer advancing his criticism of the Gestalt school of thought emphasised the need for a proper recognition of Self. 'Employing Stern's dictum that there can be no gestalt without a gestalter, Scheerer believes that the configurationists belittle the active modifications of the self which occur whenever a thing transforms its meaning ... These variations are not traceable to the objective datum or thing (Sache) but must result from the history of the individual self (person)'.⁵⁹

Of the three neogenetic laws Charles Spearman formulated the first refers to 'lived experience'. 'A person tends to know himself and items of his own experience'.⁶⁰

57. Psychologies of 1925, (Ed. C. Murchison), p. 211.

58. Outline of Psychology, Methuen, p. 40, 221.

59. Hartmann, G.W.: Gestalt Psychology, Ronald, N.Y. 1935, p.384.

60. Nature of Intelligence and Principles of Cognition.

Here evidently Spearman distinguishes between the person (i.e., Self) . and the experiences (i.e., mental processes): but this notion of the Self is attributable to direct experience. It is, as it were, the first experience, simple and 'primeval'; cognition and other mental processes are later events. Spearman favouring the commonsense view, lists four chief characteristics of Self: substantiality, persistence, simplicity and consciousness.⁶¹ Warren defined Self as 'the individual regarded as conscious . of his own continuing identity and of his relation to environment'.⁶² Brennan defined it as 'the actual kernel of a man's being, which remains unchanged through all the physiological and mental variations that each individual undergoes'.⁶³ Griffith favours the view that 'Self is not merely an organisation to which things happen. It is a patterned system of tensions which, in its total character, impresses itself upon other people through the medium of social relations'.⁶⁴

61. Psychology Down the Ages, Vol. I,
Cambridge, 1937, p. 390.

62. A Dictionary of Psychology, p. 244.

63. General Psychology, Mcmillan 1938, p. 422.

64. Principles of Systematic Psychology,
Illinois, 1943, p. 610 ff.

V. STATES OF THE SELF

The Three States

The Self, in so far as it is connected with the body, is said to have three states: wakefulness, dream and sleep. It is impossible for the three states to occur simultaneously, for by a state of the Self is meant the action of the entire organism. And no organism is an exception to these states; they are universal. 'It is well known that *all* living creatures pass through the waking, dreaming and sleeping conditions *by turns*'.¹ The distinguishing characteristics of the three states are briefly enunciated by Śaṁkara thus: 'The individual soul (*Jīva*) is called awake as long as it apprehends the external objects being connected with them by way of mind's modifications (which thus constitute the limiting adjuncts of the soul), and identifies itself with the body, which in fact is one of the external objects. When, modified by the impressions which the external objects have left, it sees dreams, it is denoted by the term 'mind'. When, on the cessation of the two limiting adjuncts (i.e., the subtle and the gross bodies), and on the consequent absence of modifications due to adjuncts, it is in a state of deep sleep, merged in the self as it were, then it is said to have gone to itself'.² It is pertinent here to note that dream is not a sub-state as it were within the state of sleep: real sleep is dreamless. It is a distinct and independent state; but he is aware of the fact that dreams do not occur in

1. *Prāśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

2. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.9.

the waking state; dream always requires the resting of the 'gross' body, the cessation of the sense function and the absence of external stimuli (i.e., presentations). Nevertheless dream cannot occur when the mind ceases to function, as will happen in sleep: it requires not only the impressions from the waking state but also the 'wanderings' of the mind through them. Thus dream, for its occurrence, demands that the body should not be awake, i.e., aware of the external presentations, and that it should not be asleep completely. It is the function of the 'subtle' body whereas wakefulness is the function of the 'gross' body; and sleep is marked by the absence of both.

We are aware, of course, that sleep and wakefulness follow a regular order of occurrence, a diurnal periodicity. But how about dreams? Śamkara holds that the occurrence of dream follows the same law;³ but while we are aware of the periodicity of the former two states, we are only infrequently aware of dreaming; dreaming does not *appear* to be as recurrent or regular as wakefulness or sleep. Śamkara nowhere explains or justifies this position, but he seems to be referring to the fact that we do not remember all our dreams. For an even more extreme position, we should turn to Wilhelm Stekel who writes: "There is no such thing as dreamless sleep, but only an unwillingness to remember dreams. We dream all night, without intermission: and all day as well. The dream accompanies us from the hour of birth till the hour of death".⁴

3. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

4. The interpretation of Dreams, Liveright, N.Y.1943, Vol.I, p.164.

We often believe that only human beings dream. We observe the lower animals asleep and awake; but they do not give evidence of dreaming. It is also believed that the ability to dream depends on the ability to form images which ability is perhaps restricted to human beings. But Śaṁkara does not subscribe to this notion; he states in definite terms that all organisms dream, sleep and are awake; these being the states of the self there are no exceptions. Whether the animals lower than man dream has not been as yet definitely settled in modern psychology: but 'there are observations enough', writes Nathaniel Kleitman, 'on animals to show that many of them, the horse, the cow, and particularly the dog, probably dream while asleep'.⁵

The Waking State

Let us consider the state of wakefulness (*jāgradavasthā*). It is characterised by knowledge obtained through the functions of the senseorgans. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī describes the state thus: 'Comprehension of objects simultaneously with the operation of an organ of sense'.⁶ Śaṁkara himself has described it as 'connection with the various external organs by means of the modification of mind'.⁷ The self knows the world 'only as limited by the internal organ and accompanied by a vṛtti of some senseorgan'.⁸ The mind flows out through one of the sense

5. Sleep and Wakefulness, Univ. of Chicago, 1939, p.153.

6. *Siddhāntabindu*, G.O.S. Baroda 1933, p.263.

7. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.9.

8. *Siddhāntabindu*, p.265.

outlets and, assuming the diverse forms of the objects, cognises. There can be no cognition if the senses do not function as gateways. Thus the waking state is characterised by the alertness and activity of the senses: one is awake so long as stimulations from the outer world incessantly stream in and engage the mind. The self is here marked by outward direction (*bahih-prajña*); to be conscious of the external objects distinct from itself, it employs the senses of knowledge, organs of action, the vital force with its five-fold functions, and the internal organ in its two aspects of *manas* and *buddhi*. One is awake as long as he is *attending*, or *active*. 'The individual self pervades the *buddhi* with a reflection of its own manifested consciousness . . . when it perceives the expansion of the *buddhi*, it is waking experience'.⁹ Expansion of *buddhi* signifies the assumption of new and diverse forms in accordance with the stimulating influences.

Modern views of wakefulness are not very different. The widely held theory is that there is a 'wakefulness center whose continuous activity is necessary to maintain a state of wakefulness'.¹⁰ Its activity is due to the constant stream of impulses to that center, 'which prevent the onset of sleep'. The streams of impulses are through the various senseorgans. Hence the justification of the importance which Śamkara attached to the function of the senseorgans in wakefulness.

9. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.19.

10. Kleitman, N.: *Sleep and Wakefulness*, 1939, p.507.

Sleep

Sleep is characterised by the cessation of the functions of all senseorgans and the consequent absence of particular cognitions. During sleep, says Śaṁkara, 'while the processes of breathing go on uninterruptedly, the activity of the senseorgans is interrupted and again becomes manifest at the time of waking only'.¹¹ The word 'sayana' (lying) is taken to signify 'the cessation of the activity of the senses... cessation of the partial knowledge produced by the senses'.¹² 'Senses (in sleep) cease activity and *prāṇa* and other airs keep watch for the support of the body'.¹³ The activities like breathing and blood circulation, which are responsible for the maintenance of the body will continue (and this is the difference between sleep and death) while the activities which serve to contact the presentations will lapse. The sleeper is alive so far as his body is concerned, but dead so far as the external world is concerned: he has severed his bond with the world. The definition of sleep offered by Henri Pieron hits the same mark: it is 'a suspension of the complex sensorymotor activities that bring the organism into relation with the environment'.¹⁴ The sleeper does not cognise, nor does he *act*; and there is no other way of transacting with the presentations. Ivan Pavlov subscribed to a similar view: absence of stimulation brings about the inhibition of the whole cortex and this 'internal inhibition widely radiated' is sleep.¹⁵

11. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.23.

12. *Kāṭhabhāṣya*, 2.21.

13. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

14. Cited in Kleitman, op. cit., p.3.

15. *Conditioned Reflexes* (Tr. by Anrep) Oxford, 1927.

Śaṁkara following the lead of the Upaniṣadic thinkers subscribes to the theory of the 'unity of senses' in sleep. 'The senses of man in sleep become all blended into one. As all the senses together, during waking, act on behalf of some master and are dependent (on him), therefore their coalition in one is reasonable in sleep, because of their dependence and acting together'.¹⁶ When we are awake the senses will be in their appropriate roles discharging the function for which each is meant: the eye will grasp the forms that are enclosed within the mass of presentation, the ear sounds, the skin touches and so on. The total field of presentation is broken up as it were into numerous fields of sense-objects, and the senseorgans sort them out, select the relevant details and convey them to the mind. Thus the function of the senseorgans and the mind is effective in bringing us 'particular cognitions'. When in sleep the sense gateways are closed and the impressions of presentations are suppressed the mind perforce (unless it be in dream) has to rest, for its activity is dependent on the sense-material, and therefore the scope for particular cognitions is denied. In the waking state we can say 'It is a table', 'I am happy', 'I talk to you' and so on. Why now do we not do so in sleep? Śaṁkara answers: 'Because of unity. Incidentally it is implied that variety is the cause of particular consciousness'.¹⁷ When particular cognitions are impossible, what results is 'general knowledge'. 'When the mind, like fire in a log of wood, pervades the whole body

16. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.1.

17. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.21.

in its form as general knowledge (as opposed to special modifications), then (one) sleeps'.¹⁸ Knowledge here is without the instrumentality of either the senses or the mind: it is an indistinguishable, partless mass (*prajñānaghana*) of consciousness. In sleep 'consciousness' does not lapse; only object-consciousness and self-consciousness do not function. The nature of the Self being consciousness it lapses in no state whether it be dreaming, sleeping or waking. The limiting adjuncts (*upādhis*) produce the object-consciousness and self-consciousness; when they rest in sleep a general consciousness results wherein neither the object nor the ego is cognised. This is what is meant by its description as 'marked by lack of consciousness'.¹⁹ The object- and the ego-consciousness spring up again immediately on waking, when connection with mind and senses is reinstituted; this relation is said to 'exist potentially during deep sleep' and to become again manifest at the time of waking'.²⁰ While thus the waking state is characterised by particular cognitions, the state of sleep is marked by 'general knowledge' or 'mass of consciousness'.

'Sleep', Śamkara holds, 'is the natural state'.²¹ He explains: 'Perception in waking and dreaming moments is a modification of the original state. That state of a thing which is dependent on external causes is not its true

18. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.6.

19. C.T. Morgan : *Physiological Psychology*,
Mcgraw Hill, 1943, p.375.

20. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.31.

21. *Taittirīyabhāṣya*, second vallī.

condition, for this cannot subsist in the absence of the external cause. Therefore sleep being the natural condition, there is no modification there, as in waking or dreaming'.²² The waking state requires the help of the senses, the mind and the objects; without anyone of them, wakefulness is impossible. Dreams require the aid of impressions of waking presentations as well as the function of mind. But sleep is not known to need such aid; when the forces and functions that condition and maintain the other two states cease to operate 'the self returns to itself' (*svam apīta*). Sleep, thus, is the natural state of the Self (as it is absorbed in itself then) and the other two states are merely 'disturbances' and departures from this tranquil state.

It is interesting to note that among modern authorities, Kleitman favours the view of regarding wakefulness as 'representing an addition of activities over sleep' rather than as 'involving activities of a different kind'.²³ The new-born babe remains asleep unless, and until, affarent impulses of the necessary type and frequency arouse the wakefulness center into some activity. As soon as these affarent impulses abate, the babe returns to the state of primitive sleep or mainly vegetative existence.²⁴ For wakefulness the dependence on the affarent impulses which excite the 'wakefulness center' is a necessity, whereas its absence finds the organism back in its pristine state, that is to say, a set of forces or influences keeps the 'naturally sleepy'

22. Ibid.,

23. Sleep and Wakefulness, 1932, p.503.

24. Ibid., p. 518.

organism awake, and only so long as the influence lasts the organism is awake. Haenel holds that the primary state of psychic life is the absence of consciousness and that the cortical cells are originally in a state of indifference; 'they are made to function through the stimulating effect of affarent impulses exteroceptive, interoceptive and proprioceptive'.²⁵ Claparède regarded sleep as 'instinctive', which amounts to saying that it is natural; and Coriat held that while waking life involves muscular tension, sleep inhibits it;²⁶ tension obviously is 'an artificially induced' state, its inhibition being more natural than its induction.

'During the waking state, one gets tired by experiences of various troubles in the shape of pleasures and pains, and then follows a cessation of the over-worked organs from their activities ... all the senses having been drawn in by the *prāṇa*, which alone keeps awake in the body; it is for shaking off the fatigue that the human self returns to its own self'.²⁷ The waking life involves activity which fatigues the organism, and its efficiency is lowered; and unless the fatigue is removed, the organism is incapable of further activity. Fatigue can be removed only by rest or inactivity, and the best rest is sleep. The tired organism goes to sleep and wakes up refreshed. Śaṁkara speaks of the 'unhappiness or discomfort caused by the fatigue which,

25. Schlaf and Schlafzentrum : Med. Klin; 21: 1258-61, 1935; cited Kleitman, op. cit., p. 498.

26. Dorcus and Shaffer : Text-Book of Abnormal Psychology, 1934.

27. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 6.8.1.

in turn, is caused by the continuous assumption of the various forms of objects',²⁸ which is removed by sleep. Sleep is therefore termed 'ānandamaya' or full of bliss, because of the absence of fatigue caused by contact with the world. Śamkara apparently believes that the mind, more than the senses, will be fatigued during the waking moments: he describes sleep as 'rest for mind'.²⁹ Mind is active both in association with the senses and by itself; the fatigue caused thereby is central. Śamkara holds thus that central fatigue is responsible for sleep. The modern hyperemia theory of sleep holds that there will be a congestion of blood in the brain due to wakeful activities, which prevents the brain's normal functioning. The anemia theory, on the other hand, attributes sleep to the lessened flow of blood to the brain. Both theories recognize the importance of brain, the organ of mind in the causation of sleep. Kleitman recognises the fatigability of the wakefulness center (in the hypothalamus) together with the neuromuscular and sensory fatigue and the fatigue of the cerebral cortex as component factors in the production of sleep.³⁰

Dreams

We have considered Śamkara's views concerning profound sleep, a state of absolute rest marked by the complete cessation of the activity of the senses as well as

28. *Gouḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya*, 'Works of Śamkara', Vani Vilas Press, Srirangam, Vol. 5, p.95.

29. *Śataślokī*, V.68.

30. Kleitman, *Op. Cit.*, p.513.

of mind. But sleep is not always so deep; there is in our experience such a thing as light sleep, wherein the occurrence of dreams is observed. Sleep, light or profound, is characterised by the absence of sense-action: but in light sleep the mind will not be totally at rest as in deep sleep. This continued activity of mind in the absence of sense function is responsible for the state of dream. 'When all the senses are absorbed in the mind and when the mind is not absorbed, the *Ātman* as *manomaya* sees dreams';³¹ and 'one dreams only when the organs have ceased to function'.³² When the mind functions together with the senses, it is the waking experience; when both of them cease to function, it is deep sleep; when, however, the mind functions but the senses rest, it is dream. By virtue of occupying the mid-position (in between wakefulness and sleep) the dream state is styled as *sandhyā-sthāna*. 'That place is the intermediate place because it lies where the two worlds, or else the place of waking and the place of bliss (deep sleep), join'.³³ That it is characterised thus implies that dreams possess characteristics of both wakefulness and sleep. It is a 'kind of perception',³⁴ but actually the organism is inactive,³⁵ it is asleep, albeit lightly. Without a paradox, dream may be described as wakefulness within sleep, not being broadly awake nor completely asleep.

31. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

32. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.14.

33. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.2.

34. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.1.18.

35. *Ibid.*, 4.3.15.

'Dream is seeing within the body, as if he were awake, by one who has turned away from waking consciousness'.³⁶

Dream, then, is a positive experience, unlike sleep. While no one is able to recall what happened to him during his deep sleep (except the later refreshing feeling that he slept well) one can recall and relate the dream experiences. This is because in dream 'the instruments of the self are not altogether at rest'.³⁷ Although the organs that are responsible for receiving the presentations from the world have ceased to function, the internal organ (mind) will still be 'awake'. 'The self wanders about in dreams together with the mind only'.³⁸ But the mind in its function is intimately connected with sense organs: can it function in any condition altogether independently of the latter? If it cannot, how then, can we explain the role of mind in dream when senseorgan is active? It is in one's experience that in dream things appear to us exactly as in wakefulness: we see forms, hear sounds, move about, and talk. But all the events occur when the body is at rest. The explanation is that in dream, mind functions not in association with senses proper, but with the impressions got through them previously in the waking state.

The apparent objectivity and the presentational character of the dream is explained thus: 'Whatever has been seen, such as son, friend etc., the mind influenced

36. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.1.

37. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.3.40.

38. *Ibid.*,

by unconscious impressions, thinks from ignorance that it sees the son, friend etc., produced from such impressions'.³⁹ It is thus that we perceive the dream-world as real so long as we are dreaming; only on waking up, it is 'sublated'; looking back we regard it as mere illusion or vision, in contradistinction with the concrete reality of wakefulness. We fail to grasp the dreaminess of the dreams while dreaming, because the sources of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*), namely the senses, will not be functioning; mind, being only an auxiliary to the *pramāṇa* (senses),⁴⁰ cannot give us either the notion of reality or the notion of illusoriness independently. Because the impressions of the senses are there and function as *pramāṇas* by proxy, the notion of objectivity and reality emerges and persists until the senses wake up to resume their function.

Śaṁkara recognises the low integration and lack of critical faculty in dreams, and offers as illustrations the fantastic space-time frames peculiar to dream experience.⁴¹ Although, for instance, the duration of the dream is all too brief, the dreamer experiences his having travelled a hundred *yojanas*. The dreamer starts from the land of Kurus and arrives at the land of *Pāñcālas* (all the while being on his bed) where he wakes up; nobody, not even the dreamer, would assume for a moment that the sleeper in Kurus has really woke up in the *Pāñcālas*. Dream occurs always within the body; but we see in dreams huge mansions, an army

39. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5

40. *Bhedādhikāra* of Nṛsiṁhāśramī, p.13.

41. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.3.

of persons, cars, horses and so on. It is ludicrous to imagine that these presentations could be objectively located inside the body. The space, time and objects have not the same significance, meaning and relation in dreams as in wakefulness. What are impossible and absurd in the waking state are easy possibilities and sensible enough in dreams. The implication is that the dreamer's critical faculties are at a low level.

Kleitman observes: 'The highest cortical levels have as their function the correct analysis and interpretation of incoming impulses, to form new associations and to exert a certain inhibitory effect upon thought and action, as a result of previous experience or training. This censorship, or control over desires and fear, is absent, greatly reduced or distorted in sleep because the highest levels do not function in that state'.⁴² William McDougall observes in the same vein: 'in dreaming, we live in a plane of primitive credulity'.⁴³ Sigmund Freud holds that the ego is 'a coherent organisation of the mental processes'⁴⁴ and explains the bizzare, weird, and fanciful nature of dreams as attempts to escape the vigilance of the censor, the mechanism active in the waking state, finding for ego a place in the world (reality principle). Henri Bergson, among philosophers, appears to hold similar views but does not give expression to them clearly: 'We are, during all the waking hours, continually in a state of tension, arising from the process

42. Kleitman, *Op. cit.*, p.159.

43. *Outline of Abnormal Psychology*, 1934, p. 155.

44. *The Ego and the Id.*, 1935, p.15.

of adapting ourselves to our environment and so while we clearly perceive the outstanding things around us, we are blind to many others that penetrate our minds and leave their impress all unknown to our conscious selves. In sleep, unmarked impressions of this kind, now that the state of tension is no more, assume an equal importance with the conscious impressions and in the sequel our sense of proportion is quite lost'.⁴⁵ In the above context, we find sufficient justification for Śamkara's view that dreams are illusory (as opposed to the reality of wakefulness) and are marked by a lack of critical faculty, evidenced by fantastic space, time and object relationships.

Śamkara explains the substance of dreams as mere impressions or memory images. Explaining a *Bṛhadāraṇyaka* passage he writes: 'He (the dreamer) detaches a portion of the world (we experience in the waking state), that is tinged by the impressions of the present life . . . makes it inert or unconscious . . . and himself creates a dream-body composed of past impressions. . . This creation too is the consequence of his past work . . . consisting in the perception of sense-objects, the mind itself being modified in the form of diverse impressions of the latter. It is these modifications that then take the place of objects . . . with this his own lustre as object and revealing it (the mass of impressions of sense-objects) by his own light, that is, as the detached subject or witness possessing constant vision,

45. Restated in A.J.J. Ratcliff: *A History of Dreams*, Lond., 1932, pp. 104-105.

he dreams'.⁴⁶ What the real objects are for one who is awake, that the impressions are for the dreamer. Thus the dream is fundamentally of the nature of memory: all dreams are in other words reproductive. 'In dreams and remembrance we notice only things seen before'.⁴⁷ Only familiar things occur in dreams.

But Śaṁkara recognises a difference between memory (or recall) and dreams: the former is relatively a faithful reproduction, whereas in dreams the creative element predominates. By virtue of its being located in the *sandhyāsthāna* there is scope for creation.⁴⁸ Visions of the waking life are acts of immediate consciousness, solely dependent on the objects around, while sleep knows no objects at all and is not conscious of anything; in between these two is creation, bringing into existence something new out of the material that already exists. The self 'sees in dreams his own greatness, i.e., assumes diverse forms in the nature of subject and object'.⁴⁹ This assumption of diverse forms is not merely a 'reconstruction of experience', but creation

46. Op. cit., p.634-635 also: 'The modifications of the mind are a little of this world, i.e., are its impressions; the former detaching the latter- in other words, being transformed into the impressions of the chariots etc., and being stimulated by the individual's previous work, which is the cause of their perception, appear as the sense objects'. (Ibid., 4.3.10, p.637). 'In dreams, the perception is indistinct and produced (i.e., obscured) by the reminiscences of the waking state'. (Kāṭhabhāṣya, 6.5)

47. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.3.6.

48. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.1.

49. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

of new patterns (on the basis of impressions) 'by his own ability'.⁵⁰ Śaṁkara approvingly cites a passage from the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* (2.5.8) : 'He, the person who is awake in us while we are asleep, shapes one lovely thing after another'.⁵¹ For him the dreams are not mere reproductions but also creations. It is now well known that elaboration is an essential feature of dreams; and the psychoanalytical standpoint regarding dreams emphasises this feature: 'There is in dream activity nothing but transformation of previously formed mental processes The dream activity proper is a process more distant from waking mental life than even the most determined detractor of dream-activities would maintain. It is not merely more careless, incorrect, incomplete, forgetful and illogical than waking thought, but it is something that qualitatively is absolutely different from this, so that the two cannot be compared'.⁵² What for Freud is the latent content is to Śaṁkara the stock of impressions available for the dreamer; the manifest content is the actual dream experience, exhibiting markedly the process of creation (condensation, elaboration, displacement, symbolisation and so on). Carl Jung's definition of dream as 'the subliminal picture of the psychological condition of the individual in his waking state'⁵³ is also instructive in understanding Śaṁkara's view about creativity in dreams.

50. *Śataślokī*, v.77f.

51. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.3.

52. Jones, Ernst: *Papers on Psycho-analysis*, London, 1923, p.229.

53. Jung, C.G.: *Modern Man in Search of Soul*, Kegan Paul, 1933.

Is there a motivation in the dream phenomenon? Creation implies a creator who is a conscious agent and whose purpose the creation serves. The creator of the dreams is, of course, the self-in-the-dream-state (*taijasa*). Now, why does one dream? 'In the waking state one gets troubled owing to the manifold activities of the body and organs; he obtains some relief by discarding them in dreams'.⁵⁴ Waking life indeed demands actions by way of adjustments and adaptations; to satisfy the demands of life completely is impossible, and inadequacies and imperfections produce dissatisfaction; and dissatisfaction is a source of misery. Every organism instinctively tries to avoid misery⁵⁵ and obtain pleasure. And so the self attempts to obtain the pleasure by dreaming. The motivation in dream then is the gratification of desires or wish-fulfillment. 'One who does not desire does not dream', says an *Upaniṣad*, and Śamkara also.⁵⁶ Elsewhere, Śamkara asks with emphasis: 'How is dream possible without wish?'⁵⁷

But Śamkara recognises that wish is not the only motivational principle in dreams. He points out that many of our dreams are unpleasant (*aniṣṭam svapnam*) and says that the 'dreaming soul is not able to create from its mere wishes'.⁵⁸ As causative factors he points to the actions

54. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.3.15.

55. *Hastāmalaḥkīyabhāṣya*, (opening sentence)

56. *Gauḍapāḍakārikābhāṣya*, 1.5.

57. *Sarvavedāntasārasaṃgraha*, v.607.

58. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.6.

performed in the waking state (which are responsible for the impressions available for dream creation) as well as to the curtailment or obscurity of knowledge and power of the self (*jñāna-aiśvaryatirobhāva*) brought about by *avidyā* or ignorance (due to its connection with the body and organs). Also, dreams occur by necessity, prompted by the type of actions during wakefulness. Śaṁkara, thus recognises three factors operating in a dream: ignorance (*avidyā*), desire (*kāma*) and action (*karma*).⁵⁹

What then is the significance of a dream? Is it just a meaningless occurrence, unreal and absurd? Śaṁkara distinguishes between the indicator, *sūcaka*, (the actual dream picture, or the manifest content) and the indicated, *sūcyamāna*, (the latent content) and asserts that while the actual dream-forms are unreal (as they are sublated on waking), the thing indicated is real.⁶⁰ Dream, that is to say, is not a meaningless phenomenon, however fantastic its forms. Śaṁkara makes a reference to those 'who understand the science of dreams' and cites some of the symbols and their meaning, as interpreted by them.⁶¹

And the dream is not a mere illusion, having no effect on the bodily processes. Not only does the fact of experiencing it (*avagati*) persist on waking, but sometimes it has actual physiological consequences. Śaṁkara illustrates

59. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

60. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 3.2.7.

61. *Ibid.*, 3.2.4.

the point: 'The dreamer having intercoursed with an imaginary lady in his dream finds his bed wet'.⁶²

In the West there are conflicting opinions regarding dream motivation. Joseph Jastrow lays emphasis on the past sensory experiences; Knight Dunlop shifts the importance to physiological causes like sleeping in odd positions and sensory factors such as sound or smell that disturb sleep; H. L. Hollingworth and L. H. W. Horton regard dreams as misinterpretations of sensory impressions; F. Pierce thinks of dreams as carry-overs from the daily doings; A. Adler explains dreams as symbolic portrayal of unsolved problems; and for the Gestaltists dream is a way of satisfaction for the tension set up by an unfinished business during wakefulness. For Sigmund Freud dream is a wish-fulfillment; for Carl G. Jung a compensatory function of the unconscious (a psychological adjustment essential for balanced action); for W. H. R. Rivers dream is essentially reproductive (of strong emotions excited by repressed instinct, prominently fear); and for William McDougall dream exhibits some conative tendency.

62. *Prabodhasudhākara*, v. 102.

VI. THE MOTIVATIONAL PROBLEM

Purpose

Experience and observation show that only living beings 'act', i.e., think, perceive, and move.¹ Action, therefore implies life or consciousness. Action is not manifest in material, lifeless things like stones; but when we do see a stone move, we look for the cause of that action elsewhere — in something which is living and conscious, perhaps the man who threw the stone. 'For we observe that things like clay and chariots are engaged in activities tending towards some goal, only when they are acted upon by intelligent beings such as potters and horses'.² Thus although activity is seen *in* the inanimate things, it does not mean that they are aroused spontaneously; the *agency* and motivation for the act cannot be ascribed to lifeless and non-conscious things. 'We do not say that activity does not belong to the lifeless things in which it is observed; it does of course belong to them. But it results from some living and conscious principle, because activity exists when life is present and does not exist in its absence'.³

By the same logic, we see the physical body act, because some other *agent* with whom it is connected is prompting it. The action, no doubt, belongs to the body, but the motivation (*pravartakatva*) is due to the self whose

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1. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.6.3.
 2. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.2.
 3. *Ibid.*,

nature is consciousness. 'Unless they (the body and organs) are operated upon by a conscious principle, they cannot discharge their functions, such as respiration; as for instance, is the case with the wooden puppets'.⁴

'All activity is purposeful'.⁵ Śaṁkara illustrates : We see in the world activity such as the emergence of a house out of stone and wood and mortar and bricks: it is an orderly event which comes into being, not of its own accord, but to serve the 'purpose' of a human being endowed with consciousness.⁶ This is to say that all activity is *directed* by some purposeful, conscious being. The logic applies to the human body also. 'The functions of *vāyu* and the senses are observed to be performed by a combination of causes and effects. This interdependence for the sake of a common, objective is not possible without an independent conscious being'.⁷ What is now termed the total or the organismic response of the body, involving the organisation of different organs and their functions are due to the purposeful self directing the body and senses. Whenever thus consciousness is found there is also evident a purpose. A strange illustration is furnished by Śaṁkara:⁸ A man who desires eating a fruit sees it on top of a tree, which he climbs; but he slips and falls down. When we analyse this situation: Climbing up the tree is a voluntary act,

4. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 3.4.1.

5. '*Prayojanatvāt pravṛttinām*' : see *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.32.

6. *Kāthabhāṣya*, 5.5.

7. *Taittirīyabhāṣya*

8. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 5.10.6.

deliberated by the individual for the purpose of plucking the fruit; whereas the fall is involuntary, forced upon the organism against its will by an accidental circumstance. Śamkara speaks of the first act (climbing up) as associated with consciousness, but not so the latter (fall); while the former satisfies a desire, the latter is detrimental to safety. Thus an activity implies consciousness, and consciousness purpose, and purpose has in view the benefit and well-being of the organism.

The above illustration also emphasises that desire is necessary for a purposeful act. 'Desire is the cause of a man's activity'.⁹ 'It is under the influence of desire that he performs ... deeds'.¹⁰ 'He who desires to meet a human end has recourse to an action... as the means of getting at that end'.¹¹ Now what is desire and how does it cause action? Desire (*āśā*) is defined as longing 'for things not hitherto obtained'.¹² Elsewhere 'desire is concerning things to be acquired. . . . Desire consists of the two hankerings after the ends and means, visible or invisible'.¹³ In a similar vein, writes Knight Dunlop: 'Every ... desire is a desire of something which is not yet actual. You do not desire what you already have or are now experiencing; you desire only what you have not or are not yet experiencing. . . . The important or directive feature of desire therefore is the

9. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.4.16.

10. *Ibid.*, 4.4.5.

11. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 7.1.

12. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.14.1

13. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.4.17.

anticipatory thinking. Unless you think of something which is not yet, you do not desire it'.¹⁴ Desire is evidently a function of mind; the objective of the desire is also a mental phenomenon. When the desire is translated into action, the deliberation by mind is essential: 'The organs start and stop their work in accordance with the deliberations of the *manas*'.¹⁵ Purposeful activity, therefore, involves the mental apprehension of the objective as well as the means to achieve it; briefly both the end and the means of the action are preconceived in mind.¹⁶ Purpose thus implies desire and desire in its turn the goal-of-action already in mind.

Śāṁkara draws a distinction between knowledge and action in the following way. 'An action is independent of the nature of existing things, and dependent on the energy of the actor's mind ... Knowledge, on the other hand, is the result of the different instruments of cognition (like the senseorgans) and is conditioned by the nature of existing objects; knowledge can neither be "made" nor modified at will, but depends solely on things as they exist, and neither on Vedic authority nor on the mind of man'.¹⁷ The distinction drawn thus implies that the action is consequent on the deliberation of man, while knowledge is a receptive experience. Effort and volition are involved in action, and Śāṁkara's emphasis on 'freedom in action' reminds the student of modern psychology of McDougall's position,

14. C. Griffith : Principles of Systematic Psychology, 1943, p.602.

15. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 6.1.5.

16. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.1.4.

17. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.1.4.

which in the words of Edwin G. Boring 'reveals the fact that they involve some degree of indeterminateness of freedom.... Nor can there be any doubt that this element of freedom is exactly what McDougall wished to preserve as the distinguishing mark of mind'.¹⁸ Śamkara's argument that action is consequent upon desire presumes that in it there is scope for alteration of behaviour and for selection: it is 'dependent upon the processes of man's mind'. Śamkara has an interesting observation to make concerning the relationship between desire and action. He writes: 'Desire manifests itself as a longing for some object, and if not interrupted, it takes a more definite form and becomes a resolve. Resolve is determination, which is followed by action. *What is resolved*, consequent on desire, is *worked out* by the particular activity that is calculated to reach the objective resolved upon'.¹⁹

The action is intended to satisfy a felt need or desire: the action should, therefore, be appropriate and sufficient to bring about the desired effect. When, however, for any reason, the action does not succeed in accomplishing the goal, there is an affective involvement. Śamkara observes: 'When one fails to attain a desired object, he gets confused'.²⁰ Action being intended to 'obtain pleasure and avoid pain in future',²¹ failure to accomplish the

18. Boring, E.G.: A History of Experimental Psychology, Appleton-Century Co., 1929, p. 460.

19. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.4.5.

20. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 3.14.2.

21. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.1.11.

intended result causes pain; it is possible that such frustration results in anger.²²

The conception of organismic integration involving interdependence of parts is suggested by Śamkara as 'mutual helpfulness among parts'.²³ There is an interesting expression employed to signify the integrative principle: *dharma*, which is described as the 'honey' (*madhu*) of all beings;²⁴ just as different juices intermingle, lose their identity and result in honey giving a total, distinct and unified effect, even so the different parts and organs of a living being. Śamkara observes that in its general form this integrative principle directs the elements of which the body is composed and that in its special form it directs the complex of body and mind.²⁵

Instinct

There is no adequate equivalent in Sanskrit for the expression 'instinct'; nor is there a definite doctrine among Indian thinkers concerning this conception. Nevertheless occasionally we do come across references to, and suggestions of, the concept of instinct. Śamkara has some observations to make on this topic. He holds that man is fundamentally an animal,²⁶ but superior to other animals by virtue of the possession of higher intelligence. He

22. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 5.23.

23. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.5. Preface.

24. *Ibid.*, 2.5.11.

25. *Ibid.*

26. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.4.17.

writes: 'Man is most endowed with intelligence. He speaks what is known. . . . He knows what is to come. He sees the visible and the invisible worlds'.²⁷ But in matters of fundamental motivation, men and animals do not differ. Śaṁkara illustrates: Contrast for instance the behaviour of a cow when you approach it with an offer of fodder and its behaviour when you approach it flourishing before it a stick; similar, he says, is the contrast in man's behaviour when he sees 'hefty and ferocious fellows approaching him with shouts and brandishing swords' and his behaviour when he meets amiable, friendly folk. In one case, it is approach and in the other repulsion or withdrawal. The opening sentence of Śaṁkara's *Hastāmalakīya-bhāṣya* runs as follows: 'Every living being *instinctively* feels a desire for happiness and an aversion to unhappiness'. Desire means 'the experiencing of a sense-object which leads to pleasure or comfort'.²⁸ Aversion is its opposite: urge to escape from what threatens to involve the organism in misery or discomfort. The 'instinctive' act is not reasoned, argued or deliberated upon: 'It is well known', says Śaṁkara, 'that the behaviour of the animals is not reasoned or discriminated; men also proceed likewise'.²⁹ The instinctive act is determined by the very constitution of the organism (*sva-rasata eva*).

27. *Taittirīyabhāṣya*.

28. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 5.2.3.

29. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, Introduction.

Emotion

Regarding the problem of emotions, there are a few desultory observations in Śaṁkara's writings. 'Affection' (*abhiṣvaṅga*), he defines as 'a special form of attachment and its characteristic is identification in sharing joys and miseries of those whom we like'.³⁰ Śaṁkara distinguishes between desire (*kāma*) and attachment (*rāga*): the former is concerned with objects which are not yet actual while the latter is with reference to those that are already actual, i.e., in the form of objective presentations.³¹ He lays emphasis on what he calls the 'affective pair' — 'desire-aversion'. 'All living beings', he says, 'are susceptible to this pair'.³² The natural course of each sense is either attraction or repulsion: the former has pleasure before it while the latter pain. 'Desire, taking its rise, spreads its wings of attraction and urges man to act'.³³ Aversion causes the organism to move away. Pain, explains Śaṁkara, is due to 'non-attainment of some desired object';³⁴ and anger is consequent on the frustration arising from the blocking of some desire.³⁵ Another interesting observation of Śaṁkara is that, under the stress of some emotion 'one cannot know things as they truly are';³⁶ emotion interferes with the normal processes of perception and cognition.

30. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 13.9.

31. *Ibid.*, 7.11.

32. *Ibid.*, 7.27.

33. *Ibid.*, 3.37.

34. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.13.1.

35. *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, 3.37.

36. *Ibid.*, 7.27.

Memory

'As we find in life pieces of cloth dyed yellow, so in the experience of objects mind gets tinged with impressions: the man in this circumstance is said to be attached, even as the cloth is dyed'.³⁷ Śaṁkara speaks of memory (*smṛti*) as a 'property of the internal organ',³⁸ or as a function of mind,³⁹ consequent on original perception.⁴⁰ Man is engaged in perceptions and actions; but 'no attribute is ever seen to come or go without effecting a change in what is connected with it'.⁴¹ In other words, no experience, however slight, fails to leave its impress upon the organism. 'Impression is a kind of modification'⁴² of the mind and it is never completely effaced therefrom.⁴³ No experience is wholly lost; it is conserved in the form of impressions (*vāsanā*). This doctrine echoes Richard Semon's theory of mnemes.

But is this impression an exact reproduction of the objects or events experienced? 'The colouring varies sometimes according to the objects presented to the mind and sometimes according to the tendencies of the mind itself'.⁴⁴ Here is a line of distinction drawn between 'pure

37. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.3.6.

38. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.13.1.

39. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.4.12.

40. *Ibid.*, 2.2.25.

41. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 1.4.7.

42. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.30.

43. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 6.9.3.

44. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 2.3.6.

memory' (as in the case of recognition or *pratyabhijñā* where the mind passively ecphorises what is conserved) and what we now term images which 'are seldom exact copies of past experience' and which are 'creative rather than imitative'. Further, the impressions are not uniform: they are conditioned by the nature of the objective presentation as well as by the intensity of the experience;⁴⁵ some impressions are bright and some dull.

There is also a consideration as to how the reactivation of the impressions happens. 'That recognition occurs, the observing and remembering person being one, is well known to all . . . ; the person . . . is distinctly aware that it is the same person who yesterday had a certain sensation that today remembers that sensation'.⁴⁶ The first requisite in memory is the endurance of a mental state through two or more successive moments. It also implies that 'the mind grasps the similarity' of the two moments; the 'subject (is) able mentally to grasp the two similar things'. Śamkara challenges the *Vaiśiṣṭika* doctrine which maintains that there is no enduring subject to connect two experiences; when an experience similar to the one whose impressions are already in the mind occurs, it is the subject which actively *recognises* this similarity. Recognition is the foundation of memory.

The impressions left by an experience are said to be 'full of tendencies'⁴⁷ and therefore they 'participate in the

45. Ibid.

46. *Vedāntasūtrabhāṣya*, 2.2.25.

47. *Praśnabhāṣya*, 4.5.

initiation of fresh actions, and also in bringing past actions to fruition.... Without such impressions, action is impossible; and the results of past actions are not achieved'.⁴⁸ Revival of past experience as memory is necessary for actions to become more efficient, and thus memory occupies an important status in man's life. It is essential for continuous thought processes and symbolisms. The value of memory in communication has been well brought out by Śamkara in the following statement: 'When people assemble and start conversing they would hear no words, no, they would not even think, if they did not have memory, for one could think of an object only if he could remember it; both thought and cognition are impossible without memory'.⁴⁹

48. *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*, 4.4.2

49. *Chāndogyabhāṣya*, 7.13.2.

**THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
STANDPOINT OF ŚAMKARA**

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Vidyāṅkara

Prof. S. K. Ramachandra Rao

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STANDPOINT OF ŚAMKARA

Śamkara lived and wrote in an age when psychology as such was not the 'fashion-of-the-day'. What psychology we can get out of him, therefore, is interspersed with the metaphysics either as a simple and neutral accompaniment of, or as deliberately subservient to, the major philosophical issues. Nevertheless this need not discourage us in our inquiry as we know for certain that Śamkara was not the man to bow before dogma and authority merely for conformity's sake, and that he was not particularly afraid of being involved in self-contradictions. He has explicitly stated that he is not in favour of accepting the word of authority when it flagrantly runs counter to reason and experience.¹ And it is common knowledge that his system lacks strict consistency; he fights, vigorously against the idealistic approach when he criticizes the Buddhist system² while employing the very tool in defence of his own system elsewhere. He discards as untenable many of the notions of the *Śūnyavādins* and the *Vijñānavādins*, all the while hugging the same notions to his bosom when he launches on the exposition of his system. Involved in contradictions himself, he can afford to ridicule the contradictions in the Buddhist Philosophy, he can enjoy disclosing the *asambaddhapralāpita*, of the '*Sugata*'.³ I mention these two

1. *Gīta-bhāṣya*

2. *Śārīraka-bhāṣya* 2-2-29

3. *Ibid* 2-2-32

features of his writings, just to show that he was a very bold and original thinker. He spoke his thoughts outright, regardless of whether they sounded well in his bigger project. His was a temperament *streng wissenschaftlich* - his inconsistencies apart, of course. By virtue of this unbiased, inquisitive and original attitude along with a very vigorous and resourceful mind, he was able to sprinkle his writings with a variety of valuable psychological concepts.

In representing them here, I do not make pretence to any sort of systematic formulation. As far as I can see, Śaṁkara adhered to no particular system of psychology. There is a particular difficulty confronting us in dealing with Śaṁkara — more than any other figure in the history of Indian Philosophy and that is his constant change of front. Now he appears as markedly theistic, and before we can make sure of ourselves, that he is, he slips unseen into agnosticism; and no longer have we recognised him there, than we find him eloquently defending some sort of nihilism. This lack of allegiance to a definite system of thought stands in the way of our attempting any systematic formulation of his psychological position.

Therefore, I have found it unavoidable to present his psychological concepts in their original discreteness, although I hope that we might with patience and labour discover that they are not in so absolutely an unrelated isolation as they appear at first sight. This hope, nevertheless, might have led me unconsciously to select only such concepts as contribute a definite trend of thought —

might be to the trend of thought that I subscribe to, myself. But I am fully aware of the fact that this possible particular trend of thought is only one of many others which could, perhaps with equal justice, be inferred from his writings.

II

Śaṁkara refuses to believe in the reality of the world as ultimate. He believes, however, in the existence of the world with its manifold varieties of things and beings which we see — and doubtless which Śaṁkara also saw — in us and out of us. The essence of the world does not consist of the things that appear. Diversity is not the original and the essential nature of the world. Through all the infinitely diverse things run a string of one 'Sat' or the existing 'thing'; that is the ground of all further changes and the manifoldness of things. Thus Śaṁkara posits a single principle without a second which he claims to be in the ultimate analysis, the substance of every thing that appears. That really is, and the world as different from it only appears; it is *mithyā* or *asat* in contradiction to the 'Sat' or Brahman.

That one principle without a second, changeless, timeless and transcendent was all that existed before. Owing to the inexplicable force of *avidyā*, the world came to appear, right from the womb of Brahman as it were. Brahman is not merely the cause of the world but the stuff of it as well. Now Śaṁkara is a sort of an evolutionist; he has no faith in the dogma that the world came into being as it is to-day on one fine morning without a precedent

stage. He repeatedly points out that the world of to-day is a result of innumerable previous developments. Beginning from inanimate matter the world is an '*uttarottara māvistaratvaṃ ātmanah*'. That one principle ascends to higher and higher lives. '*Param param variyo viśiṣṭataram asya jīvanam bhavati*.'⁴ The *nāmarūpas* or the names-and-forms will ever be changing; the world of them is '*pratikṣaṇam-anyathāsvabhāvaḥ*', of a different nature every moment. The world now is not what it was a moment ago, and will not be so a moment hence. This restless changeability is its essential trait. But with the progress of the world of names and forms, the one-principle does not change.⁵ Without that one-principle no changes could there be, in fact nothing could exist. The particularised things, names and forms that are caused by this incessant change are borne by the things of the world, are *viśeṣās*. '*Sāmānyam viśeṣān ātmasvarūpapradānena bibharti*.'⁶ The effect in essence is not distinct from the cause; merely because particularised names and forms are seen, the stuff does not disappear or change. It is universal and enduring because it is the sole substance that really is. Vācaspati-Miśra explains the intent of Śaṅkara; : "*Yad asti tad asti eva, yathā cidātmā. Nahi asau kadācit, kvacit, kathamcidvasti; kintu sarvadā, sarvatra, sarvathā asti eva, na nāsti. Na caivam vikārajātam, tasya kadācit kathamcit*

4. Commentary on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* 1-9-2.

5. "*Yadā nāmarupe vyākriyete, tadā nāmarūpe ātmasvarūpā parityāgena eva brahmaṇā-pravibhakta-deśa-kāle, sarva-avasthasu vyākriyate*."

6. Commentary on *Bṛhadāranyaka Upaniṣad* 2-4-7.

kuṭracidavasthānam.”⁷ Śaṁkara likens the diverse world to the diverse branches of the tree, to the numberless waves of the ocean — just as the tree or the ocean is one only despite the numberless branches or the waves, even so the Brahman. Śaṁkara grants that “*ekatvaṁ nānātvaṁ cobhayaṁ api satyameva*”⁸ but the difference is in the transcendental (*pāramārthika*) and the empirical (*vyāvahārika*) standpoints.

Thus we find that the world, according to Śaṁkara, began from one Māhāsāmānya, some sort of universal undifferentiated homogeneity and is gradually becoming particularised in the course of its progression, into diffused heterogeneity. But the stuff has all the while remained constant and unchanged. And for the origin and the development of the world, the Brahman has full potentiality; it needs no external aid - ‘*anapekṣya bāhyam sādhanam svayaṁ eva pariṇamate.*’ The world therefore is in entirety one single stuff, despite the variegated names and forms and despite the fact of gradual progressive change.⁹ Matter and mind alike, life and non-life alike,

7. *Bhāmatī* 2-1-14.

8. *Śā. Bhā.* 2-1-14.

9. See also *Śā. Bhā.* 1-1-11.

(“*Yadyapi eka ātmā, sarvabhūteṣu sthāvarajaṅgameṣu gūḍhaḥ, tathāpi cittopādhiviśeṣātāratamyād ātmanaḥ kūṭastha-nityasya ekarūpasyāpi uttarottaram āviśkṛtasya tāratamyam aiśvarya-śaktiviśeṣaiḥ.* Also *Ibid.* 2-1-25. “*Tantunābhaśca svata eva tantūn sṛjati; balākā ca antareṇaiva śukraṁ garbhaṁ dhatte, padmini ca anapekṣya kiñcit prasthāna-sādhanam sarontarāt sarontaram pratiṣṭate. Even cetanam api Brahma anapekṣya bāhyam sādhanam svata eva jagat sṛkṣyati.*”

stone, plant, animal and man alike are all diverse forms of the same stuff, but in higher or lower rungs in one ladder of evolution “*Ekasyapi brahmaṇaḥ vicitraśaktiyogāt upapadyate vikāraprapancaḥ.*”

The nature of Brahman who is thus the root and essence of the world, according to Śamkara is pure consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya* or *prajñāna-ghana*). It is also termed *Svarūpa-jñāna*. The *Svarūpa* or ‘Nature’ of the Brahman in its original state, i.e., before the emergence of the world (in the *prāgavasthā*) is all knowledge containing the seed of the world which will be ‘*avyaktaśabdayogyam*’. The nature of pure consciousness becomes obscured in some sort of mysterious way, owing to the imposition of *upādhis* (or the physical structures). Hence Brahman is supposed to be of dual nature; the one which is particularised into names and forms, i.e., the one which is qualified by the *upādhis* and the other free from the different standpoints: the *vyāvahārika* (deduced from the *prātibhāsika*) or the empirical and *pāramārthika* or the transcendental.¹⁰ That the *svārūpa* of the Brahman becomes *tirohita* (obscured) is true only from the former view point. The world of manifold names and forms has any claim to existence only from this angle. The lake that appears in the desert is true only in so far as it is ‘seen’, in other words, the existence of the mirage is subjective. Just as the desert

10. Compare Nāgārjuna :

“*Dve satye samāśṛtya bauddhānām dharmadeśanā;
Lokasaṃvṛtisatyam ca satyam ca paramārthataḥ.*”

(Mādhyamika-kārikā 24-8)

— personifying it — will not be deluded by the false lake which appears in all reality to the thirsty traveller, even so the *svarūpa* of the Brahman will never be, obscured, objectively. We cannot press the analogy further. The traveller that is deluded by the *Avidyā* is distinct from the desert; but the *sopādhika-Brahman* which is deluded by the *avidyā* is not distinct from the *nirupādhika-Brahman* which is ever *prajñāna-ghana*.

Śaṁkara is not explicit on the point as to why the Brahman should be deluded at all — be it on the *vyāvahārika* plane.¹¹ He seems to think that the world process is one long act of self-awareness; the Brahman as it were 'desired' to know himself — and as soon as the desire is fulfilled the world would terminate itself as miraculously as it came into being. But the Brahman is repeatedly termed '*pūrṇa-kāma*' and '*Nitya-trṛpta*'. It is difficult to get over this contradiction.

But we are more concerned, in this discourse, in the *vyāvahārika* aspect of the Brahman. The Brahman, it was pointed above, gives stuff to all diverse things, or more strictly becomes '*Vivartta*' into all these diverse things. Individual beings come about, modified and evolved from the *mahāsāmānya*. The *Jīva* or the 'self' is one such individual being; we could call it more appropriately the living individual creature. Śaṁkara seems to think that even the inanimate pieces of matter possess 'selves'. We can conveniently leave that point out and confine ourselves to the 'living' selves.

11. *Gītā-bhāṣya* 18-50.

Dharmarājādhvarī's famous definition of *jīva* as the *Antaḥkaraṇāvaccinnam caitanyam*¹² along with the statement that “*sākṣito antaḥkaraṇopahitam caitanyam antaḥkaraṇasya viśeṣaṇatvopādhitvābhyām bhedaḥ*” brings out the essential trait of the *jīva* as possessing the ‘*antaḥkaraṇa*’. Now what is this *antaḥkaraṇa* or the ‘internal instrument?’ It is a physical thing like the eye, ear, skin or any of the five organs of sense; it is elemental in constitution. In this organ, ‘*tejas*’ is supposed to predominate and hence it is never at rest; its equipoise is very precarious, readily upset at the faintest stimulation. It is active all the time (except in deep sleep) assuming the form of whatever comes into its contact, streaming out into the object as it were. The forms thus assumed are technically termed ‘*vr̥ttis*’. This *antaḥkaraṇa* could roughly be called the ‘Mind’ – in its most general meaning. It is the principle that all living creatures possess, by means of which they cognise the external world, the environment, and respond to it in a fitting way. These *antaḥkaraṇas* or the ‘Physical’ minds tend to particularise and cut into bits — as many bits as there are *antaḥkaraṇas* — as the universal consciousness. We shall revert to this point later.

The other entity in the living organism — in all things for that matter — is known as the ‘*Sākṣi*’ or the witness. While the *antaḥkaraṇa* owes loyalty to the kingdom of *Māyā*, the *Sākṣi* belongs to Brahman and hence is of the

12. *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, Ch.1., cmp. Appayya-dīkṣita’s statement; *Antaḥkaraṇopādhānena jīvas sākṣi*, etc., (*Siddhāntaleśa*)

nature of pure consciousness. It is all psychical. Whereas the mind tries to particularise the *caitanya* into divergent bits and to keep each bit in absolute isolation from the 'total ocean of caitanya' the *Sākṣi* floods each bit with the *caitanya*. This is the principle of consciousness. Unlike the Mind which is the principle of action, this *Sākṣin* is a passive looker-on. There can be no experience, no activity without this awareness. All knowing implies this passive witness. It is the first and most fundamental 'act' of awareness, having nothing else at the back or base of it.

These two components — the active Mind and the passive Awareness unite in the formation of the empirical self.¹³ In the waking state, the Mind will be active to its maximum capacity; in the dream state also. But in deep sleep it will lapse, its *vṛttis* all wound-ed up. There will consequently be no 'I — feeling' and what could be the object of knowledge will return to its native home *avidyā*, no longer to be differentiated. In this state of *suṣupti* the *sākṣi* alone will there be, still passively witnessing, and coupled with it will be its own *avidyā*. Hence the particularised individuality will not vanish. The *avidyā* operates in sleep only partially. It obscures the true character of reality, but does not split it up into a variety of 'names' and 'forms' as in *vṛttis* of the internal organ, dreams or in waking, since the discontinuous and naturally

13. Vidyāraṇya says :

Caitanyam yadadhiṣṭhānam lingadehaśca yahḥ punaḥ;
Cicchāyā lingadehasthā, tat saṅgo jīva ucyaate.

(*Pañcadaśī*, 4-11).

excluding *vṛttis* of the internal organ are absent here.¹⁴ We cannot be aware of the external world, we cannot respond to the stimulation of the environment during the state of deep sleep and we cannot then experience either joy or sorrow, pleasure or pain because the *antaḥkaraṇa* will no longer be active. But when we wake up from the deep sleep, we are not different persons from what we were before we went to sleep, nor will we be unable to recall the happenings of our pre-sleep state; in short, we will remain for all practical purposes, quite the same individuals, the period of sleep however deep causing apparently at least no break in the continuity of our individual lives. This is because of the persistence of the individual *sākṣi* associated with its own *avidyā*. The *sākṣi*, however, is not the object of awareness, as it is the most primary process of awareness.

The state of deep sleep in the individual is comparable to the state of the world before it came 'out there' (*prāgavasthā*). In both of them the manifold things of divergent names and forms will cease to appear, that is, the sensation and the reception of the outer world will be suspended, we are no longer 'subjects' for the objective environment; the *caitanya* becomes '*svam apīta*' (gone to itself). Devadatta is no longer Devadatta; the '*āham-ullekha*' returns to him only when he wakes up and feels 'I slept well'.¹⁵ His individuality during *suṣupti*, merges in the universal. The *vṛtti-jñāna* is replaced by the *svarūpa-jñāna*.

14. M. Hiriyanna; *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*, 1932, p.348.

15. See Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā* (Kāśī Ed., 1891) Pp. 19-20.

The state of waking is not very different in nature from the state of dreaming. Śamkara briefly describes the three states;¹⁶ “*saṁprasādaśabdodita jīvo jāgaritavyavahāre dehendriyapañjarādhyakṣo bhūtvā, tadvāsanānirmitāśca svapnān nāḍīcaro rubhūya śrāntaṁ śaranam prepsuṁ ubhaya rūpād api śarīrābhimānāt samutthāya suṣupā vasthāyām param jyotir ākāśaśabditam param brahmopa saṁpadya viśeṣa vijñānatvaṁ ca parityajya svena rūpeṇ abhiniṣpadyate.*” The diversity of the individual selves are like the diverse things we see in dreams. Śamkara defines the dream thus: “*svapno nāma jāgraddarśanāt nivṛttasya jāgrad-vad-antaḥśarīre yad-darśanam*”;¹⁷ and more briefly elsewhere¹⁸ as ‘*jāgradvāsanodbūtaṁ*’. Dharmarājādharī in his *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* explains : — “*indriyajanya viśayagocarā parokṣāntaḥkaraṇavṛttiyavasthā svapnāvastha.*” And the same author defines the waking state thus; “*jāgraddaśā nāma indriyajanyajñānāvasthā.*” The position is pretty clear. For the waking state the sense organs are indispensable, for the knowledge which constitutes our ‘wakefulness’ is furnished by the sense organs. For the dream state the sense impressions thus formed in the waking state are essential. In one case the sensations influence directly, while in the other its influence is only indirect. In the waking state we perceive things out of our body; but in the dream inside of us — Śamkara adds, just as in the waking state; only the sense faculties like vision,

16. Śā. Bhā. 1.3.20.,

17. Comm. on *Praśna Up.* 3-6.

18. Coomm. on *Kaṭha Up.* 6-5.

audition etc. are 'withdrawn' (*samhṛta*) and all that is available is the fund of sense-impressions left by them. The mode of activity in both the states is much the same. Only in the dream the world we unwittingly construct and perceive is 'private' or personal to us whereas the world that we perceive in the waking life is 'collective' or public, as Professor Hirianna would say. If the dream-contents are unreal, the waking contents are no less; but the latter have the merit of being believed in by an unthinkably large number of individual selves. The *viṣaya-viṣayī* feature is present alike in both the states; the '*manasspandana*' or the psychic vibrations are the sole stuff of both.¹⁹

The object of knowledge in the waking-state is apparently different and distinct from the experiencing self; it is outer (the *bahir-prajñā*). In dream the knowledge is inner (the *antaḥ-prajñā*), and of the nature of '*tejas*' because of the self being the subject of purely nonexistent and 'imaginary' objects. The *jāgrat* is, therefore fairly objective (*viśva*) and the *svapna*-state is, '*taijasika*'. In the dreamless sleep, however, the mental-activity (*manovyāpāra*) will keep out of the stage, leaving the *prāṇātmā* to play the sole role. Here the type of knowledge, as was said above, is unqualified *prajñā*. Just as in the dense dark night nothing could be distinguished and nothing recognised, even so, says Śaṁkara, the 'solidified' *prajñā*. The 'this-' and 'that' consciousness will disappear; even the '*aham*' will fade away. The feelings of sorrow and fatigue which the mental

19. Ref. Comm. on *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* 1-4.

activity causes, will naturally be abolished in deep sleep (where no mind works) and will be replaced by 'ānanda' or joy. This term 'joy' is employed because, Śaṁkara says, it is commonly held that one is joyous when one does nothing that tires him.²⁰

We can conclude this rather unsystematic treatment of the three-states with a statement of Śaṁkara. "Manahpracāropādhiviśeṣasambandhāt Indriyārthān grhṇan tadviśeṣāpannaḥ jīvo jāgrati; tadvāsanāviśiṣṭaḥ svapnān paśyan manas-śabdavācyaḥ bhavati; sa upādhidvayoparame susuptāvasthāyaṁ upādhikṛtaviśeṣābhāvāt svātmani pralīna eva."²¹ This statement sums up briefly all the essential characteristics of the three states. One other point needs to be mentioned before we leave this topic. Although Śaṁkara tends to view both the waking and the dream-states as mere *kalpanas* he draws a distinction between them as regards the space and time.²² In the short duration of a single dream we might experience the happenings of several years; and remaining where we are we might experience the travel of hundreds of miles. In the waking state, obviously, these phenomena are altogether impossible of occurrence. Moreover as the dream occurs within our minds, the space within will not be enough to accommodate the diverse things we see in dreams like the car or the mountain or many different persons. The space and time

20. Ibid., 1-5; "Yathā loke nirāyāsaḥ sthitaḥ
saukhya-ānandabhugucyate."

21. Śā. Bhā. 1-1-9.

22. Ibid., 3-2-3.

in which the dream events occur, therefore, are of different order than those in which our waking-events occur. That the dream events 'are' real — at least as real as the waking events — is vouchsafed by the continuance of the awareness of dreamexperience even though the 'concrete' objects of experience vanish when dream gives way to wakefulness. Having a bite from the snake and bathing in the lake in dream as actions are declared unreal by us on waking; but the '*avagati*' or awareness of those actions are not declared unreal.²³ Hence the need to postulate an order of space-time for it also.

Let us return to the individual, empirical self. We said that the boundless consciousness (*caitanya*) becomes particularised, owing to the imposition of the *upādhis* (or material structure). How this individuation occurs is described by Madhusūdanasarasvatī;²⁴ "*Tena ajñā nādhyāsaḥ; tad viśiṣṭe caitanya ahaṁkāradhyāsaḥ; tad viśiṣṭe ca kāmasaṁkalpādinām ahaṁkāradharmāpām indriya dharmāpām ca kāṇatva-badhiratvādīnām adhyāsaḥ. Indriyāṇāmtu parokṣatvāt nāparokṣādhyāsa iti siddhāntaḥ. Tad viśiṣṭe tu sthūladehādhyāsaḥ, dharmapunaskaranaiva 'aham manuṣya' iti ākāraḥ - na tu svarūpato 'haṁ deha iti adhyāsaḥ, tathā pratītyabhāvāt; tadviśiṣṭe ca sthāulyādinām dehadharmāpām adhyasaḥ; tadviśiṣṭe bāhyānām putra bhāryānām sākalya — vaikalyādi — dharmādhyāsaḥ. Evaṁ caitanyasyāpi ahaṁkāraḍiṣu dehaparyānteṣu adhyāsaḥ saṁsargataḥ.*" The feeling 'I' or ego is superimposed upon

23. Ibid., 2-2-14.

24. *Siddhāntabindu*, pp. 24-25

the fundamental consciousness (or Self) as a result of its association with the primal ignorance (we shall not worry over the problem of primal ignorance here). The next step is the acquiring of the essential traits of the ego like wish, will etc. along with the traits of the particular sense-organs like sight (or its absence) etc. The author points out that the sense-organs are not directly superimposed upon the egoistical self (for no one would identify himself with a particular sense-organ). What actually happens is that the self acquires the body which in its turn possesses the sense-organs, to put it crudely. Hence a man feels "I am a man." The *dharmin* or the possessor of the attributes of the ego is made prominent here. The immediate acquisition thereof is the bodily features, like fatness : later arise contacts with a variety of physical and social objects. This completes the make-up of the individual self.

Thus we find that the two sorts of structures which particularise the infinite *caitanya* into individual selves are Mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) on the one hand and body on the other; both of which belong to the category of the object-of-consciousness (*viśaya*) and are made up of inert matter. But the self which is the possessor-of-attributes (the *dharmin*) is the subject or the *viśayin*; and it is of the nature of consciousness.²⁵ The mind and body alike are material; as the sense organs are, deriving as they do, their stuff from the elemental forces. The difference between mind on the one hand and body, and sense-organs on the other lies

25. "Cīṭ-svabhāva ātmā viśayī, jaḍasvabhāva buddhindriyadeha viśayā viśayāḥ" (*Bhāmatī*).

apparently in the 'fluidity or the streamy nature (ever flowing out and ever active) of the former and the relative rigidity of the latter. We can introspect i.e., the *jīva* can be the object of its own awareness, because of the presence of this mind where *tejas* predominates. The mind and body belong to or is superimposed upon, the self; but the self does not belong to, or is not superimposed upon the mind-body; for as Vācaspati says, "*Iha tu paramārthasataḥ cidātmano' nyat na dehādyasti vastu sat.*" The self in Śamkara's words, is the 'lord of the body and controller of the vital streams.' The body sees, hears and knows, not of its own accord but owing to the presence of the *cetana*.²⁶

The self differs from 'its' material structures as light does from darkness. But the popular fallacy of identifying the two or mistaking one for the other expressed in such judgments as 'I am stout,' 'I am deaf' etc., is due to the fact of superimposition, described at length above by Madhusūdana. Śamkara makes reference to this '*naisargikalokavyavahāra*' at the very commencement of his *sārīraka bhāṣya* and explains it as due to false-knowledge and the mixing-up of the true and the untrue. That the self is not the body could easily be proved from the fact that it remains constant and unaffected by the changes in the body. The child of to-day in course of time becomes a boy and later a youth and later still an old man; but does the self go on changing likewise? If you happen to lose a leg;

26. Śā. bhā. 1-2-19.

does your 'I' lose a part of it self ? If a healthy man turns sick, does his 'I' which accompanied his health cease giving room for the sick 'I' ? The constancy, persistence or continuity of the self in the face of all changes in its material structures is enough proof to show the '*pr̥thakṭva*' of the self-although, in reality all that exists is *ātma* and nothing besides "*anātmā ātmabhinno, nāsty eva*", as *Prakāśānanda* would say.²⁷

What exactly is the self according to Śaṁkara? At one place²⁸ he defines it as "*sarve pratyayā viṣayī-bhavanti yasya sa*" — that for which every thing else becomes the object. Earlier in the same place, he describes it as "*sarvāntaratamaṁ kūṭasthaṁ*" — the innermost entity in all things and transcendental. Elsewhere he describes it as '*aham pratyayaviṣaya*' — that which could be said to be the 'I'. Its nature is brought about by such descriptions as '*Kartṛtva-bhokṛtva-viśiṣṭa jīvaḥ*' and '*manomayādi pancakośaviśiṣṭaḥ*'. Explaining the multiplicity of the empirical selves, Vacaspati says: '*avidyopādhibhedādḥīno jīvabhedo*'. We could roughly say that the self is the cosmic principle conditioned by the material structures (*upādhis*) which are products of the *vikṣepa* - aspect of *Māyā* (the unity of the cosmic principle being obscured by the *āvaraṇa*

27. *Siddhāntamuktāvali* (Ed. A. Venis, 1890) p.65 :
 "Svayamjyotiḥ svabhāva ānandaghano sangodāsīna eva ātmā
 anādyanirvacanīyāvidyā sambhbandhāt dvaitakāreṇa bhāti
 rajjuriva sarpadaṇḍadyātmanā, paramārthatastu na dvaitam
 ātmaiva kevalo vijñānaghana iti siddham."

28. Comm. on *Kena Up.* 2-4.

aspect). If the *upādhi* breaks, then automatically limitation of the Brahman fails. Individual selves are there solely because there are *upādhis* to 'fractionise' the Brahman.

The self has two phases; one in its own right and the other in relation to the surrounding world of names and forms. The former is the '*svarūpa*'; i.e., the self as such. *Vijñānabhikṣu* calls it '*Sāmānya*', to emphasise its universal persistent and transcendental nature. It is Brahman, the all-consciousness — only gripped by *Māyā*. Śamkara speaks of the '*upādhikṛtasvarūpa-tirobhāva*'; we can get a taste of this phase in our deep, dreamless sleep, when the physical and the mental apparatus cease influencing it. The other phase is the '*sambandhirūpa*'²⁹ — the phase we are ordinarily acquainted with. This is mostly of the nature of the stimulus-response and the relational patterns. It is this phase that puts us in direct contact with the outer environment. It is this *sambandhirūpa* that we refer to whenever we speak of a man as *brāhmaṇa* or *kṣatriya*, boy or youth, healthy or sick, father or son etc. The same *sambandhirūpa*-self might retain a variety of *sambandhas* in respect to various environmental situations, one is a father to his son, but a son to his father; he might be a brother, a son-in-law, a high-class *brāhmaṇa*, a very good or wicked man and so on. Apart from the environmental relations this phase of self has no meaning; it is determined entirely by objects of the outer world. And it is rooted in the *svarūpa*-self.

29. Śā. bhā. 2-2-17.

Now only the self has 'purpose' of its own (*svārtha*), while the lifeless matter is only a means to some other purpose *parārtha*. The self acts as a directive agent (*prerayitā*) and where ever we find regularity, constructive adaptation and any activity for that matter, we can safely infer the presence of self. Śamkara recognised that it is absurd to say that an activity does not belong to where it appears; the organic activities reside in the organic structures; but they are not spontaneous. The objects appear self-revealing because of the self-revealing nature of the self.³⁰ Śamkara further recognises that the *cetana* cannot 'act' in isolation (*Nanu cetanasyāpi pravṛtṭiḥ kevalasya na drṣṭā*); but remarks that just like the magnet without moving itself causes the movement of the iron-filings and just like the objects like form without activity in themselves set the eye, etc., into activity, even so the self which is all consciousness sets all things into diverse activities.³¹ The behaviour is in the individual self. Because all behaviour springs from the 'will' of the non-material and free self, behaviour moves towards some 'end'. The purpose that this behaviour 'of' the life less matter exhibits, however, is not its own; it is the purpose of the self. The very fact that matter is organised into a body reveals the purpose-of the other,³² which its behaviour subserves. By behaviour, Śamkara seems to mean, organised activity for a single end (*ekārthavṛttitvena samhananam*), i.e. the diverse

30. See Prakāśātman's *Pancapādikavivarāṇa*, p.52.

31. Ref. *Śā. Bhā.* 2-2-2.

32. Comm. on *Kena Up.* 1-1-1.

elements that enter into the organisation do not seek diverse ends severally, but all seek a common end together. All living beings are '*viśiṣṭakāryābhimukhapravṛttayaḥ*' (purposive) because of the vital-activities (*prāṇaceṣṭa*) of the self.

Śamkara does not deny the self to any living organism;³³ he recognises self wherever activity is seen. And living organisms, according to him, have gradually been evolved from inert matter. All that exists (the Brahman) should either be the subject of consciousness (*pramāṭṛcaitanya*) or mode of consciousness (*vṛtticaitanya*) or object of consciousness (*viśaya caitanya*). The original stuff of all these varieties is the pure-consciousness (*śuddhacaitanya*). All the world, therefore, is of one stuff. On the transcendental level, the pure, consciousness remains as such. On the empirical level, however, it becomes '*vivarta*' or '*paricchinna*' into this world of names and forms — without, of course losing its identity. All things — including man and other living creatures — are fundamentally this pure-consciousness. The differences that appear are due to differences in the *upādhis* or the physical and physiological structures, which obscure the original nature, piling up layers upon layers of acquired equipment.

The fundamental principle in man, — confining our attention to man — therefore, is the cosmic principle, the

33. Cmp. his statement : "*yatra rasaḥ tatra cittam anumīyate; yatra cittam tatra rasasaṁcalanādinā jīvaśadbhāva anumīyate.*"

principle that is at the back of all things in the world. Possessed of the human structure it is termed the *self*: (*jīva*); it has three sorts of structures, the mind, the body and the sense-organs — all equally material and elemental. Mind flows out and assumes the form of the objects of consciousness and hence results what is termed *vṛttijñāna*. The organism establishes contact with the outer world by means of the *vṛttis*. This aspect is relational (*Sambhandhirūpa*) and is conditioned by the environment. We are aware of our original nature, i.e., the pure cosmic consciousness, only at times such as in deep-sleep when contact with the environment is barred and the mental activities are abolished. This awareness is *swarūpajñāna*. Śamkara regards the dreams as solely arising out of the impressions, left in the waking state. They are as real — or rather as unreal as the experiences in wakefulness, only wakefulness is *īśvara-sṛṣṭa* while dream is *jīva-sṛṣṭa*. World is a dream on a large scale.

All organisation is goal-directed; all the activities of the organism are propelled by some purpose. The purpose — toward which the physical and the physiological frame of the organism moves is not its own, but of the 'conscious', self. The world is teleological — its purpose being the *ātmāvagati* of the pure conscious; the organismic processes are no less. Behaviour belongs to the body and it is indeed of the body; but the purpose which prompts that behaviour (or the center that releases the response) belongs to the selfThese are some of the main trends of the Śamkara school of psychological thought, so to say.

**Psychological Speculations
of
ŚAMKARA**

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Vidyāṅkārā

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PSYCHOLOGICAL SPECULATIONS OF ŚAṂKARA¹

Mind's mysteries have always cast a spell on man's curiosity. In India, this urge was intensified by the recognition of the desirability of controlling mental processes in order to achieve a spiritual state of perfect equipoise. But this religious incentive did in no way jeopardise dispassionate inquiry. Thus there is in India a consistent growth of psychological thought from the Vedic times through the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools and Buddhism down to the neo-logistic schools of comparatively recent times. Śaṁkara, one of the most eminent intellectuals of all time, marks a significant stage in this growth, as he synthesises the orthodox and the heterodox views and weaves a composite fabric, typically representative of the ideology of the Indian mind, before or since.

Śaṁkara (788-820 A. D.) was born in a brahmin family of a southern village in India; he turned a recluse at a tender age of eight, lived as a wandering preacher, and died at the early age of thirty-two. He wrote polemics that were intended as commentaries to the ancient lore of Vedānta, but which revolutionised the entire intellectual development of India. His intellectual eminence has never since been forgotten: a vigorous and original thinker as he was, his ideas have acted as stimuli for doctrines and counter-doctrines, schools and rival schools; they are contended, defended, demolished, rejuvenated. He was one of the few single individual forces that have contributed enormously to the intellectual life of a nation.

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He was by profession a philosopher; his philosophical standpoint was an extreme and uncompromising form of monistic idealism (*advaita*), which affirms the existence of the One Principle “without a second” — which alone and only exists: all else is mere appearance. But it was his genius to recognise that this appearance is not hackneyed; there obtains an order — an order all its own. At an age which was predominantly devout, his boldness it was that minimised the role of Godhead in this worldly drama. Doubtless it was a bit bafflingly paradoxical in his system and a vulnerable point eagerly exploited by unsympathetic philosophers; but as we can see today it is the most noncommittal and the only proper viewpoint to hold in inquiries of this sort. He envisaged the difficulty himself by developing a “transformation hypothesis” (*vivarttavāda*) asserting that the Absolute did not create the universe but was transformed into the universe; the implications were that :

- a) the universe develops spontaneously by its own pull and push;
- b) the development is a consistent successive progression or evolution (*āroha*);
- c) the mode of progression is by differentiation (*aneka*). “We must assume,” he wrote, “that the world was evolved at the beginning of the creation in the same way as it is seen at present to develop ... for we have no right to make assumptions contrary to what is actually observed at present.”²

Life and non-life, according to him, are just two stages of the same process.

The organism is defined as a material aggregate endowed with life; consciousness (*caitanya*) is the essential attribute of all life — it is the earliest of functions, gives unity to diverse experiences, and endures throughout life. Living beings are three-fold: *udbhijja* (fissiparous), root-sprung; *aṇḍaja* (oviparous), egg-born; and *jarāyuja* (viviparous), life-born. The last two are characterised by wide locomotion, and the first more or less stationary. The former, further, has “self” whereas the latter not. Śaṁkara holds that the “self” entered into the universe, which is “a metaphorical way of saying that it is perceived in its midst.” Self makes itself more and more manifest through evolution. Brahman or Self is the greatest universal (*sarvasāmānya*) while everything else is some differentiation thereof (*viśeṣa*). The evolutionary continuum is maintained by “a stream of work and impressions of innumerable beings in combination”³ the self experiences and consequently undergoes modification.

Body, holds Śaṁkara, is the locus of experience, senses the means, but the real experience is the self. “The self is of the nature of consciousness, lord of body and bearer of the senses.”⁴ Body is just a material aggregate, it is a machine. In it are located sense organs (*indriya-sthāna*), each having a sense function (*indriya-vritti*). Function is only capacity to perceive their respective objects, such as eye

3. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-bhāṣya*, 1.5.2

4. *Ved. sū.bhā.*, 1.1.6

form, ear sound, skin touch, nose smell. A sense organ is a gate, as it were, allowing the function to flow out or object to enter in. We obtain this table:

	<i>Sense function</i>	<i>Sense organ</i>	<i>Sense object</i>	<i>constitution</i>
Sensory				
1.	Audition	Ear	Sound	air element
2.	Tactual	Skin	Touch	ether
3.	Gustatory	Tongue	Taste	water
4.	Olfactory	Nose	Smell	earth
5.	Visual	Eye	Form	fire(energy)
Motor				
6.	Speech	Mouth	.	ether
7.	Prehension	Hands	.	air
8.	Locomotion	Feet	.	fire (energy)
9.	Evacuation	Excretory-organs	.	water
10.	Procreation	Sex-organs	.	earth

Senses are thus selective agents for differentiating what was, before the emergence of sense, *en masse* experience. But the unity of experience is maintained by a central sense, namely mind (*manas*). "The senses function when grasped by mind".⁵ In fact, they are just instruments (*karaṇas*) for mind to operate; but mind is directed by the intellect (*buddhi*) - and these two together constitute the "internal organ" (*antaḥkāraṇa*). Senses mediate between this internal organ and the external object; thus they are termed the "doors of experience" (*upalabdhi-dvāra*), points of contact between the individual and environment. Senses

function only in the "present", i.e., when objects are present and in the immediate field of perception; and, further, such objects only that are capable of being sensed, are perceived. Śāṁkara compares them to a lamp which illumines the object and makes it visible (which was hitherto in darkness).

"Senses cannot function but for the control." This controlling factor is the Internal Organ. Its contact with the world is only indirect. The constitution of this Organ is subtle but material. Śāṁkara recognises that mind must be postulated because of the insufficiency of the senses to explain perception: it is only mind, in the sense of attentivity, that can render the sensation meaningful by "attending" to it. Senses *select*, but mind *perceives*. But mind is not passive though, it actively "flows out" and assumes the form of the object perceived (*vṛtti*). The distinction, then, between sensation and perception is evidence of mind. Unlike sensation, perception is an organismic function and therefore mind cannot be localised. It is common to all the senses and no object is beyond it; in other words, what is mental is only operational. Mind, therefore, perceives whatever object of the world through the instrumentality of different senses each of which is sensitive to a particular phase of the phenomenal world. Śāṁkara speaks of the "separate use of the one mind along with each sense"⁶ Mind in this sense is "superior" to the senses by virtue of its indispensability in all cognition: it

6. *Bhagavadgīta.*, 15.9

is termed “*āyatana*” or substratum of experience. Mind is superior also because, unlike the senses, it can function in the past (remember) and in the future (anticipate) as in the present (perceive), and further, in the absence of any external object even (imagine).

Mind is defined as “that by which one thinks” and thinking implies “a power of reflection by which it (*mind*) urges the sense organ towards its appropriate object.”⁷ Śamkara gives a list of the “modes of the activity of mind”:⁸ consciousness (*samjñāna*); direction (*ājñāna*); knowledge (*viññāna*); wisdom (*prajñāna*); retentivity (*medhā*); perception (*dṛṣṭi*); perseverance (*dhṛti*); thought (*mati*); imagination (*manīṣā*); distress (*jūti*); recollection (*smṛti*); notion (*samkalpa*); application of action (*kratu*); self preservation (*asu*); desire (*kāma*) and sex love (*vaśa*); and also⁹ doubt (*vicikitsā*); faith (*śraddhā*); shame (*hrīh*); fear (*bhaya*) and intelligence (*dhīh*). These are designated “forms” of mind.

Subtler and more internal than mind is the Intellect (*buddhi*). “The Intellect is transparent and next to the self: it easily catches the reflection of the consciousness of the self. Next comes mind, which catches the reflection of the Self through the intellect; then come the organs of sense through contact with the mind; and lastly the body through the organs.”¹⁰ It is directed by Self and in turn it directs

7. *Chāndogya-bhā.*, 3.18. 1 and 7.3.1

8. *Aitareya-bhā.*, 5.2

9. *Bṛh.-bhā.*, 1.15.4

10. *Ibid.*, 4.3.7

mind. Just as sense organs are doors to the mind, mind is a door to the Intellect. In the Kāthopaniṣad body is compared with the chariot, sense with horses, objects with the path on which the horses move, Intellect with the driver, mind the reins in his hands and self is the master of the chariot. Śamkara has imported the Sāṅkhya view of the Intellect as the ascertainment (*adhyavasaya*). The Intellect discriminates, and determines the object; it illumines and equips the perception with awareness (*pramāṭṛ-caitanya*). It also generates egoity (*ahamkāra*). Thus the function of the Intellect is to offer a frame of reference to all experience.

Next comes Self — the most interesting topic for an Indian thinker. Śamkara had to combat a popular school of epicurean materialists who denied the existence of Self, or equated Self with the body, and fight against the prevalent skeptical school of Buddhism, which sidetracked the whole issue. He found, therefore, good reason to assimilate the incontrovertible doctrines of the rival schools and to propound the orthodox view on this basis. He examines in detail the claims of the body, of the senses, of mind and of the Intellect, to wholly explain experience, and arrives at an insufficiency; to make good the defect, he postulates Self. Without the presence of Self no function is possible: it is indeed the real experiencer — “the function of the experiencer is to grasp the appropriate object that has approached.” It “rules over the body and sustains the vital forces.” By Self Śamkara understands a being’s own nature.¹¹ He takes particular pains to show that the ordinary

11. *Ved.-sū.-bhā.*, 1.1.6

ego designated as "I" is not the real Self; ego merely refers to something beyond itself and this something that is referred to is the Self. 'I', referring to the ego and "this", referring to the world are both mere concepts or notions (*pratyaya*). Ego is the function of the internal instruments; when, for instance, in sleep the internal instruments cease to function, the egoity is lost. Thus it is termed *jīva*, or individual self conditioned by the internal instruments, mind and Intellect, whereas the Ātman or Self is "absolute and pure", described as the passive witness of all the processes.

Self is the inner principle of consciousness (*samvid*) or experience (*upalabdhi*) - a homogeneous and unbroken consciousness. It is described as "light". It is the one principle that endures all the states of mind and body and gives unity to the being. On the empirical plane its relation with the Intellect, mind, senses and body is both intimate and inevitable. Introspection as a means of knowing this Self, Śamkara dismisses on the count that all knowledge implies subject-object duality and a certain outgoing tendency.

The individual Self has three states — wakefulness, sleep and dream. So long as the objects of the outer world are perceived as conditioned by the limiting adjuncts such as mind, Intellect and senses, the being is awake. On the cessation of the sense-function and in the absence of outer objects, mind only functions on the basis of the impressions of the waking state, and this is termed dream. When even

this ceases, the individual is said to have “gone to himself” or be asleep (*suṣupti*). It is interesting to note that, for Śamkara, these three states are regular periodical recurrences, perfectly natural and inevitable. Dream is not a sub-state of sleep, for sleep is always described as deep and dreamless. In the waking state there is the “expansion of Intellect”, whereas in sleep there is practically the complete cessation of the Intellect : dream is the mid-state (*sandhyā-sthāna*). Sleep, says Śamkara, is the most natural state’,¹² and the other two states are but modifications thereof. “That is not the real state which is dependent on extraneous conditions”. The consciousness in sleep will be whole and partless, it is a mass of consciousness (*prajñāna-ghana*). Dream is essentially creative, it is a reconstruction of mental impressions. “In the waking state a man gets impurities (or knots) due, to commingling of innumerable activities of the body and organs; he gets a little joy by discarding them in dreams”. Dream is wish-fulfilment, for “one who does not desire does not dream”;¹³ it, thus, comprises of three components — ignorance, desire, action.

Śamkara admits that all activity is purposeful (*prayojanatvāt pravṛttinām*), for action is contingent on desire and consciousness; and when one fails to achieve what he wants, he gets confused. An instinctive act is

12. *Taittirīya-bhā.*, 2.163

13. *Gauḍapāda-kārika-bhā.*, 1.5

determined by the constitution of the organism itself (*svarasata eva*); it is not reasoned or discriminated.

Under emotions Śamkara recognises empathy, desire or anticipatory thinking and attachment (or dually aversion): he emphasises that the pleasure-pain pair is the major motive of all action. Regarding memory, consequent on perceiving objects mind becomes "coloured", for the objects experienced tend to leave their impressions (*vāsana*) on the mind, and no impression ever gets lost; these impressions can be revoked (more creatively than imitatively, however) under particular conditions. The colors may vary according to the objects or according to mental tendencies;¹⁴ some impressions are bright and others dull. Śamkara observes that these impressions are indispensable for all action to be done and any result of past experience to be achieved.¹⁵

Thus Śamkara, notwithstanding the antiquity in which he lived, has many interesting psychological speculations to his credit which admit of being knit into a consistent and comprehensive theory of psychological phenomena.

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14. *Bṛh-bhā.*, 2.3.6

15. *Ibid.*, 4.4.2